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Abstract 
This thesis will examine the portrayal and reception of ‘novel’ technology 
as constructed spectacle in the military and popular coverage of the Abyssinian 
(1868) and Ashanti (1873-4) expeditions. It will be argued that new and ‘novel’ 
military technologies, such as the machine gun, Hale rocket, cartridge rifle, 
breach-loading cannon, telegraph, railway, and steam tractor, were made to 
serve symbolic roles in a technophile discourse that cast African expansion 
as part of a conquest of the natural world.  
There was a growing confidence in mid-Victorian Britain of the Empire’s 
dominant position in the world, focused particularly on technological 
development and embodied in exhibition culture. During the 1860s and ‘70s, 
this confidence was increasingly extended to the prospect of expansion into 
Africa, which involved a substantial development of the ‘idea’ of Africa in the 
British imagination. The public engagement with these two campaigns provides 
a window into this developing culture of imperial confidence in Britain, as well as 
the shifting and contested ideas of race, climate, and martial prowess.  
The expeditions also prompted significant changes to understandings of 
‘small wars’, a concept incorporating several important pillars of Victorian 
culture. It will be demonstrated that discourses of technological superiority and 
scientific violence were generated in response to anxieties of the perceived 
dangers posed by the African interior. Accounts of the expeditions 
demonstrated a strong hope, desire to claim, and tendency to interpret that 
novel European technology could tame and subjugate the African climate, as 
well as African populations. 
This study contributes to debates over the popularity of imperialism in 
Victorian society. It ties the popularity of empire to the social history of 
technology, and argues that the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions enhanced 
perceptions of military capability and technological superiority in the Victorian 
imagination. The efficacy of European technology is not dismissed, but 
approached as a proximate cause of a shift in culture, termed ‘the 
technologisation of imperial rhetoric’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to extend special thanks to Jeremy Black, my doctoral 
supervisor and professional mentor, for his endless support and for always 
reminding me to keep my eye on the next step. I would also like to thank 
Richard Noakes, my second supervisor, for his insight and perspective.  
My thanks as well go to Edward Spiers and Martin Thomas for serving as 
my examiners, for making my defence an enjoyable conversation, and for their 
constructive comments. 
Also, Audra Diptee. Suzanne Klausen, and Melissa Horne at Carleton 
University, and David Trotman, Suzanne Langlois, Tom Cohen, and Marcus 
Funck at York University. 
This thesis would not have become what it is without a multitude of 
challenging suggestions, helpful ideas, inspired amendments, and outright 
criticisms from those kind enough to lend their eyes and ears. I would like to 
particularly thank Ciro Paoletti, Donna Drucker, Hannah Dick, the anonymous 
article reviewers at The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History and 
Vulcan, and my PhD colleagues at the University of Exeter. My sincere thanks 
go to the organisers and attendees of a long list of conferences, particularly at 
the International Committee for the History of Technology, the Technological 
University of Darmstadt, and the University of London Institute of Historical 
Research, for their expressions of much-needed enthusiasm. 
I would like to thank the University of Exeter and the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada for their crucial, generous, and very 
much appreciated support, and my parents for the same reason. 
I would like to thank the archivists and staff at the UK National Archives 
and the British Library in general and Jenny Lea at the University of Exeter 
Department of History in particular. 
In addition to my aunts, uncles, and cousins, I would like to thank my 
grandparents, Walter and Marilyn Patterson and Clay and Rita Kingsbury. 
I would not be what I am without my partner, Tara. Thank you for keeping me 
going. 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Jane and Roy; for their 
inexhaustible patience, support, encouragement, and what I can only imagine 
was blind faith; and to my brother, Kevin, who was not here to see it completed 
but always called me ‘Professor’ anyway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter Title Page 
 Title Page 1 
 Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
2 
3 
 Table of Contents 4 
   
 Introduction 6 
 0.1 A Transitional Period 9 
 0.2 Terminology 13 
 0.3 Campaign Narratives 18 
 0.4 Geography, Medicine, and Africa 21 
 0.5 Exploration and Explorers 
0.6 Empire and Public Opinion 
0.7 Source Material and Public Opinion 
0.8 Stereotyped Representations 
0.9 ‘Novelty’, Innovation, and Determinism 
0.10 Technology and Empire 
0.11 Amalgamated Campaign Analysis 
0.12 Conclusions 
25 
27 
29 
37 
39 
43 
47 
50 
   
1. Imperialism, Prestige, and the Public Sphere 
1.1 Imperialism and the British Press 
1.2 Military Engagement with the Public Sphere 
1.3 Prestige and the World Stage 
1.4 Foreign Media Reception of Abyssinia 
51 
51 
60 
71 
78 
 1.5 Exhibitions and Public Spectacles 82 
 1.6 Conclusions 87 
   
2. Novel Military Technology and the British Army 88 
 2.1 The Professional Military Debate on Mitrailleurs 88 
           2.1.1 Mitrailleur Show Business 93 
           2.1.2 Fosbery 96 
           2.1.3 Royal Artillery Special Committee on Mitrailleurs 98 
           2.1.4 Nachahmung – The imitation of an example 
          2.1.5 Fletcher 
          2.1.6 Henry Brackenbury 
          2.1.7 Wolseley 
          2.1.8 Rogers 
          2.1.9 Callwell 
2.2 Other Novel Technologies in the Imperial Sphere 
2.3 Military Traditionalism and ‘Resistance’ to Technology 
2.4 The Imperial Military Sphere 
2.5 Images of the Imperial Soldier 
2.6 Conclusions: Officer and a Gentleman and a Scholar 
 
101 
103 
104 
106 
107 
111 
112 
116 
124 
128 
133 
3. The British ‘Idea’ of Africa the Enemy 137 
 3.1 The Land 139 
           3.1.1 There Be Dragons 148 
           3.1.2 Allied Opposition 155 
           3.1.3 Sporting Pursuits 157 
           3.1.4 Elephants on Parade 
3.2 The People 
          3.2.1 Home Field Advantages 
          3.2.2 The West Indian Background to British Racial Environmentalism 
          3.2.3 The ‘Vigorous’ Race in Abyssinia and Ashanti 
3.3 Redressing the Imbalance 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
 
 
161 
163 
171 
174 
180 
182 
188 
5 
 
 
 
4. A Reassuring Presence 189 
 4.1 A Sphere of Civilisation 
          4.1.1 Health Nuts 
          4.1.2 A Sense of Industry in Africa 
          4.1.3 Novel Technology and a Sphere of Civilisation 
          4.1.4 Railway and Traction Engines 
          4.1.5 Artificial Light 
190 
190 
193 
195 
196 
204 
 4.2 Competition Between Spheres 
          4.2.1 Criteria of Superiority 
          4.2.2 Presumptions of Inadequacy 
          4.2.3 Only as Good as His Tools 
          4.2.4 The Mitrailleur and the Border 
206 
208 
217 
221 
227 
 4.3 Conclusions 231 
   
5. A Fearsome Presence 233 
 5.1 Presumption of Terror 234 
 5.2 Mutual Misunderstanding 240 
 5.3 The Men Who Would be King 246 
 5.4 ‘The collection of machinery excites far deeper interest than anything else 
exhibited’.   
5.5 Exhibition and Performance of Technology in Abyssinia and Ashanti 
          5.5.1 Abyssinia 
          5.5.2 Ashanti 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
249 
 
252 
253 
262 
274 
6. The ‘Idea’ of Africa and a Growing Culture of Confidence 
6.1 Minimisation of the Land 
          6.1.1 Health in Abyssinia 
          6.1.2 Health in Ashanti 
          6.1.3 Good News from Ashanti 
          6.1.4 A Path Already Travelled 
          6.1.5 Tropical Medicine and the Culture of Confidence 
6.2 Vindicated Arms 
          6.2.1 Foot In the Door 
          6.2.2 Foregone Conclusions 
6.3 Minimisation of the People 
          6.3.1 Previous Beliefs of African Dominance 
          6.3.2 In Victory, Contempt 
          6.3.3 West African Allies 
          6.3.4 West Indian Regiments 
          6.3.5 Hausa Armed Police 
6.4 Reconsidered Options 
6.5 Context Insensitivity 
6.6 Conclusions 
276 
277 
279 
284 
287 
290 
295 
297 
301 
306 
310 
311 
314 
316 
319 
326 
328 
330 
336 
   
7. Thesis Conclusion 338 
8. 
9. 
Appendixes  
Bibliography 
344 
345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
Introduction 
The later Victorian experience and popular understanding of conflict on 
the African continent was embodied in the term and ideal ‘small wars’. 
Variations of the term had been in use since the mid-eighteenth century to 
cover a range of irregular or small-unit activities, particularly those involving 
reconnaissance, raids, and ambushes.1 To the late-Victorians, it had morphed 
to refer to any contest between a ‘modern’ industrial army and a technologically 
inferior and numerically superior enemy, thus reflecting a comparative 
assessment of belligerent forces. Colonel C. E. Callwell sought to systematise 
the study and practice of ‘little wars’ in his 1896 Small Wars: Their Principles 
and Practice, defining the term as including, ‘all campaigns other than those 
where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the 
expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers’.2 
His work was a late codification of the ‘school’ of small wars theorists and 
practitioners that had become established over the preceding thirty years.3 
Looking back on decades of imperial conflicts across the globe, Callwell divided 
them into three classes, ‘campaigns of conquest or annexation, campaigns for 
the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of 
                                                       
1 Roger Beaumont, ‘Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions’, Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 541 (Sep., 1995), p. 21; Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Counterinsurgency 
or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and the study of “small wars”’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Vol. 25, no. 5-6 (2014) pp. 883-4. 
2 Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [1896]) p. 21.  
3 Daniel Whittingham, ‘“Savage Warfare”: C. E. Callwell, the roots of counter-insurgency, and 
the nineteenth century context’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 23, nos. 4-5 (2012) p. 592; 
Captain C. E. Callwell, ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have 
been Employed since the Year 1865,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 31 (1887) 
pp. 357-412. 
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conquered or annexed territory, and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an 
insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy’.4  
This was the sort of fighting with which the mid-to-late nineteenth-century 
British army was primarily engaged, the Crimean War (1853-6) being the 
notable exception. It was also an important component of the frame through 
which Victorian society came to view its relationship with the non-Western world 
and Africa in particular, one entwined with trade forts, missionary posts, and 
creeping settlement. As Whittingham stated, ‘the British Army, in the nineteenth 
century as in the twentieth, was a small wars army’.5 The term was not 
synonymous with imperialism, nor was it exclusive to ventures into Africa. Yet, 
this particular form of conflict was absolutely central to the Victorian expansion 
and maintenance of empire. At a conceptual level, the ‘idea’ of small wars 
incorporated both the struggle for, and the moral justification for, imperial 
conquest. It became inseparable from the image of the Scramble for Africa. 
There was a long history of what might be termed ‘peripheral’ conflict 
throughout the British Empire. The period of 1868-75 was, however, somewhat 
of a turning point both in the practical realisation and popular understanding of 
what small wars could be for Britain. 
In 1868, an Anglo-Indian Army force under Lieutenant-General Sir 
Robert Napier invaded the East African Kingdom of Abyssinia to rescue several 
missionaries and British government representatives taken hostage by King 
Theodore (Tewodros II). In fewer than six months, Napier’s army marched 
inland across hundreds of miles of mountainous terrain, defeated Theodore’s 
army in two significant battles, and burned his capital of Magdala. The hostages 
                                                       
4 Callwell, Small Wars, p. 25. 
5 Whittingham, Savage Warfare, p. 591. 
8 
 
were rescued, Theodore committed suicide, and only two of Napier’s soldiers 
were killed.  
In late 1873, a British Army force under Major-General Sir Garnet 
Wolseley launched a punitive expedition against the West African Ashanti 
Empire. The Ashanti King (Asantehene) Karikari had invaded the British Gold 
Coast Protectorate and taken several European missionaries hostage. In fewer 
than six months, Wolseley’s army and allied Fante soldiers marched inland 
through thickly forested terrain, defeated the Ashanti army in several significant 
battles, and burned their capital of Kumasi. The hostages were freed, Karikari 
was forced to sign a harsh treaty, and only fourteen of Wolseley’s soldiers were 
killed in action. 
These were Britain’s first successful major forays into the African interior, 
and turning points in the imperial project.6 Taken together, these two successful 
expeditions set an ideal model in the popular memory which future ventures 
were expected to follow. They thus exerted a disproportionately large influence 
on British imperial culture. This thesis will examine the portrayal and reception 
of military technology as constructed spectacle in the popular coverage of the 
Abyssinian (1868) and Ashanti (1873-4) expeditions. It will be argued that new 
and ‘novel’ military technologies, such as the machine gun, Hale rocket, 
cartridge rifle, breach-loading cannon, telegraph, railway, and steam 
tractor, were made to serve symbolic roles in a technophile discourse that cast 
African expansion as part of a looming final conquest of the natural world.  
There was a growing confidence in mid-Victorian Britain in the Empire’s 
dominant position in the world, focused particularly on technological 
                                                       
6 This is a strong statement, particularly since ‘successful’, ‘major’, and ‘interior’ are historically 
mutable in the African context. While rooted in practical developments, this is primarily a 
statement of the ways in which the conflicts were perceived, interpreted, and remembered. 
Much of the forthcoming thesis will work toward clarifying and justifying this very statement. 
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development and embodied in exhibition culture. During the 1860s and ‘70s, 
this confidence was increasingly extended to the prospect of expansion into 
Africa. This involved a substantial development of the ‘idea’ of Africa and the 
British place in relation to it. The public engagement with these two campaigns 
provides a window into this developing culture of imperial confidence in Britain, 
as well as the shifting and contested ideas of race, climate, and martial 
prowess. 
0.1 A Transitional Period 
G. A. Henty, special correspondent to the Standard, opened his account 
of the Abyssinian expedition with the claim that, ‘since the expedition of Pizarro 
and Cortes in the middle ages, no such novel and hazardous expedition is on 
record’.7 Benjamin Disraeli similarly told the House of Commons that, ‘it 
resembles more than any other event in history…the advance of Cortez into 
Mexico’.8 Their choice of analogy illustrated the widespread view of the African 
interior as a new and unknown land. Until this period, indeed until the 
campaigns in question, British influence was limited to the edges and far south 
of the continent, and even those footholds sometimes seemed tenuous and 
imperilled.9 There was considerable interest in the interior. Explorers such as 
Bruce, Salt, Burton, Speke, Grant, Livingstone, Barth, Baker, and Reade had 
shown that it could be penetrated, at least by small groups.10 The writings of 
                                                       
7 G. A. Henty, The March to Magdala (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1868) p. 1. 
8 HC Deb 27 Apr. 1868, vol. 191 col. 1338. 
9 Andrew Porter, ‘Introduction,’ in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The 
Nineteenth Century, eds. Andrew Porter and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) p. 14. 
10 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars (London: Allen Lane, 1973) pp. 163-4; Charles T. 
Beke, The British Captives in Abyssinia, 2nd ed. (London: Longman's, Green, Reader, and 
Dyer, 1867) p. xvii. 
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these explorers were in fact consulted, excerpted, and summarised for the War 
Office’s expedition plans.11 
The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) and speculative business 
associations funded expeditions to map river routes toward the centre. Major 
James Augustus Grant, formerly Speke’s partner on the expedition to discover 
the source of the Nile, went on to serve as the head of Napier’s pioneering party 
in Abyssinia. At least one officer referred to him as ‘the Nile man’.12 Thomas 
Bowdich had established political and commercial relations with the Ashanti in 
1817 and Charles Beke with Abyssinia in 1840.13 These had been the exploits 
of great explorers, however, and their paths had not been successfully followed 
by any substantial groups of Europeans. In 1868, Britain had no effective 
presence in Abyssinia and, as McIntyre claimed of the Gold Coast, ‘British 
sovereignty was confined to the plots of land on which the forts were built’.14 
McCaskie was thus correct to describe the Ashanti expedition as the ‘first 
serious British military venture into the tropical African interior’.15  
Harcourt argued that the Abyssinian expedition, ‘constituted a decisive 
                                                       
11 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), WO 107/8, ‘Routes in Abyssinia, 1867’, Prepared by 
the Quartermaster General, Bombay Army, August 1867; W. T. Blanford, Observations on the 
Geology and Zoology of Abyssinia, made during the Progress of the British Expedition to that 
Country in 1867-68 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1870) p. 151; John Camden Hotten, ed., 
Abyssinia and its People; Or, Life in the Land of Prester John (London: John Camden Hotten, 
1868); Lieut -Col Anthony C. Cooke, ed., Routes in Abyssinia (London: Harrison and Sons, 
1867) p. 1, 6; ‘The Medical Officers and the Late War’, The Lancet, Vol. 103, no. 2641 (11 Apr. 
1874) p. 521. 
12 ‘A Staff Officer’ [Lieut. W. W. Scott], Letters from Abyssinia during the Campaign of 1868 ([n. 
pub.]: [n.p.], [1868?]) p. 6. 
13 T. Edward Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, with a Statistical Account 
of that Kingdom and Geographical Notices of Other Parts of the Interior of Africa (London: John 
Murray, 1819); Charles T. Beke, Abyssinia: A Statement of Facts Relative to the Transactions 
between the Writer and the Late British Political Mission to the Court of Shoa (London: James 
Madden, 1845). 
14 W. D. McIntyre, ‘British Policy in West Africa: The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4,’ The 
Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1962) p. 20. 
15 T. C. McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters: Britain and Africa in the Nineteenth Century,’ in The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, eds. Andrew Porter 
and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 676. 
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break with the past’, and inaugurated, ‘a new phase of imperialism’.16 Beckett 
similarly claimed that the Ashanti conflict, ‘has been seen as a significant 
episode in the shifting dynamics of British policy towards West Africa in 
particular and towards empire and the projection of military power in general’.17 
This newly aggressive stance toward Africa would become characteristic of the 
‘scramble’ and mark the British presence in many parts of the continent until at 
least the Great War. 
Greenhalgh has found that many historians roughly follow Sir John 
Seeley’s delineation of three phases in the development of the empire: the 
‘mercantile’ phase up to the 1830s, the ‘anti-imperial’ phase up to the early 
1870s, and the ‘new imperial’ phase from the early 1870s onward. Porter 
likewise described a ‘happier period’ of British foreign policy coming to an end in 
1875, followed by ‘a new era of competitive imperialism’.18 Disraeli’s 1872 
Crystal Palace speech to the National Union of Conservative Associations is 
usually pointed to as a convenient starting point for this new, aggressive, phase 
of imperialism, in which he established the Tory party’s position on empire and 
his desire that England, ‘will be a great country, - an imperial country’.19 
In his work on the British image of Africa, Curtin broadly described the 
period from 1850 to 1880 as transitional from an era of humanitarianism to one 
of imperialism. He claimed that British popular and political interest in West 
Africa reached its nadir in about 1865, and then rose gradually and with an 
                                                       
16 Freda Harcourt, ‘Disraeli's Imperialism, 1866-1868: A Question of Timing,’ The Historical 
Journal 23, no. 1 (1980) pp. 88-9. 
17 Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., Wolseley and Ashanti: The Asante War Journal and Correspondence 
of Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley 1873-1874 (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: The History 
Press for the Army Records Society, 2009) p. 2. 
18 Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995, 3rd ed. 
(London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996) p. 73. 
19 Paul Greenhalgh, Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and 
World's Fairs, 1851-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) p. 57; Thomas 
Edward Kebbel, ed., Selected Speeches of the Late Earl of Beaconsfield, Vol. 2 (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1882) p. 534. 
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imperial bent.20 In Geography Militant, Driver characterised Henry Morton 
Stanley’s career as a bridge between ‘the golden age of African exploration 
(c.1851-78) and the era of the scramble (c.1884-91)’.21 Stanley’s work as a 
special correspondent in both Abyssinia and Ashanti thus lay firmly within the 
age of exploration, a telling indication that these expeditions were of a 
transitional nature. MacKenzie surveyed a period beginning in the 1880s in his 
seminal work on imperial culture, Propaganda and Empire. He found that most 
historians dealing with popular imperialism and militarism in Britain concentrate 
on the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, ‘when such manifestations are 
most apparent’.22 While MacKenzie extended this range forward to the 1960s, 
this thesis will move in the other direction and shed light on an earlier period 
when British cultures of popular imperialism and militarism underwent 
reinvention. 
William Gladstone took office as Prime Minister in December 1868, just 
after the Abyssinian expedition had ended, and left office in February 1874, 
mid-way through the Ashanti campaign.23 The campaigns thus fit 
chronologically on either side of Edward T. Cardwell’s tenure as Secretary of 
State for War in the Gladstone cabinet. Cardwell undertook a comprehensive 
reform of the administration and organisation of the army, known collectively as 
the ‘Cardwell Reforms’, establishing the parameters within which it would 
operate until the end of the nineteenth-century.24 With Gladstone’s support, 
                                                       
20 Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964) p. xiii. 
21 Felix Driver, Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001) p. 125. 
22 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 
1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) p. 9. 
23 Philip D. Curtin, Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 29-30; Howard Bailes, ‘Patterns of 
Thought in the Late Victorian Army,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 4, no. 1 (1981) p. 19.  
24 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992) p. 2. 
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Cardwell abolished the purchase of officer commissions, introduced short 
service enlistment and the reserve system, and centralised power in the War 
Office. Bond asserted that these developments constituted a ‘watershed in the 
nineteenth century history of the British Army’.25 Cardwell also began the 
practice of holding military manoeuvres on Dartmoor to test and practice tactics 
under field conditions. The manoeuvres were held annually from 1871 until 
1875, after which they ceased for reasons of cost.26 The autumn manoeuvres 
are of particular interest for several reasons. They proved to be immensely 
popular and attracted large crowds of spectators just as the public appetite for 
imperialism was gaining momentum. Furthermore, they were couched in the 
principles of rational analysis and practical tests that, while never widely popular 
in the military, brought increasing numbers of officers to lectures at the Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI), where matters of military technology and small 
war doctrine were often debated. The Ashanti expedition was, in fact, 
interpreted by many as a large-scale field-test of the Cardwell reforms.27 
Britain’s transition into the imperial era was aided, perhaps even 
precipitated, by key technological developments. Curtin argued that a 
performance gap between European and non-European armies had begun to 
appear in the middle of the century.28 Headrick noted that many of the 
innovations which proved useful in the Scramble, ‘first had an impact in the two 
decades from 1860 to 1880…Europeans who set out to conquer new lands in 
1880 had far more power over nature and over the people they encountered 
                                                       
25 Brian Bond, ‘Editor's Introduction,’ in Victorian Military Campaigns, ed. Brian Bond (London: 
Hutchinson & Co, 1967) p. 14. 
26 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, p. 22. 
27 Sir Robert Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office (London: John Murray, 1904) p. 224; Sir 
Frederick Maurice and Sir George Arthur, The Life of Lord Wolseley (London: William 
Heinemann ltd., 1924) p. 74. 
28 Philip D. Curtin, The World & the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas 
Response in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 27.  
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than their predecessors twenty years earlier had’.29 Porch further reasoned that, 
during these decades, Europeans ‘mastered the final constraint when 
organizational ability allied with technology combined to give them a potentially 
decisive advantage’, citing Abyssinia and Ashanti as the two benchmarks in the 
realisation of that process.30 It was in Abyssinia and Ashanti that the extent of 
British technological superiority, which would come to characterise small wars, 
was first successfully demonstrated and widely perceived. 
0.2 Terminology 
Both conflicts will be predominantly referred to as ‘expeditions’, rather 
than as ‘wars’, throughout this study. This term has been chosen for 
consistency with historical commentators, and also better reflects the dominant 
understanding of the conflicts in Victorian culture. By contemporary standards, 
these were expeditions in that they were short, accomplished without territorial 
conquest, and intended to serve demonstrative functions. As the coming 
chapters will explore, they were also cast in the public imagination as akin to 
hunting, exploration, and scientific expeditions. 
Though the expeditionary forces will be referred to alternately as the 
‘army’ and ‘military’, both campaigns also included Naval Brigades. This was a 
generic term defining any body of seamen or Royal Marines landed for active 
service under the orders of an Army commander. Naval Brigades were not 
equivalent to Army Brigades, nor were they consistent from case to case. 
Numbers and compositions varied widely in different circumstances.31 
                                                       
29 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the 
Nineteenth Century (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) p. 205. 
30 Callwell, Small Wars, p. xi; Douglas Porch, Wars of Empire, ed. John Keegan (London: 
Cassell & Co, 2000) p. 108. 
31 Arthur Bleby, The Victorian Naval Brigades (Dunbeath, Scotland: Whittles Publishing, 2006) 
p. vi. 
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‘Abyssinia’ will be used, rather than ‘Ethiopia’, as some modern authors 
prefer, as this was the title used by Europeans of the time. Gondar was the 
traditional capital of the old feudal Christian state. After Theodore’s push for 
unification, in which he reasserted the central power of his throne over 
Abyssinia, the Emperor based his capital at Dabra Tabor in the northwest. 
Faced with the threat of a British invasion, he burned Dabra Tabor in October 
1867 and marched his entire army to the mountain fortress of Magdala. At the 
time of the invasion, therefore, Magdala could reasonably be considered the 
capital of Abyssinia, or at least Theodore’s capital.32 The use of some titles and 
terminology in this thesis at odds with modern preferred forms (or, in cases 
such as ‘King Coffee’, with reality) are justified on the premise that such 
language was integral to the primary object of investigation, the discourses of 
British imperialism. 
At surface level, the term ‘Victorian’ refers to the temporal span of the 
reign of a particular monarch. It also applies more widely to the continuities of 
certain cultural signifiers associated with that time period, and thus 
characterises a particular image of a culture. Some historians have questioned 
the legitimacy of the concept, which might be asked of any periodisation 
arrangement. In response, Hewitt argued that: 
the Victorian period should be thought of as a set of complex 
conjunctures that defy any simple typology or literary representation, in 
which changes can be comprehended as the working through or 
consolidation of lines of development established at its outset. It thus 
becomes possible to argue that the years roughly coinciding with 
Victoria’s reign offer a periodization ‘adequate’ to the age.33 
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In this thesis, ‘Victorian’ will be used to refer to the British population and British 
culture, synonymous at various points with either one. Focused on the years 
1868-74, the present study does not necessarily apply to the whole Victorian 
era. Indeed, particular attention will be paid to the shifts (developments, 
perhaps) that occurred within Victorian culture. It nonetheless remains a useful 
conceptual shorthand.  
In the late 1950s, Brian Bond pioneered the study of the Victorian army, 
linking the history of Victorian Britain to the history of empire.34 Since the 
introduction of the Studies in Imperialism series in the mid-1980s, the social and 
cultural aspects of empire have received the bulk of scholarly attention, though 
the army itself comparatively less. As Miller claimed, ‘historians traditionally see 
the military as simply an arm of the civil power, an institution that did not think 
for itself’.35  
In its most common interpretation, ‘imperialism’ is understood as a 
projection of power, either of force or some other form of influence. While soft 
power and cultural components are important to the study of imperialism, in all 
cases these exist alongside the presence, or threat, of force. Headrick thus 
defined it as, ‘when a powerful state uses force or the threat of force to impose 
its will on a weaker society, especially when the weaker society belongs to 
another culture’.36 There are many older imperial histories, which might be 
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described as ‘traditional’, that focus almost exclusively on hard power 
components.37  
Over the past three decades, the social and cultural aspects of 
imperialism have become inseparable from scholarly discussions of the 
extension of power, a reflection of the wider cultural turn in military history. 
Drawing from MacKenzie’s work, Ryan encapsulated his conception of 
imperialism as, ‘a pervasive and persistent set of cultural attitudes toward the 
rest of the world informed to varying degrees by militarism, patriotism, a belief in 
racial superiority and loyalty to a ‘civilizing mission’.38 Imperialism, then, refers 
not only to the use of hard power but also to the discourses through which the 
imperial nation fashions, extends, and maintains an empire.  
‘Discourse’ itself can be defined along a contested scale from structures 
of linguistic systems to written or verbal communication. In truth, the word will 
be employed in different connotations throughout this study. Ryan justified the 
analysis of past discourses, ‘as it allows a variety of historically situated 
practices, concepts and institutions often considered separately – from hunting 
to mountaineering or from the Colonial Office to the Boy Scout Movement – to 
be discussed critically in relation to each other’.39 It is in the interplay between 
multifarious discourses that a culture emerges from the ideas, values, and 
social habits from which a people derive their sense of identity and purpose.40 
Renda superbly defined ‘culture’ as: 
the sum total – at any given time – of a collection of overlapping but not 
coincident discourses and fragments of discourses. These discourses 
(and discursive fragments) are produced, engaged, and negotiated by a 
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community of sorts, an overlapping but not coincident collection of 
groups and individuals who understand themselves to be connected to 
one another by their membership in a community and who use the name 
of that community to describe themselves. There is always some 
movement and flux in the sum total of these discourses, but there is also 
always some overlap, generally in such a manner as to overdetermine 
certain ideas, meanings, and images.41 
 
‘Imperial culture’, critically, is neither strictly civilian nor solely military, but 
pervades and connects both. As such, it does not provide a strong causal factor 
for military historians. Porter has argued against a ‘cultural determinist’ 
approach to strategic thinking, whereby historical actors are assumed to be 
prisoners to their cultural norms. Culture is powerful, he claimed, but it is also 
malleable, and ‘culture does not always drive decisionmakers; decisionmakers 
often exploit culture’.42 He therefore defined culture in the strategic context as, 
‘an ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas that can be selected, 
instrumentalised, and manipulated, instead of a clear script for action. Within 
this process strategy is made’ (original emphasis).43 
0.3 Campaign Narratives 
Much of Hayden White’s concept of ‘emplotment’ in historical writing can 
also be applied to the more immediate genre of journalism.44 In seeking to 
make their retelling of an event intelligible and interesting, an eyewitness 
subsumes their observations (a selection of them, rather) under a basic plot 
structure, thereby creating a ‘story’ out of a series of memories. Spurr employed 
this logic in his analysis of the rhetorical features of colonial discourse through 
the imperial and postcolonial eras. Journalism and travel writing, he argued, 
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have a metaphoric as well as metonymic relation to historical actuality and thus 
depend on the use of rhetorical procedures.45 
Having examined such rhetoric in much of his own work, MacKenzie 
claimed in 1992 that, ‘we still await a full analysis of the British press and 
imperial attitudes, not least in relation to colonial warfare’.46 Several historians 
answered this call. Stearn’s 1987 thesis had already addressed some of the 
Victorian images of war.47 Manning deftly analysed press coverage of the 
Anglo-Zulu war.48 Koivunen, Ryan, and Maxwell unpacked the visual 
representations of empire and colonised people in illustrated books, 
newspapers, slideshows, and exhibition displays.49 
Stafford surveyed exploration literature as a culturally powerful crossing 
of scientific and literary conventions, characteristic of the Saidian ‘structures of 
feeling’ that were a major component of Britain’s will to expand and rule.50 In 
Ornamentalism, Cannadine similarly set out to consider the British Empire as a 
set of social perceptions.51 He argued that, from the middle of the nineteenth 
century to the middle of the twentieth, the British both intellectually 
comprehended and physically created their imperial sociality in an essentially 
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ornamental mode, ‘and the phrase that best describes this remarkable 
transoceanic construct of substance and sentiment is imperialism as 
ornamentalism’.52  
This thesis will demonstrate that military technology was employed to an 
ornamental purpose in Abyssinia and Ashanti. A certain technophile impulse 
pervaded how the expeditions were conceived, but also how they were actually 
performed. A set of presupposed colonial discourses on Africa were reflected in 
actions, as well as words. A central claim of this thesis is that the conduct of 
small wars in the field reflected the sense of performance that characterised the 
media reproductions and narratives of those events in the home country. This 
thesis will bring the lens of imperial performance to the British army in pre-
Scramble Africa. Particular attention will be paid to presentations of technology 
to Africans, to be explored in depth in Chapters 4-6, as windows into the impact 
that the British desired to have, the anxieties they were attempting to overcome, 
and the spin with which they chose to recount events. 
In Geography Militant, Driver focused on the representational motifs 
tacitly present in the British construction of Africa. These ideas, he claimed, ‘are 
best conceived of as dynamic, rather than inert: they have to be constructed 
and re-enacted in order to live on’.53 Cultural creations thus present a challenge 
to the historian; they exist but are rarely declared and, while generally robust, 
cease to exist if not re-enacted. In Language and Power, Fairclough examined 
the hidden ideologies present in discourse, arguing that: 
invisibility is achieved when ideologies are brought to discourse not as 
explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which 
on the one hand lead the text producer to “textualize” the world in a 
                                                       
52 Ibid., p. 122. 
53 Driver, Geography Militant, p. 201. 
21 
 
particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter to interpret the 
text in a particular way.54 
  
Since discourses and the texts that occur within them all have histories, all texts 
rely on historically linked sets of presuppositions. Fairclough posited that, 
‘presuppositions are not properties of texts, they are an aspect of text 
producers’ interpretations of intertextual context’.55 The study of presupposed 
images, therefore, can reveal much about the historical context with which the 
producers of the texts engaged. Discourse analysis need not lose the link to 
past events, as discourses are shaped by past events. 
 It is therefore argued that the presence of discourse momentum, the 
cumulative nature of discourses across source materials, can be meaningful 
evidence in itself. The repetition of particular discursive tropes across numerous 
contemporary sources can suggest that the ideas embedded in those tropes 
had become forgone conclusions to historical commentators. This is the 
rationale and justification for a degree of evidence repetition throughout this 
thesis, seeking to examine British imperial culture ‘in depth’. 
0.4 Geography, Medicine, and Africa 
The present analysis of the Abyssinian and Ashanti campaigns will tease 
out several such presupposed images, some of which have been touched upon 
in previous works. Glacken’s Traces on the Rhodian Shore was a foundational 
study of the relationship of human culture to the natural environment over the 
longue durée. He argued that themes of ‘environmental influence’ and ‘man as 
a geographical agent’ are recurring ones in human cultures, tracing them to the 
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modern study of ‘the geography of man’.56 Glacken and MacKenzie noted that 
the concept of ‘nature’ has been used to signify both physical environments and 
also less matter-of-fact philosophical dimensions.57 Curtin’s The Image of Africa 
and Cairns’ Prelude to Imperialism were both significant studies into the self-
referential nature of British attitudes toward Africa, and African nature in 
particular.58 Koivunen recently analysed how the distorted and stereotyped 
visual images of Africa were actually constructed. She traced the process 
through which illustrations in African travel journals were published and argued 
that each step acted to further reinforce pre-existing stereotypes.59  
Arnold, Driver, and Martins were pivotal in delineating the idea of 
‘tropicality’ as a manifestation of environmental otherness in European thought. 
Tropicality was a matrix of ideas based upon a perceived fundamental contrast 
between the concepts of the temperate and the tropical, and has been one of 
the most enduring themes in the European view of the outside world.60 Along 
with Bell and Coates, these authors have demonstrated that Western images of 
tropicality were largely negative and pestilential, notwithstanding the 
simultaneous competing images of fertility and unexploited wealth.61  
Consequently, medicine and health were central to discourses of 
tropicality. Arnold indicated that his main concern was, ‘not so much with 
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disease and medicine as such as with their instrumentality – what they reveal 
about the nature and preoccupations, the ambitions and methods of an 
encompassing imperialism’.62 Curtin had also unpacked the cultural dimension 
of British popular medical thought. In a study of colonial power and African 
illness, Vaughan ‘viewed medical texts and medical theories rather as 
narratives which draw on a wide range of cultural signs and symbols for their 
effect’.63 Worboys similarly examined the development of tropical medicine 
(later to be institutionalised in devoted schools) in the colonies in light of its 
symbolic role to the colonisers as a pillar of modern ‘scientific’ rationality.64 
Medicine in the tropics thus carried the implication of Western exclusivity and 
dominance.  
 Ideas of landscape have also been central to many studies of British 
attitudes toward Africa. These largely follow from Said’s concept of ‘imaginative 
geography’, which links geographical knowledge to imperial discourse.65 Ryan 
suggested that photographs and the processes by which photographic images 
were constructed, ‘reveal as much about the imaginative landscapes of imperial 
culture as they do about the physical spaces or people pictured within their 
frame’.66 He elsewhere argued that ‘the very idea of empire in part depended on 
the idea of landscape, as both controlled space and the means of representing 
such control’.67 McAleer examined such contested representations in British 
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travel accounts from Southern Africa, a place conceived as liminal between 
temperate and tropical.68 Stafford claimed that ‘science operates within the 
same paradigm of control as technology. In Victorian Britain, they fused with 
exploration and Empire in support of an aggressive culture that sought to export 
its achievements for the betterment of Greater Britain’.69 In the editor’s 
introduction to Sèbe’s excellent study, MacKenzie agreed that nineteenth-
century empires were characterised above all by an imperial fantasy seeking to, 
‘sweep up the natural phenomena of the world (including its human varieties) 
into global taxonomies, classifying and ordering in a scientific embrace both 
facilitated and symbolised the military and technological advances achieved by 
the imperial people’.70 
Bayly grounded his recent dissertation in the assertion that, ‘these 
representations have a history’.71 He argued that:  
throughout the nineteenth century, the British developed, refined, and 
acted upon an amorphous and contested ‘idea’ of Afghanistan; one that 
was more than simply the function of great power geopolitics. The 
sources informing this imagined entity were cultural, intellectual, moral, 
political, and social-scientific, as much as they were emotional. It was an 
idea, or collection of ideas, that would evolve and become trammelled by 
events, and ultimately leave a legacy that persists to this day.72 
 
A relatively small number of travellers and writers contributed, ‘to a vision of 
Afghanistan that would provide the intellectual universe upon which British 
officials would draw to guide their policy decisions throughout the nineteenth 
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century’.73 The British came to view Afghanistan as a ‘violent geography’, a 
representational criteria that fixed it as a threat to their own civilisation.74 
 Arndt described a similar process of representation production in British 
interactions with the Xhosa peoples of South Africa. A series of small wars from 
1834 to 1853 fostered a ‘military knowledge system of the Xhosa’, which 
characterised them as treacherous and barbaric. These became the dominant 
and lasting images of the Xhosa in British and South African culture.75 
In a similar way, this thesis will contend, the vision of Africa that solidified 
during the British collective engagement with the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions would leave its mark both on policy decisions and the public mood 
toward the continent throughout the imperial era. 
0.5 Exploration and Explorers 
 
The Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were also engaged through 
discourses of exploration. In 1868, The Times described the British Empire as 
a, ‘Geographical Society on a large scale’.76 While presenting Napier with the 
Freedom of the City in 1871, Benjamin Scott, the Chamberlain of the City of 
London Corporation, declared that the expedition against Theodore: 
if we could divest our minds and memories of the sanguinary episode at 
its close, looks more like a grand geographical exploration, a 
philanthropic expedition – such as that undertaken by Livingstone – on a 
gigantic scale, rather than the march of a hostile invader, travelling in the 
greatness of his strength.77 
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Kennedy described ‘exploration’ as, ‘a knowledge-producing enterprise’ 
and ‘the explorer’ as an essentially nineteenth-century creation.78 Explorers of 
Africa such as Burton, Speke, Baker, Livingstone, Stanley, and others achieved 
tremendous fame and respect in their times. Livingstone’s 1857 book, 
Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, sold 70,000 copies in the 
first year of publication alone.79 His 1874 state funeral was conducted with full 
national honours in Westminster Abbey, attracting widespread media coverage 
and huge crowds.80 Expeditions were powerful focal points for the imagined 
ideals embodied in these, as Driver termed them, ‘cultures of exploration’.81  
Thomas recently argued that exploration expeditions were ‘particular 
cultural formations, as distinctive to their epoch as the novel or the 
photograph’.82 Hinting at contemporary processes of emplotment and narrative 
construction, he further drew attention to, ‘analogies between expeditionary 
history as a discursive phenomenon and the construction of literary canon’.83 
Many of the military and press accounts employed in this thesis were written, 
whether consciously or subconsciously, along the established rubric of the 
expedition tale. 
 British exploration culture had seen an unexpected surge following the 
first successful ascent of the Matterhorn in 1865. Four members of the climbing 
team had died in an accident during the descent, launching a public debate on 
the value and legitimacy of mountaineering. After The Times and Charles 
Dickens tarred it as pointless braggartism with no positive benefit, the Illustrated 
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London News and other supporters of empire defended mountaineering as 
critical to the interplay between the Empire, exploration, scientific discovery, and 
British manliness. Mountaineering was compared to military service, and 
mountaineers to soldiers and frontier explorers in Africa and Australia. The 
public mood swung so strongly in support of mountaineering that The Times 
and many other critics went back on their initial criticisms.84 Soon after this 
popular debate, Napier found himself climbing mountains in East Africa with an 
imperial army and a cadre of scientists. 
The Abyssinian expedition proved to be an important event for the Royal 
Geographical Society. Sir Roderick Murchinson, the Society’s president and 
most ardent proponent of marrying science, exploration, and empire, managed 
to secure the appointment of a scientific team to accompany the army.85 It was 
a resonant demonstration of the Society’s special relationship with military 
imperial ventures, a bond that would usher in the ‘scramble’ era.86 A 
geographer, an archaeologist, a botanist, a zoologist, and a geologist who 
happened to be Secretary of the RGS, joined Napier’s force, effectively turning 
it into a functioning exploration expedition.87 ‘It is of comparatively little 
interest…what the military results of the Ashantee war may be’, Harper’s 
declared of the later campaign to West Africa, ‘the chief significance of the war 
to the world in general is derived from regarding it as an expedition of 
discovery’.88 
0.6 Empire and Public Opinion 
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This study will contribute to the historiographical debate over the 
popularity of imperialism in Victorian society. This debate has long revolved 
around the work of John Mackenzie, who emphasised the widespread influence 
that imperialism had on society and showed that developments in the colonies 
and on the periphery were received in Britain with popular interest. His impact 
on the field continues to be immense, both through his own research and his 
work as editor of the Manchester University Press Studies in Imperialism 
series.89 In The Absent-Minded Imperialists, Bernard Porter disputed many of 
MacKenzie’s claims and argued that the working classes and other major 
sections of British society were unaffected by and largely unconcerned with the 
empire.90 The findings of this thesis support the concept of ‘popular imperialism’ 
and the assertion of many authors in the Studies in Imperialism series that 
empire was central to the construction of British identities.91 The images of 
empire, in particular, and those of imperial ‘heroes’ generated cross-class 
appeal.92 
Stanley claimed that, ‘there was not the least enthusiasm shown by the 
people of England upon the announcement of [the Ashanti] war’.93 Beckett 
nonetheless described it as, ‘arguably the first Victorian colonial campaign to 
really catch the public’s imagination’ and Spiers noted the strong middle-class 
pressure from the press, public, and Parliament to intervene in both the 
Abyssinia and Ashanti crises.94 In this study, it will be argued that these 
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campaigns received considerable popular attention, and that the manner in 
which they were discussed in the public narrative enhanced the subsequent 
popularity and popular comfort with the idea of imperial small wars. This thesis 
will tie the popularity of empire to that of technological innovation and 
imperialism, and argue that the Abyssinia and Ashanti expeditions enhanced 
perceptions of military capability, technological superiority, and civilisational 
supremacy in the Victorian imagination. It in no way dismisses the effectiveness 
of European technology, but approaches it as a proximate cause of a shift in 
culture, termed ‘the technologisation of imperial rhetoric’. The form that imperial 
culture would take through the scramble period to the late nineteenth-century 
owed much to the manner in which these early expeditions were presented, 
perceived, and remembered by the public and by the military. It will be argued, 
indeed, that the success of these early African expeditions built up a culture of 
British confidence in their ability to conquer and civilise Africa, its environment, 
and its inhabitants. 
0.7 Source Material and Public Opinion 
Chapter 1 will consider in detail the degree to which the official and 
civilian source material examined in this thesis was representative of British 
official and public opinion. Beckett suggested that, while the army was one of 
the largest institutions in Victorian Britain, ‘neither its officers nor rank and file 
were representative of Victorian society as a whole’.95 The same was certainly 
true of newspaper correspondents, explorers, and the members of scientific 
societies. Yet, it was upon these military, professional, and civilian reports that 
the public image of Africa was based. 
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 The majority of published veteran accounts came from among the 
officers. That said, many subalterns wrote letters home, a few published books, 
and several contributed articles to the periodical press. Emery estimated that by 
the 1870s, nearly half of NCOs and private soldiers were capable of writing 
letters from active service.96 If so, that figure remained fairly constant until the 
end of the century, when, Spiers concluded, forty per-cent of the ranks were 
functionally literate.97 Spiers stressed the value of army letters as 
‘impressionistic commentaries’, providing ‘rare insights into the feelings, 
opinions and priorities of Victorian officers and the rank-and-file’.98 Letters home 
were often circulated among family members, impacting a number of readers. In 
a letter to his mother, Lieutenant Scott suggested that, ‘you might send this to 
anybody you think would care to read it’.99 It was also fairly common for friends 
and relatives to send letters (or excerpts from them) on to newspapers, where 
they would be published for public consumption. 
The major newspapers employed in this study reached a wide tranche of 
society. By the time of the Ashanti expedition, the Daily News and Daily 
Telegraph each sold more than 150,000 daily.100 Bolt concluded that these 
journals, along with The Times and The Saturday Review, exerted the largest 
influence on public opinion.101 The Standard was not far behind.102 Circulation 
and readership numbers, as Wiener noted, must be a matter of some 
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conjecture in this period. The repeal of the Stamp Act in 1855 removed one 
possible source of distribution monitoring. Newspapers were required to report 
the number of copies sold, but these figures were not audited until the 1890s 
and owners had reasons to exaggerate. While this might suggest a rounding 
down of circulation numbers, each copy might in fact reach many readers, 
circulating in coffee houses, reading rooms, and military barracks.103 On 
campaign, in particular, an only slightly out-of-date newspaper might be read by 
the entire literate half of the men and read-aloud or summarised to the other 
half.104 
A reasonable portion of the public thus had access to the special 
correspondents’ despatches from Abyssinia and Ashanti. Hobbs has argued 
that The Times and a select few major London papers have dominated 
historical study out of proportion to their actual contemporary impact, and are 
not in fact representative of the diverse array of Victorian periodical 
publications.105 That dominance poses less of a problem, however, when 
studying the coverage of imperial expeditions. Despite the fact that it was 
mostly London-based papers that sent correspondents with the army, their 
words reached a much wider readership across the country due to the 
centralised nature of the British press. ‘In its main features,’ Charles Peabody 
claimed in 1882, ‘the Provincial Press is of necessity a reproduction of the 
Press of the Metropolis’.106 Local context was certainly important, as Peabody 
went on to explain, and editorial opinions were not simply parroted. When it 
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came to stories of foreign conflicts, however, the source material on which 
articles were based was largely drawn from the capital city. Potter noted that:  
coverage of empire was characterised by a striking degree of 
homogeneity. The raw news that reached the press was often the same 
all around England…This partly reflected the mechanics of supply in 
England. Provincial papers relied on London papers for much of their 
news, a dependency that was reinforced by the advent of syndicated 
news reports provided by agencies such as Reuters.107 
 
It is significant to the kind of discourse analysis employed in this thesis that 
these articles were usually printed and re-printed verbatim. Reuters and the 
other major news agencies monopolised telegraph communication in an 
arrangement whereby each covered a different sphere of influence. To maintain 
this arrangement, all agencies diligently forwarded news reports from any 
correspondent across the globe without distortion.108 Once messages reached 
England, it was the accepted convention to reproduce them exactly. It was 
considered improper to alter the work of correspondents, and telegrams were 
thus printed in their totality as they arrived.109 This practice was the observable 
norm among the London dailies until at least the early 1890s.110 When officers 
and journalists sent messages from Abyssinia and Ashanti, their exact wording 
would appear in the London papers, which would then be copied and re-printed 
in newspapers across the country. The historian can, therefore, glean a good 
impression of the British press through an examination of the major London 
papers. The small number of military and civilian correspondents on campaign 
exerted a substantial influence on the public image of the expeditions and of 
Africa. 
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 The New York Herald was a somewhat different case. Although writing 
for an American paper, Stanley nonetheless influenced campaign narratives in 
Britain. Many of his despatches were indeed quoted and reprinted in London 
papers in precisely the same manner as the London papers quoted each other. 
Coomassie and Magdala, an edited collection of his newspaper articles, was 
sold in Britain.111 Stanley was an absolute celebrity after his 1871-2 expedition 
to find David Livingstone, followed by a very popular book and a busy lecture 
circuit.112 
These influential newspapers and individual correspondents all had their 
own political and social inclinations. According to May’s Press Guide for 1879, 
33% of the 1015 newspapers in England professed allegiance to the Liberal 
party and 22% to the Conservative party.113 These rates were higher among 
metropolitan papers, where the vast majority were indebted or dependent in 
some way on political groups. The Times and Daily Telegraph were exceptions, 
charging higher fees and advertising the fact that they took no political 
money.114  
Party allegiance was not, however, necessarily a determining factor 
when it came to coverage of imperial expeditions. Only the most successful and 
prosperous papers could afford to send correspondents to overseas conflicts. It 
was not simply an issue of salary (some correspondents covered or at least 
fronted their own expenses) but also of very expensive inter-continental 
telegraph fees. Such large and wealthy papers tended towards political 
conservatism, which was associated with pro-imperialism, albeit a more 
                                                       
111 Review of ‘Coomassie And Magdala,’ The Times, 25 Apr. 1874, p 12 
112 Henry M. Stanley, How I Found Livingstone (London: Sampson Low, Marston Low, and 
Searle, 1872); Sèbe, Heroic Imperialists in Africa, p. 319. 
113 F. L. May, May’s British & Irish Press Guide 1879 (London, F. L. May, 1879) p. 6; Also 
discussed in Manning, Foreign News Gathering and Reporting in the London and Devon Press, 
p. 34. 
114 Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers, p. 61. 
34 
 
nuanced association than would be the case in later decades, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 1. The Times, Standard, and Morning Post could usually 
be relied upon to support the causes of empire and imperial prestige, if not 
always the commanders themselves.115 The Telegraph catered to the less-
educated reader and, while a strong supporter of Gladstone, always touted the 
empire. The Daily News was an explicitly Liberal journal, but the Conservative 
vs. Liberal split over ‘jingoism’ (itself only clearly delineated in the late 1870s) 
was complicated at this time by the fact that Gladstone was in office from 
December 1868 to February 1874. It might go without saying that the Times of 
India was in favour of empire and particularly pro-Napier.116 The New York 
Herald, again, was a different case. The largest and most successful stateside 
newspaper, it appealed to all social levels and ran articles on a wide range of 
subjects. British expeditions were not standard fare for the Herald, but the editor 
agreed to print Stanley’s reports if they proved sufficiently interesting, which 
Stanley ensured.117 
Perspectives on race were in some ways more important that those on 
politics in the coverage of African conflicts, and both influenced perspectives on 
empire. In her seminal study Victorian Attitudes to Race, Bolt concluded that the 
Daily News and The Spectator took a sympathetic approach to race questions, 
while The Times, Morning Post, and Daily Telegraph (despite its Gladstonian 
political viewpoint) were fairly conservative on race issues.118 Lorimer warned 
that newspapers courted sensationalism to attract interest and that the ‘experts’ 
in ethnological debates appealed to a select and like-minded readership. He 
thus found that, ‘opinion, and press reports in particular, exaggerate and distort 
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the degree of racial antipathy in mid-Victorian England’, and that historians tend 
to over-estimate the popular appeal of particular vocal ethnographers.119 
This thesis has been written with a mind to such potential for distortion. 
Public discourses are the primary subject of investigation, however, and it will 
be argued that published books and newspapers remain significant, even if they 
presented sensationalised versions of public attitudes, for the fact that they fed 
those perspectives back into the public consciousness. Published accounts 
need not accurately represent the moods of the moment to influence the 
narratives by which that moment is collectively remembered. 
British perspectives on race, and their place in the ever-changing image 
of Africa and culture of imperialism, will be discussed throughout this 
dissertation and particularly in Chapters 3-6. The ‘Africa’s Sons Under Arms’ 
project at the University of Warwick represents a current investigation into the 
changing notion of race in the British world as perceived through perceptions of 
African (or black) soldiers. A multifaceted examination of the West Indian 
Regiments, the project is premised on the claim that, ‘the militarisation of the 
black subject is comparatively under-studied, yet is crucial to our perception of 
the plastic nature of race as a concept’.120 This follows from Buckley’s work, a 
pioneer in the social study of race in military social systems.121 Reid also 
examined European interpretations of African military practices, linking changes 
in perceptions of ‘savage’ war to changes in those of race more broadly.122 
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Bolt has discussed the link, perhaps prerequisite link, between the 
aggressive assertion of white superiority in the 1860s and the explosion of 
British expansion in Africa.123 Abyssinia and Ashanti straddled a time when 
these assertions were beginning to influence imperial policy. Racial ideas also 
guided the ways the conflicts were interpreted and reported. Retellings of the 
expeditions in turn reinforced the shifts in British racial thought. The perceived 
ease of the military victories, coupled with evident advances in medicine and an 
imagined triumph over the natural world, it will be argued, precipitated a 
reassessment of the nature of racial dominance. The conquest of the idea of 
Africa was intertwined with the development of a new sense of racial superiority. 
The source material employed in this thesis is thus ‘representative’ in 
that it reached a large audience and engaged the diverse and contested 
discourses that made up imperial culture. Thompson argued that since the 
empire and Britain itself were so diverse and pluralistic, ‘there never was likely 
to be any single or monolithic “imperial culture” in Britain’.124 He argued that 
Britons were neither ignorant of the empire nor staunchly imperialist. This thesis 
does not seek to suggest otherwise or imply a singular ‘British idea’ of Africa, 
technology, or imperialism. Rather, if there were always many strands in play, 
the chapters of this thesis attempt to grasp one or two at a time. 
Questions of influence and impact of such individual threads are, like 
circulation figures, necessarily matters of conjecture. As Stearn and Bolt have 
claimed, periodicals and books targeted to middle-class readers may have 
largely confirmed and reinforced imperialist viewpoints rather than converted to 
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them.125 There was, nonetheless, an important difference between the political 
support of Conservative imperialism and what MacKenzie called the 
‘spectatorial fascination with colonial warfare’. The latter did not require the 
former, and the latter could cross class lines. In 1898, the editor of Labour 
Leader worried that the working class was more interested in Omdurman than 
in the Welsh coal strike.126 
Moreover, sources that confirm and reinforce existing beliefs are still 
valuable to the historian. As Potter argued: 
in order to succeed, propaganda must “resonate” with the pre-existing 
attitudes of the target audience, and tap into shared ideologies and 
stereotypes. If we accept this, then we must assume that, if pro-imperial 
propaganda stimulated enthusiasm for empire among the British working 
classes, then there must have been at least some degree of pre-existing 
support.127 
 
Throughout this study, it will be demonstrated that the multifarious Abyssinian 
and Ashanti narratives engaged a consistent set of tropes. Harcourt asserted 
that newspapers in the 1860s and ‘70s, ‘reflected as well as formed opinion in a 
way that the restricted circulations of earlier decades and the mass circulations 
of later ones did not’.128 Indeed, as Spiers argued, ‘it would seem unreasonable 
to discount the influence of the press entirely. The campaign coverage almost 
certainly had some effect upon readers and their families, friends, and 
associates – anyone with whom the news was discussed’.129 
0.8 Stereotyped Representations 
Spiers elsewhere noted that ‘certain racial stereotypes evolved’ in the 
1860s and ‘70s among the works of missionaries, explorers, novelists, 
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scientists, and anthropologists.130 Adas similarly found that such generalised 
images, ‘had been disseminated at all class levels by adventure novels, travel 
accounts, and the penny press’.131 These diverse sources of information and 
authority, written with varied intents and to varied audiences, overlapped in key 
areas. New correspondents fell under the influence of earlier writings before 
arriving in Africa, Curtin explained, already steeped in, ‘the reports of their 
predecessors and the theoretical conclusions already drawn from them’.132 The 
images of the military maintained by such, ‘varied mutually reinforcing media’, 
argued Stearn, ‘so dominated perceptions that the presentations of those with 
and without battle experience hardly differed’.133 Many newspapermen also 
wrote journal articles, books, pamphlets, lectures on various military or 
ethnographic topics, and even fiction based on their experiences, all biased 
toward stereotyped norms through received knowledge and editorial 
practices.134 ‘How many volumes have already been written on this subject’, 
asked a Spectator author in a review of Henty’s Ashanti book, ‘What a task lies 
before the historian of the future who will have to make use of all these 
“mémoires pour servir”!’135 
Many of the special correspondents’ books were in fact re-printings of 
their original newspaper despatches, bound together almost unaltered. In 
Shepherd’s, they appeared chronologically as independent letters to the Times 
of India, subtitled with the original dates and locations.136 Henty declared in the 
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preface to his book that his letters were presented in, ‘the same form and 
substance as when they appeared in the columns of the Standard’, but added 
that he had updated some of his predictions, opinions, and conclusions that 
turned out to be erroneous.137 Maurice's account of Ashanti contained his 
original reports from the Daily News annotated with his later commentary.138 In 
Coomassie and Magdala, a book recounting both expeditions, Stanley re-wrote 
his time in Abyssinia as a narrative but kept his Ashanti reports to the New York 
Herald in their original form.139 This practice of re-printing what had been written 
in the field was, along with the aforementioned newspaper policy of printing 
despatches in the exact form that they arrived, reflective of a general 
commitment to ‘scientific’ veracity in Victorian reporting. Thus, Henty and 
Stanley tended to provide later corrections and context to their letters in 
footnotes, rather than changes to the text. 
The ‘Wolseley Ring’ of officers represented another prism through which 
the public perceived the British experience in Africa. Handpicked by Wolseley to 
accompany him to Ashanti, quite a few books and runs in the periodical press 
came from within this cadre. These men had an allegiance to their Commanding 
officer and, given his penchant for media manipulation, surely his direct input on 
their narratives.140 Wolseley’s inner circle (also known as the ‘Ashanti ring’) was 
famously self-promoting and jestingly referred to as the ‘mutual admiration 
society’.141 McCaskie claimed that these men had a profound and lasting effect 
on the public image of Africa because of their subsequent successes, going on 
to direct military policy through the height of imperial conquest and to the end of 
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the century. Ashanti had been their first success as a team, and, ‘their views 
formed a powerful template for subsequent readings of other [African] polities 
during—and beyond—the conquest’.142 
0.9 ‘Novelty’, Innovation, and Determinism 
Speaking after an 1888 lecture at the Royal United Service Institution on 
the military application of bicycles, Wolseley told the gathered officers: ‘I 
confess, I am one of those who believes in novelties’.143 While that position was 
not always popular in military circles (though usually at RUSI), it was central to 
the ‘imperial school’ of colonial-minded officers and to the idea of small wars.144 
The concept of ‘novel’, however, requires some unpacking. The serious 
methodological consideration of innovation in the history of technology impacts 
upon the study of military history. 
The terms ‘science’ and ‘technology’ carry implicit and overlapping 
definitions. They are often conflated in common use, as was very much the 
case in the Victorian press.145 Edgerton defined science as natural science and 
technology as machines, structures and processes.146 Adas similarly defined 
‘the search for the understandings of fundamental entities as the essence of 
science, whereas technology seeks to solve more practical and immediate 
problems’.147 Headrick defined the latter as, ‘all the ways in which humans use 
materials and energy in the environment for their own ends, beyond what they 
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can do with their bodies’.148 Simplified, then, science is the ‘knowing’, while 
technology is the ‘doing’. 
A Gatling gun is a piece of technology, a discrete item, and possessing 
one allows a soldier (assuming the gun is in working order and provided with 
ammunition) to fire bullets faster than he would with a rifle. If, however, the 
enemy were to steal the gun, they would gain that same ability (again, 
assuming a supply of ammunition). An item cannot be made to serve as 
evidence of ‘civilisation’ (itself an abstraction) or a civilisation’s dominance over 
‘savagery’ in a culturally satisfying way if it can simply be taken or bought.  
In War and Technology, Black provided a possible solution to the 
treatment of technology when he presented it: 
as a relationship between materials and human ingenuity. As such, 
technology is the application of a process…By extension, it is the product 
of that process. The word tends to be used in the associated form rather 
than in the first sense, especially when the product is a device that does 
something when energy is supplied to it. Thus, ‘technology’ becomes 
such a device. This sort of definition applies equally well to swords as to 
tanks.149 
 
An understanding of technology’s simultaneous existence as both process and 
product was evident in the Victorian public sphere. The technologies of 
particular interest to war correspondents and military authors in Abyssinia and 
Ashanti were those of transport and combat present in the field. These discrete 
items were, nonetheless, reflective of (and, in the case of the more complicated 
and conspicuous Gatling gun, traction engine, and locomotive, directly 
reminiscent of) the industrial processes that created them and the scientific 
knowledge that those processes applied. This association was significant to the 
symbolic roles that these items were made to serve as manifest indicators of 
the superiority of British civilisation. Victorians had become convinced that it 
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was their machines that marked them as the foremost nation, as will be 
explored in Chapter 1. Their campaign narratives reflected this identity. 
Since the cultural turn of the 1980s, the notion of ‘technological 
determinism’ has been attacked for its association with a teleological approach 
to the history of technology, triumphalist military history, and an amateur 
fascination with artefacts.150 Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch launched a field of social 
studies of technology with their 1987 book The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems. The resulting ‘SCOTS’ school of researchers focused 
on the nontechnical aspects of technical systems, asking, not just how things 
worked, but why they mattered to contemporary historical actors.151 Social 
constructivist historians have tended to prefer microanalyses, where human and 
social influences are more readily apparent. Those adopting macro 
perspectives have been more likely to attribute causal roles to technology.152 
Even studies with a narrow focus, Edgerton argued, often fall into what 
he termed ‘innovation-determinism’. He noted that the study of innovation and 
invention is ‘systematically biased by the future, in that we study innovations 
which succeed later; we study the pre-history of innovating organisations of 
types which came to dominate later’.153 In military history, most notably the 
popular type, such bias often manifest in stories of ‘war-winning-weapons’. If 
such weapons are implicitly accepted as having been inevitable, the narrative 
tends to revolve around the lionised inventors who seemingly understood the 
future of war that their own devices brought about and the ‘militarist’ army brass 
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who in their traditionalism failed to predict that future.154 Few historians go quite 
that far, but a lean toward innovation-determinism remains present in the field. 
One effect, as Black warned, is that ‘the generally incremental character of 
technological advances and applications is underrated’.155 A new weapon is 
presented as having been introduced in a moment, which obscures its earlier 
versions and analogues. Furthermore, it is the nature of technological 
development that many inventions are at least in part ‘reinventions’, which the 
search for war-winning weapons also obscures.156 New technologies, Otter 
explained, do not abruptly replace older ones but, rather:  
become embedded and integrated into everyday practice, become 
superimposed over, and slightly displace, older artefacts…Technological 
change, then, is best described as a process of complex, uneven 
sedimentation in space, rather than abrupt, jarring rupture in time.157 
 
In this thesis, ‘novel military technology’ will refer to the cultural 
representations of the imprecise and shifting list of technologies that were seen 
to be new from the British perspective and from British interpretations of the 
African perspective. This study is unquestionably focused on innovation, in that 
it will argue that the Victorian public sphere was fixated on innovation. It is not 
intended to imply that any of these technologies constituted ‘magic-bullets’, but 
that certain groups of historical actors were keen to construct them as such 
(while others were not). 
0.10 Technology and Empire 
Cannadine affirmed that ‘the British Empire was held together 
functionally, and driven forward economically, by the most advanced 
technologies available’ and that technology-centrism lay at the heart of ‘this 
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version and vision of empire’.158 Many historians from a range of disciplines 
have studied the imperial roles of technology.159 Headrick examined the 
diffusion and adoption of Western technology by European powers in colonial 
settings, arguing that weaponry, transportation, and medical technology 
constituted the ‘tools of empire’.160 He put forward that new imperialism could 
best be understood as the interaction between motives and means. McNeill 
focused on the reciprocal interplay between technological, social, and political 
developments in The Pursuit of Power, which Roland has suggested ‘dominated 
the decade’ of the 1980s.161 
In the past two decades, approaches have increasingly reflected the 
cultural turn and fixated on the representations of weapons alongside the 
weapons themselves. Thus a 1999 volume of Science, Technology, and Society 
encouraged contributing authors, ‘to look beyond colonial technologies as mere 
“tools” of empire and to avoid the vanity enterprises of European science such 
as positional astronomy and pure mathematics’.162 The International Congress 
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of the History of Technology (ICOHTEC) recently issued a call for papers asking 
authors to consider: 
What are the contexts of social values, attitudes, and interests, non-
military as well as military, that shape and support (or oppose) [military] 
technologies? What are the consequences of gender, race, class, and 
other aspects of the social order for the nature and use of military 
technology? Or, more generally: How do social and cultural 
environments within the military itself or in the larger society affect 
military technological change?163 
 
In their focus on representations and culture, histories of military 
technology must increasingly engage with Western ideologies of modernity and 
dominance. In his comprehensive study Machines as the Measure of Men, 
Adas placed technology at the centre of Europe’s success in colonisation, but 
drew attention primarily to the change in European perspective that such 
success engendered. He traced the development of an ideology of superiority 
(variously British, Western, European, white) based on perceived technological 
advancement. As the power differential between them grew, Adas argued: 
increasingly industrialized European (and North American) cultures as a 
whole were seen to be a separate class, distinct from all others. The 
polarities were numerous and obvious: metal versus wood; machine 
versus human or animal power; science versus superstition and myth; 
synthetic versus organic; progressive versus stagnant. All aspects of 
culture could be linked to these polarities, to the fundamental dichotomy 
between industrial and preindustrial societies.164 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will explore the ‘lessons’ many British commentators drew 
from Abyssinia and Ashanti as significant contributions to this process.  
Yet, in practice, such all-encompassing dichotomies were not always 
appropriate to small wars, in Africa or elsewhere. Both Abyssinians and Ashanti 
wielded muskets, and King Theodore possessed a much-treasured artillery 
train. Until these two expeditions, it will be argued, many of Britain’s conflicts 
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across the globe had been fought against comparably, or at least analogously 
armed fighters. Yet, machine guns, breach-loading rifles, and rockets appeared 
to be without analogue and thus provided a marker that allowed the imperial 
mind to separate who was ‘civilised’ and who was ‘savage’. Those cases where 
opposing weapons were equally advanced, such as Egypt in 1882, also draw 
attention to the racial component of small wars, which will be examined 
throughout this thesis. 
Moreover, both of these expeditions took place before machine guns 
were well-established in military circles or the public sphere; they were still quite 
novel.165 Significantly, through this entire period the army had not officially 
accepted the Gatling gun.166 The machine gun remained a naval monopoly until 
the 1890s, though even at the end of 1875 the navy had little experience with 
them.167 They were, in short, experimental and the experiment was to take 
place in Africa.  
Chapter 2 will examine the contemporary debates that were waged in 
military circles over mitrailleurs (machine guns) to better understand the lens 
through which the new technology was perceived. The investigation will speak 
to the social factors that go into decision making in technological systems. The 
historiography is replete with studies of the development of weapons and of 
tactical systems to incorporate them. Comparatively few consider in any depth 
the contested nature of debates over novel military technologies in martial 
culture or wider society. In his 1975 study The Social History of the Machine 
Gun, Ellis explored just such a cultural dynamic and gave considerable attention 
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to representations of early rapid-fire weapons.168 More recently, Epstein traced 
the development of torpedo technologies and tactics in the American and British 
navies, countering the common perception that officers were slow to recognise 
their potential and demonstrating that various factions within military 
bureaucracies invested the new device with different hopes and expectations.169 
0.11 Amalgamated Campaign Analysis 
Examining these two campaigns together, almost interchangeably, as 
windows into Victorian culture may not seem an obvious choice, as they were 
undertaken at opposite sides of the African continent, in very different physical 
environments, against very different populations, and even by different armies 
(British and Anglo-Indian). In the contemporary public sphere, however, the 
practical dissimilarities between the two campaigns blurred together into a 
stereotyped ‘idea’ of Africa. Reporting on the Ashanti war, The Lancet medical 
journal saw, ‘no reason for altering our opinion that the present undertaking is a 
miniature Abyssinian campaign…there is a certain parallelism between the two 
expeditions’.170 A number of historians have since followed suit.171 
Ensign Wynter served in Abyssinia, Ashanti, and Afghanistan, retiring 
afterwards in protest of the Cardwell reforms.172 One of the steel 7-pounder 
cannons that Napier fired on Magdala, thereafter informally referred to as the 
‘Abyssinian pattern’, was later hauled through the bush for Wolseley’s attack on 
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the Cape Coast town of Elmina.173 Aside from those cases, very few soldiers or 
pieces of equipment appeared in both conflicts. 
At the outset of the Ashanti operation, Abyssinia was looked to as its 
direct predecessor and apt analogue, still very relevant a mere four years later. 
Looking back with his particular operational lens, Callwell classed them together 
by name as examples of his third category of small war: ‘campaigns undertaken 
to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous 
enemy’.174 
‘England has found another Abyssinia in Ashantee’, Harper’s New 
Monthly Magazine claimed, ‘and in King Koffee Kalkalli another Theodorus’.175 
The Spectator declared, ‘as Napier went to Magdala, Kaufman to Khiva…so 
Wolseley can go to Coomassie’.176 The 1889 history of the Royal Engineers 
stressed with pride that ‘they were both Engineer wars in their main 
characteristics…In both the Engineers were called on to fight against obstacles 
of no common character’.177 
Henty, special correspondent for the Standard at both expeditions, noted 
that, ‘in forming any critical opinion as to the Ashanti campaign, one is led 
irresistibly to a comparison with the sister expedition to Abyssinia. The 
resemblance between these campaigns is so close as to be almost singular’.178 
Despite the wide climatic and epidemiological difference between the West 
African jungle and East African tableland, he continued, ‘it must be remembered 
that the prophecies and warnings against the climate were quite as great in one 
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campaign as in the other’.179 Stanley, having bound both tales into a single 
volume, referred to King Theodore as King Karikari’s ‘illustrious prototype’.180 At 
the beginning of the war he expressed his hope that Wolseley, ‘will be as 
successful as Napier’s march to Magdala’ and reduce Kumase ‘to a smoking 
ruin like Magdala in 1868’.181 
Wolseley did little to invite the comparison, not least because Napier was 
a political enemy and rival for the spotlight, but he was certainly aware that his 
performance would be assessed alongside that of his own illustrious 
prototype.182 He told Stanley that, ‘as great a force will ultimately move upon 
Coomassie as Napier marched upon Magdala’.183 His biographer, Charles 
Rathbone Low, attempted to refute the common comparison between the 
expeditions in Wolseley’s 1878 memoirs, arguing that in every major criterion 
the Ashanti expedition had been more spectacular and the commanding 
officer’s success more incredible.184 Henty took the opposite position, arguing 
that due to the greater distance travelled, the difficulty of the terrain, the larger 
size of the force and weight of material, and the lack of protection from the sun, 
‘the labours’ achieved by Napier’s force ‘were beyond all comparison greater 
and more arduous than those which the white troops performed in Ashanti’.185 
After the success of the Ashanti campaign, it joined Abyssinia as the predictive 
trope for African small wars, the joint standard to which future campaigns would 
be compared and the joint ideal to which future commanders would aspire. 
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Thus, when a diplomatic issue flared up with the King of Dahomey in 1876, The 
Spectator recommended that ‘the Abyssinian precedent will be followed, and 
not that of Ashantee’, meaning that the king should be dethroned.186 The idea of 
African conflict had become tied in the British imagination to the events of 1868-
1874. 
 
 
0.12 Conclusions 
The expeditions to Abyssinia and Ashanti were significant moments in 
the development of the British idea of small wars, a concept intertwined with 
notions of scientific exploration and explorer heroes; industrial expositions and 
international prestige; martial prowess and military preparedness; race and the 
nature of racial superiority. Different groups in Britain each saw in small wars 
what they wanted to see, and made the idea of imperial conflict work for them. 
Small wars, in turn, became a site on which British culture was contested and 
remade. 
This thesis will demonstrate that discourses of technological superiority 
and scientific violence were generated in response to particular anxieties of the 
perceived dangers of the African interior. Accounts of the Abyssinian and 
Ashanti expeditions demonstrated a strong hope, desire to claim, and tendency 
to interpret that the mere presence of novel technology would beat back the wild 
climate and terrify Africans into submission. This inclination among British 
commentators tells us something about the imperial ideal, particularly as it did 
not accurately reflect the real potential of those technologies or the reactions of 
Africans to them. 
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Chapter 1: Imperialism, Prestige, and the 
Public Sphere 
1.1 Imperialism and the British Press 
Stephen Manning noted that ‘for the vast majority of the British public in 
the nineteenth century, their understanding of the campaigns in which their 
soldiers were engaged was obtained from newspapers’.187 This was certainly 
true of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions, and it is therefore important to 
sketch a picture of the British press during 1868-74. It was a transformative 
period for the media, as well as for the empire. The abolition of the stamp and 
paper duties from 1855-61 opened up a very competitive newspaper market, 
forcing most titles to bring their cover price down to a penny and hold it there for 
decades.188 The Times was unable to drop below three pence due to 
particularly high editorial costs but could rely on its established reputation to 
remain competitive.189 Newspapers began to employ the rotary press in the late 
1860s and early 1870s. This process used continuous rolls of newsprint and 
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increased the number of copies that could be produced and the speed of their 
production.190 Literacy rates were higher than ever and would continue to rise 
among the middle and lower-middle classes. Newspapers, in consequence, 
ratcheted up the established practice of using sensationalism to draw the 
attention of the reading public, providing crime news, scandals of all sorts, and 
a more jingoistic and bellicose presentation of the military and empire. Matthew 
Arnold famously characterised this turn toward sensationalism as the ‘New 
Journalism’ in 1887.191 However, many of the characteristics associated with 
the New Journalism had already become prominent in the British press by the 
1860s, when they rose further on the back of imperialism.192 Thompson noted 
that ‘New Imperialism’ and the New Journalism had ‘a symbiotic relationship’.193 
 ‘The army enjoyed unprecedented popular appeal and esteem during 
the last three decades of the nineteenth century’, Spiers argued, ‘it earned more 
popular adulation than ever before over a comparable period of time’.194 
Weapons tests undertaken by the Royal Artillery at Woolwich and 
Shoeburyness were considered worth reporting by many newspapers, the more 
ostentatious devices receiving substantial and often illustrated coverage.195 
Commemorative statues of imperial heroes had not been common until the 
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1870s, when they began to appear frequently on British streets, erected both 
through government expense and private subscription.196 There was a dramatic 
increase in the number of battle paintings displayed at public exhibitions from 
1874 to 1914.197 The battle painting sensation Lady Butler displayed Balaclava 
at the Fine Art Society in 1876, attracting 50,000 visitors.198  
Fiction and non-fiction books on military themes became extremely 
popular.199 Captain George Chesney, formerly of the Bengal Engineers, 
spawned a popular fiction genre in 1871 with ‘The Battle of Dorking: 
Reminiscences of a Volunteer’, first published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine and soon after as a novella.200 Chesney’s alarmist tale of a 
successful German invasion of England was an immediate success, Seed 
argued, ‘because it played so directly to contemporary anxieties about national 
defence by projecting the weaknesses of the French on to Britain’.201 After a 
second run of 80,000 copies, it became clear that the book had inaugurated a 
craze for invasion fantasy literature. From 1871 to the Great War, speculative 
tales of future-war would appear every year in Britain.202 Sir Francis Butler, 
husband of Lady Butler, member of the ‘Wolseley Ring’, and veteran of Ashanti, 
Zulu, and Tel-el-Kebir, contributed his own invasion fantasy, The Invasion of 
England, in 1882.203 By the end of the 1870s, juvenile literature wedded the 
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popular interest in warfare to the long-popular genre of exploration journals in 
‘boy’s novels’, or adventure fiction. The young heroes of these stories, such as 
those of G. A. Henty, overcame obstacles, realised their potential, and became 
men, significantly, out in the empire.204 
Such literary genres reflected the increased popularity of imperial 
conflict. Steinbach argued that by 1868: 
the combination of the Indian Rebellion, the Maori Wars, and the 
[Jamaican] Morant Bay Rebellion had convinced the white British public 
and government that nonwhite natives were inherently violent, and that 
governing them with a firm hand was more important than protecting their 
political rights.205 
 
Various interpretations of Darwinism further swayed the public perception of 
small wars, which were coming to be viewed as necessary enactments of 
national pre-eminence.206 Thus, even relatively small skirmishes in the imperial 
sphere received substantial press coverage, further exaggerating their 
significance.207 Such empire-focused media reports also shaped and gradually 
changed popular images of Africa and Africans.208   
The Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions themselves straddled a 
significant, perhaps pivotal, period in the development of British public and 
press interest in African conflict. Beckett claimed that, ‘the Crimean War had 
been effectively the first British campaign covered in the new more popular 
                                                       
204 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 
1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) p. 7. 
205 Susie L. Steinbach, Understanding the Victorians: Politics, Culture, and Society in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (New York: Routledge, 2012) p. 69; See also Christine Bolt, 
Victorian Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) p. 76. 
206 MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 6. 
207 Alex Nalbach, ‘“The Software of Empire”: Telegraphic News Agencies and Imperial Publicity, 
1865-1914,’ in Imperial Co-Histories: National Identities and the British and Colonial Press, ed. 
Julie F. Codell (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003) p. 77. 
208 Ulrich Pallua, Eurocentrism, Racism, Colonialism in the Victorian and Edwardian Age: 
Changing Images of Africa(ns) in Scientific and Literary Texts (Heidelberg, Germany: 
Universitatsverlag Winter, 2006) p. 133. 
55 
 
national press and had established the pattern’.209 That pattern, characterised 
by special war correspondents and an increased tendency toward 
sensationalism, had remained relatively dormant since the Indian Mutiny. There 
had been a number of colonial conflicts in the interim but, until Abyssinia, wrote 
Henty, ‘such little wars pass nearly unheeded at home’.210 Sir Samuel Baker’s 
1869 expedition to the Sudan, during which the Prince of Wales joined him for a 
period, brought media attention back to African exploits.211 Henry Morton 
Stanley’s presumption of David Livingstone provided the papers with a 
thoroughly dramatic story in 1871. The Franco-Prussian War turned British 
minds to the military and, significantly, the Prussian victory left a gap in the 
public hunger for exciting war news. Lucy Brown noted that the more 
sensationalist evening and Sunday papers saw their sales drop after the 
declaration of peace.212 The Cardwell reforms had been the subject of much 
public debate and criticism and many looked to Napier’s and Wolseley’s 
campaigns as field-tests of the new system. This convergence of factors meant 
that the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions caught the British public’s 
imagination in a way not seen since the Mutiny and were covered in the press 
to an extent not seen since the Crimea.213 Badsey noted that the era of 
journalism thus sparked would become mythologised as the ‘golden age’ of war 
reporting.214 
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The Abyssinian campaign received saturation coverage by the standards 
of the time. Over just under a year, the Illustrated London News published 100 
illustrations on the subject.215 Marching with the army along different points of 
the advance were Dr. C. Austin for The Times, G. A. Henty for both the 
Standard and the Pioneer, Viscount Adare for the Daily Telegraph, William 
Simpson as the correspondent and artist for the Illustrated London News, and 
H. M. Stanley for the New York Herald. Among the Indian Army officers, 
Lieutenant F. A. Shepherd took a side job as a military correspondent for the 
Daily News and the Times of India, and Lieutenant W. O. Whiteside for the 
Morning Post. Clements Markham, secretary of the Royal Geographical Society 
and the expedition’s geographer, sent articles to Macmillan’s Magazine.216 
Stanley, Henty, Shepherd, and Markham all went on to publish books of their 
campaign experiences. The journalists’ books were very popular, as was 
Markham’s among the more limited circles of those interested in geography.217  
The Ashanti Expedition was the subject of similar, indeed greater, press 
saturation in Britain. In the preface to his narrative of the Gold Coast campaign, 
Maurice dubiously stated that, ‘only one history of the Ashantee War has 
appeared or is likely to appear – that of Major Brackenbury’.218 Brackenbury had 
indeed worked at a fevered pace and with several assistants to ensure that his, 
Wolseley approved, account of the expedition would be the first to reach the 
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British public. Nonetheless, in his projection of what was ‘likely’, Maurice made 
a blatant attempt to discredit the cadre of press correspondents who would, in 
the months after Brackenbury, all publish their own versions of events. Maurice 
had been Wolseley’s private secretary and an inaugural member of the 
‘Wolseley Ring’.  
Winwood Reade began his book with the self-deprecating but more 
accurate claim that, ‘as five other books on the Ashantee War have been 
announced or have already appeared, the preface to a work on that subject 
ought to be apologetic…for writing on an over-written subject’.219 In terms of 
eyewitness press coverage, he was justified in asserting that, ‘never perhaps 
has there been a war so fully reported for the press’.220 Reade was the special 
correspondent for The Times in Ashanti. He was joined by Frederick Boyle for 
the Daily Telegraph, Henty again for the Standard, and Stanley again for the 
New York Herald. All four correspondents went on to publish books about the 
campaign.221 Melton Prior was ‘Special War Artist’ for the Illustrated London 
News; he would not publish a book about his experience in Ashanti until his 
1912 memoirs.222 Among the officers in Ashanti, Frederick Maurice wrote for the 
Daily News (as did another unnamed officer, most likely Lieutenant W. Dooner), 
Captain Ebenezer Rogers and Percy P. Luxmore for Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, and Major Robert Home for the Pall Mall Gazette. Brackenbury and 
Maurice released their aforementioned books, as did Dooner and Major William 
Butler.223 The Lancet ran field reports on the all-important medical 
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arrangements from their own correspondent stationed at Cape Coast Castle.224 
An illustrative example of the sheer volume of public coverage, The Times ran 
209 articles on the Ashanti expedition in 1873 and 206 in 1874. Curtin found 
that The Times ran 300 pieces during the most intense and eventful six months 
of the campaign, more than one a day.225  
The 1870s were ‘crucial’ to the prominence with which imperial events 
were reported, argued Mackenzie. The decade ‘opened with those celebrated 
markers of a new enthusiasm for imperial expansion and consolidation…by 
[1879] the empire was firmly established as a source of spectacular events 
worthy of prominent press treatment’.226 By 1878, the War Office recognised 
that, ‘the presence of Newspaper Correspondents with an Army in the Field is 
an evil of modern warfare which cannot be avoided. The public will not consent 
to be shut out from all news of the theatre of war; nor is it wise that they should 
be’.227 ‘Special correspondent’ was the most common term used to refer to 
journalists on assignment. Different editors might alternately call them 
‘occasional correspondent’, ‘special commissioner’, or simply ‘specials’.228 
Serving soldiers who wrote for newspapers or journals were usually called 
‘military correspondents’.229 Until the Abyssinian expedition, special war 
correspondents were known in Britain almost solely in the context of the 
Crimean War. William Howard Russell of The Times had reported from the 
Crimea and established an image of the profession as ‘truthtellers’ to the public. 
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He was not the first journalist to report from a theatre of war but, Hoover 
argued, could be considered the first ‘modern’ war correspondent, ‘in the sense 
that he travelled with the troops and gave eyewitness reports of the war’.230 The 
Crimea also firmly established the profession of ‘special war artist’ or ‘war 
illustrator’ who made realistic sketches of camp and battle scenes based on 
direct personal observation. The pioneer in this field was William Simpson of the 
Illustrated London News, who portrayed the Crimea, the Abyssinian expedition, 
the Franco-Prussian War, and the Afghan War.231 He was succeeded at the 
Illustrated London News by Melton Prior, whose first campaign was the 1873 
Ashanti war and who would go on to become the most famous special war artist 
of the imperial era.232 These artists fired the public interest in imperial 
campaigns through the immediacy of their images and formed a well-paid elite 
among journalists.233 
 Henty covered both the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions, having cut 
his teeth in the Crimea.234 Stanley covered both expeditions as well and 
published the narratives together in a two-volume book.235 Reade spent three 
years travelling in West Africa and, in 1863, published his extensive 
observations and impressions of the region.236 In 1868, he applied 
unsuccessfully to serve as the special correspondent for The Times in 
Abyssinia and consequently set out on another two-year journey through the 
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Gold Coast, Slave Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.237 He was again rejected 
when he applied to join the Livingstone Relief Expedition, but succeeded in 
landing The Times special correspondent assignment in Ashanti.238  
 The foundations of the New Journalism were being laid in the 1860s and 
‘70s.239 The British reading public was hungry for sensational news of exotic 
locales, military adventure and, if at all possible, violence. An established and 
rapidly expanding field of journalism responded with more inclusive war 
coverage and more column space devoted to African expeditions of all sorts. 
Imperial ventures were particularly marketable public commodities, providing 
adventure, novelty, and a locus for national military pride at a time when the 
army was little engaged on the continent. Special correspondents had become 
a public expectation, and integral mediators of the British experience of empire. 
Media engagements with the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were both 
responses to this dynamic and watersheds in its extension. Journalists were 
not, however, the only architects of the media presence on campaign in Africa.  
1.2 Military Engagement with the Public Sphere 
Kiernan has argued that, ‘Empire soldiers as a race were highly sensitive 
to attitudes in Britain’.240 In Chapter 2, it will be argued that those British officers 
and military thinkers concerned with imperial and colonial warfare comprised a 
military culture divergent from those officers focused on European great power 
conflicts. It was the imperial-focused soldiers who tended to show more concern 
for public opinion and more eagerness to manipulate the press. That did not 
necessarily mean that they enjoyed it. The overall feeling among military men of 
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all stripes was usually hostile toward the press, if not toward the journalists 
themselves. The war reporting profession was in its infancy and many officers 
believed that it represented a threat to operations. It was suggested that 
newspapers aided the enemy by revealing troop movements and morale to 
anyone with a penny to spend.241 In his Soldier’s Pocket Book, Wolseley 
iterated the importance of keeping one’s intentions hidden from the enemy. Yet, 
‘an English general of the present day is in the most unfortunate position in this 
respect, being surrounded by newspaper correspondents, who, pandering to 
the public craze for “news,” render concealment most difficult’.242 He famously 
described them as, ‘that race of drones…an encumbrance to an army; they eat 
the rations of fighting men, and do no work at all. Their numbers should be 
restricted as much as possible’.243 Lucy Brown claimed that, ‘Garnet Wolseley 
stands out from other people by the scale and assiduity of his cultivation of the 
press’.244 Throughout his career, he sought to keep correspondents placated 
and deferential while restricting their access to real information as much as 
possible.245  
When one of King Karikari’s European hostages, a missionary, arrived in 
Wolseley’s camp after five years of captivity in Kumase, Percy Luxmore wrote 
to his wife, and Blackwood’s, that:  
the members of the Press are furious because the General will not allow 
them to interview the missionary. I don’t know what information he has 
brought down, but I saw most of the correspondents yesterday, and that 
one of the ‘Standard’ [Henty] was beside himself with rage and prickly 
heat.246  
 
Boyle railed against such restrictions in the Daily Telegraph: 
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It will be observed that in too many cases I am obliged to preface my 
story with the hateful words ‘it IS said.’ The fact is that no facilities at all 
are offered to correspondents in this war. We may pick up our 
information as we can, for the answer of the staff to any inquirer is 
invariably, ‘I don't know anything!’ Of personal courtesy there is 
abundance in most cases…A little less politeness, and a little more 
information, is an exchange which correspondents would welcome. At 
the same time, a civilian might think it within the resources of military art 
to give both. As a matter of system, however, Sir Garnet disapproves of 
correspondents. In this war he has an excellent opportunity of showing 
his abstract objection to them, for there never could be a case in which 
gossip would do so little harm.247 
 
Napier was far more accommodating to correspondents, as there was 
indeed little chance that their dispatches would reach Magdala in the Abyssinian 
mountains. He provided each one with a letter granting unrestricted access to 
military activity. There is no evidence of official censorship of their reports. He 
did require the specials to pay for their provisions, the first month in advance, 
but also invited them to his tent for dinner many times and seemed to get on 
affably with them. The mood among other officers, nonetheless, reflected the 
usual military suspicion towards the press. Lieutenant Scott, one of Napier’s 
ADCs, wrote to his mother that, ‘we have swarms of special correspondents 
with us, and the general opinion seems to be we should be much better without 
them’.248 Colonel Merewether refused to allow Henty to join the reconnoitering 
expedition on the basis that any additional mouths would strain food supplies, 
despite Henty’s insistence that he would bring his own. The correspondent later 
learned that Merewether had, in fact, been offended by a number of articles 
criticising his leadership that had appeared in the Standard. Henty’s portrayal of 
that officer would only get worse.249 
This incident perhaps embodied the true nature of the official disquiet 
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toward the press. As Boyle had pointed out, newspaper dispatches could not 
seriously threaten military secrecy. Callwell would later suggest that, ‘in small 
wars, when the correspondent is restricted to the side of the regular troops, the 
mischief resulting from indiscreet disclosures is greatly diminished by the 
ignorance of the foe’.250 The Crimean War had not been a public relations 
disaster for the Army because the press kept the enemy informed of troop 
movements, but because it kept the British public informed of troop suffering. A 
confidential 1878 War Office paper, Newspaper Correspondents with an Army 
in the Field, opened with an admonishment of such ‘amateur’ complaints: ‘It is 
bad enough when correspondents, by giving their opinion on matters which they 
do not understand, excite the public against an officer in command, who, 
perhaps, is doing all that can be done, and who is supported by the confidence 
of the Government’.251 By doing so, it was feared, correspondents would also 
undermine the public’s confidence in that government. 
This War Office paper represented an early attempt to codify and 
standardise, indeed legalise, military control of the press. Produced by the 
Intelligence Branch, it presented a series of recommended measures to 
minimise the risk that press correspondents could pose. It proposed that such 
civilians should be placed under the Mutiny Act and bound by the same 
censorship regulations as regular field conveyance. Journalists would, thus, be 
legally limited to approved modes of communication under military surveillance. 
Most importantly, the paper proposed, all correspondents wishing to stay with 
an army would require a license granted by the Commanding officer. Military 
authorities would, ‘not grant licences to those whom they consider undesirable 
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to have as correspondents in the field. Retired officers will be preferred’.252 
Significantly, newspaper editors would have to sign these agreements along 
with their correspondents and both would be subject to license rejection 
together, thus adding another incentivised filter for information. The 11th 
recommendation demonstrated the level of press control to which the military 
aspired: ‘The Military Authorities will give as much information, as they may 
consider advisable and consistent with their duty, to correspondents; the latter 
are, therefore, invited to get their news from that source as much as 
possible’.253 The recommendations were never adopted in full, nor released 
publicly, and provide a window into the institutional mindset of the War Office at 
this time. 
Before any such attempts at standardisation, of course, officers had 
already been using their considerable authority to assert control over press 
coverage. In The Soldier’s Pocket Book, Wolseley famously advocated directly 
lying to the press: ‘the post and the telegraph will always be in the general’s 
hands, so he can lay an embargo on the mails whenever he wishes it…or he 
can, by spreading false news among the gentlemen of the press, use them as a 
medium by which to deceive an enemy’.254 In a related, though not strictly 
press, issue, Wolseley remarked that George Greaves, who succeeded him in 
Cyprus, ‘had yet to learn that it does not do to insert the whole truth in official 
correspondence’.255 Wolseley was by no means alone. Spiers claimed that:  
From the Indian Mutiny (1857-9) onwards a succession of military 
commanders and their staffs, including Sir Colin Campbell, Wolseley and 
his rival, Sir Frederick Roberts, sought to accommodate, co-opt and 
manipulate the media. They hoped thereby to utilise the correspondents 
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to project a favourable image of the army in general and of their specific 
campaigns in particular.256  
 
Many of the key players in this process were, notably, associated with 
empire.257 An important distinction between the European-focused military 
establishment and imperial soldiers was that the former tended to avoid the 
press, while the latter, ‘learned to further their objectives of their careers by 
taking advantage of the new channels of publicity, playing to the press 
gallery’.258 Wolseley used the press to counterbalance and circumvent the Duke 
of Cambridge’s enmity-driven attempts to block his career.259 While traversing 
the Canadian wilderness in command of the Red River Expedition, sent to put 
an end to the Métis rebellion, he rephrased Shakespeare’s As You Like It in a 
letter to his wife: ‘the bubble reputation which I seek, not at the cannon’s but at 
the mosquito’s mouth, is the light that beckons me on’.260 The wilderness could 
be the place to make one’s name, but that of course hinged on the public 
perception of events and one’s own place in them.  
A commander could seek to control the text in the press through official 
letters and announcements, as these were sure to be reprinted in newspapers 
in full and verbatim. As Wolseley finalised his ultimatum to the Ashanti King, he 
told his wife that the letter was: 
only really meant for the English public, as it is not expected that even an 
answer will be sent to it. I have had to be very careful therefore in the 
words selected…I feel that if it does not meet with public favor, the 
Government will throw me over and say that I am to blame.261  
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Wolseley’s concern for public opinion could thus influence critical aspects of a 
campaign. That was less true of Napier, who, while sensitive to politics, did not 
concern himself with the popular mood. Wolseley’s example would increasingly 
become the norm among officers in future colonial conflicts. 
Military leaders could further seek to influence public perceptions by 
circumventing the newspapers and printing their own accounts. Halfway through 
the Ashanti campaign, just before the arrival of British reinforcements, J. J. 
Collett published a short news booklet titled The Life of King Koffee; Or, Sir 
Garnet Wolseley, the Ashantees and the Fantees, their Mode of Warfare; 
Fighting in the Bush! The front cover, an illustration of an Ashanti warrior 
holding a dripping severed head, was intended to draw the eye. Sold at 
newsagents for a penny, the booklet was composed of a series of Wolseley’s 
official dispatches (and several of Captain Freemantle’s) selected to maximise 
the impression that the war was going well and that Europeans could survive 
and thrive in the legendary tropical climate. The Life of King Coffee will be 
examined in detail in later chapters; suffice to say that Wolseley certainly had a 
hand in its production and thus managed to put his preferred version of events 
in direct competition with that of the periodical press.262 
Whether through the direct efforts of Commanders-in-Chief or the honest 
temperaments of the newsmen themselves, special correspondents were 
largely supportive of and deferential to the army.263 Spiers has written 
extensively on the relationship between journalists and the military in the late 
nineteenth-century. He found that in the vast majority of cases these men felt an 
affinity for and a shared set of values with the officers on whom they reported. 
While on campaign, they were continually reliant on the army; if not for 
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transport, communication, information, and access, then at the very least for 
protection. This relationship of dependence presented incentives to temper any 
harsh words toward one’s ‘hosts’, but also undoubtedly forged some sense of 
common plight and common cause against the enemy and the elements. The 
result, Spiers argued, was that, ‘they generally lavished praise upon field 
commanders and never mocked them’.264 He also found that special 
correspondents on campaign, ‘were often intensely patriotic and imbued with a 
strong imperial ethos, supportive of military values, and sympathetic to the 
soldier’.265 Reade provided an interesting glimpse of his partiality for the army 
soon after his return from Ashanti. He died in April 1875, and the epitaph he 
provided for his tombstone gave pride of place to his campaign experience: ‘In 
the Ashantee campaign he was always in the front. He shared in the defence of 
‘Abrakrampa’, fought in the ranks of the 42nd Highlanders at the great battle of 
‘Amoaful’ and was the only civilian present at the capture of Coomassie’.266 
As discussed in the introduction, most special correspondents also wrote 
for pro-imperial, or at least broadly pro-military, papers. The Times, Standard, 
Morning Post, Telegraph, and Times of India could all generally be expected to 
support the empire, national prestige, and the opening up of Africa. Their 
special correspondents reflected those dispositions.267 Henty was often 
described as, ‘the most Imperialist of Imperialists’, a characterisation he would 
come to exemplify in his jingoist boys’ novels.268 In his account of the Ashanti 
Expedition, Henty expressed his ‘sincere thanks to Sir Garnet Wolseley, for the 
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very great kindness with which he uniformly treated us’.269 Boyle similarly 
prefaced his book with a declaration of friendship and allegiance:  
If anywhere in this work or in my published letters, I have offended the 
feelings of a single officer of the expedition, I beg of him to believe that it 
is done unwittingly. A wilful hurt would be the most ungrateful return for 
unvaried courtesy on the part of all with whom I was brought into 
contact.270  
 
These dedications were of course largely formulaic and conventional, but 
nonetheless emblematic of overall tone. 
There was some scattered disapproval among the press coverage, 
Stanley and Reade being notable examples. Stanley was critical of the transport 
problems that hindered both campaigns, and always of the elitism he sensed 
from the British officers. That said, he also praised Napier and Wolseley as men 
and commanders, directing his criticisms toward some of their particular 
decisions.271 Reade went a step farther in Ashanti, where he was quite 
disparaging of Wolseley’s leadership. He usually argued against the emerging 
‘official’ narrative of events, invariably downplaying Wolseley’s effectiveness in 
his own version. Reade took the General severely to task over transport 
problems and for being too lenient with King Karikari. He claimed suggestively 
at the end of his book that: ‘In this work I have applied to Sir Garnet Wolseley’s 
brilliant success that searching kind of criticism which is usually reserved for 
undertakings that have failed. I have not glossed over or palliated a single error 
which he committed during the campaign’.272 Reade was atypical in the amount 
of such criticism that he included in his final drafts. 
When The Spectator reported on Wolseley’s departure for the Gold 
Coast in September 1873, the editor expressed his hope that the General, ‘may 
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make a good war, a good peace, and a good book out of it’.273 Wolseley did not 
publish a book about Ashanti (until his autobiography), nor did Napier of 
Abyssinia, but there was no shortage of officers who did. Any understanding of 
the dynamic between the army and the press in this period is complicated by 
the considerable number of men who were indeed both. When Stanley arrived 
at Cape Coast and took stock of his competition, he concluded that 
Brackenbury was ‘an indefatigable caterer for the Press’, and that Maurice 
‘writes for one if not two newspapers…I will take it for granted, that they 
[Wolseley’s staff] are mostly all newspaper writers in military clothes’.274 An 
overestimation, perhaps, but Stanley was right to suspect that a large number of 
the reports sent to publishers from Abyssinia and Ashanti came from within the 
officer corps. 
In East Africa, Lieutenant Shepherd wrote for the Daily News and the 
Times of India. The latter published his letters in book form, unchanged but for 
the addition of a preface and some addenda in the footnotes.275 Lieutenant 
Whiteside sent despatches to the Morning Post. Major Baigrie sent scores of 
unsolicited drawings and paintings to the Illustrated London News, which was 
then a common enough practice for artistically skilled officers abroad. Attributing 
them only to ‘A Staff Officer’ until after the campaign, the paper published 32 of 
Baigrie’s drawings over 7 months, many of which were also included in the 
ILN’s published book.276 
In West Africa, Maurice wrote for the Daily News and published a book 
primarily compiled from his articles. Lieutenant Dooner likely wrote for the same 
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paper anonymously (one of the officers did, at any rate) and he authored a book 
of his experience.277 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine printed letters from 
Captain Rogers and Commander Luxmore and the Pall Mall Gazette from 
Commanding Royal Engineer Robert Home. Major Butler published a rousing 
and thoroughly embittered tale of his unsuccessful mission to recruit the Akim 
nation to march on Kumase.278 
Brackenbury knew something about the importance of army writers to the 
public perception of a conflict. His brother, Captain Charles Brackenbury, had 
been a military correspondent for The Times in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-
Prussian Wars.279 Henry presented his two-volume The Ashanti War, A 
Narrative: Prepared from the Official Documents by Permission of Major-
General Sir Garnet Wolseley as the official and authoritative account of the 
expedition. Upon his return to England, he absolutely rushed, successfully, to 
get his book to publication first, before any of the other forthcoming accounts 
might taint public opinion. In fact, the War Office neither commissioned nor 
authorised Brackenbury’s book. He approached the Blackwood and Sons 
publishers himself and signed a book contract before the expedition had 
launched. Upon the book’s release, Brackenbury faced a War Office 
investigation asking whether he should have had access to all the military 
documents he used, much less publish them as appendixes. Nothing ever came 
of the investigation. 
Brackenbury dedicated The Ashanti War, ‘to my comrades of the head-
quarter-staff mess in remembrance of our unbroken good-fellowship from the 
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first to the last day’.280 The military correspondents were, as might be expected, 
very supportive of the campaigns, their commanding officers, and the British 
military in general. They sought to oppose any negative voices in the civilian 
press, taking the roles of advocate and apologist for their Commanders-in-
Chief. Hoping to pre-empt the criticisms that might follow from the special 
correspondents, Brackenbury justified and defended the field transport 
arrangements and assigned all blame for supply difficulties to the unreliability of 
the Fante carriers. Maurice took an even more passionate tack in his book. In 
almost every chapter, he directly addressed one or more ‘misunderstandings’ in 
the press or public perception, invariably pushing for an interpretation more in 
the General’s favour. Maurice also defended the officer corps’ handling of the 
transport system and Wolseley’s decision not to place guards on all the gates of 
the captured Kumase, both of which Stanley had criticised. Maurice ended his 
book with a lengthy rebuttal to T. J. Bowles, whose scathing article ‘The Ashanti 
War, Unnecessary and Unjust’ had appeared in Fraser’s Magazine.281 Maurice 
systematically countered the validity of Bowles’ arguments and closed his book 
with the statement: ‘If ever there was a war necessary and just it was that which 
ended in the destruction of Coomassie’.282 
1.3 Prestige and the World Stage 
In his analysis of the British empire, Hyam argued that from the 1870s: 
crucially and fundamentally, obsession with prestige assumed a primary 
significance for all expanding states…So pervasive is the determining 
influence of prestige on governments that it can also be shown to be 
intimately related to geopolitical assessments, and thus a root cause of 
the wars which they fight.283  
                                                       
280 Henry Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, A Narrative: Prepared from the Official Documents by 
Permission of Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 
1874). 
281 T. J. Bowles, ‘The Ashantee War Unnecessary and Unjust,’ Fraser's Magazine IX, no. 49 
(1874) pp. 124-34. 
282 Maurice, The Ashantee War, p. 405. 
283 Ronald Hyam, Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) p. 130. 
72 
 
 
Disraeli was at the centre of that obsession in British politics. He was 
determined to reverse the isolationist trend of the mid-century and reassert 
Britain’s influence as a European power, going so far as to threaten war with 
Russia during the 1875-8 Eastern Crisis.284 Hurd and Young claimed that 
Disraeli considered prestige to be ‘a solid asset. It conferred authority; it 
provided security; indeed it was the true currency of international relations’.285 
He thus made a real priority of accumulating and protecting this asset. The Earl 
of Derby, then foreign secretary, complained to Lord Salisbury in 1877 that 
Disraeli, ‘believes thoroughly in “prestige” – as all foreigners do, and would think 
it (quite sincerely) in the interests of the country to spend 200 millions on a war 
if the result was to make foreign States think more highly of us as a military 
power’.286 
Liberals, in general, did not put much stock in the benefits of prestige. It 
had been a Liberal article of faith in the mid-century that conflicts between 
nations were not strictly necessary. What mattered was unrestrained world 
trade, which was beneficial to all. War, territorial expansion (at least when 
coupled with exclusive exploitation), and competitive prestige would all lead to 
protectionism and hinder free trade.287  
However, the political scene was fluctuating during this period and party 
perspectives on foreign affairs underwent realignment. By the end of the 1860s, 
the Chartist ideal of radical patriotism had fragmented and no longer appealed, 
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or even seemed relevant, to the British electorate.288 The 1867 Representation 
of the People Act, along with the corresponding Irish and Scottish acts in 1868, 
almost doubled the size of the electorate, and endowed public opinion with 
unprecedented importance.289 As the franchise expansion took place during a 
move away from isolationism, foreign policy debates became wedge issues and 
major factors in working-class decisions to associate with one or the other 
party.290 Over the course of the 1870s, Disraeli carved out a new ideal of 
patriotism, one firmly associated with royalism, militarism, and Conservatism.291 
Thus, the empire and imperialism, of little consideration to most Britons in 
earlier decades, became more popular.292 While the term itself had not yet been 
coined, the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions took place during the 
materialisation of this popular concern for national prestige that would soon be 
known as ‘jingoism’.  
There were critics, to be sure, who interpreted the concept of prestige in 
a different way and believed that imperial ventures sullied Britain’s reputation. 
During the preparations for Wolseley’s departure, the prominent philosopher 
Richard Congreve published The Ashantee War, a pamphlet in which he called 
for an immediate end to the British expedition.293 Congreve cast British 
technological superiority as a source of shame, rather than of pride: 
Can anybody seriously maintain that a successful war with Ashantee, 
with all the appliances of modern destructive skill, and in sole reliance on 
our superiority in this respect, is calculated to give us prestige? Putting 
aside the climate, the disparity in every point except personal bravery is 
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too great to make success a credit even on the ordinary standard of 
military judgments.294 
 
Thomas Snape of the Liverpool Peace Society made a similar argument in The 
Ashantee War: Its Causes and Results, a strongly anti-war pamphlet that the 
Society published and sold for two pence, less than the cost of an issue of The 
Times.295 In these tracts, Congreve and Snape claimed that prestige could only 
result from victory in a fair fight, which the Ashanti would not present. That was 
not quite how Disraeli and his supporters conceived of it. Imperialism in Africa, 
and the advanced weaponry employed there, was largely intended to influence 
the other great powers of Europe. 
Why, then, did Britain need to boost her prestige on the world stage? By 
the late 1860s, Porter argued, the Balance of Power, ‘was at an end, destroyed 
by its own contradictions, and Britain was left without even an illusion to cover 
her nakedness’.296 Russia had made huge territorial gains, the battle of 
Königgrätz in 1866 made the spectre of a centralised Germany very real, 
France was riding a wave of industrial development and appeared increasingly 
expansionist, and the bulk of the British Army was scattered across the empire. 
The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica, the Maori Wars and Poverty Bay 
Massacre in New Zealand, and the Indian Mutiny (still sharp in the collective 
memory) seemed to suggest that these forces were needed simply to keep 
rebellion in the colonies at bay and could not be easily recalled in a crisis.297 
With the illusion of balance somewhat dissipated, there was an, ‘ominous gap in 
Britain’s diplomatic defences’.298 Throughout the 1860s, the other Great Powers 
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had conspicuously ignored Britain’s views in international affairs.299 After the 
Prussian invasion of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, Disraeli tabled a vote of 
censure against Palmerston’s policies, arguing that:  
the just influence of England in the councils of Europe has been lowered. 
Within twelve months we have been twice repulsed at St. Petersburg. 
Twice we supplicated in vain at Paris. We have menaced Austria, and 
Austria has allowed our menaces to pass her like an idle wind. We have 
threatened Prussia, and Prussia has defied us. Our objurgations have 
rattled over the head of the German Diet, and the German Diet has 
treated them with contempt.300 
 
Expanding the armed forces would not necessarily provide much of a 
solution. On the one hand, Britain could never hope to keep up with the armies 
of the major European powers; the population was insufficient and the 
constitution stood in the way of conscription. From the 1870s till the outbreak of 
war in 1915, the British army would consistently find it difficult even to recruit 
enough men to replace peacetime wastage.301 On the other hand, the Tories 
and Liberals were both (in their own ways) very concerned about the cost of it 
all. While Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1866, Disraeli recommended to Lord 
Derby that: 
The moment the American elections are over, we should withdraw the 
great body of our troops [from Canada]…Leave the Canadians to defend 
themselves; recall the African squadron; give up the settlements on the 
West Coast of Africa; and we shall make a saving which will, at the same 
time, enable us to build ships and have a good Budget.302 
 
Despite his support of imperialism, which in later decades would be firmly 
associated with territorial expansion, Disraeli was mindful of the financial burden 
of empire during the 1870s.  
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Eldridge disagreed strongly with the common suggestion that Disraeli 
had been separatist in the 1850s and 60s and somehow morphed into an 
expansionist in the 1870s.303 Disraeli, he argued, ‘had never been, nor did he 
claim to be, interested in individual colonial problems, but he was interested in 
the potential value of the empire to British power and prestige’.304 The 
reductions to colonial garrisons were based on the conviction that the Empire 
could be best defended by large reserves of troops stationed in the home 
islands and in India, capable of being dispatched when and where most 
needed. This expedition-centred strategy would make the best use of the Royal 
Navy and, advocates believed, give Britain a stronger profile in the eyes of the 
other major powers.305 If Disraeli was primarily concerned with utilising British 
possessions to increase British influence in foreign affairs, then his swing 
toward ‘imperialism’ was more a change of method than of principle.306 Hence, 
as Porter noted:  
what strikes one most immediately about his style of imperialism is the 
importance that was attached to that “style” itself: to the propaganda 
benefits, domestic and foreign, that were thought to accrue from the 
lesson he taught the Abyssinians in 1867, for example – without Britain 
taking an acre of territory.307  
 
In short, an imperialist posture need not necessarily impose a larger empire on 
the country. 
 What was important was that Britain was seen to be militarily capable, 
and that might be accomplished by short, well-orchestrated, and well-reported 
small wars.308 After the Abyssinian campaign, Disraeli suggested to the Queen 
that Napier should receive a peerage for, ‘wiping out all the old stories of 
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Crimean blundering’.309 In a recent article, Collins suggested that British small 
wars of the late nineteenth-century were undertaken as a means of ‘creating 
victory’. Military objectives, he claimed, ‘were often selected for their impact 
upon political or public opinion rather than for their material benefits. The 
overwhelming concern was to create a situation which could be regarded as a 
victory’.310 Harcourt has similarly argued that Disraeli sought to warn Europe 
that Britain, if threatened, was able to mount a quick and efficient military 
response. The Suez Canal would open in November 1869, bringing the British 
Isles four thousand miles closer to India.311 The army might be scattered across 
the empire, but it could still be brought into play where least expected.312 This 
idea gave the expedition the potential to exert real influence on international 
relations, and the presence of foreign observers in the Abyssinian theatre 
ensured that any success there would be noticed. 
‘One remarkable feature of this Expedition’, Simpson recalled, ‘was that 
almost every Government in Europe sent officers with it to report upon its 
organisation’.313 These foreign military personnel were granted permission to 
travel with the British army. In all, a brigadier-general and a lieutenant-colonel 
from Spain, a captain and a commandant from France, two captains from 
Austria, a major and a captain from Italy, two lieutenants from Prussia, and two 
from the Netherlands, were attached to Napier’s force.314 It was unusual to see 
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so many foreign observers in a far-off imperial conflict. Their interest, in fact, 
was not really in Abyssinia but in the state of British military preparedness 
viewed through the lens of the European power balance. Observers and 
intelligencers were expected to carefully assess an army’s levels of 
organisation, professionalisation, and technological development and report on 
soldiers’ tactical effectiveness and overall morale.315 A British captain in the 
Second Opium War (1856-60) expressed the common belief that every 
European nation, ‘is closely watching us, and marking how we are likely to 
come out of the great fight hereafter to be fought’.316 Those watching in 
Abyssinia, it was generally believed, had reason to be impressed. Henty closed 
the final despatch to his special correspondent column in the Standard with the 
claim that, ‘by our success under innumerable difficulties, England has gained a 
prestige…which is the more gratifying inasmuch as that England, although she 
has always risen under difficulties, and has come triumphantly out of great 
wars, has yet notoriously failed in her “little wars”’.317 Since Britain only had little 
wars for such a long period, they were the only observable analogue for her 
military abilities as a whole, and such notoriety, Disraeli believed, had to be 
corrected. In the conclusion of his book about the campaign, Stanley drew a 
different analogue:  
Though a little war, it was a great campaign … the fame of it sounded 
with loud reverberations over wide Asia. Princes and potentates, 
scattered far apace, heard the noise of it and trembled; a peaceful 
epoch, they saw, had not vitiated England’s strength; and this last, this 
best, this greatest of victories, seemingly made so little of, established 
her prestige on a firmer base than ever.318  
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The British government was not particularly concerned with the nation’s prestige 
among Asian ‘potentates’, but surely the victory had been heard elsewhere as 
well. 
1.4 Foreign Media Reception of Abyssinia 
In a congratulatory letter to Napier, Sir Stafford Northcote wrote that the 
expedition ‘will have effected as great an alteration in our position in the eyes of 
Europe as the battle of Sadowa effected in the position of Prussia’.319 That 
British officials intended to influence foreign opinion is itself important. It is also 
worth briefly considering what impact the Abyssinian campaign ultimately made 
in the foreign press. When the expedition had barely begun, the New York 
Times Russian correspondent reported that: 
Russian journals are already assuming that the English design is to 
permanently hold certain portions of Abyssinia and on the strength of the 
supposition they suggest in very plain language a rapprochement 
between England and Russia on the Eastern question as likely to 
recommend itself to the interests of both parties.320 
 
If that sounding of the periodical press in Moscow was indeed accurate, it 
certainly gave some credence to Northcote’s optimism.  
In September 1867, The Times of London reported that, ‘the topic of 
Abyssinia is decidedly a favourite one now in Paris’.321 The French mood was 
cautious and somewhat dubious early on. The Journal de Paris suggested that 
King Theodore’s army was fully capable of posing a serious threat, making the 
fanciful claim that 2,000 European deserters had joined and drilled the 
Abyssinian troops.322 
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A particular media rush sprang up around the Comte de Buisson, a 
French nobleman and military adventurer who had visited Theodore’s court.323 
Buisson disparaged the British expedition in a series of editorial letters, 
displaying what The Times declared a ‘manifest malevolence towards 
England’.324 In the Patrie, a Conservative and pro-government Paris 
newspaper, Buisson gloomily predicted that ‘neither 15,000 nor 20,000 soldiers, 
Indian or English will suffice to rescue the prisoners’. He claimed that Theodore 
possessed several thousand breech-loading rifles and a working cartridge 
manufacture.325 
As months passed and the campaign advanced, French papers showed 
more concern for a potential spread of British influence. The Finance argued 
that the expedition was part of a British manoeuvre to gain control of the Red 
Sea. With Perim Island under occupation and the Suez Canal close to 
completion, warned the author, the English government would soon have ‘the 
exclusive possession of the Red Sea and of Abyssinia, and the protectorate of 
the possession of Egypt’.326 The Siècle similarly claimed that much of the 
French population believed Britain would annex Abyssinia after the expedition. 
La France also drew attention to Suez. The Abyssinian coast would soon border 
the new route to India, where lay, ‘the true motive of the war which the English 
have carried on, and of which the deliverance of their countrymen was merely 
the pretext’.327 
When news of Napier’s success reached France in April 1868, The 
Times Paris correspondent claimed that: 
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the result of the campaign in Abyssinia excites astonishment and 
admiration in Paris – in the Press and in society. It is the same sentiment 
among military men as among civilians, unqualified praise of the manner 
in which General Napier has done his work…With their lively imagination 
some writers look upon the whole affair as a ‘magnificent epic’.328 
 
The Journal de Paris marvelled at the speed with which the army had marched, 
and the Temps posited that news of Britain’s success would have immense 
political implications around the Indian Sea.329 La France took the opportunity to 
hold Abyssinia up as a positive example of political unity during war. The 
government-linked newspaper contrasted the British Parliament to the French 
Legislative Chamber, where the Opposition party had been critical of a recent 
French punitive expedition to punish the Mexican government for its supposed 
ill treatment of French citizens.330  
May 1868 saw the Comte de Buisson make a brief return to the Paris 
press. Buisson had evidently been near Magdala at the time of the British 
victory. His account, as translated in the New York Times, was still critical of 
British motives but acknowledged their military competence. In what was likely 
meant as a slight against British honour, Buisson (misspelled Busson in the 
NYT) recounted that, ‘seven hundred of [Theodore’s] warriors fell before the 
terrible fire of the breech-loaders, while three times that number were wounded. 
The valor of Theodore’s soldiers was of no avail against the appliances of 
modern warfare’.331 The translated article itself demonstrates that there was 
enough international interest in Abyssinia for a New York paper to reprint a 
Paris paper on the subject. 
The New York Times embraced the chance to print a vicarious tale of 
exotic adventure. Their London correspondent rousingly declared at the outset 
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that Theodore had taken his prisoners, ‘to the great disgust of England, the 
distress of the families of the prisoners, and the great disgrace of the Civis 
Romanum doctrine of Lord Palmerston. English prestige suffers in the 
East…war will be declared at once without any more drifting’.332 Over 1867-8, 
the NYT featured 145 articles on the topic of the expedition. During the most 
intense period of conflict from December 1867 to June 1868, it ran a dozen 
articles per month.333 The paper was overwhelmingly complimentary of the 
British forces. The fall of Magdala was described as ‘highly important and 
gratifying intelligence’.334 Napier had ‘unquestionably manifested military 
capacity of a very high order’ and, with his victory, ‘the prestige so invaluable to 
England and India has been maintained intact’.335 
There was no suggestion in the NYT of American concern for the spread 
of British influence. ‘We do not believe that the English Government will make 
any attempt to hold Abyssinia’, one author claimed, recognising that to do so, 
‘would produce a commotion throughout Europe. It would be as offensive to 
France as to Russia’.336 Notwithstanding the concerns of those countries, the 
NYT expressed confidence that, ‘England does not now wish any increase of 
her outlying or isolated possessions in Africa, Asia, or America’.337 
Presented, as it was, through a glut of domestic and foreign media 
attention, the British imperial venture into Abyssinia was a veritable public 
spectacle and, as such, was consumed and interpreted in part as an exhibition. 
1.5 Exhibitions and Public Spectacles 
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The 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition has long been recognised as a 
symbol of Britain’s overwhelming self-confidence in its industrial and 
commercial supremacy, then at its peak.338 The success and cultural impact of 
the event gave rise to an exhibition culture that continued to re-enact and 
reinforce this symbol of Britain’s dominance, later organisers always looking 
back to 1851 as a model and ideal.339 Exhibitions became a contested space in 
which nations competed for prestige. The basis of this competition, and the 
central focus of these events, was technology. The Crystal Palace came to 
represent ‘technological confidence, even swagger’.340 In his A Guide to the 
Great Exhibition, George Routledge claimed that, ‘the collection of machinery 
excites far deeper interest than anything else exhibited’.341 Robert Askrill used 
the identical phrase in his Yorkshire visitor’s guide to the Great Exhibition.342 At 
the 1862 London exhibition, the Illustrated London News singled out Machinery 
Hall and printed a double-page portrait of it.343 Richards has described the 
technological performance that took place as, ‘the elevation of a form of 
technology into a form of culture…The Victorian stage put machines on the 
stage, and after a time the machines became the stage’.344 
In the decades that followed, the focus and fixation of British exhibition 
culture slowly shifted. As European nations increasingly looked to empire as 
another contested space in which to compete for prestige, so imperial imagery 
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moved into the competitive realm of the exhibition.345 Mackenzie claimed that, 
‘their theme was gradually transformed from the international industrial 
exposition, as in 1851 and 1862, to Imperial and colonial display. They came to 
have a predominantly imperial flavour from the 1880s, precisely the decade of 
the new aggressive imperialism’.346 He went on to say that exhibitions, 
‘effectively chart the rise and fall of imperial sentiment’.347 It was, therefore, 
fitting that Disraeli delivered his famous 1872 speech to the National Union of 
Conservative Associations at the Crystal Palace, during which he established 
the Tory party’s position on empire and his desire that England, ‘will be a great 
country, - an imperial country - a country where your sons, when they 
rise…obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the 
respect of the world’.348 
The 1851 exhibition had been cast as a tribute to commerce and to a 
future of peace through commerce, though there were certainly weapons 
among the displays. The number of weapons on display increased in 
subsequent events, as did the prominence with which they were presented. 
One of the most eye-catching exhibits at the 1867 Paris Exhibition was a Krupp 
steel cannon capable of firing thousand-pound shells.349 The event as a whole 
showed how far Napoleon III’s industrial and commercial stimulation had 
progressed since the 1850s, causing shock and envy in Britain. The Times 
submitted that, ‘the real strength of France, depending on material prosperity 
and industry, had been illustrated by the Great Exhibition of Paris’, and pointed 
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out that the event had been witnessed by the monarchs of Prussia, Russia, 
Austria, and several other nations.350 
Greenhalgh argued that power groups within British society sought to 
use the Great Exhibitions to encourage the idea of ‘Greater Britain’ among the 
population. If, he suggested, ‘the population at home could be swayed into 
believing Africa was theirs, the problems of sending resources to defend it 
would be considerably reduced’.351 Moreover, if the population could be 
enthralled by the power of British military technology at these events, then the 
endeavour of defending the empire would seem less daunting. 
Indeed, the amplified focus on empire did not come at the expense of the 
machinery rooms. New technologies remained the foundation of the later Great 
Exhibitions, which were industrial fairs above all. What the increased concern 
for imperialism did was link the technological swagger of the fair directly to the 
prospect of dominating Africa and Asia. As Hoffenberg explained, ‘machines 
were one measure of man for Victorians and Edwardians, a yardstick by which 
to determine the progress for each exhibiting nation. The technology displays 
offered an evolutionary lesson…The history of machines told the history of 
man’.352  
By the 1870s, the history of machines was also believed to demonstrate 
the contemporary hierarchy of the races. This discourse within exhibitions 
reflected and perpetuated changes in wider society. In 1867 Frederick Farrar, 
then headmaster at Harrow, published his essay Aptitudes of the Races, in 
which he argued that invention and scientific discovery were the best markers of 
racial superiority and inferiority. He promulgated this idea among a generation 
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of public school boys who went into English politics and imperial 
administration.353 In his 1871 book Primitive Culture, which strongly influenced 
the new developing field of anthropology, Edward Tylor ranked the stages of 
human development and their contemporary representatives (savage, barbarian 
and modern) on the basis of their demonstrated capacity for ‘adapting nature to 
man's own ends’.354 In his comprehensive cultural history, Machines as the 
Measure of Men, Adas argued that during the mid-nineteenth century, 
‘European observers came to view science and especially technology as the 
most objective and unassailable measures of their own civilization’s past 
achievement and present worth. In science and technology their superiority was 
readily demonstrable’.355 Exhibitions were sites of that competitive 
demonstration. When the British public turned their attention outward to empire 
during 1868-74, therefore, exhibition culture had already established the criteria 
by which they would rank racial dominance and international prestige.  
The result was an empire experienced at home through what Ryan 
termed ‘spectacular view-making’.356 In Manchester, the Belle Vue Park 
pyrodramas, themselves interesting performances of technology, were popular 
attractions for the middle and working classes. Elaborate stage performances 
engaged a wide variety of topical subject matter to appeal to a wide audience. 
In 1875 Belle Vue staged The Capture of Coomassio, ostensibly a re-enactment 
of Wolseley’s final battle against the Ashanti. Actors dressed as the Black 
Watch Highland Regiment fought black-painted performers amongst camels 
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and elephants from the park zoo, punctuated by loud and bright pyrotechnics.357 
In 1868, similarly, the Royal Polytechnic exhibited a large diorama of The Death 
of Theodore twice daily to enthusiastic audiences, while the Royal Geographical 
Society and the War Office Topographical and Statistical Department both 
exhibited panoramas of Abyssinian photographs.358 A central claim of this study 
is that a similar sense of performance was present in the imperial setting as was 
present in such reproductions and emplotments of that setting at home. 
Cannadine characterised the spectacle of empire as driven by the 
domestication of the exotic under familiar hierarchical categories, a sentiment 
he termed Ornamentalism.359 Ryan claimed that, ‘in many respects, Britain’s 
Empire, like much in the Victorian age, had the atmosphere and aesthetic 
charge of a grand spectacle’.360 In one sense, exhibitions and pyrodramas 
brought this spectacle home to Britain. In another, the men who went on 
expedition brought a similar sense of technological spectacle out to the 
periphery. 
1.6 Conclusions 
By the 1870s, exhibitions had served as a primary outlet of the nation’s 
desire for prestige for some twenty years. The emergent imperial ambition to 
which Disraeli catered built upon the existing ideals for the demonstration of 
national dominance that exhibitions had set. At some level, exhibitions had 
already demonstrated how European nations competed with each other; the 
popular excitement for imperial ventures transposed where that competition 
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might take place. As the coming chapters will demonstrate, the exhibition ideal 
of technological dominance was reflected in the manner in which the Abyssinian 
and Ashanti expeditions were reported and the narratives cast. It even 
influenced some of the military performances that took place on campaign. 
Expeditions sent to exotic locations, witnessed and retold in popular press, and 
scrutinised by foreign powers, were emplotted in part as military enactments of 
an industrial fair: expeditions as exhibitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Novel Military Technology and 
the British Army 
2.1 The Professional Military Debate on Mitrailleurs 
 
In 1873, Major Robert Home at the British War Office Topographical and 
Statistical Department prepared a summary of the prominent contemporary 
military debates taking place on the continent. On the subject of machine guns, 
he opined, ‘a new weapon, the mitrailleuse, has been introduced recently, about 
the value of which opinions are divided’.361 His research turned up enough 
credible opinion both for and against the device that he concluded there was no 
consensus among military thinkers to either the question of whether to employ 
mitrailleurs, or the matter of how to employ them.   
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The implications of early machine guns were actively debated in British 
military circles during the 1860s and ‘70s in tactical treatises, the Colburn’s 
United Service Magazine and Navy and Military Journal, and both the journal 
and the lectures of the Royal United Service Institution.362 RUSI had opened in 
1831 to establish a ‘strictly scientific and professional society, and not a club’.363 
It became an important forum for new military thinking, tactics, administration, 
and technology among the professionalising officer class and the journal, 
JRUSI, was the most important military periodical in Victorian Britain.364 This 
section will explore the machine gun debate as a window into the culture of the 
British military, its images of itself, and its images of empire during a pivotal 
period in the formation of British imperialism. It was by no means certain in this 
debate whether the Gatling gun or any mitrailleur would pass muster.  
Many histories of the British military in this period characterise the officer 
class as having been ‘resistant’ to new weapon technology and particularly to 
the machine gun.365 If such weapons are implicitly accepted as having been 
inevitable, the narrative tends to revolve around the inventors who seemingly 
understood the future of war that their own devices brought about and the 
(pejoratively) ‘militarist’ army brass who in their elite traditionalism failed to 
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predict that future. Edgerton has argued for an approach to the history of 
invention in which one resists the tendency to characterise novel technologies 
as ‘revolutionary’ or inevitable. A pillar of his use-based approach to the history 
of invention is that alternatives exist for nearly all technologies.366 ‘To become 
widely used’, he posited, ‘a thing does not have to be massively better than 
what preceded it; it need only be marginally better than alternatives (assuming 
for the moment that better technologies will replace worse ones)’.367 I would add 
that to become accepted a technology must be perceived as marginally better in 
those specific categories that the decision-makers in question believed to be 
most important. Thus, the British professional military debate on mitrailleurs 
reveals what the various groups of commentators felt was needed in a new 
weapon and, hence, where the army itself would be needed. Black has argued 
that, ‘there has to be a desire to change, and technological change is therefore 
affected by cultural responses to innovation’.368 This chapter will focus on those 
cultural responses. 
Victorian military thinkers were generally divided between those focused 
on predicting and preparing for European conflict and those focused on colonial 
and imperial conflict.369 The machine gun appealed primarily to those officers 
who devoted their attention to African and Indian ‘small wars’, as they were then 
conceived. This debate thus lends itself to Pinch and Bijker’s mode of analysis, 
‘focused on the various meanings attributed by different social groups to an 
artefact’, and demonstrates that such factions often differ in the criteria by which 
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they rank technological superiority.370 In other words, the actors in the machine 
gun debate had more than one ‘military’ in mind. 
First, a brief timeline of the pertinent events in which the debate was 
situated. ‘Mitraille’ is French for ‘grape shot’, indicating a multitude of projectiles, 
so the name ‘mitrailleur’ marked the machine gun as ‘being able to pour out a 
continuous stream of grape shot’.371 In 1863, the Belgian engineer Joseph 
Montigny introduced a 37-barrel mitrailleuse. Montigny had advertised his 
design to Napoleon III, but the French Artillery Committee opted to produce a 
proprietary French version. Lieutenant-Colonel Verchère de Reffye developed a 
25-barrel variant in collaboration with Montigny, based on the latter’s original 
design but with some alterations to the loading mechanism and ammunition 
plates. The French Army adopted the resulting Reffye mitrailleuse in secret in 
1866.372 The Bollée mitrailleuse, a further French variant, was introduced in 
1870 but only adopted by the French Army of the Loire during the Franco-
Prussian War. It was similar in principle to the Montigny and Reffye, but 
featured 30 barrels arranged in two circular rings.373 
 English-speaking commentators tended to use the word ‘mitrailleuse’ 
generally to refer to any machine gun models, as the French have continued to 
do to this day.374 This generalised use has led to an identification error in many 
military histories, whereby any French machine gun is referred to as a ‘Montigny 
mitrailleuse’. Willbanks, as one illustrative example, described the Montigny as 
a 37-barrel machine gun, later reduced to 25, but the latter of these would in 
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fact have been the Reffye. He rightly claimed that the French mitrailleuse 
factory was under the joint direction of Montigny and Reffye, but consistently 
referred to the French machine gun used in the Franco-Prussian war incorrectly 
as the ‘Montigny’.375 It is true that the Reffye and Bollée were classed as falling 
under ‘the Montigny type’ to differentiate them from the ‘Gatling type’. They 
were, nonetheless, three distinct models registered under three different 
patents. To be clear, the only machine guns under consideration by British 
authorities at this time were the American Gatling and the Belgian Montigny. 
The Reffye was proprietary to the French Army and thus not available on the 
international market.  
The first substantial test of a Gatling machine gun by a British officer took 
place in 1869 in Belgium. The Royal Artillery purchased its first Gatlings in 
September 1870 to undergo testing and the army incorporated it in a limited 
capacity as an auxiliary weapon in 1871.376 Some authors have erroneously 
claimed that the British government adopted it in September 1870.377 In fact, the 
Royal Artillery purchased its first Gatlings in September 1870 for examination by 
a Special Committee on Mitrailleurs, which only recommended incorporation in 
November 1871.378 When the Kingdom of Ashanti invaded the British Gold 
Coast protectorate in 1873, military equipment was sent to Cape Coast Castle 
for 150 Marines who would soon follow to reinforce the garrison. According to 
the War Office confidential summary of the conflict, two Gatling guns with 
10,000 rounds per gun, the first ever sent to a British Army conflict, were 
included, ‘in consequence of various representations from officers and others 
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well acquainted with the Coast’.379 A full army expedition was soon sent under 
General Garnet Wolseley, by which time British forces in the area possessed 
four Gatling guns and 3.3 million rounds of ammunition.380 The presence of 
these guns is noteworthy because they had not yet been adopted as a regular 
arm of the British Army. The Royal Navy, it is worth noting, had 36 Gatlings in 
service by 1873, though none had been used in combat and none were present 
in the Gold Coast theatre.381 The Gatling Gun Company at that time had sold 
fewer than one thousand guns worldwide.382 Ashanti was the first time the Army 
had taken one into the field and the arrangements had to be specially made.383 
The inaugural British use of a machine gun thus came in response to what 
amounted to individual lobbying.  
Chapters 4 and 5 of this study will focus on the Gatling gun’s reception 
among soldiers of the Ashanti Expedition, its portrayal in the British media, and 
its display as spectacle to Africans. To understand the cultural dimension 
involved with taking a Gatling into the field, we must have an idea of its status 
as practical military technology among British military thinkers during a time 
when the device was considered to be very much experimental. 
2.1.1 Mitrailleur Show Business 
Individual enthusiasm and bureaucratic scepticism: these two threads 
ran through much of the British debate on mitrailleurs. Both were natural 
consequences of the prominence of the weapon show business and its 
importance to technological development. ‘Before the 1880s’, McNeill argued, 
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‘initiative for technical change nearly always rested with private investors who 
hoped to make money by persuading the authorities to change some aspect of 
existing weaponry or production methods’.384 The Enfield and Martini-Henry 
rifles, for example, were selected through Royal Artillery competitions in which 
inventors submitted their prototypes for experimental trials.385 The US Army 
Ordinance Department in the 1870s managed the adaptation and incorporation 
of new technologies through a comparable system of ad hoc committees and 
informal connections between officers and civilian suppliers.386 
This was, critically, a very different arrangement to the ‘military-industrial 
complex’ that would emerge in the late 1880s. Epstein characterised the late-
century paradigm for weapon development as follows: 
Industrial naval technology was so sophisticated and expensive that 
traditional methods of building weapons in public-owned factories or 
purchasing them as finished products from private contractors did not 
suffice. Instead, governments had to invest in private-sector technology 
during the experimental phase. Collaboration on research and 
development made it difficult to determine whether the public or private 
sector owned the resulting intellectual property rights and led to 
numerous legal disputes.387 
 
McNeill termed these products of big-science ‘command technologies’, meaning 
those technologies requested or demanded by a government from the private 
sector, rather than those initiated by the private sector and marketed to 
(multiple) governments.388 At the time of the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions, the first signs of a proto-military-industrial complex may, at most, 
have been discernable in the production of large ships.  
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This was not the case, however, for army equipment. The development, 
testing, and purchase of mitrailleurs, Sniders, Armstrongs, and Hales followed a 
different paradigm. Neither the British nor American governments funded or 
claimed any right to these weapons. During the explosion of military technology 
in the 1860s and ‘70s, the bulk of advanced weaponry design and funding for 
said design came from private sector enterprise, rather than from government-
directed development.389 This was an industry of individuals, and of marketing. 
Thus, after the Prussian Artillery Test Commission snubbed Krupp’s steel 
cannon:  
Krupp the showman took up the slack – exhibiting his polished cannon at 
a string of international exhibitions, courting royalty and officialdom 
whenever and wherever he could, and peddling his guns on an endless 
series of business trips back and forth across Europe. In his relentless 
salesmanship Krupp perfected and epitomized the role of the modern 
industrialist’.390 
 
The producers of new military technology relied on publicity, at least in some 
circles, and hoped that getting their products noticed would lead to their being 
considered by and incorporated into armed forces. They tended toward 
showmanship. Samuel Colt displayed his new repeating pistol at the 1851 
London Crystal Palace Exhibition, where it caused quite a stir.391 Colt 
distributors in the UK later printed advertisements in the Hart’s Annual Army 
List, thereby using a military-linked publication to make officers across the 
empire aware of their products.392 Other companies hired space in the opening 
and end leaves of Hart’s, offering Sniders, Chassepots, and centre-fire breech-
loading revolvers for private sale.393 Gatling launched his new machine gun at a 
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well-organised and well-advertised public demonstration in Indianapolis to 
which he invited notables, the press, military brass, and the Governor of 
Indiana.394 Gatling was the subject of numerous articles in Scientific American 
in the 1870s and ‘80s. Newspapers and magazines went beyond reviews of his 
device and presented flattering profiles of the man and inventor himself.395 Such 
visibility could indeed lead to the right people. In 1867, Gatling brought a 
demonstration piece to the Paris Exposition Universalle, where it attracted the 
attention of Emperor Napoleon III. The French government ordered the gun to 
be removed from the public display and brought to Versailles, where the 
Emperor personally attended a series of firing trials.396  
Such interest among foreign nations was itself a matter of interest for the 
British armed forces. Many officers were aware that by 1869 France and 
Belgium were manufacturing machine guns in considerable numbers, the 
United States had ordered 100 Gatlings, and several European states had 
ordered one or two Montignys for trial.397 Advertising and the momentum of 
popularity could gain the attention of interested officers and well-connected 
private enthusiasts. The downside to this mode of distribution was that, as 
McNeill explained:  
plenty of cranks and crackpots competed with those who did have a 
technically sound innovation to peddle; and until the 1880s the prevailing 
attitude among officers charged with deciding whether to approve 
                                                       
394 ‘Tests new gun for public and Governor Morton’, Indianapolis Daily Journal, 30 May 1862, p. 
3. 
395 Keller, Mr. Gatling's Terrible Marvel, p. 236; ‘The Gatling Battery Gun’, Illustrated London 
News, 23 Mar. 1867, p. 300; ‘A New Gun’, The Sunday Times, 14 Aug. 1870, p. 3; ‘The Gatling 
Gun’, Illustrated London News, 24 Aug. 1872, p. 174; ‘Naval and Military Items’, The Sunday 
Times, 31 Mar. 1872, p. 7; ‘The Gatling System of Firearms’, Scientific American, Vol. 26, No. 
10 (2 Mar. 1872); ‘Improved Gatling Gun’, Scientific American, 7 Feb. 1874. 
396 J. F. Owen, Compound Guns, Many-Barrelled Rifle Batteries, Machine Guns, Or Mitrailleurs 
(London: Mitchell & Co., 1874) p. 5; Also published verbatim as J. F. Owen, ‘Compound Guns, 
Many-Barrelled Rifle Batteries, Machine Guns, Or Mitrailleurs,’ Proceedings of the Royal 
Artillery Institution 13 (1874) pp. 419-53. All future references are to the book version. 
397 Ibid., pp. 1, 3-4. 
97 
 
technical change was one of extreme scepticism toward the claims that 
eager salesmen made for their new gadgets.398 
 
Thus, while there was considerable interest in the Gatling gun among some 
clusters of officers, official cynicism was the established, and perhaps 
understandable, norm. 
2.1.2 Fosbery 
The first British officer to come out strongly in support of machine guns 
was Major Fosbery, V.C., an officer in the Bengal Staff Corps. In 1869, Fosbery 
conducted a trial of the Montigny mitrailleur at the Tir National in Brussels. 
Fosbery’s report to the Director General of Ordinance strongly recommended 
adopting the machine gun as a general arm in the artillery, specifying that it 
should be added to the normal complement and not in substitution for any 
existing guns.399 He described the various defensive rolls to which the gun was 
well-suited, and in particular that it would be perfect for, ‘dealing with an enemy 
unprovided with Artillery’. As such, he felt that, ‘it would be especially useful in 
India’.400 That last point received some attention from the Government of India, 
which expressed, ‘the opinion that if after further trial the weapon be found to 
possess the advantages which [Fosbery] attributed to it, it [would] be a most 
valuable adjunct to the armament of the army in India’.401 That request for 
further trials, along with a growing interest among a selection of Royal Artillery 
officers, led the War Office to establish a Special Committee on Mitrailleurs. The 
Committee report began with a summary of the few machine gun trials that the 
Artillery had hitherto conducted. All had recommended against acceptance until 
the India Office forwarded Fosbery’s report. From its inception, therefore, the 
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Special Committee conducted tests with due consideration of, ‘India, where 
small detachments of European troops [we]re frequently compelled to hold 
defensive positions’.402  
As the Committee began its investigation, Fosbery continued his 
encouragement with an article in JRUSI tellingly titled ‘On Mitrailleurs, and their 
Place in the Wars of the Future’.403 The article read as coming from a defensive 
posture by a man who at least felt that his was an uphill fight against 
established norms. Thus, Fosbery opened insisting that he, ‘shall not 
commence this paper by any apology for such attention as I have paid to a 
class of weapons which are called infernal or inhuman, only by superficial 
reasoners, or by those who fail to comprehend the lessons conveyed by military 
statistics’.404 He strongly endorsed mitrailleurs, in which he now included the 
Gatling along with the Montigny. He had, in fact, personally examined every 
rapid-fire gun then under consideration.405 Fosbery was quite optimistic that 
machine guns could directly oppose enemy artillery, an issue that would snarl 
the debate over the next decade. He closed with the challenging claim that little 
attention had been paid to mitrailleurs in England, despite the looming fact that 
every other European power was then experimenting with them.406 On that point 
he was certainly correct. The fact that it was a colonial officer who forced open 
the British debate on mitrailleurs is instructive. Considering them from his 
Anglo-Indian perspective, he pushed for their suitability to the colonial setting. 
2.1.3 Royal Artillery Special Committee on Mitrailleurs 
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The Special Committee on Mitrailleurs under Colonel Wray, Royal 
Artillery, conducted two sets of trials of both Gatling and Montigny guns at the 
Department of Artillery Studies School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness. The 
Director of Artillery, Brigadier-General John Miller Adye, submitted the final 
reports in October 1870 and November 1871 with his own commentary, though 
was not directly involved with the testing. Adye was a mixed character on the 
subject of technological innovation. A third-generation R.A. officer, he served in 
Crimea and the Indian Mutiny. He was a distinguished artillerist and central to 
the establishment of an Ordinance committee to investigate advances in 
gunnery. Yet, he also fought for the reversion to muzzle-loading guns in the 
1860s, which removed from service the seemingly successful breach-loading 
Armstrong cannon, and argued that the commissariat department should be 
organised for European conflict and not for small wars.407 Adye was knighted in 
1873, appointed governor of the Woolwich Academy in 1875, and then 
Surveyor-General of the Ordnance in 1880.408 
Interestingly, Adye’s son, also in the Royal Artillery and also named Sir 
John Adye, briefly found himself in command of a Gatling gun battery in 1879. 
Then a Lieutenant, Adye had been sent to India to instruct Kurram Valley Field 
Force personnel on their new ‘screw gun’ cannons. The new guns had not yet 
arrived, and he was asked to take command of a new Gatling battery. Two days 
later, before Adye had any chance to practice with the guns, his new command 
was instructed to conduct a firing demonstration for Major-General Frederick 
Roberts, his staff, and most of the Kurram garrison. In Adye’s words, ‘the result 
was a complete fiasco…the bullets went everywhere except where they should 
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have gone’. Roberts was outwardly polite, but there were no further Gatling 
demonstrations. Adye came down with typhoid fever several months later and 
was invalided to England without ever seeing his erstwhile unit in action.409 
Returning to the October 1871 Special Committee on Mitrailleurs, the 
committee cited a number of technical weaknesses needing improvement, but 
nonetheless recommended that the Gatling be introduced into land and sea 
service. Director Adye, however, had the final word and was, ‘of the opinion that 
the Mitrailleur has little or no future use for field operations; furthermore, I am of 
the opinion that the French committed an error in hastily adopting them in large 
numbers’.410  
 The second Special Committee report was considerably more focused 
on the gun’s positive attributes, again recommending it for naval and defensive 
land operations and for any cases where the enemy could be expected to pass 
through a narrow space. The committee systematically refuted many of the 
criticisms that had been levied against the mitrailleur by French and Prussian 
officers in the then-current Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), attributing many of 
these problems to the fact that the French had not recognised the importance of 
concealing the gun behind cover.411 The committee particularly recommended 
the mitrailleur for situations suggestive of small wars, concluding that it could, 
‘prove very effective when employed against a half-disciplined enemy 
inadequately supplied with field artillery’.412 There was, however, again a split in 
opinion between Colonel Wray and Director Adye, who was, ‘still unable to 
agree with the Committee in their general views as to the uses and supposed 
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advantages of this weapon’. ‘On the whole’, he closed his comments on the 
Special Committee report, ‘it appears to me that the tendency of modern 
warfare is to the development of far-reaching powerful field guns, and that the 
introduction of mitrailleurs for field purposes would, therefore, be a retrograde 
step’.413 Each report thus closed with Adye undermining it. 
The Special Committee reports were read with interest as the situation in 
Ashanti deteriorated. The Earl of Kimberley at the Colonial Office asked Edward 
Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, for his opinion of the Gatling and its 
potential use for the defence of the protectorate. Citing the committee reports 
and Director Adye’s comments, Cardwell told him that, ‘it would not be desirable 
to send mitrailleurs to the Coast of Africa’, as, ‘they are comparatively feeble 
weapons, of exceptional use’. They were also, he noted, much more expensive 
than field guns.414 Admiral Thomas Maitland, Earl of Lauderdale, interpreted the 
committee reports more positively. He had been Captain of the Gunnery School 
at Portsmouth from 1854 to 1857. In a RUSI lecture subsequently published in 
JRUSI, he described the measures he believed should be taken in response to 
the then-active Ashanti invasion of the Gold Coast. Citing the reports, 
Lauderdale argued that the Cape Coast garrison, ‘should have mitrailleuses or 
Gatlings (I believe this is by far the best description of weapon for the country, 
and I am supported in this opinion by all Officers to whom I have spoken on the 
subject)’.415 
Despite the Special Committee’s quite positive conclusions, the general 
opinion among British officers and policy-makers still leaned against the 
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mitrailleur as a weapon for the army. Their dismissal of mitrailleurs was not 
based on any particular technical point, but rather on their focus toward Europe 
and their general perception that the gun had performed poorly in the 1870-71 
Franco-Prussian War. This was itself rooted in a strong tendency among British 
military thinkers to follow the German example. 
2.1.4 Nachahmung – The imitation of an example 
Writing, in 1887, a retrospective of the preceding 50 years, Wolseley 
claimed that: 
Since the Crimean war it has been our practice to hold up some foreign 
army as the pattern of military excellence. When any new idea is started 
it is pooh-poohed unless it finds favour in the army most admired at the 
moment…For years past many have striven in vain to introduce 
machine-guns into our army; they were always met with the argument, 
“The Germans don’t think anything of them”.416 
 
There was indeed a certain fixation on German military opinion.417 This was not, 
however, quite as flippant as Wolseley would later characterise it. France and 
Prussia had both previously conducted trials on several machine gun models. 
The French army deployed them in much larger numbers and in more combat 
situations than did any of the German armies, and the Germans won the war. It 
was understandable that Prussian opinion would be so highly regarded in 
British military debates. Moreover, most British commentators did not simply 
accept the opinions of German officers, but critically considered the German 
experience as witnessed by British observers. That said, the German example, 
and the prisms through which it was perceived, did have a significant effect on 
the professional debate on mitrailleurs in Britain. 
 When the French adopted their mitrailleuse in 1865, the Prussian army 
conducted its own investigation of several machine gun types and concluded, 
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as later reported in the United States, that, ‘the very narrow sphere within which 
their effect was restricted did not at all compensate for the personnel and 
materiel required in serving them’.418 The Franco-Prussian war actually 
strengthened that perspective among German military thinkers. Jackman has 
argued that the Germans largely misinterpreted the main tactical lesson that the 
war would seem to have provided – that modern firepower demanded greater 
dispersion of soldiers in battle and independence of units. Instead, the German 
army continued for a considerable time to prize ‘old Prussian drill’ and combat 
discipline through automatic response to orders.419 A series of tactical mistakes 
ensured that the French mitrailleuse did not shake this doctrine. In one of the 
first engagements of the war, a French machine gun battery moved to attack 
Prussian artillery from an exposed position. The Prussian guns quickly forced 
them to withdraw and mortally wounded General Charles A. Douay.420 News of 
such mishandlings hardened the already official German military opinion of the 
device, which was duly reported by British attachés. Captain Hozier wrote to the 
War Office that: 
the opinion of Prince Frederick Charles and of all the officers with whom I 
have spoken on the subject of the mitrailleuse are averse to the 
employment of that weapon for field service…As to the moral effect of 
the noise of the mitrailleuse they say that it excited laughter rather than 
terror, among their men.421  
 
Adye repeated Hozier’s findings almost verbatim at the end of his commentary 
on a report from the Special Committee and, in doing so, concluded a 
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fundamentally technical British document with the opinions and sentiments of 
German officers.422 
2.1.5 Fletcher 
There were, nonetheless, vocal counterpoints from officers who 
supported continued experimentation. Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher of the Scots 
Fusilier Guards had witnessed and written about the American Civil War, had 
long advocated military educational reform, and had been a member of Colonel 
Wray’s Special Committee.423 He delivered a lecture at RUSI in 1872 where he 
outlined and expanded on the committee’s conclusions.424 Fletcher argued that 
the Gatling could be very useful on the defensive.425 Moreover, he stressed that 
their comparatively small size, less space taken on the march, and fewer 
required personnel than field guns should be considered advantages, as 
Gatlings could move across ground not suitable for artillery.426 Hinting that 
these characteristics fit well with colonial warfare, he pointed out that Gatlings 
were used to protect US Army forts in the American Far West and were on hand 
in Salt Lake City in case of, ‘any trouble with the Mormons’.427 The Mormon 
rebellion of 1857-8, America’s first civil war, had largely taken the form of 
Mormon guerrilla raids on US military supply lines. The experience of the US 
army column in this conflict was very much characteristic of colonial small 
wars.428 
2.1.6 Henry Brackenbury 
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Captain Henry Brackenbury was in the audience at Fletcher’s talk and 
participated in the discussion afterwards.429 Brackenbury had been a British 
observer in the Franco-Prussian War and published a book on it.430 In his 
reports from the war, and later as a witness to the Special Committee on 
Mitrailleurs, he took particular notice of the several cases in which the French 
had put their Reffyes to good use. During the battle of Rezonville, Marshal 
Bazaine had used two batteries of mitrailleuses to defend the head of a ravine. 
‘Any one who has seen that battle-field’, Brackenbury reported, ‘who has seen 
the way in which the graves are at this point piled almost one upon another, will 
see how awful the slaughter must have been; and it was due, practically, 
entirely to these mitrailleuses’.431 He also described a ‘peculiar case’ from the 
battle of Sedan in which Prussian infantry columns attempted to move out of a 
wood into an area covered by French machine guns. Brackenbury reported that, 
as they emerged, ‘they were swept down by these mitrailleuses, and they did 
not succeed. They could not make any progress, but were obliged to go back 
again…checked by the mitrailleuse’.432 At Bazeilles, he further described, 
Bavarian columns attempted to cross a railway bridge where, ‘two mitrailleuses 
only…were placed behind a garden wall, and they simply swept the bridge, so 
that the Bavarians could not pass it’.433 The Special Committee consulted 
Brackenbury’s reports and summarised that he ‘consider[ed] the mitrailleur a 
really valuable weapon in certain positions’.434 Recall that a large portion of 
German officers did not think highly of the French mitrailleuses even after these 
incidents and underplayed their impact on the war. Brackenbury was 
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noteworthy for the amount of credit he gave to the French machine guns. He 
would, soon after, serve as Wolseley’s private secretary in the Ashanti War and 
write the General’s ‘approved’ history of the expedition. As a member of 
Wolseley’s ‘Ashanti Ring’ of officers, Brackenbury went on to become a major 
player in British imperial warfare and, through his writing, contribute significantly 
to the public perception of small wars.435  
His brother, Captain Charles Booth Brackenbury, had observed the 
Franco-Prussian war as a military correspondent for The Times and was also in 
attendance at Fletcher’s RUSI lecture.436 In an article reviewing the 1872 
autumn manoeuvres for JRUSI, he suggested that the army should, ‘try a 
battery or two of them in the field at the manoeuvres and we shall soon see the 
use of them’.437  
2.1.7 Wolseley 
General Garnet Wolseley largely stayed out of the professional debate 
on mitrailleurs, though he surrounded himself with many men who were central 
to it. The guns do feature in a positive light his 1872 Wellington Prize essay 
submission ‘“Ubique” - 7.777.777’. Wolseley proposed that large armies moving 
along European roads should be preceded and covered by an advanced guard 
featuring horse artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, and a mitrailleur.438 A 
similar body should protect the rear of the army and, ‘one mitrailleur should be 
with all such rear-guards’.439 Wolseley intended these advanced and rear-
guards to be stripped down, quick, and very efficient so it is noteworthy that he 
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attached machine guns to them. He argued that they increased flexibility in the 
defensive by, ‘enabling certain portions of a position to be thinly occupied by 
troops, whilst the important points are strongly held’.440 He went so far as to say 
that, ‘the presence of mitrailleurs with advanced and rear guards will, I believe, 
be henceforth looked upon as a necessity…its fire for defensive purposes (until 
the arrival of the main body) would enable the advanced-guard to hold its own 
against long odds’.441 That was fairly strong support for the mainstream British 
army of the time, and no doubt contributed to his reputation just before the 
Ashanti War as a radical. 
2.1.8 Rogers 
Fletcher, Wolseley, and Brackenbury saw real potential for the mitrailleur 
in the European arena, in which opinion they were certainly a minority among 
British military thinkers. There were others, like Fosbery, who saw far more 
potential for these machines elsewhere. Before, during, and after his service in 
Ashanti, Captain Ebenezer Rogers argued that Gatling guns were perfectly, 
specifically, the weapon for imperial small wars. Rogers was the most 
enthusiastic of the attending officers who spoke in the discussion following 
Fletcher’s 1872 RUSI speech. He argued that, ‘apart from its deadly effects, 
there would be with the Gatling…an awe-inspiring moral effect…upon untutored 
minds’.442 Rogers made a direct comparison with his experience in the 1867 
‘little war’ in British Honduras, in which rockets had been fired at hostile 
Mayans. The effects of these terror weapons, he said, ‘would have been 
ludicrous had they not been so serious. Scarcely had two or three rounds been 
sent over a village, that the enemy in utter consternation took flight, betaking 
themselves with frightful yells into the bush’. Rockets had been used to burn the 
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rebel town of San Pedro and had indeed caused a retreat, though no known 
casualties, at their final stand at Marajal.443 He believed that, in the next ‘little 
war’, Gatling guns ‘would, no doubt, have produced the same amount of abject 
terror: but how many also would it not have placed hors de combat!’444 He was 
pushing the Gatling as a psychological weapon. The Victorian meaning of 
‘moral’ was effectively synonymous with the modern meaning of ‘morale’. A 
short note in the 1885 Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institute addressed, ‘so 
much wrangling recently about these two words’, and set out to, ‘settle the 
question once and for all’.445 Quoting from General Foy’s 1827 Histoire de la 
Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon as an exemplar, the author concluded 
that, ‘Moral, then, not morale, is the word an Officer would use with regard to his 
men, when dealing with the military side of their moral nature. Morale is the 
word a Chaplain would use to the same men, when exhorting their temperance, 
soberness, and chastity.’446 
In the discussion following Lauderdale’s RUSI lecture several months 
later, Rogers dwarfed the speaker’s already strong recommendation by 
asserting that, ‘there is no gun so admirably and essentially adapted for the 
purposes of either attack or defence in savage warfare, as the Gatling’. He 
again suggested that it would terrify Britain’s ‘savage’ opponents pointed out 
that the machine was not, ‘subject to endemics of pestilential Africa’. He was so 
convinced, he told them, that, ‘when the first news of any serious danger to our 
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settlement at Cape Coast arrived, I volunteered to go there in charge of a 
battery of Gatlings. The government did not accede to my proposition.’447 
Rogers got his wish two months later, as he had likely hoped his 
comments in front of Lauderdale (soon to be Admiral of the Fleet) would 
precipitate, when he was sent with the force of Royal Marines to reinforce the 
Cape Coast protectorate. More accurately, he got part of his wish, as he had 
not been given command of a battery of Gatlings. During his time at Cape 
Coast, Rogers wrote regular articles for the United Service Magazine, in which 
he continued to lobby for machine guns to be sent to the region.448 In 
September 1873, he was thrilled to report that, ‘best news of all, the Gatling gun 
has been despatched to try conclusions under extremely urgent 
circumstances’.449 In his articles over the remainder of the campaign, Rogers 
described the gun’s movements toward the front, offered his opinions as to how 
it might be better employed, and recommended the term ‘Gatlingeer’ as the 
machine gun equivalent for ‘gunner’.450  
A Gatling appeared embossed in gold on the cover of Rogers’ 1876 
published memoir of the Ashanti campaign (dedicated to Lauderdale).451 Setting 
out to ‘recount the manifest advantages I claim for this piece’, he argued that 
the Ashantee War exhibited all the characteristics for which Gatlings were best 
suited, ‘namely, an unhealthy climate, a dangerous coast-line, timid allies and 
no interior roads, few European troops, and a savage foe on every side’.452 
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These were, of course also the conditions likely to be expected in many future 
small wars. In a rather convoluted argument, Rogers drew attention to what he 
claimed was a tendency in media and official sources to exaggerate the 
effectiveness of British weaponry. Despite the power granted by modern arms, 
he claimed: 
Disease, which ever accompanies the march of ill-fed and unclean native 
hordes, has hitherto done the work of death more effectively than any 
number of Sniders, Hale's rockets, or Abyssinian field-guns - and why? 
Because the excitement of a first encounter, and the disposition to fire 
carelessly at a despised because a savage foe, have combined to affect 
the aim of our troops. Now the Gatling gun has no nerves to disturb, and 
is not influenced by the character of those whom it is directed to kill.453 
 
In effect, he argued that a man with a Snider became cocky, but the Gatling 
was immune even to hubris. 
Shortly before his departure for Ashanti, it has recently been discovered, 
Rogers began corresponding with Richard Gatling. In the summer of 1873, 
Rogers sent a letter and an enclosed picture of himself to inform Gatling of his 
efforts to have the gun sent to the Ashanti War.454 Gatling received another 
letter the following November, in which Rogers urged him to lobby the War 
Office to purchase six or eight of his mitrailleurs to send to the Gold Coast. As, 
however, the Gatling Gun Company had entered into a five-year licencing 
agreement with the G. W. Armstrong Company in 1869, the latter were 
responsible for sales of the gun in Great Britain.455 Thus, Gatling could not take 
Rogers’ advice, but he had taken notice of the man, telling his associate that, 
‘Capt. E is doing us a good service in England [and] his efforts should be 
encouraged’.456 To that end, the Gatling Gun Company began to send him 
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money. Having decided that Rogers was ‘a man that can do us much good’, 
Gatling arranged to have twenty British pounds drawn for him from the Colt 
company.457 He followed this with a personal letter containing five pounds 
more.458 In January 1875, Rogers sent Gatling a note of thanks for his letter, 
‘with its unexpected enclosure which however I regard as a substantial 
recognition of my devotion to the subject at hand’.459  
Having received an unknown number of such gifts from his favourite 
inventor, Rogers delivered another RUSI lecture decisively titled, ‘The Gatling 
Gun; its Place in Tactics’. The machine guns in Ashanti had never actually been 
used in combat, his presentation explained, a fact that he insisted should not be 
held against their future utility for ‘the ever-recurring “little wars”’, but which 
prevented the submission of any new hard evidence.460 That was not a great 
start. He nonetheless went on to repeat his now standard list of praises and 
continued to portray the Gatling as a tool for, ‘offensive bush and hill warfare’.461 
It could not be doubted, he said, ‘that as an auxiliary arm Gatlings are peculiarly 
adapted to colonial defensive operations, as well as for retaliating 
demonstrations against troublesome neighbours, in countries where our 
enemies are numerous but ill-armed’.462 Rogers thus continuously attempted to 
link the machine gun to the very definition of small wars and the experience and 
identity of the imperial soldier.  
He was also emblematic of the manner by which new technologies made 
their way into the British army of the 1870s. Rogers was an individual 
enthusiast, avidly engaged with the professional societies, and also a paid 
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lobbyist for a private company in the midst of a sales push. It should be noted 
that he was indeed both, and that his passion for Gatling guns not only predated 
any payments but precipitated them. These matters largely came down to 
individuals. 
2.1.9 Callwell 
The debate on mitrailleurs in Britain was particularly open-ended and 
diverse in the early-to-mid 1870s, when the public image of the gun was quite 
new. It would not reach a consensus after Ashanti, Zulu, or even South Africa. 
In an 1884 essay, ‘Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars’, his first published 
work and first foray into the discussion of small wars tactics, Callwell claimed 
that, ‘the true tactical application of machine guns is a subject of 
controversy…Of the true use of the machine gun, we have learnt nothing in our 
small wars’.463 His 1901 book Tactics of To-day focused more evenly on both 
European and colonial conflict than did his usual specialist work. In the chapter 
titled ‘Defence’, his discussion of the importance of preparing defensive 
positions made no mention at all of machine guns.464 He published the book in 
an attempt to address the deficiencies in British army tactics made so apparent 
by the South African war and consequently took a fairly critical approach. Yet, 
he asserted that, ‘it does not appear probable that machine guns will ever play a 
very great part in battle’.465 It is striking, in retrospect, that he considered this 
controversy to be active over ten years after the Maxim gun, far more effective 
than the Gatling, had been introduced into imperial conflict. Callwell’s 
perspective demonstrates that the debate on mitrailleurs was long in the British 
army and perhaps not truly settled until the Great War. 
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2.2 Other Novel Technologies in the Imperial Sphere 
Lieutenant Porter argued that, in small wars, ‘so long as fire tactics can 
be used, superior arms and superior discipline must tell, but when it comes to 
cold steel, the enemy, if he wait to receive, must have the advantage’.466 British 
military personnel recognised that their advantage over non-industrial foes 
relied on their comparatively more advanced weapons. Through their attempt to 
maximise that edge, the imperial sphere saw the most radical use of novel 
military technology. Put simply, the Gatling gun was only one of many. The 
tendency would later be institutionalised in the 1899 Hague Convention. During 
the drafting negotiations, the British War Office and Admiralty protested against 
the banning of dum-dum bullets (hollow tipped bullets that caused terrible 
wounds) on the premise that such a ban, ‘would favour the interests of savage 
nations and be against those of the more highly civilized. It would be a 
retrograde step’.467 The final text thus banned the dum-dum in ‘civilised’ 
warfare, but allowed it to be used against ‘savage’ peoples.468 The Hague 
Convention was the legal culmination of a dynamic that had been in play for at 
least 80 years, whereby colonial armies tended to employ new, advanced, and 
atypical weaponry in Africa and Asia long before their military counterparts in 
Europe.469 Shrapnel was first used in Surinam, percussion muskets in China, 
and Minié bullets against the Bantu.470 Dum-dums, rockets, a diverse 
succession of prototype rifle designs, and even steam-ship bombardment were 
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tested in African small wars before being adopted by any European power.471 It 
might, of course, be noted that Britain was not at war in Europe, and that small 
wars provided the only opportunities for combat use. As the mitrailleur debates 
reveal, however, many of these weapons were considered inappropriate for 
European war for a considerable time after their introduction to the wider 
empire. This was an effect of perception and interpretation, not simply of where 
the opportunity of battle had presented itself. 
In 1860, Napier had commanded the Second Division of the British China 
Force, which featured the first deployment of Armstrong rifled breech-loading 
cannon.472 He recalled the attack on the Sen-ho entrenchments where his four, 
‘Armstrong guns opened on the enemy. They were the first shots fired by that 
weapon in war, and the range and accuracy of their fire excited the admiration 
of the force.’473 Soon after, the British used Armstrongs in the 1863 Maori War 
in New Zealand. They were effective against regular Maori villages, but far less 
so against their pa fortifications, which featured underground tunnels and 
artillery-proof bunkers.474 When Napier invaded Abyssinia, his artillery 
prominently featured a new steel gun that the ordinance department at 
Woolwich had developed specifically with colonial conflict in mind. Not thigh-
high and weighing only 148 pounds, it was well-suited to difficult landscapes.475 
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Wolseley’s 1873 Ashanti Expedition used several of them to great effect as well, 
by which time they were referred to as the, ‘7-pounder Abyssinian gun’.476  
The Abyssinian campaign was the British Army’s first practical field 
experiment with breech-loading rifles. The white infantry units of Napier’s force 
were armed with the Snider-Enfield conversion rifle, made by lathing out the 
breech of an Enfield muzzle-loader and adding a breech-loading mechanism. 
They fired the new brass cartridge invented at Woolwich.477 The arrangement 
was not quite top-of-the-line by contemporary civilian standards, but the army 
had never sent a large force of breech-loaders into combat.478 ‘The “Snider” 
converted arm proved itself a most efficient weapon the first time of asking’, in 
the words of one War Office report, ‘and the only time it has ever been tried 
against a “human target”’.479 Markham went as far as to say that the culminating 
battle of the Abyssinian campaign would, ‘be remembered in military history as 
the first in which the Snider rifle was used’.480 Wolseley’s Ashanti expedition 
force carried the Martini-Henry rifle, which was indeed top-of-the-line. Designed 
from inception to fire brass cartridges, it had been provisionally approved in 
1871 but would not be issued to regular soldiers till 1874.481 
Rockets also saw proportionately much more service in small wars than 
in European ones. British forces used the Congreve rocket in the 1824 Burmese 
War, the 1837 First Afghan War and Canadian rebellion, the 1839 Opium War 
in China, the 1856 Anglo-Chinese War, the 1864 bombardment of the Japanese 
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Shimonoseki seaport, and many conflicts in India.482 At the 1845 battle of 
Puketutu, during the New Zealand Wars, a naval rocket brigade attempted to 
force Maori warriors from their pa fortification, albeit with scant success.483 It 
was first fired in Africa in 1826 against the Ashanti, successfully precipitating 
their retreat, and later in the 1831 ‘Barra War’.484  
Britain purchased William Hale’s rocket patents in 1867, and the Hale 
rocket officially succeeded the Congreve for the British forces.485 It saw its first 
use by British troops on Napier’s Abyssinia campaign.486 During the 
preparations for the expedition, Napier sent two officers, several NCOs, and a 
detachment of artillery soldiers all the way to the Arsenal at Woolwich for Hale 
rocket training.487 The resulting Rocket Brigade consisted of 2 batteries of 6 
rocket tubes each.488 The British would go on to employ them against the Xhosa 
in South Africa (1877-81), the Naga on the Indian Northwestern Frontier (1879-
80), the Egyptians in Alexandria (1882), slave traders in Sudan (1884-85), 
Arabs in Zanzibar (1894), and the Sofa in Gambia (1894).489 
2.3 Military Traditionalism and ‘Resistance’ to Technology 
In 1945, Roger French, managing director of the cartridge belt 
manufacturing company Thomas French & Sons Ltd., wrote the introduction to 
a British history of rifles and machine guns. Despite the historical importance of 
small arms to British armies, he claimed, ‘there has always been a certain 
conservatism among our higher Army Authorities against the adoption of new 
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arms, and this applied particularly to the machine-gun, which was almost forced 
into our army against inclination and judgement during the last war’.490 French, 
though laden with vested interest and speaking with hindsight, was hardly alone 
in his claim that British officers were hopelessly traditionalist. The author of a 
review of Robert Home’s 1873 A Précis of Modern Tactics in The Saturday 
Review bemoaned the scarcity of good critical writing on ‘the tactical science’. If 
work like Home’s was so rare, he asked: 
Is there, in truth, some fatal necessity that prevents those able men who 
cluster round the War Office from turning the full strength of modern 
daylight on our own shortcomings? We ask this question because it 
seems to be generally felt that there must be some impenetrable 
obstacle hidden from the public, some personal prejudice, or some 
tradition born of the Peninsular veteranship and hardened in the Crimean 
blunders, which stands in the way of the progress of our army.491 
 
The Saturday Review writer further claimed that, through Home’s frank and 
realistic weighing of the arguments for and against breech-loaders: 
his work becomes a prolonged satire on the backwardness of our own 
tactical system, if that is to be called a system which is in truth no better 
than a bundle of relics, made up of scraps of old Frederick’s drill-book, 
mixed with bits of pedantry from the Dundas school of 1800, and here 
and there a fragment or two of the Algerian rags which the French army 
is discarding under the stern teaching of defeat.492 
 
Such criticisms of a perceived traditionalism among the officer corps have been 
reflected and reproduced by many historians of late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth-century British history. 
In The Shock of the Old, Edgerton criticised the tendency of many 
historians to view the acceptance of new technologies as inevitable. Histories of 
technology, he contended, are largely premised on the assumption that new 
devices are substantially and obviously superior to existing ones, which become 
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‘old’ the moment that new alternatives arise. Thus, ‘resistance to new 
technology’ is cast by many historians as a sign of ‘conservatism’ and devotion 
to an outmoded doctrine.493 Such ‘cultural lag’ is usually assumed to be very 
strong in the military and particularly among officers, who are often portrayed in 
histories of technology as dogmatically dismissive of any new developments.494 
Thus, ‘before the First World War, it is claimed, admirals thought submarines 
ungentlemanly, and generals irrationally defended cold steel and horses against 
machine guns’.495 These discourses of ‘resistance’ are rooted in a teleological 
view of the history of invention. To understand the historical debates 
surrounding novel technologies, one cannot work toward a foregone conclusion 
that was not necessarily apparent even to the well informed of the time. In her 
recent book, Epstein similarly reflected that:  
Too often, the history of the decades before the war is examined as the 
prehistory to the war. This teleological approach tends to efface the 
contingency and complexity of the prewar period, which should be 
engaged on its own terms rather than as the prelude to another: after all, 
the people living through it may have guessed but did not know what was 
coming.496 
 
In her history of the development of torpedo technologies and tactics in the 
American and British navies, she countered the common perception that 
officers were slow to recognise their potential. Torpedoes (and there were 
different competing types), she argued, ‘were highly sophisticated industrial 
products which required expert care and handling in order to achieve their full 
tactical potential, along with accessory technologies such as fire control and 
tubes. Their best use was by no means obvious.’497 
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 Histories of the machine gun, however, have largely been written from 
the standpoint that their efficacy and inevitable dominance was indeed obvious. 
Phillips observed that, ‘twentieth-century military historians showed a marked 
tendency to dismiss those officers who, trained in the age of Victoria, stressed 
the continuing significance of the “moral factor in war” as ideologically 
reactionary and blind to the new technologies in battle’.498 This chapter has 
argued for a more complicated picture of British military opinion. The divisions 
between ‘resistant’ and ‘innovative’ (or perhaps between ‘stable’ and ‘radical’) 
hinged, in part, on the perceived distinction between imperial and European 
conflicts. The men who debated British tactical theory effectively had more than 
one ‘military’ in mind. 
Bailes submitted that three main schools of thought existed within the 
Victorian home army. The ‘continentalists’ asserted that the army should 
prepare for a grand-scale European war, base these preparations on German 
and French army developments, and ignore imperial warfare almost altogether. 
The ‘traditionalists’ firmly opposed the Cardwell reforms and, attempting to 
retrench, tended to reject the more disruptive tactical innovations. Finally, the 
‘imperial school’ believed in the importance of imperial warfare, tended to 
downplay European developments and examples, and strongly adhered to the 
Cardwellian system. The imperial school included Wolseley and most of his 
‘Ashanti ring’ officers, though this association developed only during and after 
the Ashanti War.499 Spiers further complicated the model by establishing that 
the reform-minded imperial school was itself split between Wolseley’s camp, 
experienced in Africa, and Roberts’ camp, shaped by their experiences in India 
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(Roberts also participated in the Abyssinian Expedition).500 This split between 
Rogers and Wolseley developed later in the century but reflected cultural 
leanings that were present in earlier decades. Spiers’ distinction between 
African and Indian officers remains pertinent and quite correct. Throughout this 
study, the African- and Indian-focused British soldiers will be considered 
together under the broad ‘imperial school’ heading. There was considerable 
diversity between and within these groups. This study contends, nonetheless, 
that the British soldiers of these interconnected camps demonstrated similar 
interpretive relationships with technology in small war settings. 
 That the continentalist and imperial schools coexisted among British 
officers may help to explain why two seemingly polar perspectives have 
continued to exist in the historiography of Victorian military technology. ‘When 
faced with the machine gun and the attendant necessity to rethink all the old 
orthodoxies’, Ellis argued, typifying the more common historical perspective, 
‘soldiers either did not understand the significance of the new weapon at all, or 
tried to ignore it, dimly aware that it spelled the end of their own conception of 
war’.501 O’Connell made a similar argument, stressing a lack of technical 
understanding among British officers.502 Orme suggested that, ‘complacency, 
intuition and conservatism were the hallmarks of the officer corps, not intellect, 
energy or expertise’.503 Pearton argued that the value systems of nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth-century European military establishments were rooted in 
land and privilege, which prevented their embracing mechanisation before the 
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experience of the Great War.504 These characterisations are often convincing, 
though border on cultural essentialism. 
The other, less common, and comparatively newer perspective among 
historians rejects the ‘resistance’ argument in light of Britain’s substantial use of 
novel technology and modern weapons in wars of imperial conquest. 
Vandervort disagreed with the claim that machine gun development was 
neglected since, he argued, ‘the British would appear to have been in the 
forefront in introducing machine guns in African land warfare’.505 In his study of 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century British cavalry doctrine, Stephen 
Badsey challenged the prevalent view that the equine arm of the army was 
obviously obsolete, and that officers clung to it out of sentimentalism and 
stupidity.506 This viewpoint is intimately tied to the common historical 
interpretation of machine guns, as the belief that cavalry should have been 
abandoned presupposes that mitrailleurs should have been (and would have 
been) embraced. Badsy demonstrated that the debate over how cavalry should 
adjust its tactics in the face of modern firepower was active from the mid-
nineteenth-century. He argued that a belief in some continued role for cavalry 
was not, in itself, evidence of military incompetence. The same might be said of 
those officers who were slow to accept early machine guns. 
Tactical systems, moreover, are concerned with far more than the 
deployment of individual technologies. Nicholas Murray recently argued that the 
great power militaries were neither ignorant of nor unprepared for ‘trench 
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warfare’ operations before the Great War.507 Defensive doctrine was well-
developed among the continentalists, even if it proved inadequate for the 
realities of the Western Front. Examining this link between doctrine and 
equipment, Black argued that the limited availability of machine guns in 1914, 
‘reflected the widespread assumption that a conflict would be mobile and that 
heavy guns would be an encumbrance as their value was in supporting the 
defensive, not the offensive’.508 This assumption was incorrect, but it had not 
been made flippantly. 
Beckett argued that Britain did not lag behind the other major powers in 
technological or tactical development.509 If, he asked, ‘the army used and 
appreciated the value of technology in colonial campaigning…why has the 
conservative image persisted?’510 As this chapter has argued, both images of 
Victorian British military culture have persisted because these schools of 
thought may have coexisted in the officer class. In the Cardwellian period, 
British military thinkers were divided between those focused on current 
European conflict and those focused on colonial, imperial, and small wars. The 
critical concern distinguishing those two schools of thought may have centred 
on the presence or absence of enemy artillery. To unpack that concern, this 
section will close with a look back to the first time RUSI hosted a talk on the 
subject of a battery gun, and consider how the attendant officers engaged the 
idea at a purely theoretical stage.  
In 1862, General Vandenburgh of the New York Militia gave a 
presentation titled ‘A New System of Artillery for Projecting a Group Or Cluster 
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of Shot’ at RUSI in London. He argued that the primary purpose of regular 
artillery was to kill soldiers behind fort defences and ship hulls, yet there 
remained, in all conflicts, a need to kill the enemy when he was out in the open. 
‘Whatever may be the conditions of naval warfare, or of coast defense’, he 
reasoned, ‘armies are not likely to march with iron plates before them’.511 In 
such circumstances, a machine that could deliver the largest number of deadly 
projectiles would presumably have the greatest effect. His ‘Gen. Vandenburgh’s 
System’, was a proposed gun type, which he admitted might never be made.512 
He described a cluster of rifled barrels loaded from the breech by a round plate 
full of holes containing powder and shot for each barrel.513 It was, in essence, a 
ball and powder version of the Montigny mitrailleur, somewhere between a 
Reffye and a ‘Ribauldequin’. In the discussion that followed, Vandenburgh was 
pressed with several questions about the proposed gun’s ability to withstand a 
direct hit from cannon roundshot. He conceded, hesitantly, that such an impact 
would render his gun inoperable. The officers at RUSI, or at least those asking 
questions, imagined the cluster shot gun to be competing directly with artillery. 
Vandenburgh’s admirably detailed calculations of the number of infantry 
casualties it would inflict were not seriously challenged at all. 
The torpedo provides a useful comparison. Epstein argued that the 
torpedo delivered a shock to existing naval doctrine and stimulated both 
technological and strategic/tactical development because it threatened to topple 
the primacy of the large capital ship firing heavy guns, upon which all great 
power navies were based.514 The machine gun, in contrast, was not perceived 
as a ‘game-changer’ for the existing field army. Critics of the mitrailleur focused, 
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above all, on comparing and contrasting it to field guns, the presumed 
competing piece of ordinance. While opinion was divided on their potential 
advantages against infantry and cavalry, few believed that mitrailleurs posed a 
direct threat to guns themselves. Even smaller rifled cannons outranged and 
seemingly outclassed machine gun crews, a conclusion bolstered by reports 
from the Franco-Prussian war. As the machine gun did not threaten the primacy 
of artillery, it did not capsize the organisational foundation of the army. Those 
conclusions, limited as they were, were not actually shattered by the experience 
of the Great War. Artillery killed more soldiers than did machine guns on the 
Western Front, and few cannons fell to machine gun fire. 
2.4 The Imperial Military Sphere 
A key characteristic that set the culture, or ideal, of imperial soldiers 
apart from that of the continentalists was a comparative openness to novel 
technologies. This tendency was particularly marked in the 1860s and ‘70s, 
when British technological advantages were increasingly tipping the balance in 
small wars and further distinguishing the imperial sphere.515  
Daniel Headrick claimed that, ‘at no point has the distinction between 
tourists and conquerors been so blurred as it was in late nineteenth-century 
Africa’.516 The contemporary perception that imperial warfare presented very 
distinct conditions demanded that soldiers adapt in ways outside the martial 
norm. Callwell defined ‘small wars’ by this very dissimilarity: ‘whenever a regular 
army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against irregular forces, or forces 
which in their armament, their organisation, and their discipline are palpably 
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inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions 
of modern regular warfare’.517 It followed that, ‘a system adapted to La Vendée 
is out of place among fanatics and savages’.518 La Vendée was a region of 
France where Republican forces fought a substantial and intractable 
counterrevolutionary peasant’s revolt from 1793 to 1796. In this comment, 
therefore, Callwell also revealed his impression that the continental model of 
asymmetrical warfare was itself still mired in late-eighteenth-century principles.  
In 1888 Wolseley claimed, partly for his own aggrandisement, that Britain 
was, ‘the only European army that [was] thoroughly experienced in what we 
may properly call savage warfare. This warfare is an art in itself.’519 What made 
Callwell and the imperial military thinkers significant was their belief that small 
wars were not necessarily easier than continental wars, but divergent, and 
requiring a largely different set of skills and guiding doctrine. The imperial-
minded soldiers of the British army saw their craft as existing in parallel 
opposition to that concerned with European conflict. Thus, Callwell claimed 
early in his writing career that, ‘many of the maxims laid down for the guidance 
of [the army] in European warfare, are either altogether inapplicable to combats 
against irregular warriors, or else required considerable modification to meet 
altered circumstances’.520 Callwell wrote during the height of the imperial era, 
but several writers developed this theme decades earlier. Bailes argued that 
that signs of a general understanding of the divergence of spheres began after 
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the Ashanti Expedition and the wave of publications that followed it.521 As 
Wolseley pushed through preparations for the expedition, which differed 
markedly from those to which the Duke of Cambridge was accustomed, he 
reasoned (slightly sarcastically) with him that, ‘this Expedition being of a 
peculiar and novel nature, I thought that perhaps its requirements might be 
better met in a special manner’.522 
Colonel George Furse, the army’s chief expert on logistics, argued that, 
‘our wars differ so essentially from the wars carried out by Continental armies, 
that we should not adhere to a servile imitation of their systems, but we should 
originate one of our own which may be in concordance with our 
requirements’.523 Furse’s language is quite significant in revealing a possession 
of ‘our’ identity apart from the ‘Continental’. His comments referred not only to 
foreign officers, but those British army officers who mimicked them. The 
condemnation went both ways. Moreman has argued that many British 
observers attributed the French loss in 1870-71 to their Algerian military 
experience.524 In his 1872 Wellington Prize submission, the anonymous 
‘Adjutant’, warned: 
The service which our soldiers have seen in India, or China, or New 
Zealand, will not stand them in much stead [against a Great Power]; the 
lessons gathered in such warfare, unless read with great intelligence, 
might prove rather the reverse of useful, just as the Algerian experience, 
there is reason to believe, was positively injurious to the French army.525 
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‘An officer who has seen [colonial] service must sweep from his mind all 
recollections of that service’, Colonel Lonsdale Hale later told members of the 
Royal Artillery Institution, ‘for between Afghan, Egyptian, or Zulu warfare and 
that of Europe, there is no similarity whatever’.526 The Egyptian army of the time 
was, in fact, well armed by European standards, but perceptions of climate and 
race implicitly and explicitly influenced images of peripheral conflict. 
 Small wars were fought in very diverse conditions but imperial school 
thinkers believed that, taken together, they constituted a discrete craft. Porter 
claimed that, ‘certain main principles run through them all, which may serve as 
guides in future cases’.527 Major-General Alexander thought that it would be, 
‘highly useful to practice [bush fighting] as a part of the army manoeuvres’, 
which would require the development of a new set of exercises, rules, and 
referees.528 Such advocates were not simply calling for the development of new 
tactics, but also for the recognition, dissemination, and systemisation of those 
already in use in some colonies. The Punjab Irregular Force employed a tactical 
system distinctive to the Indian North-West Frontier.529 Imperial troops and 
settler-frontiersmen in New Zealand developed the ‘bush-scouring’ system to 
combat the Maori, and Belich has argued that most of the operations from the 
1864-8 Maori wars can be understood as applications of bush-scouring 
theory.530 Though well developed, such peculiarly colonial ways of war were not 
recognised by the War Office, nor taught in military colleges. Officers arriving in 
these regions would be taught by their fellow officers, using notes or 
guidebooks that were never published. 
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The press also drew attention to the distinct conditions of imperial 
warfare. Of the Ashanti War, The Times claimed, ‘history teaches us that 
warfare with a semi-savage nation is marked by certain peculiar characteristics, 
which require to be fully recognized and provided for. The savage does not fight 
by the rules of modern tactics’.531 After consulting Sir Samuel Baker as an 
expert in the field, The Sunday Times reported his insistence that, ‘it would be 
impossible to fight them on any plan practiced by civilized nations. Savage 
warfare is exactly the antipodes of civilized warfare’.532 When Lord Napier of 
Magdala died in 1890, The Saturday Review printed a memorial retrospective of 
his career. The tone was predictably flattering, but the article also demonstrated 
a belief that Napier was expert in a discrete and separate field of soldiering: 
Campaigns against barbarians…have difficulties of their own which are 
not met with in European warfare, and which require on the part of 
generals and soldiers the display of qualities not inferior to those 
demanded in regular warfare...if the whole Abyssinian compaign (sic) is 
compared with any section of [the Franco-Prussian War], it will not 
appear inferior as an operation of war…It is certain that, if the European 
portion at least of Lord Napier’s army had there and then been called 
upon to serve on the Moselle or the Loire, it would have held it (sic) own 
with or against Germans or Frenchmen. It is by no means equally certain 
that, if the pick of Marshal Moltke’s army had been suddenly required to 
march from Annesley Bay to Magdala, it would have extricated itself from 
the task with as much success as the British expeditionary force did.533 
 
2.5 Images of the Imperial Soldier 
 If small wars comprised a separate specialty, then the imperial sphere 
was seemingly suited to a particular, and different, type of commander. The 
men who participated in small wars were praised foremost for their innovation 
and adaptability. The imperial school of British military thought - which was 
more specific than the characterisation of the ‘imperial soldier’ - would come to 
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be associated with the ‘Wolseley ring’ of officers. In Beckett’s words, this group 
‘emphasised flexibility and practicality over the slavish imitation of continental 
practice’.534 Thompson claimed that, ‘the Indian army thought of itself as 
attracting (and retaining) more able men than the home army’, and called the 
former more ‘meritocratic’ than the latter.535 The culture of the Indian army was 
well established by the mid-nineteenth century and the broader culture of 
imperial soldiers developed out of the Indian ideal.  
The Saturday Review claimed that Napier’s ‘matured 
experience…influenced the whole undertaking, the lowest rank feeling faith in a 
general who not only had power to order, but capacity to direct, and ability to 
control under the novel circumstances of a march into the interior of Africa’.536 
This managerial characterisation was singled out over the usual martial ones. 
Wolseley attributed much of the blame for the disastrous Afghan campaign to 
the considerably advanced age of the commander in charge. He claimed that in 
small wars of empire, youth: 
and the inventive genius that is one of its characteristics, is far more 
essential for all ranks than for the ordinary cut-and-dry campaigns where 
vast bodies of about equally well-trained and well-armed regular troops 
meet in almost equal numbers. A great readiness of resource and 
immense powers of endurance are especially necessary for the leader 
who has to penetrate far into a little known country with a force that will 
be outnumbered ten to one.537 
 
Wolseley had, of course, himself been the youngest man promoted to 
lieutenant-colonel in the British army, and was just forty when he left for the 
Ashanti campaign.538 
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Over the last quarter of the century, Porch argued, ‘imperial conquest 
came to be regarded as hardly more than a technical problem to be solved’.539 
Appropriately, successful small war commanders tended to be praised for their 
organisation and intelligence more than for their nobility or bravery. The Royal 
Geographic Society made Napier an Honorary Fellow in 1868 after his success 
in Abyssinia. Sir Roderick Murchison, the head of the Society, proudly 
expressed his, ‘delight that the distinguished General who has accomplished 
these glorious results is a man of science, and is particularly well versed in 
Geography’.540 Napier received several honorary degrees after the campaign, 
seen as an appropriate form of reward for that endeavour.541 Abyssinia was the 
first campaign to be placed under the supreme command of a member of the 
Royal Engineers. The official history of the R.E. expressed with pride that, ‘until 
that moment it had been held as an axiom at the Horse Guards that an officer of 
the scientific branch of the service was…incompetent to fill such a post…Since 
that date, and probably owing largely to that experiment, the veto has been 
withdrawn’.542 
Gilbert and Sullivan used Wolseley as the model, well understood to 
audiences at the time, for their very model of the modern Major-General.543 The 
Major-General Stanley character and his introductory song satirised the ideal of 
the intelligent officer with the notion that a commander need not have combat 
experience but must know the Encyclopaedia Britannica from cover to cover. 
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For decades after the Ashanti war, a well-organised and well-executed job in 
England was said to be ‘All Sir Garnet’.544 This focus on intelligence set the 
imperial soldier apart from the traditional officer ideal. Napier recalled an 
illustrative case from his first campaign in India. The Commanding officer 
needed a unit for a particularly important night guard duty and Napier 
recommended Colonel Taylor as, ‘an excellent and clear-headed soldier’. The 
commander replied, ‘I want the hearts of the army, not their heads, Captain 
Napier’, who claimed he ‘was not politician enough to make any reply’.545 
Wolseley liked to think that he was seen as a radical. In his second-place 
Wellington Prize essay on British continental tactics, he challenged 
traditionalists with the claim that, ‘the more one studies the battles lately fought 
in France, the more one is convinced that the…days of grand imposing charges 
of horsemen in masses are past, and only to be remembered amongst the 
spirit-stirring deeds of a bygone era’.546 He asserted, more directly than many 
were willing to, that ‘as a rule, it may be accepted that general actions will 
henceforth be fought along lines of railway communication’, and proposed that 
fully armoured trains equipped with heavy artillery should be developed to push 
into enemy territory.547 Incidentally, the first armoured train in British warfare 
would make its appearance ten years later in Wolseley’s 1882 Egyptian 
campaign.548 His advocacy of Cardwell’s reforms, connections with radical 
politicians, and public condemnation of mainstream officers made him much 
disliked among sections of the military establishment. From at least the early 
1880s, Cambridge and a group of senior officers (including Lord Napier of 
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Magdala) considered him to be insubordinate and tried to stymie his career.549 
Wolseley claimed that the Duke and his staff were ignorant of modern warfare 
and that their reactionary sentimentalism held the army back from achieving 
efficiency.550 Some of his suggestions can be read as including insults toward 
this ‘old guard’ to which he felt opposed. ‘The attempt to carry about a table or 
chair during the active work of a campaign is ridiculous’, he claimed in the ‘Field 
equipment for officers’ section of his Soldier’s Pocket Book.551 Though 
published for public consumption, the Pocket Book was also a practical general 
military manual. Captain Glover found that some of his officers were ‘not 
provided with this work, which I consider essentially necessary’, and ordered 
twelve copies to be delivered to his base in West Africa, paid for out of his 
expedition fund.552 
 Myatt argued that, by the time of the Abyssinian expedition, ‘the beau 
ideal of a soldier…had become a bronzed, bearded individual, preferably in a 
funny hat and tattered drill stained with coffee’.553 That ideal had developed in 
the colonial Indian context and existed in parallel with a strictly regimented 
martial ideal in the metropole. Alexander believed that the conditions of New 
Zealand warfare did not fit with parade ground discipline. ‘The attitude of a bush 
fighter’, he argued, ‘is not a dignified one, neither is that in deer-stalking…he 
must stoop, and creep, and take advantage of whatever cover presents 
itself’.554 Wolseley challenged regimental tradition when he ordered all his 
soldiers to wear a loose uniform of grey homespun, designed for jungle 
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conditions.555 He even forced the 42nd Highlanders to abandon their kilts for the 
new trousers.556 To imperial-focused soldiers, such actions were justified by the 
difficult conditions of colonial conflict. To many continentalists, they smacked of 
lax discipline and radical reform. 
2.6 Conclusions: Officer and a Gentleman and a Scholar 
In 1884, Callwell claimed that, ‘the revolution in Tactics – the natural 
result of the experiences of the breech-loader in 1866 and 1870 – has given 
birth to a whole library of works’, of new tactical theory. Yet, within this growing 
corpus of professional military science, he found that ‘the lessons to be drawn 
from these works are of no great value to us in our frequent contests with the 
savage tribes that in all parts of the globe border the British empire’.557 Callwell 
believed that most of the military theory in Britain revolved around a few narrow 
issues copied from almost identical German principles and that none of it 
applied to imperial conflicts against non-European foes. Alexander likewise 
found when he returned from the Maori wars that, ‘I could find no good manual 
on bush fighting’.558 Indeed, despite the increased call for more ‘scientific’ 
officers for imperial service, many of them still felt ignored and peripheral to the 
military as a whole. After a lecture at RUSI, Captain Colomb spoke to the 
assembled officers as if they were a club of outcasts: 
it is worthy of note that this Institution has supplied a want which must be 
acknowledged by all who consider the present state of the organization 
of our forces and the administrative power. England embraces in the 
folds of her Empire more square miles of bush territory, and more savage 
people, than any other civilized power. It is reasonable to suppose, and 
past history shows it to be the case, that for one war we have with a 
civilised power, we have about ten with savages; yet with all our boasted 
reorganization, that fact appears to be totally passed over; and I doubt 
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whether, if we had rumours of disturbances within our territory in New 
Zealand, or in Honduras or at the Cape, when the administrators of our 
war forces wished for information as regards those countries, they would 
find the information anywhere but in the records of this Institution.559 
 
It is, perhaps, not surprising that imperial-focused soldiers played a significant 
role in the mounting professionalisation of the British officer corps. RUSI was 
central to that process. Tucker argued that ‘Britain’s aristocratic respect for the 
gentleman amateur as regimental officer would gradually have to yield to a 
more demanding and more pervasive military education. The JRUSI reflected 
this change’.560 The journal published on a wide scope of topics, but the content 
was suggestive of the imperial school above all else. Bailes concluded that the 
JRUSI of this period, ‘gave little room to criticism of the Cardwell system, and 
much space to the latest technological and organizational ideas’.561 The Royal 
United Services Institution of India (RUSII) formed in 1870 and also published a 
journal of proceedings.562 While certainly conservative on some subjects, it 
devoted considerable attention to small and frontier warfare.   
Callwell was a later contributor to the variegated discourse on small 
wars, and benefited from it greatly. His major achievement was not the creation 
of this school of military theory, but the bringing together and systematising of 
many colonial military practices that had already been in use, clearly evidenced 
by his relentless reference to case studies. The result, Beckett claimed, 
‘represents the only original and distinctive contribution to the development of 
military thought by any British soldier in the nineteenth century’.563 Small Wars 
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was sanctioned by the War Office Intelligence Department and made required 
reading at the Staff College until 1934, when it was succeeded by Sir Charles 
Gwynn’s Imperial Policing.564 
Robert Home, commanding Royal Engineer of the Ashanti expedition, in 
many ways epitomised the professional idea of an imperial officer. One of the 
first officers to emerge from the new Staff College at Sandhurst, he showed a 
proclivity for analysis throughout his career. After working on the new Portland 
defences, he was sent to Canada to prepare a report on defending the western 
frontier from invasion. His able recommendations led to his appointment to the 
staff at Aldershot. He also served in the War Office Topographical and 
Statistical Department and its successor, the Intelligence Branch. From 1870, 
Home was the secretary of the Royal Engineers committee, a standing scientific 
committee frequently called on to evaluate technological developments.565 
After his work on Wolseley’s expedition, where he oversaw the cutting, 
bridging, and housing of the army’s entire march to Coomassie, Home returned 
to the Intelligence Branch and various War Office think tanks. He was perhaps 
the most substantial contributor to the 1875 Army mobilisation plan and the 
‘Regulations for the organization of the line of communications of an army in the 
field’.566 His Précis of Modern Tactics, already discussed, became an official 
textbook. He translated and annotated several other French and German 
military works and contributed to Macmillan’s, the Quarterly Review, the Pall 
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Mall Gazette, The Academy, and the Cornhill Magazine.567 He was, of course, 
also a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. ‘He belonged to a class’, as a 
colleague posthumously described him: 
a well-known one among English officers who have done individual work 
among half-civilized races, the class of which Gordon was the supreme 
type – who combine great practical ability in administration and fighting 
with a strongly imaginative idealism…Such men are very often strongly 
convinced imperialists, England having in their eyes a special mission to 
bring light to the dark corners of the earth.568  
 
Had his career continued, it is entirely likely that Home would have left an 
indelible mark on British military thought and doctrine, but he contracted typhoid 
while surveying the border of Bulgaria and died in January 1879.569 Robert 
Home was a thoroughly professional and intellectual officer and a prominent 
member of the ‘Wolseley Ring’. His obituary in The Times reflected that Home’s 
influence, ‘was known to a comparatively limited circle; but that circle comprised 
most of those to whose hands the destinies of the Empire have been intrusted 
during the last two Administrations’.570 The same could be said of many imperial 
officers in the Victorian army. 
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Chapter 3: The British ‘Idea’ of Africa the 
Enemy 
The fact that small wars are, generally speaking, campaigns rather 
against nature than against hostile armies…constitutes one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of this class of warfare. It affects the course of 
operations…so vitally at times as to govern the whole course of the 
campaign from start to finish.571 
 
Such was Colonel C. E. Callwell’s characterisation in Small Wars. When 
The Times announced Wolseley’s appointment as supreme civil and military 
commander of the British Gold Coast possessions, it justified his (somewhat 
controversial) suitability for the position by the fact that he had, ‘seen how small 
bodies of disciplined soldiers, led by English officers, can crush large masses of 
semi-civilized men; he has learnt how to subdue the obstacles interposed by 
Nature to his purpose, and to do so without wasting the lives of those placed 
under his command’. The article proposed that, ‘the difficulty of penetrating 
inland to the seat of the Ashantee Power is not greater than that of forcing a 
way from Lake Superior to Fort Garry’.572  
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Wolseley had seen action in the Indian Mutiny and the 1860 Anglo-
French expedition to China, but none in Africa. Metis Separatists in Manitoba 
fought in a reasonably modern fashion by British standards and, in any case, 
Wolseley had never actually fought them. What really qualified, or seemed to 
qualify, Wolseley to lead the Ashanti expedition was the fact that he had 
managed to get his force across the Canadian wilderness and back again. That 
the commanders of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were chosen for 
their believed ability to ‘subdue the obstacles interposed by nature’ was 
indicative of the underlying British image of Africa. Press and military accounts 
of the expeditions were framed by discourses emplotting a battle against the 
natural world, and portraying the people of Abyssinia and Ashanti as reflecting 
that natural world. 
The 15th Earl of Derby termed the Ashanti war, ‘to a great extent, a battle 
between Science and Nature’, and a Lancet article declared that ‘this will be a 
war with climate’.573 Such framing made the conflict a source of considerable 
anxiety to military authorities, the government, and the general public. As The 
Lancet continued, ‘this is the fourth war in which we have been engaged in this 
[West Coast] climate; and the results of the former wars have not been very 
encouraging’.574 Put simply, Britain in 1868-74 had precious few examples from 
its history in which African nature had been successfully overcome.575 When the 
33rd Regiment landed at Zoulla, they were the first European army to stand on 
that beach since Cristóvão De Gama’s five hundred men over three hundred 
                                                       
573 ‘The Ashantee Expedition’, The Lancet, Vol. 102, no. 2618 (1 Nov. 1873) p. 635; ‘The 
Medical Aspects of the Ashantee Expedition’, The Lancet, Vol. 102, no. 2603 (19 Jul. 1873) p. 
87. 
574 Ibid. (no. 2603), p. 88. 
575 Philip D. Curtin, Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 21. 
139 
 
years earlier.576 There were plenty of gaps in the popular understanding of 
these places for imaginations to fill in. Captain Rogers claimed of the Gold 
Coast: ‘the most opposite theories meet on neutral ground out there; for all is 
fog and smoke and cimerian (sic) darkness...who would not believe the wildest 
stories, the most fabulous inventions concerning such a country and such a 
people? Absolutely anything!’577  
Victorian society drew on a resulting pervasive ‘idea’ of Africa that was 
absolutely deadly. Received knowledge, common knowledge, and the tone of 
the press all made up an overlapping and fairly consistent image of the Africa 
that would await the expeditions. This chapter will explore that image, and 
sketch an impression of the spectre of African nature as it appeared in the 
British imagination. 
3.1 The Land 
When Wolseley returned to London with the bulk of his (white) troops, 
Cambridge issued congratulatory general orders, which appeared in the 
newspapers. The British troops, he stressed, had to face, ‘not only organised 
savage tribes in their own impenetrable bush and paths, hitherto unexplored 
and known only to themselves, but also to contend against a climate proverbial 
for sickness and fevers so dangerous to European constitutions’.578 This 
prepared statement ramped up the subject of the climate and placed the 
greatest emphasis upon it. Cambridge knew that the British people saw the 
African climate as particularly threatening and the surmounting of that climate 
as the particularly impressive feature of the expedition’s success. 
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Government policy had strictly opposed using British troops in tropical 
Africa since 1863-4, the last time a campaign had been attempted against the 
Ashanti. In what Brackenbury would later describe as the ‘the abortive effort of 
1864’, a British force marched inland to the Prah River, the border of Ashanti 
territory, just in time for the onset of the rainy season.579 Sickness spread 
quickly, the commander ordered the cannons to be buried and abandoned, and 
everyone withdrew back to Cape Coast Castle.580 Disease killed so many 
soldiers that General Peel compared the disaster to the Crimea.  
Sir John Hay, a Conservative MP whose brother was among the 
casualties, brought a motion of censure against Palmerston’s government: 
I appeal to this House to do justice to its soldiers…I entreat you to lay the 
blood of our brethren…at the door of Her Majesty's Ministers. I move, Sir, 
that Her Majesty's Government, in landing forces on the Gold Coast for 
the purpose of waging war against the King of Ashantee without making 
any sufficient provision for preserving the health of the troops to be 
employed there, have incurred a grave responsibility, and that this House 
laments the want of foresight which has caused so large a loss of life.581 
 
Bitter criticism was heaped on the Liberals, Palmerston narrowly evaded defeat, 
and Cardwell, then Colonial Secretary, instructed that British troops would never 
again be deployed to such deadly climates.582 ‘Such is the irony of fate’, The 
Lancet later noted in 1873, ‘that Mr. CARDWELL has now to adopt a policy 
which he opposed ten years ago, when Lord PALMERSTON was in power’.583 
During the preparations for the 1873 Ashanti expedition, therefore, 
Wolseley attempted to reassure Cambridge that, ‘if I possibly can attain the 
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objects in view without landing European soldiers, I shall certainly endeavor to 
do so, as I am most anxious to avoid exposing the lives of more than are 
absolutely necessary, to the baneful influences of such a climate’.584 
Cambridge’s general instructions to Wolseley made clear that the policy toward 
the Gold Coast had not changed. The majority of the document focused directly 
on the issue of exposure. In one of many examples, Cardwell instructed 
Wolseley to bear in mind: 
1. That European soldiers ought never to be exposed to the influence of 
that climate, when the service required can be performed by Houssas, or 
by Native Auxiliaries, or by any other Force indigenous to the country. 
2. Nor unless the service is of paramount importance to the main object of 
your mission. 
3. Nor unless it can be accomplished with a rapidity of execution which may 
render the exposure to the climate very short. 585 
 
Cardwell warned him that, ‘nothing but conviction of necessity would induce Her 
Majesty’s Government to engage in any operation involving the possibility of its 
requiring the service of Europeans at the Gold Coast’.586 If sheer space is taken 
as proportional to importance, then the African climate was the most important 
single element of the government’s orders. 
 After assessing the situation in the Gold Coast protectorate, Wolseley did 
indeed send a request for British troops, claiming that the Fante army were 
unwilling and unable to fight. Kimberley granted that request, on the condition 
that, ‘you will not employ this force, especially in the interior, a day longer than 
the paramount objects of your mission may require. The limit of their 
employment is fixed by the continuance of the more healthy season.’587 From 
the initial planning stage of the Abyssinian expedition, similarly, it was ‘made 
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generally known that Her Majesty’s Government would greatly deprecate any 
necessity for a British force remaining in Abyssinia longer than might be 
absolutely requisite for the accomplishment of [the desired] objects’.588 The 
Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were soon praised for the efficiency and 
speed with which they had been conducted, the leaders admired for their ability 
to rush their men in and out. It was quickly forgotten that this focus on speed 
was born in part out of anxiety. Indeed, Napier and Wolseley had their economy 
of schedule imposed upon them.  
Wolseley wrote to Captain Glover that, ‘the English Govt. look to me to 
get the British Regts. away from this Coast with the least possible delay: next to 
beating the Ashantees or at least humbling them, this early withdrawal of the 
English troops from the Coast is I believe the object most desired at home’.589 
Wolseley knew that he might have to make an exit before properly defeating 
King Karikari. He mused to his wife that, ‘I seem always to be condemned to 
command in Expeditions which must be accomplished before a certain season 
of the year begins.’ The Red River expedition had to be completed before the 
Canadian frost set in and his mission in Ashanti required that he ‘only keep the 
British Regts. on shore for about six weeks’.590 One of Wolseley’s major 
qualifications for command, claimed The Lancet, was his proven ability to evade 
the Manitoba winter, as ‘to waste time is to waste both money and lives’.591 
By the end of the expedition, most were eager to heed Kimberley’s 
advice and clear out. Wolseley had been made administrator of the Gold Coast 
for the course operation but, with his embarkation for England, someone had to 
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take his place. Four officers were each offered the position at an annual salary 
of £4,000 yet, Kimberley later recalled, ‘one & all replied – “not if we receive 
£4000 a day!” The climate is our real enemy.’592 If the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions were to be campaigns against nature then, in the public discourse, 
nature was emplotted as a rival combatant. 
In the preface to his history of the expedition, Captain Hozier declared 
that, ‘in the Abyssinian campaign the enemies to be feared more than the open 
foe were natural obstacles and starvation’.593 In their description of Abyssinia 
and Ashanti, commentators repeatedly employed language that characterised 
the landscape as a barrier to Europeans, to civilisation, and to technology.594 
These discourses marked the land as something that had to be penetrated and 
that would be difficult to penetrate. Lieutenant Borrett wrote to his wife that, ‘the 
Commander-in-Chief and other Officers who have been through the Crimean 
and all the numerous Indian wars, say, that no English army ever had to endure 
such hardships or go through such an amount of fatigue as the army in 
Abyssinia’.595 The Sheffield Daily Telegraph similarly quoted an unnamed officer 
who reported that, ‘Old campaigners of the Crimea, Indian Mutiny, and China 
say nothing ever came up to the fatigue and privations of this.’596 The Illustrated 
London News described the campaigns as, ‘heat and cold…wearisome 
ascents, perilous descents, high mountain passes, deep gorges…these were 
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the foes with which our brave soldiers had to maintain a daily warfare’.597 In a 
book-length history published by the same newspaper, Roger Acton 
characterised the Takazze canyon as, ‘a stupendous mountain wall, running 
from east to west, having a straight and even top without any visible break. It 
might have been fancied to be a Titanic rampart erected by some freak of the 
Earth-Spirit, on purpose to bar any farther advance.’598 
After the Ashanti expedition, Brackenbury described the hardships of 
living, ‘always shut in by this dense wall of foliage on either side…always 
enclosed by these walls, which none the less imprison because they are of 
leaves and not of stone’.599 During his keynote speech at a reception held in the 
expedition’s honour, Wolseley mocked a particular ‘distinguished gentleman’, 
who: 
when applied to officially for information as to the feasibility of using 
English troops in the interior…was pleased to state that it was impossible 
for English soldiers to march in such a climate, and that to take a 
thousand white men into the bush would require 6,000 black men to 
carry them.600  
 
Sir William Muir, Director-General of the Army Medical Department, quoted an 
officer who had been part of the Red River Expedition having said in Ashanti, 
‘we lived on the climate then, but here the climate lives on us’.601 Muir and the 
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expedition’s medical officer, Captain Huyshe, recommended that drinking cold 
tea might provide some resistance to the tropical fevers.602 
As had long been the popular phrasing, most soldiers and journalists still 
referred to the West Coast of Africa as, ‘the so-called white man’s grave’.603 
Wolseley further specified Sierra Leone as the ‘Grave of the Englishman’.604 
Cambridge told the House of Lords that, ‘it was impossible for Europeans to 
remain on the coast except for a few hours at a time’.605 Much has been written 
on the medical perils of West Africa and it need only be noted here that during 
the Ashanti expedition it remained common knowledge and official policy that 
white men could not survive there.606 
Abyssinia had not been expected to prove much better, at least in the 
public sphere. In both reality and accepted medical thought of the time, the 
climate of East Africa was considerably less dangerous than that of the Gold 
Coast. That fact, however, had not filtered into the dominant cultural impression 
of Africa. Holland and Hozier wrote that the daily journals: 
drew ghastly pictures of the malaria of the coast and the insalubrity of the 
country…The climate was hastily laid down as similar to that of the West 
Coast of Africa. Insurance offices raised their rates mercilessly to the 
officers volunteering for the service, who were regarded as rushing 
blindfold into suicide.607 
 
‘The medical department in the Abyssinian campaign, were, happily, but lightly 
taxed’, reported Henty, ‘nevertheless, it must be remembered that the 
prophecies and warnings against the climate were quite as great in one 
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campaign as in the other’.608 Abyssinia and Ashanti were at least seen to pose 
comparable threats. 
Vice-Admiral Sir John Dalrymple Hay admitted that, ‘the Gold Coast is 
less unhealthy than Sierra Leone, the Gambia, or Lagos, but, nevertheless, it is 
a climate most injurious to European life’.609 ‘It is not pleasant seeing one’s 
friend knocked over’, wrote Lieutenant Dooner, ‘undoubtedly the West Coast of 
Africa is a vile climate’.610 Whatever the actual dangers, more important to the 
present discussion is how bad the Victorians expected them to be when the 
expeditions were launched. Surgeon-Major Albert Gore described Western 
Africa, ‘as embracing the whole range of the most important of the tropical 
diseases’.611 During the preparation for the Ashanti invasion, Dr. Home, the 
principal medical officer on the Coast, ‘had been specially sent out on account 
of his great experience in sanitary duties’. The fact that a disease specialist was 
selected to precede even the first arrival of officers is indicative of the War 
Office’s focus. He recommended that any expedition would require hospital 
accommodation for not less than 45% of the European force, with an additional 
7% in reserve. The Director-General of the Army Medical Department ordered 
Home’s recommendations to be carried out.612 Expedition planners were 
anticipating a large proportion of the European troops would be incapacitated, 
and worse. 
Such was believed to be the case in Abyssinia as well. During the 
proposal stage, Napier informed Cambridge that, ‘the expedition would be very 
expensive and troublesome, and if not a hostile shot is fired the casualties from 
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climate and accident will amount to ten times the number of captives’.613 The 
Army’s research dossier on the area quoted Mansfield Parkyns’ 1853 travel 
account Life in Abyssinia, which stated that the lowland valleys through which 
the army would have to pass, ‘are much to be feared from the malaria which 
prevails and which brings on, in persons exposed to its influence, most terrible 
inflammatory fevers, of which four cases out of five are fatal’.614 Parkyns and 
Bruce had visited the areas in question, but these were dated and rather 
narrative sources upon which to base a military expedition. Hozier concluded 
that, ‘the climate of the lowland on the African coast was believed to be more 
dangerous to European constitutions than that of the most unhealthy stations of 
India’.615 A dire comparison indeed, even for Napier’s Anglo-Indian army.  
 In his own published contribution to the media buzz, John Camden 
Hotten claimed that: 
It is understood that the Government has received more unsolicited 
advice upon what is commonly known as the ‘Abyssinian Difficulty’ than 
upon any other question of politics which has engaged public attention 
for some time. During many months past the newspaper press has 
teemed with editorial articles and letters from correspondents, making 
comments and offering suggestions of every conceivable character.616 
 
Newspapers declared that, ‘fever, dysentery, ague, and a long train of diseases 
besides, were to meet the army at every turn; ugly flies with ugly names were to 
annoy the men, and kill the animals; scorpions and snakes were to be the 
scourge of all and sundry; water was always to be scarce, and often 
poisonous’.617 Colonel Robert Phayre, head of the Abyssinian reconnoitring 
expedition, had been sent well ahead to plot out the route for the main 
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expedition, and was thus one of the first to get a first-hand look at the 
landscape. He reported to Napier, still making preparations in Bombay, that, 
‘though there are difficulties, yet they are magnified a good deal by persons who 
do not and will not, see their way out of them, but are so impressed with the 
miserable and untruthful tone of the Press, that they view everything through 
that medium’.618 That same week, Cambridge complained to Napier that, ‘the 
English papers have, I think, been writing very foolishly as regards this War…I 
should hope that the fears expressed as regards the badness of the climate are 
much exaggerated’.619 The real and imaginary dangers, the prudent and 
paranoid precautions, all combined with a dearth of solid information and a 
sensationalist press to create something terrifying. As Stanley summarised, ‘in 
short, there was no known horror, danger, or disease, which was not 
prophesized would befall the Expedition’.620 ‘One thing is clear’, an anonymous 
Lancet writer similarly reported of Ashanti, ‘the expedition can scarcely prove a 
greater failure than it has been prophesised that it will be’.621 
3.1.1 There Be Dragons 
Abyssinia was cast as a lifeless wasteland. Stanley described an 
expanse, ‘undulating as far as vision of man can reach, in nude dunes, bereft of 
the least signs of shrub, rolling like a vitrified sea – such was the Wadela 
plateau rising above the nether world: strangest freak of nature this!’622 Phayre 
warned Napier that he, ‘should not like to detain European Troops for one hour 
longer than requisite on this alluvial soil…[which] must be feverish from its very 
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character’.623 Hozier explained that the expedition had to navigate, ‘the 
unhealthy lowland of the Soudan, which teems with fever and malaria’.624 
Shepherd even claimed that, ‘often one steps from solid ground into a perfect 
bog…it is said that a body of three-hundred Galla horsemen, having been 
repulsed near Ashangi a few weeks before had fled precipitately towards the 
lake, and having rushed unawares upon one of these treacherous quagmires, 
disappeared at once and for ever’.625 
The War Office dossier on the region also quoted the explorer James 
Bruce, who reported in his 1790 Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile that, 
for much of the year, ‘it is death to sleep in the [lowland] country…the whole 
inhabitants retire and live in villages on the top of the neighbouring 
mountains’.626 Tweedie similarly wrote that, in the mountain passes to the 
Tigrean highlands, ‘no sign of human habitation meets the eye, excepting 
where, far away on the summit of some almost inaccessible mountain, wheeling 
kites indicate to us that a village is probably posted there’.627 The British public 
was thus presented with an image of a desolate plain. Humans could only live 
on the peaks, besieged in their tiny fortresses by the lethal country around 
them. 
Major Butler provided some of the more evocative descriptions of the 
Gold Coast. During the rainy season, he wrote, ‘the giant foliage of the forest 
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exhaled disease and death from its myriad nostrils’.628 He described the tropical 
forests as harbouring, ‘rivers teeming with monstrous reptiles…forests filled with 
uncouth beasts; malaria and poisonous vapour ever rising from its myriad 
marshes;…fanned by withering breezes which carry death and destruction on 
their noxious wings’.629 A veteran of the region told The Lancet that the 
atmosphere poisoned those exposed to it, ‘like so much mephitic gas’.630 
‘So vast is this vegetable kingdom’, claimed Butler, ‘that the animal world 
sickens and dies out before it – this immense forest holds scarcely a living 
creature’.631 Wolseley, likewise, recalled that he, ‘never saw an animal during 
our march to Koomassee, not even a rat or a snake’.632 Captain Freemantle told 
an audience at the Royal Geographical Society, ‘that animal life, like human life, 
was exceedingly scarce where the bush or forest is exceedingly thick….and 
what was there consisted, at any rate as far as he could see, of ants’.633 It was 
well known that draft animals could not survive on the coast. Ashanti sat 
squarely in the West African tsetse fly belt, its armies completely without 
cavalry.634 The absence even of domesticated animals added to the impression 
that the area was, while lush, also somehow lifeless. Winwood Reade reported 
to The Times that: 
all the pictures of the Forest that came back to my mind were somber 
and sad. Great gloomy trees shedding darkness; creepers coiled round 
them like serpents; fungi feeding on their flesh; pools of green water; 
sloughs of black mud, yielding, when stirred with the foot, a sickening 
stench.635  
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On the east bank of the Volta, Stanley described the plant life as a direct threat: 
The black vegetable mould of the morass is still in a state of 
chaos…Even while we hurry by we feel the influence of the forbidden 
region…we are conscious that a veil of death hangs over us, and 
sensible that for breathing that noxious air we shall suffer…below is the 
rich, deep alluvial deposit of the river, fermenting in the fervid sun and 
adding still more to the disease which has begun to permeate through 
our frames.636 
 
Henty claimed to fear only ‘the death which was lurking unperceived among 
those palm trees, which hung in the thin, light mists which were rising from the 
valleys, which was to assail us in the water we drank and in their air we 
breathed’.637 In the dominant British image of the Gold Coast, disease seemed 
to emanate from the water; the soil; the living plants; everything. 
Published explorer journals and tales of military daring-do played up 
such challenges and revelled in the idea that plucky British men could trudge 
into the harshest environments and succeed. Bravado is so often a reaction to 
anxiety, however, and the popular imagination still saw African exploration on 
the scale of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions as simply impossible. 
Indeed, it could seem to have been statistically proven. Butler suggested that 
the era of African exploration opened with Mungo Park and closed with 
Livingstone. Inspirational examples, to be sure, but, ‘between these men what a 
host of brave names are links and rivets in a long chain of death. Denham, 
Clapperton, Landon, Oudeny, Billon, Laing, Toole; all sleep out somewhere in 
that pitiless land’.638 Park himself had drowned trying to escape hostile West 
African natives. What hope could the expedition have? There was a strong and 
quite vocal thread in the public sphere that it had none. Henty recalled that, 
during the preparation for the Abyssinian expedition, all African travellers who 
                                                       
636 Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, p. 124. 
637 Henty, The March to Coomassie, pp. 46-7. 
638 Butler, Akim-Foo, p. 20. 
152 
 
offered their opinions, ‘had united only in prophesying evil things…freely 
uttered, and it really appeared as if our expedition was to partake strongly of the 
nature of a forlorn-hope’.639 The expedition, claimed Markham, ‘was looked 
upon as hazardous and almost impossible by the guides of public opinion’.640 
Even after Wolseley’s success in Ashanti, Boyle of the Daily Telegraph 
did not believe that Africa had been made any safer. He argued that even the 
most modern and expensive drainage system, bush clearing, and sanitary 
measures would not lower the death rate below 25% a year.641 He cautioned his 
readers not to be swayed by the example of popular explorers. Livingstone 
notwithstanding, ‘it is proved by a thousand melancholy instances that we 
cannot live in the country’, and the odd exceptional cases were ‘men of a 
constitution most unusual in England. To send an official to West Africa is to 
send him to death’.642 He repeatedly suggested that Britain leave the Gold 
Coast entirely. The Sunday Times seemed to agree, asserting that: 
Public opinion has been from the first adverse to the war. It is not so 
much a national affair as a Government whim. It is one of those little 
wars which cause considerable vexation and involves an expenditure 
disproportionate to the practical objects and military glory to be 
attained.643 
 
Even the New York Times argued that, ‘of all the hopeless, futile, foolish 
expeditions on which troops were ever sent this seems the most hopeless, the 
most foolish’.644 
Lieutenant Dooner was irritated that, ‘the Press did nothing but abuse the 
Government of the day for thinking of sending British officers to such a climate; 
it seemed to be looked on as a quiet process of ridding the earth of our 
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presence’.645 As he assembled his personal equipment for the expedition, a 
‘friend’ advised him not to bother, ‘as it would be quite sufficient to go to an 
undertakers and order a coffin, which was all the kit I would probably ever 
need’.646 Wolseley gestured to Dooner and mocked his friend, ‘one of the worst 
of these alarmists’, in his Mansion House speech.647  
As Reade wrote of the proposal to invade Ashanti, ‘it is not therefore 
surprising that the Imperial Government should have been reluctant to cast two 
of its noble regiments into that dark and dismal forest out of which, perhaps, 
none might live to return’.648 That was an important part of the government and 
public reluctance to launch military expeditions into tropical zones. Intrepid 
explorers inspired and amazed the British public for the very reason that their 
dashes into the wild were seen to be against all possible odds. Those were 
individual men of enterprise, however. It was something quite different for the 
army to order soldiers into the ‘white man’s grave’. 
Butler cast the forest itself as stubborn and implacable, ‘the only forest I 
have ever seen which defies man; you could not clear it, for the reason that long 
before you could cut it down, a new forest would have arisen’. He described 
several supposed ‘wise men’ in the newspapers that had recommended burning 
the forest with petroleum oil.649 Acklom, a contributor to the United Service 
Magazine, also argued that Wolseley use ‘that great extirpator “fire,” to clear the 
forest and the river jungle from the skulking, cruel, man-eater, whether biped or 
quadruped, to scare and destroy moreover the venomous crawling world, to 
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suck up the foul death-dealing miasma’.650 As a communications officer 
explained in a letter home, however, the Gold Coast bush simply ‘will not 
burn’.651 Butler similarly countered, ‘alas! the African forest is always green, 
always wet, always fire-proof’.652 In its defiance of the expedition, Butler’s bush 
thus rejected even that most original and blunt of humanity’s tools to alter the 
environment. 
At the outset of the Ashanti campaign, an anonymous artillery officer with 
fifteen years of experience in the region claimed in the London magazine 
Belgravia that, ‘to the general public, until lately, little was known about the 
West Coast beyond the two facts that it was very unhealthy, and that gold dust 
came from there’.653 Such a dichotomy of great riches and certain death had 
long been the popular image of the African interior, where many maps still 
showed blank patches.654 ‘The interior of the African continent has been…for 
the most part a sealed book to the outer world’, claimed Harper’s.655 ‘To live 
there’, wrote Stanley, ‘would be like eating of the forbidden fruit’.656 In North 
Africa, Butler argued, men had to climb precipitous mountains or dig deep 
shafts to find gold and consequently risk their bodies to attain it. He contrasted 
this to the Gold Coast, where: 
Nature had seemingly guarded her treasures by a process more 
completely effective than that of great distances and giant mountains 
encompassing them. The grim figure of Fever stood sentry over the mine 
of wealth, ready to wither with his burning touch the adventurous white 
man who would dare to seek this gold lying close beneath the red 
surface of the earth.657 
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Consequently, ‘for four hundred years Ashanti has sent its gold to the sea. For 
hundreds of years again there will be gold in that land of death’.658 Butler 
notably believed that nature and fever allowed the Ashanti to pass, which gave 
them exclusive access to the gold from which the coast took its name. In his 
memoir, Wolseley described the forest with a quote from John Milton’s 1645 
poem L’Allegro: ‘it seemed, indeed, that “brooding darkness spread his jealous 
wings” to protect those “ebon shades” from the invader. If there be gnomes on 
earth who guard the dark recesses of nature, surely they must haunt these 
fever-breeding forests of Ashantee’.659 He told an audience at the Royal 
Geographical Society that he ‘could not, therefore, hold out much hopes of 
pleasurable excitement to the gold-seekers who might intend to visit that 
coast’.660 The Lancet agreed that, despite ‘the amount of gold existing in that 
country…the possession of wealth is no recompense for the loss of health 
which a residence on the West Coast of Africa will almost certainly entail’.661 
3.1.2 Allied Opposition 
In his 1905 military treatise, West African Warfare, C. Braithwaite Wallis, 
former District Commissioner for Sierra Leone and veteran of the Protectorate 
Frontier Force, described ‘the cunning savages of West Africa, who fight amid, 
and are protected by, their dense and impenetrable forests’.662 The notion of 
this special relationship was prominent in 1873 as well. In a lecture at the Royal 
United Services Institute, Colonel Wood told the gathered officers that ‘malaria 
fought in the van of the Ashantis…who had defied us so long by their weapons 
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of Distance, Disease, and Treachery’.663 Disease posed such a threat to British 
soldiers, claimed The Lancet, that, ‘the expedition may…be likened to the 
march of a force under fire’.664 Brackenbury argued that, ‘there never was a 
European population at Cape Coast until the expedition arrived, and yellow 
fever only attacks Europeans’.665 The War Office had likewise believed before 
launching the Abyssinian expedition that the, ‘climate of the lowlands was 
known to be extremely prejudicial to European constitutions’.666 It was true that 
African diseases were usually more deadly to Europeans with no previous 
exposure, but that differential was overblown to the point that, in the public 
discourse, Africa seemed to hunt white men.  
As a reaction to this anxiety, Butler took some solace in the idea that 
‘African fever finds in British pluck its most obstinate opponent…the staggering 
limb and wandering brain are kept to their work by the spirit which will not 
declare itself vanquished’.667 The British had long valued pluck, fortitude, and 
phlegmatic perseverance as their core martial qualities. Stanley described 
Elmina as a nice town built in a European style. Looking down on it from the top 
of a nearby hill, he saw ‘the wide prospect of bush which seems to threaten to 
bury the town itself in its wide-spreading arms’.668 Stanley thus presented an 
image of an isolated beacon of European ‘civilised’ architecture at risk of being 
consumed by the African wild. 
British commentators in Abyssinia and Ashanti tended to describe the 
African wildlife as possessing malicious intent, as conspiring against the men of 
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the expeditions. Shepherd in the Times of India reported that the swarms of 
baboons populating Abyssinia: 
insisted upon having a ‘constitutional’ upon the [telegraph] wire every 
morning and evening, performing their gymnastic capers with such vigour 
as to pull it down altogether. Punch accounted for the breaking of the 
Trans-Atlantic cable by suggesting that the playful mermaids made a 
swinging rope of it; but the exhibitions of these hoards of baboons upon 
the Abyssinian cable completely eclipsed the Charivari’s cartoon, 
inasmuch as they were not only equally ludicrous and destructive, but 
perfectly real.669 
 
Shepherd introduced the implication that these baboons were acting against 
modern technology. Butler described a swarm of ants ravaging his provision 
box as, ‘a corps d’armée engaged on the highly-disciplined and scientifically-
conducted loot of some defenceless French city’.670 Boyle told of a large 
tarantula ‘slain…in single combat’ with Dr. Samuel in ‘one of the briskest actions 
of the war’.671 The detailed rendition was published both in his book and in the 
Telegraph. The tarantula was described as cruel, planning its attacks, and 
seeking to strike the Doctor’s weakest points. The African servant in Boyle’s 
story fled at the first sight of the arachnid. The tale closely matched tropes 
associated with colonial tiger hunting, according to which the British were the 
only ones able to protect the natives from the local fauna. Sramek and others 
have argued that this trope was presented as proof of the coloniser’s fitness to 
rule over the weaker natives.672 Critical to the tiger-hunting ideal was that the 
hunted animal was in fact a dangerous foe, as Boyle presented his spider. 
3.1.3 Sporting Pursuits 
Appropriately, the officers of the British army, in the popular ideal as 
much as in their real-world enactment of it, were hunters. Looking back on 50 
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years of military progress in 1887, Wolseley proposed that, ‘no army has 
officers of such varied experience in all parts of the world as ours; they are to be 
found in the remotest regions of the earth, relentlessly bent on “sport.” They 
hunt lions in Equatorial Africa, tigers in Bengal, elephants in Ceylon, and other 
big game in the snows of Thibet’.673 Such pursuits marked army officers as 
members of the leisured class, but were also believed to demonstrate and hone 
their military effectiveness on campaign. Colonel Gawler, former military 
magistrate to the Kaffir tribes, argued at RUSI, ‘(at any rate in savage warfare) 
that the best sportsman makes the best soldier’.674 In 1901, Callwell questioned 
why the British army in the Transvaal had fallen into so many Boer traps. He 
was surprised by this because, ‘officers are mostly sportsmen. The favourite 
pursuits of many of them amount in reality to the pitting of their wits against the 
marvellous instinct of animals in their natural state’.675 Callwell was faced with 
the damning evidence of the British performance in the Boer War and lamented 
the failure of an idea that for well over a century had been the ideal. This ideal 
was quite apparent in the Abyssinian war, which seemed like a fine opportunity 
for a hunting expedition. 
Always eager to embrace romantic stereotypes from his affected 
‘outsider’ perspective, Stanley made his way from the British beachhead in 
pursuit of Napier’s advancing army with a certain Captain Smelfungus (Stanley 
removed or altered most names). Riding at night, they heard the roar of a 
nearby animal, whereupon the Captain spurred his horse forward, ‘like a man 
bound to clear the way for the troop behind, couching a large boar spear in true 
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knightly style’.676 The animal turned out to be a hyena and Smelfungus, 
returning to the road, told Stanley that it was, ‘not worthy of my steel. I mean to 
reserve this spear for gorillas and wild boars, or lions and hippopotami’.677 Over 
the rest of their journey, he shot an absolute legion of birds and small 
mammals. He claimed to have shot boars, though Stanley never saw any.678 
Upon hearing a commotion further up the road, Henty emerged from his 
tent to see a troop of ‘very large monkeys’ pursued by stone-throwing soldiers. 
‘Visions of monkey-skins flashed across my mind’, he reported, ‘snatching up 
revolvers and sun-helmets, three or four of us joined the chase’.679 The 
Abyssinian expedition involved very little military action until the final stretch and 
these brief instances of hunting in campaign accounts comprised some of the 
only references to violence between long descriptions of travel. Big-game 
hunting was an important symbol in the construction of British imperial identity, 
representing ‘the striving and victory of civilized men over the darker primeval 
and untamed forces still at work in the world’.680 Tiger hunting in India was a 
particularly potent representation of, ‘the struggle with a fearsome nature that 
needed to be resolutely faced’, an ideal which extended to Africa as well.681 
Ritvo argued that in the early and less confident period of expansion into a new 
area, big game hunting served as, ‘the emblem of armed European conquest of 
territories that seemed particularly threatening and alien’.682 Thus, ‘the arrival of 
big game hunters in regions previously untrodden by Europeans was seen as 
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the harbinger of civilization’.683 In Abyssinia, the hunters and the dominating 
army had simply arrived together and the two activities were presented as 
acting in harmony. The military flavour of this domination was easily apparent. 
Dead wild animals symbolised the British suppression of the human inhabitants: 
‘rows of horns and hides, mounted heads and stuffed bodies, clearly alluded to 
the violent, heroic underside of imperialism’.684 
The collection of specimens for scientific study was another sort of 
hunting the Abyssinian expedition fostered. A cadre of scientists and naturalists 
accompanied the army and Napier was instructed to ‘afford these officers every 
assistance’.685 William Jesse, the expedition zoologist, collected 24 mammal 
skins, an elephant skull, a rhinoceros skeleton, 3 antelope heads, 8 other 
mammal skeletons, 750 bird skins, 6 tortoises and lizards, 30 fish, 50 
crustaceans, 350 insects, 26 jars of birds, mammals, and reptiles in 
formaldehyde, and an aboriginal Abyssinian skull for a grand total of 1,250 
specimens. He also live shipped 2 wild cats, 2 large rats, and 2 guinea fowl to 
the Zoological Society in London; only the cats survived the trip.686 The 
expanding spheres of knowledge created by collecting such specimens and 
displaying them in museum settings played an important part in European 
imperialism.687 Hunting and collecting had been of central importance to earlier 
explorer expeditions to Abyssinia.688 These specimen collections were powerful 
signs that Africa had been penetrated, tamed, and analysed. 
                                                       
683 Ibid., p. 254. 
684 Ibid., p. 248. 
685 Holland and Hozier, Expedition to Abyssinia, 1:69. 
686 Ibid., 2:376-7. 
687 John McAleer, Representing Africa: Landscape, Exploration and Empire in Southern Africa, 
1780-1870 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010) p. 109. 
688 Parkyns, Life in Abyssinia, 1:111; W. T. Blanford, Observations on the Geology and Zoology 
of Abyssinia, made during the Progress of the British Expedition to that Country in 1867-68 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1870) p. 67, 100, 101, 116, 139, 213, 233; Sir Samuel W. Baker, 
The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia and the Sword Hunters of the Hameam Arabs (London: 
161 
 
As Jesse’s aboriginal skull had been listed along with his animal 
specimens, so other commentators blurred the line between human and animal 
targets. On the way to the battle of Essaman in Ashanti, before they had made 
enemy contact, Reade noted a marine saying, ‘we had seen no game’.689 After 
the ensuring battle, his Hausa servant told him that the fight, ‘was just like 
“shooting meat” – by which he meant to say that it resembled the pleasures of 
the chase’.690 Captain Hutton, 60th Rifles, told his father in a letter from 
Abyssinia that ‘It is to me like a shooting expedition, with just a spice of danger 
thrown in to make it really interesting’.691 Colonel Penn was happy to tell Scott 
that ‘he made a splendid bag’ in one battle.692 Beinart described a similar 
dynamic at play in Southern Africa, where, ‘so pervasive were the language and 
symbols of the hunt that they were used to describe contact with people’.693 
 
3.1.4 Elephants on Parade 
In Abyssinia, it quickly became apparent that the locals were very 
impressed by Napier’s 44 domesticated elephants. British commentators seized 
on this fact as an opportunity to project and exhibit dominance over the natural 
world. Holland and Hozier stated that:  
elephants are considered untameable by the natives, who refused to 
believe that is was possible to reduce them to a state of subordination to 
man. The passage of the elephants through the country was, therefore, 
followed by crowds of wondering and awe-struck Abyssinians, who 
formerly thought that anyone who told them that an elephant could be 
tamed was dealing in the most flowery romance.694 
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Henty was likewise intrigued to find that, ‘the natives never tired of watching the 
huge beasts at their work, and wondering at their obedience to us. This 
astonishes them, indeed, more than anything they have seen of us, with the 
exception of our condensing water from the sea.’695 Hozier also compared local 
reactions to elephants with those to novel technology, describing, ‘a sensation, 
second only to that caused by the elephants was created by the arrival of 
Murray’s battery of Armstrong guns’.696 In this case, the elephants elicited an 
even greater reaction than the newest weapons. 
Shepherd was interested in the ‘moral effect produced upon the minds of 
the Abyssinians’ by the animals.697 He witnessed several Abyssinian chiefs 
visiting the British camp at Ad Abaga. They were shown and reported to be 
impressed with the Armstrong guns and Snider rifles. However, ‘the elephants, 
of which two gigantic specimens were attached to Head-quarters, were another 
cause of extreme wonderment’. Shepherd attributed the chiefs’ reactions to 
their lack of technical understanding:  
The mysteries of the bursting shell and the graduated fuse may not have 
been fully comprehended by them; but they knew how wild and 
untameable was the elephant, that monstrum, ingens, horrendum, which 
roams among their own hills and mountains. When the exploits of the 
great Sabagadis are depicted on the walls of their churches, his 
slaughter of an elephant is always placed in a good light; and how much 
greater than Sabagadis must the least of that nation be, which can not 
only kill the elephant, but catch him alive, tame him, and render him the 
most gentle and docile of creatures.698 
 
In an 1864 anniversary address to the RGS, Murchinson argued that, 
‘the most remarkable proof of the inferiority of the negro, when compared with 
the Asiatic, is that whilst the latter has domesticated the elephant for ages and 
rendered it highly useful to man, the negro has only slaughtered the animal to 
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obtain food or ivory’.699 On the premise that the animals demonstrated a 
civilisation’s level of development, it was hoped that they might be employed as 
performance. Since the Abyssinians ‘have up till now steadily refused to believe’ 
that the British possessed elephants in a tamed state, Scott anticipated that, 
‘they would believe anything of us now, I fancy’.700 
Napier chose to ride up to his parlay with the Ras of Tigre on the back of 
an elephant. Acton explained that, ‘this was done for the sake of effect, as the 
Abyssinians have no idea of taming or mounting the elephant’.701 The elephant 
elected not to cross a small river separating the two delegations and Napier had 
to dismount and proceed by horse. Henty expressed his ‘hope that our 
elephants and cannon will open his Majesty’s eyes to the fact that we are a 
people whom it would be vastly safer to leave alone’.702 It was particularly 
appropriate in light of this dynamic that the elephants were primarily employed 
in the task of carrying the Armstrong guns and mortars. Abyssinians thus often 
witnessed the two together, the cannons strapped to the animals’ backs.703 
Napier exhibited his elephants alongside his cannons to other local leaders as 
well.704 In a sense, elephants achieved some of the same symbolic function in 
Africa as did novel British military technology, that of demonstrating British 
mastery over nature.705 
These presentations were seen as being so effective that some 
suggested bringing elephants to Ashanti. Reade recalled that, ‘it was suggested 
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by members of the Press, and by members of the Profession, that elephants 
should be employed’. ‘Is it impossible’, asked The Spectator, ‘to add a few 
elephants? They do not die in malarious jungle, they can go where nothing else 
can, and they can carry half-a dozen guns larger than can be carried either on 
mules or horses’.706 Wolseley had refused to apply for any, which Reade 
criticised on the basis that, ‘we had to fight a superstitious people, and I believe 
that the sight of tame elephants would have had no slight effect upon the 
enemy’.707 Stanley agreed that, had Wolseley brought elephants to the Gold 
Coast, ‘a certain lasting awe would be created in the Ashantees’ mind at the 
fact that the white man could compel the service of so many lords of the 
forest’.708 
3.2 The People 
Abyssinia and the Gold Coast were described in British public discourses 
as lacking real civilisation, and the lifestyles of the Africans living there as not 
meriting that term. This was a well-established trope.709 In 1860, the explorer 
Richard Burton wrote that, ‘Eastern and inter-tropical Africa also lacks 
antiquarian and historic interest, it has few traditions, no annals, and no 
ruins…It contains not a single useful ornamental work of art, a canal or dam’.710 
Acton similarly claimed that the Abyssinians, ‘have no arts; they have no 
manufactures; they have no trade…There are fairs and markets in Abyssinia, 
but nowhere a shop…No one can build a wall of mortared stone or brick. No 
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one can make a cart or a boat; there is no such thing in Abyssinia’.711 Taking 
pride in being a citizen of a nation of shopkeepers, he further ‘reported’ that, ‘the 
arts of brickwork, masonry, and cementing stones with mortar, are unknown in 
this country; though several tolerably good buildings are to be seen, which were 
probably erected by the Portuguese about three hundred years ago’.712 The 
only structures of note were thus presumed to be traceable to Europeans. 
Describing an Abyssinian market, Stanley noted that, ‘there were no books, no 
lamps, no newspapers, no post-office – people never perceived the want of 
them’.713 Stanley found this wonderful summary of his own hallmarks of 
Victorian civilisation to be lacking. Brackenbury claimed that the Fante, ‘have no 
arts, and no manufactures except an imitative workmanship in gold, a very 
small amount of weaving, a little rough basket-work, and a very coarse 
description of pottery’.714 Butler similarly described the people of the entire 
continent as, ‘without law, art, honour, truth, or justice…the African race stands 
to-day as it stood 3000 years ago; hopeless to man, and cursed by heaven’.715 
Reade compared the West African inland bush tribes to the seaside 
villages of the Kroos, with whom he had previous experience. He described the 
Kroos as existing in a state of pre-civilisation, whereby, ‘every village was a 
kingdom; at every thirty miles another dialect was spoken – that surest sign of 
barbarism: prisoners of war were eaten, but not women “because they were 
tough.”’.716 He contrasted the Kroos with the Ashanti and Fante somewhat to 
the latter’s benefit, claiming that, ‘in the forest of the Kroos iron is in use, but 
gold is unknown; and it is doubtless the knowledge of gold which by means of 
                                                       
711 Acton, Life and Reign, p. 3. 
712 Ibid., p. 8. 
713 Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, p. 294. 
714 Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, A Narrative, 2:326. 
715 Butler, Akim-Foo, p. 19. 
716 Reade, Ashantee Campaign, p. 8; He made the same claim of tribes living ‘in the backwoods 
of Liberia’ in Winwood Reade, The African Sketch-Book (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1873) p. 
116. 
166 
 
commerce has raised the people of the Gold Coast from that early and rude 
condition by which their neighbours still remains’.717 His compliment only went 
so far, and Reade was quite atypical in having travelled widely in Africa and 
having had significant experience with different African nations. For much of the 
British reading public, and indeed many of the troops and officers on the 
campaign, the image of the Kroos would have been generalised to incorporate 
all Gold Coast Africans. 
Wolseley took an interesting approach in his judgement of civilisational 
development in his journal. He tied Africans’ supposed lack of industriousness 
to the presence of decay and thus to the prevalence of disease. Looking at 
Sierra Leone, he felt it: 
monstrous to think that such naturally productive localities should be 
given over to waste and consequently as become breeding beds for the 
propagation of malaria, because the people who are supposed to own 
the soil are too lazy and worthless to till the soil, and I cannot believe that 
the Creator intended there should be races left on the face of the earth to 
vegetate in sensual idleness.718 
 
According to Wolseley’s logic, if someone had brought Sierra Leone under 
proper cultivation, such improvement of the land would have made it healthier 
for Europeans. He thus imagined that the Gold Coast was kept deadly by the 
lack of sufficiently advanced civilisation, and for this he blamed Africans. The 
term ‘vegetate’ is also worth noting. To Wolseley, if the people vegetated, the 
wild vegetation took over.  
 His thinking paralleled a change of perspective on disease then taking 
place in British India. In the tropical colonies, Curtin argued: 
Fear of the native inhabitants was still another hygienic concern 
reinforced in the second half of the nineteenth century. Early in the 
century, European death rates were so much higher than those of the 
‘natives’ it was hard to blame them as a secondary source of infection. 
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The usual explanation was the claim they had some inborn source of 
immunity. By the 1870s, however, European health in the tropics had 
improved so much that death rates of Indian and European troops were 
nearly equal. It then became possible to switch sides and to blame 
‘native filth and disease’ for European illness.719  
 
The perception of native populations as sources of infection led to an increasing 
physical separation of Indian quarters and the construction of walls to separate 
them from European military and civilian areas.720 
Though Wolseley’s thinking was aligned with the contemporary view of 
natives as disease vectors in India, he was pre-emptive in applying such a shift 
of blame to West Africa, given the much higher rates of European morbidity in 
that setting. The natives around him seemed to have both an inborn immunity to 
disease and a perceived civilisational stagnation that promoted it, which made 
them a special threat to Europeans. Lieutenant Edward Woodgate, similarly, 
wrote in his diary that Magdala was, ‘a fearful place for fleas which grow to an 
enormous size…the worse places for them are the huts into which I will not 
venture’.721 When on the return march they reached the town of Bashilo, he 
‘was anything but glad to find most of the natives out of Magdala there, 
especially as they had brought their fleas with them’.722 
The Queen’s forces thus represented the coming of modernity to a place 
wholly without it. The Spectator described Napier’s force as, ‘this army of 
Bruces, half explorers, half soldiers…It is civilization at war which that 
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expedition represents’.723 James has argued that, ‘Imperial wars in Africa were 
therefore being undertaken to overcome backwardness and savagery and were 
waged by a nation which saw itself as the banner-bearer of civilization’.724 This 
was seen to involve a forcing back of the dangerous natural world that African 
societies had failed to keep at bay. If nature was the enemy to be opposed, then 
Africans were subsumed under that larger category.  
Apropos, British officers and correspondents commonly described 
Africans in language likening them to animals.725 Reade described, ‘a crowd of 
Ashantees: they ran down the hill like mad, and, with their naked black bodies, 
resembled a herd of wild animals’.726 Maurice believed that his guides 
displayed, ‘just the look of the wild creatures one might expect to meet amid 
such a mad luxuriance of nature’.727 Tweedie described the Shoho people as, ‘a 
man and brother verging not very remotely on the animal or even vegetable 
world’.728 The chief of Aleggie, in Stanley’s characterisation, ‘sat on his knoll of 
strength like a caged tiger’, and his soldiers looked down, ‘wrathy and eager for 
prey and plunder…like crafty wolves’.729 Henty likewise compared the Ashanti 
army to a stalking tiger pitted against a British hunter.730 ‘A savage is exactly 
like a wild beast’, Rogers told the United Service Magazine.731 Butler described 
Africans the continent over as, ‘eaters of human flesh, full of cowardice, and of 
cruelty; half tiger, half monkey’.732 Seeking a more substantiated allusion, 
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Reade joked that since the usual beasts of burden could not survive, 
‘hammock-men on the Gold Coast are the substitute for horses…Two men form 
a perfect animal, with four black legs, the hammock-pole serving as the spine, 
and the hammock itself as a saddle.’733 
When King Theodore decided to make a last stand at Magdala, he first 
allowed the civilian population to evacuate. William Simpson of the Illustrated 
London News passed the refugees and, sometime later, ‘passed a very large 
flock of baboons…they seemed not unlike the vast human herd we had so lately 
seen. The one seemed a sort of caricature of the other…but which was really 
the caricature it might be hard to say. I might suggest that both were caricatures 
of humanity.’734 Shepherd told his readers that if one attempted to describe a 
group of Galla chiefs in formal regalia: 
truth could not be told, without remarking upon the wonderful likeness 
between Gallas so arrayed and demure-looking monkeys which 
mischievous boys have rendered inexpressively uncomfortable and 
ridiculous by muffling them up in red nightcaps and comforters.735 
 
Henty heard a report from the front that an allied Abyssinian chief and his army 
were monitoring Theodore’s progress to Magdala and chided that he did ‘not 
think that the news that he was watching Theodore was of any more importance 
than if it had been “a troop of baboons are watching Theodore”’.736 Reade 
claimed that among the West African Kroo people, ‘it was forbidden by the 
fetish to kill the chimpanzee because he was “too near;” considered in fact as a 
man and a brother’.737 
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In the battle outside Magdala, wrote Stanley, Theodore’s soldiers ‘bore 
down the hill, reached the plateau, and inundated it with their dusky bodies. A 
clear open plain was before them, over which they rolled like a huge wave.’738 
After the battle, he described, ‘[stumbling] over the thickened dead, who, lying 
stripped, were of the colour of the soil. Among the thickets the slain warriors, 
enrobed in their cotton togas, appeared like white splotches upon the dim and 
indistinct ground’.739 Stanley here presented dead African soldiers as merging 
back into the landscape from which he had described them as emerging. In 
Ashanti, after the battle of Amoaful, he described, ‘the dead Ashantees…thickly 
lying, with the most frightful wounds, proving that Snider rifles have terrible force 
and penetration. If other evidences were needed to establish this fact, the wreck 
of the bush, and the deep rugged rents of great trees, seen all around, did 
so.’740 Stanley thus presented both the damage to the bush and the death of 
Ashanti soldiers as evidence of the destructive power of British military 
technology. The Lancet similarly noted that, ‘the wounds caused by the hollow 
snider bullets…resembled in severity those caused by small explosive shells 
when fired into large animals’.741 Prior described a sergeant of the 42nd shooting 
an Ashanti soldier out of a tree, ‘like a pheasant in a battue’.742 MacKenzie 
defined a battue, as ‘the often competitive, apparently compulsive, and hugely 
destructive shooting of birds as stationary butts’ and ‘the large-scale slaughter 
of carefully reared birds’.743 The term was used as a battle analogy on several 
occasions in Abyssinia and Ashanti. 
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British commentators at times spoke of fallen African foes as having 
been ‘mowed down’, thus likening them to fields of grass. Austin reported in The 
Times that at Magdala, ‘to describe the fight after the Snider came into play 
would be only to describe a battue…The unfortunate foe had no longer even the 
shadow of a chance, but went down like grass before the sithe (sic).744 Acton 
likewise described the repeated volleys fired at Theodore’s soldiers, ‘mowing 
them down as with the swiftly repeated strokes of a mighty scythe’.745 Henty 
wrote of the same battle that, ‘the breech-loader [did] wonders…it literally 
mowed them down’.746 From Markham’s column and book, similarly: ‘the Snider 
rifles kept up a fire against which no Abyssinian troops could stand. They were 
mown down in lines.’747 In Ashanti, Lieutenant-Colonel Festing reported that, 
‘our advance continued to the edge of a thick bush…Here the Ashantees made 
one more stand as a final attempt, but it was no use, they were mown down.’748 
In a reflective article after Abyssinia, the editor of The Times stated his disquiet 
at the prospect of British soldiers being send to, ‘mow down…miserably-armed 
ranks with the deadliest weapons of modern art’.749 
3.2.1 Home Field Advantages 
Lieutenant Dooner had gone to bed after posting his native Opobo 
soldiers on picket duty outside Dompoassie. An officer who had come down the 
road and not seen any guards later woke him. Believing they had deserted, 
Dooner rushed out to check and was, ‘amazed to see them perched up in the 
trees like so many monkeys. It was a moonlit night, and they could see anyone 
coming along the track much better than if posted in the ordinary fashion. I 
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thought this very clever.’750 Dooner was pleased to see innovative bush tactics 
among his irregulars and allies, but that was exactly the sort of behaviour that 
British officers feared from the enemy. During the planning for the Ashanti 
expedition, the War Office interviewed any merchants or military men with 
experience on the Gold Coast, which Brackenbury summarised as: ‘the bush, a 
home to the enemy, would be impenetrable to English soldiers…Surrounded on 
all sides, they would be shot down in the narrow paths…Every tree within reach 
would be full of armed men...Such were the opinions expressed by the majority 
of the witnesses.’751 
A memorandum on bush fighting distributed to officers in Ashanti 
instructed that the men were to be, ‘specially warned to beware of clearings & 
never to form in them, but always when they have to cross them to do so with a 
rush and to plunge at once into the bush beyond. To halt in a clearing is to 
expose yourself as a target to enemies (sic) shot from the bush’.752 Maurice 
stressed in the Daily News that the soldiers, ‘had to contend against an enemy 
whose especial skill lay in ingeniously contrived ambushes, and in creeping 
along the flanks of an advancing force, to attack at unexpected points’.753 He 
characterised such ambushes as, ‘that strangest, most weird, and most 
confused of all things, a bush fight with invisible enemies’.754 Wolseley recalled 
that, ‘it was a curious sensation that of being fired into upon four faces…by a 
howling mass of many, many thousands of savages…and yet to be unable to 
see them in the dense bush beneath that awe-inspiring forest’.755 During the 
                                                       
750 Dooner, Jottings En Route, p. 48. 
751 Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, A Narrative, pp. 114-15. 
752 Draft of Memorandum on Bush Fighting by Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Alison, Bt, [n.d.] 
[December 1873], Bodleian, Alison MSS, MS. Eng. lett. c. 450, in Beckett, Wolseley and 
Ashanti, p. 280. 
753 ‘Daily News’ Special Correspondent (Sir John Frederick Maurice), The Ashantee War: A 
Popular Narrative (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1874) p. 343. 
754 Ibid., p. 78. 
755 Wolseley, Soldier's Life, 2:341. 
173 
 
battle of Amoaful, claimed Wood, a number of Ashanti soldiers, ‘penetrated into 
the angle of uncut bush…Lying flat on the ground, they were as invisible as a 
hare on her form, till they fired.’756 Later in the battle, ‘a few [Ashanti were] killed 
within four yards of us, whose presence we never detected till they fired, so 
easily were their dusky bodies concealed’.757  
Faced as they were with such invisible enemies, it was impossible, 
according to Henty: 
to give a picturesque account of an affair in which there was nothing 
picturesque; in which scarcely a man saw an enemy from the 
commencement to the end of the fight; in which there was no 
manoeuvring, no brilliant charges, no general concentration of troops ; 
but what consisted simply of lying down, of creeping through the bush, of 
gaining ground foot by foot, and of pouring a ceaseless fire into every 
bush which might conceal an invisible foe.758 
 
 
 
The Times (reprinted in The Broad Arrow and elsewhere) described that: 
in bush-fighting great waste, or apparent waste, of ammunition is 
unavoidable, and tends to save the expenditure of life on our side. If 
soldiers withhold their fire too long the Ashantees creep up and fire in at 
close range. The bush should be cleared by volleys whenever there is 
reason to suspect the enemy is there. 
 
As for defence, furthermore, ‘it was proved on the other side of the Prah that a 
clearing [of the bush] is the best fortification, and the wider the clearing the 
stronger the position’.759 If the bush contained armed opponents and made it 
impossible to see those armed opponents, then the bush itself had to be treated 
as a potentially armed opponent at all times. It was a real tactical problem, 
which developed out of the Ashanti way of fighting. The British technological 
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advantage further required Ashanti soldiers to stay even more tightly to cover. 
This practical reality of bush warfare reinforced the already existing threatening 
image of the African landscape. The Newcastle Courant erroneously reported 
that the Black Watch was able to advance only through ‘clearing every forward 
step with the Gatling and the rifle’.760 
The Abyssinian and Ashanti enemies were thus made to represent not 
only an opposing military force, but also opponents in the campaign against 
nature. In that capacity they posed a serious threat. In 1905 C. Braithwaite 
Wallis, formerly the District Commissioner of Sierra Leone, described his long 
experience of the ‘savage enemy’: 
Like the wild animals of his own forests, he is alert. Nature has given him 
first-rate sight and hearing, which have not been impaired by civilization, 
and he is cunning and suspicious. Nature has further come to his aid, as 
she does to every one who lives according to her laws. The human 
inhabitant of the forest, naked as he is, harmonises closely with his 
surroundings, and is extremely difficult to detect. Like the tiger in the 
jungle, the deer in the mountains, and the snake in the grass, this 
wonderful provision of Nature for ensuring invisibility is strikingly 
illustrated in her inalterable laws, which extend even to savage man.761 
 
From a strictly military perspective (and it was a military manual) this was 
actually intended to be a sort of compliment. Wallis described the tactical 
advantages that the ‘savage’ enemy gained from his close connection with the 
forest, especially when within the forest. Wallis’ enemy was in fact a dangerous 
foe because he was ‘savage’, not in spite of it. This idea was quite old when 
Wallis wrote his guide and formed the foundation of the perceived enemy at the 
time of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions. If Africa was indeed a wild 
place and if Africans were indeed wild themselves, then they were presumed to 
possess a distinct advantage in that setting. Racial dominance, as it applied to 
military conflict, might be said to have been context-sensitive.  
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3.2.2 The West Indian Background to British Racial Environmentalism 
In this thesis, the term ‘racial environmentalism’ will be used broadly to 
refer to the popular theories of race and climate in early nineteenth-century 
Britain. Racial environmentalism stressed difference between races without 
necessarily arranging those races in a clear or linear hierarchy. There was a 
lingering belief in polygenesis, which hypothesised separate creations for each 
of the races.762 There was also a strong belief in scientific circles of the plasticity 
of species and the influence of environment and climate.763 The implication was 
that each race was best suited to a particular climate and no single race could 
thrive everywhere.764 Since racial difference was due either to environmental 
influence or to separate creations, the ‘best’ race need not necessarily be the 
best at everything. 
In 1818, William Wells, an American physician living in London, 
developed a theory of racial origins through natural selection. He proposed that 
the most significant variation between Africans and Europeans lay in their 
differing reactions to region-specific diseases, and that skin colour was a mere 
accidental trait co-incident with this climatic adaptation.765 Aside from that 
particular presupposition, his theory appeared remarkably Darwinian. As 
individuals always varied in nature, some of the accidental varieties of man 
would be born: 
better fitted than others to bear the diseases of the country. This race 
would consequently multiply, while the others would decrease, not only 
from their inability to sustain the attacks of disease, but from their 
incapacity of contending with their more vigorous neighbours. The colour 
of this vigorous race I take for granted…would be dark.766 
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The lighter variations, being less able to bear the region’s diseases, would have 
moved north or died out, thus generating the differentiation between African and 
European lineages.767 Wells’ theory and the contemporary ideas that underlay it 
not only argued for context-sensitive racial dominance but also made it the 
mechanism by which the different races had arisen in the first place. It 
suggested, Curtin argued, that ‘whatever Europeans might think about of their 
own racial superiority, in the conditions of tropical Africa, the Africans 
themselves were the more “vigorous” race’.768 
According to this worldview, therefore, those races that British officials 
believed to be ‘martial’ did not need to resemble the British in their fighting 
habits or perceived physiological makeup. Such interpretations of race differed 
markedly from those of the later-nineteenth-century, which tended toward a 
more universalised racial hierarchy with white Europeans at the top. Racial 
environmentalism was dominant in Britain at the end of the eighteenth-century 
and through to the mid-nineteenth-century. It lost ground to scientific racism and 
Darwinian ideas of hierarchy through the 1860s and ‘70s, during which time 
martial race theory became more firmly established.769 In Traces on the 
Rhodian Shore, Glacken discussed such a transition from eighteenth-century 
climatic causality to late-nineteenth-century racial determinism.770 
The West Indian Regiments provide an illustrative case from the late-
eighteenth-century in which the British military decided that the Anglo-Saxon 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Single Vision with Two Eyes and the Other on Dew… (London: A. Constable and Co., 1818) pp. 
435-46; Also included in Ibid p. 237. 
767 Curtin, The Image of Africa, p. 237. 
768 Ibid., p. 238. 
769 Drescher, Ending of the Slave Trade, p. 429; Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, 
Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004). 
770 Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought 
from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967) p. 620. 
177 
 
race was not superior. Bush warfare in the West Indian colonies required skills 
very different from the European norm. The French Revolution had a profound 
extended effect on the French Caribbean.771 During 1794-98, Buckley argued: 
a revolution in West Indian warfare occurred. With the abolition of slavery 
in the French possessions and the successful efforts of [French] agents 
to foment rebellion among the slave populations of certain British islands, 
the fighting took on the character of large-scale guerrilla 
warfare…Protracted operations against insurgent slaves and Carib 
Indians were conducted for the first time in the mountainous, almost 
inaccessible, and largely uncharted interiors of the embattled sugar 
islands.772 
 
As was the case in Europe, the vast majority of British soldiers in the West 
Indies were trained and equipped as traditional line infantry. Guerrilla warfare, 
or bush warfare, lay completely outside their training and experience. Writing in 
1738 of the hardships of fighting Maroons in the interior, Jamaican Governor 
Trelawney stressed that, ‘in short, nothing can be done in strict conformity to the 
usual military preparations and according to a regular manner, bush fighting as 
they call it being a thing peculiar to itself’.773 British soldiers trained in the 
‘regular manner’ did not perform well in the bush. While fighting Maroons in St. 
Domingue, Lieutenant Thomas Phipps Howard of the York Hussars claimed 
that 500 European cavalry, ‘would destroy five thousand of them in [the] Plain, 
but the Case is much altered when they fight in their own Woods & 
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Mountain’.774 Faced with a tactical novelty that did not fit with their existing 
military system, many concluded that it had a racial basis. It was not believed 
that Anglo-Saxons were well-suited to this, as it was called, ‘unnatural war’.775 
 One solution that the Army came to was to employ African or black 
soldiers for these atypical duties. These units took different forms and will be 
treated in generalised terms here, but all initially involved forming groups of 
slaves into infantry regiments. The Island Rangers, the Royal Rangers, and 
Malcom’s Rangers were formed in Martinique and St. Lucia of plantation slaves 
who were given their freedom after a term of service.776 After some initial 
success with these units, the Army began to purchase its own slaves direct from 
Africa and, in 1795, the British Army created the West Indian Regiments, 
officially listed and uniformed regiments composed entirely of black slaves 
commanded by white officers.777 In just over a decade, thirteen thousand 
Africans were imported for the West India Regiments, comprising a very 
significant portion of the British forces in the Caribbean.778 From 1796 till the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the British Army was the largest single 
buyer of slaves in the West Indies.779 
These African soldiers in British service were not simply used as cannon 
fodder for the dangerous bush warfare, but were sought out because they were 
perceived as possessing skills and abilities that European troops did not. 
Brigadier-General John Moore wrote to Abercromby in 1796 that, ‘in this country 
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[mountainous jungle conditions] much may be made of Black Corps….They 
possess, I think, many excellent qualities as Soldiers…for the W. Indies they 
are invaluable’.780 More to the point, the black soldiers were thought to be better 
than the white ones in the jungle. Months after taking command in The Second 
Carib War, Moore found ‘from experience’ that his European troops were 
incapable of fighting insurgents in the ‘prodigious’ terrain of the island interior.781 
Major-General Williamson wrote to War Secretary Henry Dundas in 1794: 
I have had the honour to mention to you the great utility the British [Black 
Ranger] Legions have been to us. Indeed, I may in a great measure 
attribute our success to them. It is impossible that regular troops can 
ever follow the Brigands into the mountains: they must have people 
somewhat of their own description to engage them.782  
 
‘It is amazing to observe’, wrote Captain Stedman, ‘with what skill one negro 
discovers the haunts of another: while an European discerns not the smallest 
vestige of a man’s foot in the forest the roving eye of the negro-ranger catches 
the broken sprig, and faded leaf trod flat, without ever missing it’.783 Moore told 
his father that, ‘the Black troops are the only troops equal to scour the woods – 
the British are unequal to such service’.784 According to the commander of the 
Second West Indian Regiment in Grenada, the officers of his corps had to be 
assisted personally, carried at times, by their black soldiers in order to negotiate 
the rugged terrain.785 In a striking assertion of European inferiority in bush 
warfare, Stedman stated that, ‘it will ever be my opinion, that one of these free 
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negroes is preferable to half a dozen white men in the forest of Guiana; it 
indeed seems their natural element, whilst it is the bane of the Europeans’.786 
This aptitude was, critically, seen as primarily a result of race, and not of 
training; of nature, rather than nurture. After observing the performance of Black 
Rangers and European regulars, Dr. George Pinckard reported that ‘the 
exertion and fatigue required in [bush warfare] cannot well be conceived by 
those who are accustomed only to regular and systematic warfare’ and 
concluded that such military service could not ‘have been supported in this 
climate by European soldiers’.787 After decades as the commander of a West 
Indian Regiment, Brigadier-General Thomas Hislop wrote a treatise on the units 
in which he stressed that, ‘it has always been evident to me…that they are also 
from their constitution & natural Habits, better calculated for that species of 
Warfare in this Climate than Europeans’.788 Officers concluded from their West 
Indian experience that all the black races of Africa were better suited to bush 
warfare than all the white races of Europe. 
The 2nd West Indian Regiment first sailed for Africa in 1819. The 
regiments formed the backbone of the British military presence in tropical 
regions on both sides of the Atlantic until the Great War.789 British West Africa 
relied particularly heavily on them from 1840 to 1870, supported by local units of 
African armed police such as the Hausa.790 The area would have been nearly 
impossible to defend without them. Rogers even suggested that, ‘had the 3rd 
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West India Regiment been in existence in 1872 and stationed in full strength 
along our West African settlements, it is extremely probable that no Ashantee 
War would have taken place’.791 
3.2.3 The ‘Vigorous’ Race in Abyssinia and Ashanti 
MacKenzie has argued that, ‘although medical scientists began to 
discern and control microbiological causes of tropical ills after the mid-
nineteenth century, the claims for climatic causation did not undergo a 
corresponding decline’.792 Cultural lag in this area meant that many of the 
tenants of racial environmentalism were still very much present in the 1860s. 
The Scottish anatomist Robert Knox proclaimed that Europeans could only 
thrive in Europe and would never break into equatorial climates.793 Of Africans, 
he claimed that, ‘the tropical regions of the earth seem peculiarly to belong to 
him; his energy is considerable: aided by the sun, he repels the white 
invader’.794 
James Hunt founded the Anthropological Society of London in 1863 and 
contended that each race degenerated when it migrated from its home 
region.795 In a lecture, On the Negro’s Place in Nature, delivered at the 
Anthropological (with Winwood Reade in attendance), he put forward his 
‘general deductions’ that, ‘there is as good a reason for classifying the Negro as 
a distinct species from the European, as there is for making the ass a distinct 
species from the zebra’, and that, ‘the Negro is inferior intellectually to the 
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European’.796 He concluded that ‘man’ could not be defined as a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
creature, because ‘it is as difficult to plant a race out of its own centre, as it is to 
extinguish any race without driving it from its natural centre’. He believed that 
this applied to Europeans as well, claiming that European children could not 
reliably be raised in India.797 
Concern over the limitations of climate can also explain the prominence 
of what Osborne has called, ‘the essential science of colonization – 
acclimatization’.798 By tackling the problem of shifting plant and animal species 
across the globe, acclimatisation societies were ‘intimately entwined with the 
rise of modern imperialism and with the marginalization and alteration of 
indigenous ecosystems and peoples’.799 Kuklick described Darwin’s era as, ‘an 
age obsessed with the problem of acclimatization’.800  
In Chapter 6, it will be argued that the British successes in Abyssinia and 
Ashanti eventually led to a marked reassessment of the West Indian Regiments 
and of the wider nature of racial aptitude in tropical settings. Going in, however, 
military planners were still very much concerned with questions of race, 
respective climatic centres, and the troubles of acclimatisation.  
3.3 Redressing the Imbalance 
During the Abyssinian and Ashanti campaigns, British commentators 
often described Africans as immune to the dangers of nature and actually 
protected by the dangers of nature. They were, so to speak, in their element. 
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‘No wall or rampart defended this city’, Butler said of Kumase, ‘but fifty leagues 
of fever circled it.’801 Baker told a session at the Royal United Services Institute 
that, ‘the jungle, which to troops in uniform is almost impregnable, is to the 
native warrior a retreat that shields him from all danger’.802 Henty claimed that 
‘there was no possibility of attacking the enemy in their stronghold, the bush’.803 
‘The wily chief of Ashantees has determined on playing the waiting game’, 
Rogers reasoned, ‘depending on King Fever and his attendant demons of the 
Marsh to decimate our unfortunate troops’.804 
As he disembarked at Cape Coast, Dooner observed that, ‘some native 
kings were on the beach to receive [Wolseley], surrounded by their slaves, 
supporting huge umbrellas over them, a most unnecessary duty, as the 
African’s head will stand the hottest sun without any difficulty’.805 Brackenbury 
reported that the Ashanti king held a similar opinion, quoting from the journal of 
Mr. Plange, who had presented the British demands to Karikari. The King told 
Plange that, ‘for fight affairs I am not afraid…So far I know that the white man 
never agree with raining and sunshine as we can bear.’806 Ramseyer and 
Kuhne wrote of the same meeting in their collective account of their time as 
captives in Kumase. When Plange made an abstract threat of British reprisals, 
the Ashanti king retorted that, ‘We are ready! Your governor cannot leave his 
fort without an umbrella, so afraid is he of the sun and rain. Let him try to come 
to us.’807 Medical science, much less the popular interpretation of medical 
science in this period, did not understand what made the Gold Coast so 
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deadly.808 The sun and heat were as likely candidates as were miasmas or poor 
nutrition.809 The idea that Africans were largely exempt from deadly tropical 
diseases was, Curtin claimed, ‘the one unquestioned “fact” about race 
difference’.810 He further explained that this assumption ‘remained dominant in 
the popular mind and even in official British thought’, even when the better 
medical investigations began to raise professional doubts.811 
During the sea voyage to Cape Coast Castle, Captain Huyshe delivered 
a crash course in Ashanti warfare to his fellow officers. In one lecture he said 
that the Ashanti, ‘love the bush, and dislike fighting in the open’.812 The Fante 
believed that Ashanti soldiers could not be defeated in the thick inland 
undergrowth and the Ashanti of course promoted that impression. Butler 
recounted a translation of an Ashanti proverb: ‘the Prah rolls to the sea. Its 
waters do not come back again; neither can the white man come hither from the 
sea.’813 Butler was pleased to point out that British soldiers had come hither, but 
the image of the protective bush endured in Ashanti culture. 
When he arrived at the Coast, Wolseley sent for the chiefs of a number 
of hostile Elmina cities that had sided with the Ashanti, demanding that they 
appear and account for their conduct. He wrote to Cambridge that these chiefs, 
‘flew to the Ashantee Camp for advice…They were told that although we were 
brave, the Ashantees were still braver and that we would never dare to attack 
them in the bush.’814 Maurice likewise reported in the Daily News that the 
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Ashanti claimed, ‘White man very brave in the open. White man dare not touch 
you in the bush.’815 This notion was an important part of Ashanti diplomacy and 
morale, central to their myth of invincibility in the region. 
A belief that the British army could not operate in the African setting was 
still a fixation in pre-scramble Britain and held on in popular culture for at least 
another decade.816 It is worth stating directly that this chapter is not intended to 
revive or advocate environmental determinism, as has been suggested of some 
historians of environment and empire.817 The subjects of focus here, rather, 
have been the discourses associated with the historic environmental determinist 
(and later racial determinist) perspectives as windows into the prevailing ‘idea’ 
of Africa at the time of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions. Belief in climatic 
causation, it will continue to be argued, influenced press opinion, government 
policy, and even government planning. 
British victories, or perceived victories, in Abyssinia and Ashanti were 
cast as having been over nature. Stanley described the 4th Foot in Abyssinia, 
‘having, like heroic souls, surmounted fairly the Wadela plateau, Colonel 
Cameron requested of his regiment…to give three cheers, saying it was a 
worthier feat to have marched up this height of 3,000 feet than to have 
conquered Theodore’.818 King Theodore thought he was safe in his elevated 
fortress of Magdala. It is likely that Cameron honestly believed that the long 
uphill march would prove to have been a greater challenge than any 
forthcoming battle. 
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In Ashanti, Maurice reiterated that:  
it has been the boast of the Ashantees that though the white man could 
beat them in the open, where his arms gave him the advantage, in the 
bush they would always have the best of it. That was the thing that was 
preached to us ad nauseam before we left England by those who have 
lived on this coast before. It makes all the difference with what idea on 
this subject the troops who fight on our side, and the Ashantees 
respectively, go into the coming contest.819  
 
The conflict before Wolseley’s arrival in the Gold Coast had not undermined the 
jungle’s status. Colonel Festing had bombarded the town of Elmina and landed 
a force of marines under fire. Brackenbury later explained that, although the 
British had done very well in the fight, ‘as the enemy had not been pursued into 
the bush, the Ashantis retained the opinion, which they were known previously 
to possess, that the European troops dare not advance after them into the 
bush’.820 
In the early days of the expedition, Wolseley was concerned with the 
psychological place the bush occupied in the minds of the Ashanti, his Fante 
allies, and his own troops. He was confident that properly-led British soldiers 
could defeat the Ashanti, even in the forest. In this belief he went against the 
grain of common knowledge. He had read the newspapers, knew how hesitant 
Kimberley and the War Office were, and could not be sure how many of his 
white troops doubted their own abilities. He needed to take some of the threat 
out of the bush and that would require a victory. Thus, Wolseley launched the 
battle of Essaman to prove his point. It was actually more of a raid; he spread 
the false information that he was heading to help Captain Glover on the Volta 
river and, having secured the element of surprise, ‘pounced down upon some 
villages occupied by the Ashantees – fought them in the bush, where they 
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always boasted white men would never dare to go, gave them a good thrashing 
and returned to Elmina that night’.821 
Wolseley’s message was soon circulated through a pamphlet, The Life of 
King Koffee, sold at British newsstands for a penny. The cover illustration 
presented a crazed-looking Ashanti soldier, holding a dripping severed head 
among a dark and tangled bush. The booklet itself was made up of selections 
from Wolseley’s and Freemantle’s official despatches, describing several small 
engagements fought by the British marines stationed at Cape Coast Castle. It 
was repeatedly stressed that the Ashanti did not believe white men could fight 
in the bush and that the British had proven that, indeed, they could. Wolseley 
wrote that, ‘the result of yesterday’s operations cannot fail to have a very good 
effect. Last week…The chiefs [had] declined to come, and relied on the 
Ashantees’ promise of aid, and our supposed inability to reach them’.822 
The publisher’s choice of excerpts for the pamphlet focused so strongly 
on the bush as a barrier to Europeans that it suggests the presence of an 
anxiety in the British public imagination. The pamphlet was printed just before 
the European battalions arrived at the Gold Coast and was in part intended to 
sell British citizens on the controversial decision to send them there. In 
Wolseley’s official memoir, Charles Rathbone Low explained that:  
it had been Wolseley’s earnest desire, since he landed on the Gold 
Coast, to prove to the people that the Ashantees were not invincible in 
the bush, a proposition which had come to be regarded as an article of 
faith in West Africa, and was even held by some people in England, who, 
while they allowed the superiority of European soldiers in the open 
…would shake their heads when anyone argued that even British 
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soldiers could fight and overcome, in the recesses of their own forests, 
the most dreaded of all the tribes of African warriors.823 
 
In another excerpt from The Life of King Koffee, Wolseley stated 
confidently that he had, ‘wished for an opportunity to strike a blow against the 
Ashantees…which should inspire confidence in the friendly, and remove from 
the hostile the impression that our men cannot act in the bush’. The printing of 
this excerpt, of course, also worked to remove that impression among the 
British public. He claimed that ‘the fight of yesterday was solely in the bush, and 
they never once held their own against us. The effect, as encouraging the 
Fantees and discouraging their enemies, will be, I am assured, very 
considerable.’824 Wolseley expressed his hope in the pamphlet that he had, 
‘taught the Ashantees a great lesson’.825 A dispatch from Freemantle was also 
included, claiming that, ‘the effect of this operation…the impression it must 
make on the natives, both hostile and friendly, is incalculable. We have shown 
that we are capable of carrying all before us in the densest bush.’826 Wolseley 
hoped the point had been made, as his European battalions were soon to arrive 
on the Gold Coast. The expedition’s newspaper correspondents described the 
victory in the same terms.827 Stanley claimed that it had ‘dissipated the illusion’ 
of Ashanti military dominance in tropical settings.828 The focus directed on the 
victory at Essaman reflects how novel such a victory was then seen to be. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Stanley described the scene he found upon arriving at the shore of the 
Prah River, the border between the British protectorate and Ashanti territory. 
                                                       
823 Charles Rathbone Low, A Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley (London: 
Richard Bentley & Son, 1878) 2:101. 
824 Wolseley, The Life of King Koffee, p. 6. 
825 Ibid., p. 4. 
826 Ibid., p. 8. 
827 Maurice, The Ashantee War, p. 85; Reade, Ashantee Campaign, p. 182. 
828 Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, p. 43. 
189 
 
Construction had begun on a major British camp from which the invasion of 
Karikari’s country would soon be launched. Stanley told his readers with 
confidence that, ‘in a few days the scene will be that of an orderly, well-
conducted camp, under rigid discipline, for so quick do ready hands and skilled 
minds change and subdue the virgin forest’.829 As this chapter has explored, it 
was very important to British commentators that the landscape of their imagined 
Africa be changed and subdued. The next chapter will explore the ways that the 
men of the expeditions attempted to employ their most advanced technology to 
that same end. 
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Chapter 4: A Reassuring Presence 
‘Modern warfare may in many respects be considered as so many 
applications of science’, claimed the author of a Nature article on military 
photography:  
Not only is war matériel designed and manufactured nowadays upon the 
most approved data, and according to theories worked out with 
mathematical accuracy, but a large section of our soldiers are educated 
in such a manner as fully to appreciate the value of their resources, and 
so to overcome difficulties which years ago would have been regarded 
as impossibilities…No instance demonstrates this more satisfactorily 
than the recent Abyssinian expedition.830  
 
Kiernan has argued that, in the mid-nineteenth-century, Europeans began to 
refer less to ‘civilized warfare’ and more to ‘scientific warfare’.831 The Abyssinian 
expedition was a milestone in that cultural shift; it was emplotted in the public 
sphere as a victory for science and, in a sense, a victory of science. Markham 
reported that the British were ‘armed and provided with all that modern science 
could suggest’.832 A Staff Officer wrote to Blackwood’s that, ‘this was to be 
expected in operations directed by so scientific a soldier as Sir Robert 
Napier’.833 The Illustrated London News hailed the victory as, ‘a triumph of 
which science may well be proud; and it shows how large a part science will 
hereafter bear in military administration’.834 
In this ‘technologised’ rhetoric of empire (‘science’ and ‘technology’ being 
largely conflated), science was presented as an ally of the British expeditions. 
The African wild was seen to protect Africans and to threaten, even attack, 
Europeans. In response, it was hoped and claimed that technology would shield 
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the Europeans and subdue Africa the enemy. In the first section, ‘A Sphere of 
Civilisation’, it will be argued that the expeditionary forces sought to fashion a 
conceptual bubble of modern civilisation around them. The presence of novel 
technology provided reassurance that they might pass over the white man’s 
grave without getting stuck within it. In the second section, ‘Competition 
Between Spheres’, it will be argued that discourses of technological superiority 
and scientific violence were generated in response to particular anxieties of the 
perceived dangers of the African interior.  
4.1 A Sphere of Civilisation 
4.1.1 Health Nuts 
As Wolseley began his preparations to reinforce the Gold Coast, the Earl 
of Derby remarked in a banquet speech that, ‘improved artillery won’t help us 
when the chief enemy we have to fight is fever. (Hear, hear) It is a doctor’s war 
and an engineer’s war, quite as much as a soldier’s war.’835 There were, it was 
nonetheless hoped, a number of other improvements that might protect the 
expedition from its chief enemy. The Lancet echoed Derby’s phrase and 
declared that, ‘doctors seem determined to spare no pains to bring it to a 
successful issue’.836 In another article, the journal stressed, ‘we must be 
prepared to apply the achievements of modern science to the task’.837 En route 
to Cape Coast, Wolseley indicated his ‘determin[ation] to give myself every 
possible chance that science can dictate to keep my health’.838 
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Every effort did indeed appear to have been made. Alan Lloyd and 
Robert Edgerton have both claimed that the preparations devoted to 
maintaining the health of the Ashanti expedition may have been the most 
elaborate hitherto in the history of the British Army, and must have been driven 
by a good deal of apprehension.839 ‘In no campaign has the British soldier ever 
had such comforts and luxuries on the march’, Reade claimed in his account, 
‘Each camp was like an hotel, and some were almost as elegant.’840 
Accounts tended to focus on the technological components of health and 
safety preparations. Holland and Hozier described the three hospital ships off 
the coast of Abyssinia as being, ‘fitted with such appliances as science could 
suggest or experience dictate for the restoration of the sick and the comfort of 
the suffering’.841 The Lancet sent a commission to review the hospital ship 
H.M.S. Victor Emmanuel in harbour before it left for Ashanti. The glowing and 
detailed illustrated review articles strike one as having been generous both with 
compliments and with sheer column space.842 The commission called the 
Emmanuel, ‘the most complete specimen of a floating hospital that has ever left 
our shores’.843 
 It is important to stress that this level of interest in health science was 
then unprecedented. Britain’s ‘new’ imperial era would become characterised by 
what Porch termed, ‘the marriage of technology and organization’, and a focus 
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on health (particularly quinine) and transport above all other considerations.844 
A notable early example was the 1863-64 Waikato War in New Zealand, a small 
war also characterised by challenges of transport and supply. Most requisites 
had to be imported from England and Australia and transported 100 miles 
inland. Belich claimed that these problems, ‘were tackled by the British with 
complete success’. No one ever starved, and the sick rate never exceeded five 
per cent. Careful preparations and the organisational talents of Lieutenant 
General Cameron, ‘ensured that as far as natural obstacles were concerned the 
British invasion ran like a well-oiled machine. The campaign was one of the 
best-organized ever undertaken by the British army.’845  
The development of the new imperial norm can also be largely attributed 
to the success and subsequent emulation of the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions. These first two successful military forays into the African interior 
were remembered as successful experiments and, indeed, were undertaken as 
unpredictable field trials. The deep sense of uncertainty with which the 
government, military, and general population approached the expeditions has 
been established in preceding chapters. A valorisation of science and 
technology were reactions to that uncertainty. Before the decision was made to 
send European battalions, Brackenbury described Wolseley’s original staff as 
having been sent, ‘that the experiment might be made upon the bodies of 
officers only, whether while men could stand a campaign in the West African 
bush’.846 Once Wolseley convinced the War Office that the initial results had 
been encouraging, a larger population of test subjects were sent.  
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4.1.2 A Sense of Industry in Africa 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the image of Africa was characterised by 
a lack of civilisation, tied directly and indirectly to the presence of disease. To 
combat that threat, British commentators stressed that the army had brought 
industrialised civilisation along with it. The particular image of civilisation at play 
was conceived as not only supplanting that of the primitive Africans, but also 
forcing back the dangerous natural world that those societies had failed to keep 
at bay.  
In 1856, the Governor-General of India lauded the progress that his own 
tenure had ushered in, singling out, ‘the first introduction into the Indian Empire 
of three great engines of social improvement, which sagacity and science of 
recent times had previously given to Western nations – I mean Railways, 
Uniform Postage, and the Electric Telegraph’.847 The post services in Abyssinia 
and Ashanti were actually commendable, but most commentaries focused upon 
the technological engines of social improvement. Such fixation on the spectacle 
of imperialism served to justify aggression, but also to alleviate the fears that 
loomed large in the British imagination. It was not necessarily a matter of 
making Africa feel like home, but of making it feel like civilisation, as Europeans 
would recognise it. 
Commentators in Abyssinia painted an image of modernity dropped into 
a desert wasteland. Holland and Hozier described: 
stores of coal…to provide the motive power for the transport of troops, 
and the means of condensing from the sea fresh water …The power of 
steam was not to be limited to the sea alone. Preparations were made for 
sending out a railway to connect the landing-place with the 
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interior…Condensers, such as the latest experiments of science had 
proved to be the most efficacious, were supplied for use on 
shore…Means were obtained for finding water in inland positions, and 
powerful pumps for forcing it to the surface.848  
 
The two officers focused on coal and steam power; the fuel that had powered 
Britain’s rise to industrial and commercial supremacy would power its drive into 
the African interior. Stanley similarly took comfort in the sounds of a contrived 
urbanism:  
the shrill shriek of two anomalous locomotives, the noisy roll of ricketty 
(sic) cars as they thundered to and fro, caused the scene to appear at 
the first impression as if a whole nation had immigrated here, and were 
about to plant a great city on the fervid beach of Annesley Bay.849  
 
Markham marvelled at the speed with which, ‘a desert shore, utterly devoid of 
resources, had been converted into a very convenient port’.850 
Simpson of the Illustrated London News described the Royal Engineers 
levelling hills for the construction of ‘on the whole a fair road’ over the original 
Abyssinian track. ‘War is not supposed to be a civiliser’, he argued, ‘but in this 
case the making of this road will certainly convert the present war…into an 
agent of progress and a great benefit to the inhabitants of the country’.851 In his 
vision of progress, Simpson echoed the concept of land ‘improvement’ 
employed by British agents in India, Canada, and the Antipodes. 
In Ashanti, Boyle of the Daily Telegraph evoked an image of a city 
carved out of the jungle. On 21 December 1873, Wolseley’s force had only 
recently reached the Prah River, which divided Fante and Ashanti territory, and 
had begun the construction of a substantial camp on the south bank. Boyle took 
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a canoe across to the north bank, the second European of the force to do so. In 
his description of what he found there, Boyle employed the Prah as the literal 
border of a European sphere of influence: ‘Every one asks what the other bank 
is like. I can only say it is exactly like this bank, except the clearing. But though 
nature's work be identical, there is all the contrast between civilization and 
barbarism, life and death’. That contrast was established, in his description, 
through ‘the clang of axe and cutlass, the shout of busy men, the thump of 
mallet… cutting bush, collecting thatch, burning rubbish, digging holes, planting 
stakes’. Boyle took comfort in the idea that nature was being tamed through 
labour, and that a camp for 5,000 men could ‘be made in the midst of a dense 
jungle’. He also implied that nature was tamed through scientific quantification:  
Lieutenant Saunders, R.A., is taking sights across the river with 
mysterious implements of science. Captain Buckle, B.E., meanwhile 
draws a plan at the entrance to his tent, wherein our muddy river is 
depicted of cerulean blue, and dabs of green represent the forest…The 
Prah has been measured, and found to be sixty-five yards broad at the 
point selected for the bridge. 
 
In contrast to Simpson in Abyssinia, Boyle did not suggest that these 
improvements would serve the population after a British withdrawal. Industry 
arrived with the army, having ‘not been seen on the Prah since 1863, when the 
4th W.I. were posted here’.852 Later, as the expedition left Coomassie for the 
coast, Boyle saw it as, ‘fad[ing] again from civilized view, behind the mist of 
negro barbarism’.853 The zone of civilisation was conditional upon the presence 
of Europeans and their implements of science. 
4.1.3 Novel Technology and a Sphere of Civilisation 
As Stanley advanced through the Fante protectorate toward Ashanti 
territory, he described the laying of the telegraph line, ‘a very novel institution in 
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Fantee land – a long Fetich (sic) charm, as some of the natives believed it to 
be’, atop bamboo poles along the road. Having mocked the natives for falsely 
attributing supernatural power to the line, he nonetheless took heart that, ‘as we 
looked at it the barbarity of the country was somewhat relieved’.854 The 
members of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions repeatedly described 
articles of modern technology as sources of comfort and security. Novel (or 
relatively advanced) technology was used by British soldiers and newspaper 
correspondents to evoke the idea of a bubble of civilisation, a sphere of 
influence within which Europeans could thrive, if only for a time.855 Thus, 
whatever their practical purposes, novel technologies also served a conceptual 
purpose as phantasmagorical charms, protecting the expeditions from the 
threatening natural world. 
4.1.4 Railway and Traction Engines 
In his 1871 Soldier’s Pocket Book for Field Service, Wolseley declared 
that all future wars would undoubtedly take place along railroads. This was a 
common enough opinion among contemporary military thinkers.856 The 
continental school knew that railways would be critical in any Great Power 
conflicts, and their significance was actively discussed at RUSI.857 Wolseley, 
however, was particularly interested in railways from an imperial school 
perspective and envisioned using them in small wars. When operating in 
countries not furnished with existing tracks, he suggested, ‘it will often be 
advisable to lay down a railway temporarily, as we did in the Crimea and 
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Abyssinia. We were the first nation that demonstrated how feasible and useful it 
was to do so.’858 It would soon become clear that Wolseley had been greatly 
impressed by Napier’s railway in Abyssinia and was inclined to over-estimate 
the uses to which such technology could be put. His focus on future imperial 
ventures was evident in his recommendation that:  
all staff officers should carefully study the construction of railways as 
practiced in America. The English system is more applicable to 
permanent constructions…whereas in America, where lines are run 
through wilderness, economy of construction is the first great object 
aimed at.859  
 
When, two years later, he set off for the Gold Coast, Wolseley intended to build 
a railway to carry his army through the jungle. 
It did seem like a good idea at the time. It was argued in earlier chapters 
that, despite Britain’s long presence on the coasts of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
interior was still seen as largely unknown. This general ignorance led to a near 
professional consensus that the Ashanti bush was suitable for railroad 
construction. Sir Charles Wilson at the War Office put together a summary of 
what was known about Ashanti territory in preparation for the expedition. 
Drawing on the few explorer accounts available, he admitted that it was, ‘difficult 
to reconcile the itineraries of the earlier travellers’. He nonetheless concluded 
that, ‘from the coast to the Prah the country is either flat or slightly undulating’, 
and that became the official line.860 Wolseley, Kimberley, and a wide array of 
commentators thus agreed with The Lancet that, ‘by all accounts, the country 
offers peculiar facilities for constructing a railroad; and we venture to reiterate 
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an opinion, which is gaining ground more and more every day, that this will 
probably prove the best as well as the cheapest method of procedure’.861 
Captain Knapp Barrow, an officer who had, ‘seen a good deal of the Gold 
Coast’, disagreed in a letter to the Colonial Office. Formerly of the 27th Foot, he 
had served with the Gold Coast Artillery and as an ADC during the ill-fated 1863 
campaign.862 Having learned from the newspapers that thirty miles of railway 
were to be sent with Wolseley, Barrow was ‘confident that when at Cape Coast 
Castle it will be useless. The “bush” will not allow of the construction of 
railways’.863 The Times printed a letter from ‘A Civilian Who Has Seen War’, 
who asked ‘Is there no possibility of stopping this mad railway scheme?’. 
Insisting that the Crimean example was completely inapplicable to the Gold 
Coast, the anonymous author explained, in detail, the difficulty of landing heavy 
material in the shallow surf, the impossibility of levelling the terrain, and the 
danger of disturbing the malarial soil.864 Joseph Conrad conveyed a similar 
sense of impossibility in his 1899 novel Heart of Darkness: 
I came upon a boiler wallowing in the grass…an undersized railway-truck 
lying on its back with its wheels in the air. One was off. The thing looked 
as dead as the carcass of some animal. I came upon more pieces of 
decaying machinery, a stack of rusty rails…They were building a 
railway.865 
 
Their warnings went unheeded and the equipment was shipped.  
On 13 October 1873, Wolseley sent the following telegram to Her 
Majesty’s Consul at Madeira for transmission to Cardwell at the War Office: 
‘Country unsuitable for railroad and traction engines. Do not send them out.’866 
The bulk of the equipment had already arrived. ‘I find from the nature of the 
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country that to be of any use a Rl. Rd. is out of the question’, he wrote in his 
journal, and ‘the gradients on the road are so steep that traction Engines cannot 
be used’.867 Frustrated by the wasted effort and considerable expense, he 
defended himself:  
both the Rl. Rd. and the traction engines were pressed upon me by 
Major Home & Sir L. Simmons, both belonging to that theoretical but very 
unpractical corps, the Rl. Engineers. I asked for them after my original 
requisition for stores had been submitted, and against my better 
judgement.868  
 
Wolseley sent his campaign journal in sections to his wife, who then passed 
them among his family members, and thus wrote with a small audience in 
mind.869 He made his case more publicly to Boyle, who quoted Wolseley saying 
that:  
Of the scores of people I questioned…there was not one who 
represented the interior of the country to be other than a level, over 
which a railway could be laid with ease. I find it to be so broken and hilly 
that nobody besides Major Home will believe it possible to take even the 
traction engine one stage toward Coomassie.870 
  
Boyle reported that the ‘unpractical’ Royal Engineer actually managed to 
get the traction engine to Akroful, the second camp along the road, but only, ‘at 
a fearful risk of explosion’. Home took it back to Cape Coast Castle, where, ‘it 
gave up further travel, and passed the remainder of its sojourn in West Africa 
peacefully employed in sawing boards’.871 Stanley described the engine as, 
‘totally inadequate to the requirements. After a feeble attempt of about two 
miles, and twice tumbling into a ditch, it returned to the neighbourhood of the 
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castle, where it is now employed in the more undignified labour of cutting planks 
for the Control Department.’872  
The railroad and traction engines in Ashanti turned out to be a debacle. 
Wolseley took serious criticism for the incident, as well for his inability to 
establish an adequate supply system for the expedition without the aid of steam 
power. One scathing article in The Sunday Times tarred the expedition as 
reckless: 
How the railway scheme was abandoned as impossible is well known to 
every newspaper reader…The railway sent out to the Gold Coast was 
found useless, and sent home again. It would have been more 
economical on the part of our excessively economical Government if the 
question of the practicability of railways in such country had been 
inquired into before so expensive an experiment was made.873 
 
It bears some consideration why Wolseley decided to invest so much faith in 
trains and sappers in the first place. Incorrect intelligence was a factor, to be 
sure. There was, however, a psychological reason that Wolseley and the 
engineers advising him were so attracted to Napier’s Abyssinian example and 
were able to gloss over those intelligence gaps in their attempt to recreate it. 
Steam technology presented an appealing potential remedy for the 
perceived dangers of the African bush. The War Office plans for the expedition 
described the railway as a protection against nature: ‘supposing the railway is 
laid to Mansu, it will carry the troops over the worst (most unhealthy) districts, 
obviate the necessity of their encamping in the Mangrove Swamp, and make 
the distance between Cape Coast Castle and Prahsu only four days’.874  
Steam Sappers offered similar promise. In 1858, an Ordinance Select 
Committee had conducted a trial of the Burrell-Boydell engine at the Arsenal. 
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The East India Company expressed interest, and sent Colonel Sir Proby 
Cantley to attend the trial. After a favourable report, Colonel Sir Frederick 
Abbott of the Military College suggested that steam sappers could be used in 
India to move and concentrate troops more quickly, regardless of heat, and thus 
allow the Government to withdraw a full half of the military force from the colony 
(a suggestion made, mind you, while the Indian Mutiny was still on-going). The 
Committee recommended that two engines be sent to Calcutta and two to 
Bombay.875 
It is not known what came of those plans, but Wolseley had similar hopes 
for the protective power of his sappers. Once the railway had been abandoned, 
Wolseley told Boyle that, ‘if the [traction] engines can be got to Mansu…one 
half, and that the half most difficult, of our campaign will be achieved’.876 When, 
in fact, the engines were first despatched to the Gold Coast, The Times 
considered them so readily able to plough through the African bush that, it 
argued, their very presence was evidence of Wolseley’s intent to march all the 
way to Coomassie (before he had announced that plan).877 The Lancet argued 
that a railroad was critical to preserve the health of any European troops hoping 
to make it that far north.878 
Railways occupied an important place in Victorian British culture. In 
Machines as the Measure of Men, Adas claimed that, ‘more than any other 
technological innovation, the railway embodied the great material advances 
associated with the first Industrial Revolution and dramatized the gap which that 
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process had created between the Europeans and all non-Western peoples’.879 
Sinnema has argued that, through the mid-century, the Illustrated London News 
represented railways as advancing human dominance of natural obstacles. By 
transporting urban populations to the country for pleasure, they made nature 
more accessible to people and, thus, more domesticated.880 It was therefore 
appropriate for British commentators to single out steam-powered engines as 
the solution to a dangerous landscape in dire need of domestication. 
 Wolseley and those interested in imperial ventures had been inspired by 
the Abyssinian war and the image of the Zoulla camp, an area of industry and 
civilisation set up in a desert. A Staff Officer had told Blackwood’s that at Zoulla, 
‘even the locomotive seems to feel the influence of discipline…it keeps to its 
appointed place, and works steadily away, almost as noiselessly as its relation, 
the condensing engine, which is on duty at the edge of the pier’.881 While the 
plans for a railway in Ashanti had come to nothing, the traction engines were 
able to fill a practical and symbolic role not unlike the condensing engines in 
Abyssinia. Unable to advance, they remained at the Cape Coast for the duration 
of the conflict, their drive belts rigged to saw blades.882 By sawing wood into 
planks, the engines at least managed to contribute to the industrial flavour of 
the British presence in West Africa and engage African nature in a small way. 
Traction engines had become increasingly common in large-scale farming over 
the 1860s, pulling ploughs in place of horse teams and powering belt-driven 
machinery. By 1867, over 250 John Fowler ploughing engines were in private 
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use.883 In 1871, an Ordinance Select Committee recommended that two 
engines be purchased directly from the Aveling and Porter agricultural machine 
manufacturers according to Royal Engineer specifications. ‘Seam Sapper 
Number 2’, as it was named, was the engine sent to Ashanti.884 
 An additional potential influence was present in another example of the 
role that interested individuals could play in professional military debates on 
novel technology. Major Robert Home, Commanding Royal Engineer for 
Wolseley’s Ashanti campaign, had previously served as the full-time paid 
secretary of the 1871 Committee. Home (then a Captain) had participated in 
and been responsible for recording and writing up the rigorous series of trials 
conducted on Steam Sapper Number 2.885 He thus had considerable 
experience with, not only traction engines in general, but also the specific model 
on the Ashanti campaign.  
Home’s official appraisal of the steam sapper, as indicated in his journal 
of operations, was not as wildly optimistic as Wolseley would later claim.886 It 
stands to reason, nonetheless, that his deep familiarity with the machines might 
have imparted a certain emotional investment in their performance. The 
Engineer might have felt compelled, as well, by a professional desire to repeat 
his previous tests in field settings. Moreover, while Home himself was aware of 
the engine’s limitations, fellow officers with whom he conversed might have 
preferentially recalled the high points of his descriptions, thus disseminating an 
inflated image of the sappers’ potential. In the final analysis of his report, Home 
hinted at the effects of his sense of disappointment: 
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The traction engine did not come up to expectation. On good roads, with 
ordinary gradients, it would be valuable; but on the very narrow roads on 
the West Coast, where no attempt could be made to zig-zag up the road, 
and where the bridges were of a flimsy description, it was unsuitable as a 
traction engine. This conclusion was fought against for some time, but at 
last it became apparent that it could not be trusted to. As a stationary 
engine it worked very well. While such engines should form a portion of 
the Engineer’s park, yet they should not, in their present state, be 
counted on as a means for transport.887 
 
4.1.5 Artificial Light 
Somewhere among the masses of equipment, munitions, and stores 
stacked under waterproof tarpaulins at Zoulla stood three sets of the ‘Prosser’s 
lime-light’ apparatus. An ordinary limelight, itself nothing new, stood behind a 
large vertical lens on a geared swivel, allowing a user to adjust the focus and 
direction of a powerful beam of light.888 Each Prosser cost £350, more than a 
Gatling gun and four times as much as a 9-pounder rifled steel cannon.889 
These devices demonstrate another case of the desire for novel technology to 
maintain a sphere of civilisation around the expedition. They were never 
actually brought to the front. Lieutenant St. John of the Royal Engineers had not 
been informed that the limelights were being sent and by the time he stumbled 
upon them it was too late to get them up the line. He conducted some trials at 
Zoulla and submitted a review to the India Office.890 
British commentators wrote often of these limelights and attributed 
immense power to them, despite the fact that they had all remained in their 
boxes. In the lighting apparatus, wrote Holland and Hozier, ‘the discoveries of 
chemists were combined with the skill of the mechanician’. With the Prosser, 
‘the whole of the country adjacent to a camp could be illumined by a light as 
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powerful as that of the sun’.891 Theodore was famous for conducting night 
attacks, and the light was thus presented as a serving practical, but highly 
overstated, purpose. Shepherd similarly felt that the limelight represented, ‘a 
guarantee that all that experience, science, energy, and intelligence could do, 
would be effected in order to frustrate Theodore’s knavish tricks by making the 
night light about him’.892 By, ‘discover[ing] at once the position and movements 
of an enemy within five or six hundred yards, and, at the same time, shroud[ing] 
those of the [British] Force in thickest darkness’, the limelight was able to 
reverse the uncomfortable feeling of walking into the unknown.893 Holland and 
Hozier described it as being, ‘to a commanding officer much what his bull’s-eye 
lantern is to a policeman’, conjuring a sense of familiarity and order.894 
In The Victorian Eye, Otter explored the emotional and political 
significance of artificial light to British towns and cities. Victorian writing on light, 
he argued, was infused with liberal ideals: 
Factory owners eulogized electric light’s ability to generate states of 
productive attention, while the introduction of even modest illumination to 
public spaces was invariably promoted as an aid to public order. Electric 
light was also advanced as an agent of salubrity…its introduction 
increased health and, consequently, enhanced productivity’.895 
 
Toward the end of the century, ‘artificial light was routinely viewed as the 
supreme sign of “modernity” or “civilization”’.896  
The French made the first military use of light machines in the 1853-56 
Crimean War, but they were not used on a large scale until the 1870-71 Franco-
Prussian War.897 The British Army had not deployed any such devices in 
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colonial conflict until the Abyssinian expedition; they were considered quite 
novel to that setting. 
Ryan uncovered a similar emotional relationship with light in the 1890 
British occupation of Mashonaland, where a huge, steam-powered electric 
searchlight protected the expedition force at night. The light was most likely 
powered by a stationary traction engine equipped with a dynamo, an 
arrangement that had been successfully tested during the 1890 manoeuvres.898 
It may have served a practical purpose, Ryan argued, but it, ‘does seem to be 
an elaborate solution, and suggests both a desire among the British for the 
comforting presence of technology and perhaps an assumption that the 
European contraption would frighten away the “savages”. Light itself was being 
used as a weapon’.899 
The Ashanti force did not carry a limelight into West Africa, though the 
howitzers were equipped with magnesium star shells to illuminate the bush.900 
Artificially generated light was retroactively cast as providing the men of the 
Abyssinian expedition with a sense of security against ‘Darkest Africa’. The 
following section will explore the ways in which British commentators of both 
expeditions recruited novel weaponry to defend and maintain the critical, if 
intangible, line of demarcation.  
4.2 Competition Between Spheres 
In Small Wars, Callwell argued that, ‘uncivilized races attribute leniency 
to timidity. A system adapted to La Vendée is out of place among fanatics and 
savages, who must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise 
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again’.901 Callwell repeatedly advocated the use of overwhelming violence in 
small wars to convince one’s enemy of the very idea that they were, by 
European standards, only a small threat. In the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions, the British army sought to use novel military technology to affect a 
sense of awed defeat. 
Black recently argued that success through comparative technological 
superiority is necessarily dependant upon the level of damage that a given 
enemy is able (or willing) to tolerate. However effective a novel weapon might 
be, perception, ‘plays a major role in the consideration of the effects of weapons 
on targets, and this perception affects the use of the weapons, tactically and 
operationally’.902 This section will focus on British perceptions of their novel 
weapons and, critically, their perceptions of the ability (or inability) of Africans to 
tolerate them. Bolt has argued that, in the 1860s and ‘70s:  
the nervousness aroused by the Indian Mutiny and the protracted New 
Zealand wars, and given a theoretical justification by the scientific 
exponents of the ‘war of the races’ doctrine, had strengthened a perhaps 
inevitable instinct of powerful minorities in a threatening environment to 
bolster their position and confidence with a massive display of force. 
Superior weapons were to demonstrate, if all else failed, the superiority 
of the Anglo-Saxon.903 
 
The men in Abyssinia and Ashanti conducted their expeditions as minorities, 
based on a correct assessment of numbers but also upon the threatening image 
of Africa in the British imagination. In reaction, they sought to demonstrate 
Anglo-Saxon superiority with what The Spectator termed, ‘the weapons of 
civilisation – the Snider [rifle], the rocket, and the shell’.904 
 
 
                                                       
901 Callwell, Small Wars, p. 148. 
902 Jeremy Black, War and Technology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013) p. 26. 
903 Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) p. 
105. 
904 The Spectator, 3 January 1874, p. 13. 
209 
 
4.2.1 Criteria of Superiority 
There was a palpable disparity in military technology between the British 
and their African enemies. British soldiers and commentators, anxious that 
those enemies might have an advantage in the African wild, overplayed that 
disparity, edging toward the claim that technology would provide them with an 
easy and safe victory. The British arsenal, and its novelty by contemporary 
British standards, has been discussed in Chapter 2 and in the Introduction. A 
degree of bravado is usually to be found among the soldiers of any military 
conflict. Nevertheless, the specific language used and concepts chosen by the 
British to denigrate their enemies and bolster their own confidence provide a 
glimpse into the concerns of their contemporary culture. Such rhetoric often 
involved belittling African weaponry. 
 The Abyssinian and Ashanti armies both used gunpowder weapons in 
considerable numbers. After securing his position on the throne in 1861, 
Theodore had pursued the manufacture of heavy guns with fervency. He 
maintained a staff of European artisans, mostly German, to build cannon and 
mortars and by 1868 had amassed an imposing collection. With a total of 37 
artillery pieces at Magdala, his artillery train was certainly the most powerful 
ever seen in the country and ensured that, even when the bulk of his kingdom 
was in rebellion, no rival would attack him directly.905  
Yet, British commentators cast Theodore’s love of cannon as a sign of 
his comparative weakness, rather than strength. In his analysis of ‘the 
Abyssinian captives question’, Dufton argued that Theodore would quickly 
surrender if attacked by British forces:  
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The king knows as well as we do that to attempt to hold his mountain 
fortress against European war appliances would be hopeless, suicidal to 
him and his cause. Have not all the plans for the construction of mortars 
and cannon in his own country, which have engaged his attention for the 
last ten years, been based on his knowledge of the superiority of Europe 
in these matters?906  
 
Stern described a scene in which Theodore spoke to his troops of the 
approaching British army, supposedly admitting to them that, ‘the English, ever 
since the time of Noah, have cast cannons, and manufactured guns and 
powder, whilst we only commenced yesterday’.907 A Staff Officer wrote to 
Blackwood’s that Theodore, ‘himself, indeed, fully understood the value of 
gunpowder and the superiority of modern weapons over the old shield and 
spear of the dark ages’, with which he implied the Abyssinian army was chiefly 
armed.908 Theodore’s understanding was not, however, expected to extend to 
tactics or ballistics.  
After the Abyssinian artillery performed poorly at the battle of Magdala, 
British commentators almost unanimously attributed that fact to an inability on 
the part of the Africans to comprehend or manage the tools that Europeans had 
manufactured for them. Markham, for example, mockingly described 
Theodore’s ‘thirty pieces of ordinance, which his people did not understand the 
use of, to oppose this enormous disciplined [British] army’.909 Holland and 
Hozier claimed that the guns were manned by Abyssinians, not by the 
European craftsmen, and followed directly with the report that, ‘Theodore’s 
favourite cannon, which he had named after himself, burst on the first 
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discharge’.910 ‘Theodore’s famous guns - gave them no assistance whatever’, 
Reade reported in The Times: 
on the contrary, killed, it is said, a few of them. The big gun burst at the 
first explosion, the rest…kept up a steady cannonade easily 
distinguishable by its dull, heavy sound, ascribed to the slow ignition of 
the bad powder, from the quick rattle of the mountain guns, but did not 
even touch one of our men.911  
 
In their portrayal of Theodore, British commentators thus granted him the 
intelligence to recognise British superiority, but not the intelligence to 
successfully imitate British methods. When battle arrived, Stanley (alone) 
claimed, Theodore incredulously cried that, ‘the English are not afraid of my 
chain shot; they march up in spite of my big balls’.912 
Abyssinian infantry were also described as ineffective on account of their 
technological inferiority. In 1848, Plowden had reported that, ‘though the gun 
[referring to Abyssinian matchlocks] is much feared by the warrior…yet from the 
want of skill which the Abyssinians almost invariably display…it is found that the 
battle is generally carried by the superiority of horse or spearmen over that of 
guns’.913 Parkyns claimed in 1853 that, ‘in the use of the gun the natives are in 
general exceedingly clumsy. They prefer large, heavy, matchlocks, to load 
which is a labour of some minutes.’914  
In their account of Napier’s later expedition, Holland and Hozier 
described the situation as relatively unchanged. Roughly half of the Abyssinian 
force that engaged the British, they reported, had been armed with muskets. 
The majority of these carried matchlocks, though about a thousand carried 
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percussion muskets.915 Markham again exemplified the general dismissive tone 
of Western observers. He described Theodore’s army as a ‘helpless rabble of 
followers armed with spears and shields’, a ‘mob of spearmen’, and only 
considered the 3,000 ‘gun-men’ to be worth recognising as soldiers.916 
Choosing to focus on armament above all, he suggested that Magdala could not 
be defended by such troops, ‘who in opposition to the English were virtually 
unarmed’.917 He thus denied the Abyssinians their status as soldiers, arguing 
that ‘the interminable wars of these Abyssinian chiefs are as little worthy of 
record as the skirmishes of crows and kites’.918 After passing a group of allied 
African soldiers, Simpson reported that among the spears and shields, ‘a few 
has musquets (sic), or rather what was intended for such, for many of them 
reminded one of their youthful attempts with an old key tied to a stick by which 
most boys have at one time or another endeavoured to produce something like 
firearms’.919 
Compared with the Abyssinian army, the Ashanti army was armed with a 
very high proportion of firearms. By the 1860s, Birmingham exported from 
100,000 to 150,000 guns per year to Africa, a large amount of which went to the 
Gold Coast.920 There was a thriving gun trade into Ashanti and the nation’s 
substantial military power in the region was based entirely upon musket infantry. 
Winwood Reade, The Times correspondent to the Ashanti War, had from 1868 
to 1870 travelled West Africa under the patronage of the prominent London-
based merchant Andrew Swanzy. The F. & A. Swanzy firm was the leading 
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British trading company on the Gold Coast.921 The African Sketch-Book, 
Reade’s account of his journey, is replete with signs of the importance of the 
gun trade to the area. At a palaver in the French-linked coastal city of Assinnie, 
Reade noted that King Amatifoo ordered a thousand muskets on behalf of the 
Ashanti from his travelling companion, the French trader M. Chatelain. Assinie 
held the monopoly on coastal trade in the area and acted as middleman 
between European companies and the inland Ashanti Empire.922 Swanzy, a 
Fellow of the Geographical Society, ‘was desirous to take part in the great work 
of laying open Inner Africa’.923 He gave Reade carte blanche to spend as much 
as he wished, and provided him with goods with which to pay his travelling 
expenses.924 As to his patron’s reason for funding the expedition, Reade 
diplomatically reported that ‘Mr. Swanzy had asked me to explore the River 
Assinie; and I proposed to him that I should endeavour to reach Coomassie, the 
capital of Ashanti. To this he agreed.’925 He made little direct reference to 
Swanzy’s dealings in arms and ammunition but, after the outbreak of hostilities 
with the Ashanti, the Colonial and Law Offices turned their attention to Reade’s 
former patron.  
Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office wished to halt the sale of arms, 
ammunition, and gunpowder to Assinie, well aware that it traded on Ashanti’s 
behalf.926 Kimberley tried to apply the ‘Customs and Consolidation Act’ to that 
end, but the Law Office took the opinion that it would not stick except in cases 
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of completely banned articles of trade.927 Frustrated that he could not even stop 
British traders from selling to an enemy belligerent under the standing colonial 
law, Kimberley contacted Colonel Harley, the governor of Cape Coast. ‘An 
Ordinance to empower the Administrator to regulate or prohibit the importation 
and sale of munitions of war’ passed the Gold Coast Legislative Council at 
Cape Coast Castle on 29 April 1873.928 Harley finally imposed a blockade on 29 
August and Freemantle deployed four of his seven ships to enforce it.  
With so large a coast to patrol, it was only partially effective, made less 
so by the fact that it only applied to the stretch under British jurisdiction, thus 
excluding Assinie.929 Moreover, following an appeal by F. & A. Swanzy and 
other merchants, the law office again declared it to be illegal in November. 
Freemantle did what he could to maintain the porous and legally awkward 
blockade until it was lifted for good in March 1874.930 Several of the Swanzys’ 
ships were detained.931 The Pall Mall Gazette accused them of ‘Blockade 
Running on the Gold Coast’, to which the Swanzys responded in protest that 
the embargo did not technically apply to the French ports.932 Even during the 
blockade, the Newcastle Courant reported, at Assinie the Ashanti could buy, 
‘whatever arms and ammunition they may choose to order…agents at 
Birmingham are collecting muskets for the Ashantees, the cost price being 9s 
6d each’.933 Kimberley’s desire to close off the firearm shipments was, of 
course, strategically obvious, but also indicative of the scale and consistency of 
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that trade. The Ashanti had not simply stockpiled a few muskets over time; they 
were large-scale importers. 
 While the Ashanti were, therefore, a fully gunpowder army, they were 
nonetheless described dismissively by British commentators for the 
comparative lower quality of their weapons. In the tactical memorandum 
distributed to incoming British troops, Brigadier-General Alison, in consultation 
with Wolseley, reassured the men that, ‘Each soldier must remember that with 
his breech loader he is equal to at least twenty Ashantis, wretchedly armed as 
they are with old flint muskets, firing slugs or pieces of stone that do not hurt 
badly at more than 40 or 50 yards range.’934 Most of the journalists and officer-
writers made similar comparisons, and almost all based on weaponry rather 
than fighting ability or bravery. Stanley told his readers that the Ashanti warrior 
carried his ammunition in a pouch slung over the shoulder. He described the 
supposed contents of such pouches as:     
any miscellaneous a set of articles as may be seen in any Jacktar’s box 
or bag. Bark thread, bark waste (probably for wadding), iron pins, queer-
looking stones, an assortment of dark-coloured beans, a stale piece of 
yam or manioc, a piece of chew-stick, a handful or so of small snail 
shells and other extraordinary articles…One need not wonder, then, at 
the very few severe wounds inflicted upon the English, despite the very 
many splendid opportunities the ambushed Ashantees have had to inflict 
instantaneous death. The powder is thrown loosely into the barrel, and, 
being often without wadding material, the bullets or slugs of iron, or 
handfuls of snail shells, or a piece of unsmelted iron ore, are dropped on 
the loose powder, and the loose charge is thus fired when only a few feet 
from their foes.935 
 
Again, Stanley mocked the equipment with which the Africans fought yet also 
attributed their ineffectiveness to their inability to use that equipment properly. 
The Ashanti, he argued, had every tactical opportunity but lacked the basic 
mechanical skill even to load a musket. Surgeon-Major Gore reported that the 
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abdominal bullet wounds sustained by British soldiers were so shallow, ‘it really 
becomes a question of some practical interest whether it would not be of 
advantage to devise some kind of light, but tough leathern doublets for this 
peculiar bush warfare’.936 Leather bulletproof vests, in effect.  
Technological superiority was, and is always, a matter of degree. The 
special correspondents and officers of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions, 
however, described their own superiority as if it was fundamental rather than 
relative. In such discourses, Africans did not simply possess incrementally less 
advanced technology; they were relegated to the status of non-technological. 
Their inability to manage their own weapons, British commentators believed, 
was further reflected in their inability to withstand those of the fully industrial 
Europeans. Henty claimed, in fact, that he was, ‘quite satisfied that the Snider is 
more than sufficient for the Ashantis, and that we might well dispense with other 
weapons’.937 
It is, on that note, worth reconsidering why the Gatling appealed so 
strongly to the contemporary idea of small wars, which Callwell would later 
define as, ‘expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined 
soldiers’.938 That was a statement of comparative technological dominance, 
rather than strictly of race. In practice, however, opposing forces were not 
always so diametrically split. Many of Britain’s imperial conflicts across the 
globe had hitherto been fought against comparably, or at least analogously 
armed fighters. But the mitrailleur appeared to be without analogue and thus 
provided a marker that allowed the imperial mind to separate who was ‘civilised’ 
and who was ‘savage’.  
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An 1881 popular history of science demonstrated the appeal of that 
distinction. In the chapter on firearms, the author stated that: 
the more costly and ingenious and complicated the instruments of war 
become, the more certain will be the extension and the permanence of 
civilization. The great cost of such appliances…the ingenuity needed for 
their contrivance, the elaborate machinery required for their construction, 
and the skill implied in their use, are such that these weapons can never 
be the arms of other than wealthy and intelligent nations.939 
 
The Daily News took the same stance in an article announcing that the first two 
Gatlings had been sent to the Gold Coast: ‘no misgivings need be entertained 
on account of the enemy capturing these Gatlings, for without a supply of 
ammunition, which necessarily requires great skill in its preparation, the guns 
would be perfectly useless’.940 Claims that the mitrailleur was beyond the 
capacity of ‘less-civilised’ enemies, even if captured, in fact echoed Gatling’s 
original sales pitch to the Union government during the American Civil War. In 
1863, he published a brochure with a list of the advantages that his new 
weapon would offer, the eighth and final being that:  
If the government should adopt this fire-arm and the necessary metallic 
cartridge…it will not be in the power of the rebels, in case they should 
capture the same, to use them against us, as it is impossible for them to 
manufacture, or procure, the cartridges in any way, and would, therefore, 
render the guns utterly useless in their hands.941 
 
Gatling described the Confederate South in the same strategic terms as British 
commentators would later describe the Ashanti. The bulk of military thinkers 
who expressed interest in early mitrailleurs seem to have envisioned and 
intended combat with technologically inferior enemies. In other words, rather 
than hoping that machine guns would, by their presence, create a state of 
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comparative technological dominance, supporters planned to deploy them to 
arenas where such a state already existed to further extend the gap. 
4.2.2 Presumptions of Inadequacy 
‘The importance of clearing away all cover from the immediate front 
cannot be exaggerated’, wrote da Costa Porter in an article about small war 
tactics, ‘On the efficacy of our fire must our safety in great measure depend. It is 
by shooting down the enemy fast enough that a moral impression will be made 
upon him strong enough to make him forget his superiority of numbers.’942 The 
moral, or psychological, impact of European firepower upon ‘primitive’ foes was 
also a fixation in the first British expeditions to Africa. The simple fact that 
enemy morale was of interest is not itself significant; it always is. The fact that 
British military personnel desired to create a moral impression significant 
enough to rout a numerically superior ‘savage’ enemy does, however, provide a 
window into the British perception of the ‘savage’ mind. British commentators in 
the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions gravitated toward the idea that their 
African enemies were inherently unable to withstand modern military 
technology.  
Simpson of the Illustrated London News described the Abyssinian 
assault at the battle of Magdala as being, ‘that of most barbarous nations. They 
rushed on with the bravery of ignorance…in the end the inevitable result of such 
a collision followed’.943 The Spectator presumed that, ‘neither their chief not the 
soldiers had the slightest idea of the power of the enemy upon whom they were 
charging’.944 As Colonel Penn’s Mountain Battery and the Naval Rocket Battery 
began to fire, Scott recorded, ‘the enemy were evidently as ignorant as babes to 
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what was in store for them. They came on really in the most innocent kind of 
way. O! what a slating they got! It was quite a little holiday. They certainly did 
get it hot and strong’.945 Once the Abyssinian obliviousness of British armament 
was dispelled, most commentators agreed, the result (retreat and rout) became 
inevitable. When the Snider rifles came into play, The Times reported, ‘the 
unfortunate foe had no longer even the shadow of a chance, but went down like 
grass before the sithe (sic)…Sir Charles Staverley, as night was coming on and 
nothing more was to be gained by useless butchery, sounded the retreat’.946 
The language used evoked a pre-determined outcome, and also coloured the 
engagement with a non-martial tint.  
 It was important to the British sense of superiority that the Africans 
believed they had been thoroughly routed (or, rather, that the British believed 
that the Africans had believed it). Stanley thus reported that, ‘a moment’s 
consultation was enough to convince them that here there was no hope. 
Against shell-vomiting cannon, and against a very wall of fire, discharging 
bullets by the hundred to their one, what could matchlocks and spears 
effect?’947 The Abyssinians had, in fact, held to their charge for a considerable 
time under fire. A Staff Officer contemplated that Theodore could not possibly, 
‘indulge the hope of standing up before us for an hour in battle array. One of our 
rockets would for ever disperse the few thousand followers that remain to 
him.’948  
 ‘I can scarcely believe that you do not know how unequal would be the 
struggle which you invite’, Wolseley wrote in his first ultimatum to the Ashanti 
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King.949 Boyle reported in the Daily Telegraph that the Ashanti, ‘were met…by a 
fire too crushing for savages to stand, and again they fell back, to sing, drum a 
little, and madly fire and advance once more’.950 ‘The Snider rifle was too much 
for imperfectly armed savages’, claimed The Sunday Times.951 The battle of 
Amoaful ended, wrote Stanley, when the enemy was ‘convinced that he has 
been defeated, and is unable to withstand the strange weapons which the white 
men use in war’.952 The implication was that European soldiers would have 
been able to withstand it. European infantry training focused above all on 
standing firm while under fire, an ideal (if a somewhat different tactical reality) 
held since the line infantry days of the Brown Bess musket. Since the British 
martial ideal prioritised ‘holding the line’, descriptions of African inability to do so 
against modern weapons brought an additional notion of racial superiority to 
that of technological advantage. Just as descriptions of primitive African 
weaponry were tied to the idea of technical incompetence, so descriptions of 
African inability to hold firm against novel military technology were couched in 
an assumption that British troops would somehow have held out longer. 
 Chapter 3 explored the images in British (and some African) discourses 
of a barrier of nature, which shielded Africans and opposed European 
advances. The first section of this chapter posited that the British sought to 
employ novel technology to maintain a competing sphere of influence, within 
which they would be protected from the African wild. These images came into 
play in some descriptions of one-sided combat. The Abyssinians at Magdala 
had not, ‘understood in the least the impassable nature of that wall of leaden 
spray with which a civilized army protects itself against the rush of mere brute 
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courage’, claimed The Spectator, ‘the moment they felt it the Abyssinian 
soldiery became cowards, as incapable of further resistance as Europeans are 
of standing up to thunderbolts’.953 
Years later, in its description of a repulsed Ashanti attack on the British 
fortified town of Abrakrampa, The Spectator asserted that, ‘the fire of fifty 
Sniders is too much for them, even at night. The storm of bullets is like a shield 
which they cannot penetrate, and from which they incessantly recoil’.954 The 
cartridge rifles thus succeeded in maintaining the desired border of British 
control. 
The East African tableland and West African bush represented 
competing spheres of influence, and British correspondents were keen to 
highlight cases in which military technology had seemingly penetrated the 
natural partition. Henty asserted that the penetrative power of Snider bullets:  
could not but create a great impression upon [the Ashanti], as it would 
prove to them that their favourite shelter of the bush avails them nothing; 
and though not one single inch of black flesh might be visible among the 
foliage, yet that the Snider bullets could reach them almost as effectually 
as if they stood in the open.955  
 
That was a very freighted statement, as it rejected the contextual element of 
military dominance. In his adventure novel published ten years later, Henty 
again claimed that the Ashanti had become convinced of the white man’s 
superiority, whose ‘heavy bullets, even at the distance of some hundred yards, 
crashed through the brush wood with deadly effect, while the slugs of the 
Ashantis would not penetrate at a distance much exceeding fifty yards’.956 
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At an 1873 RUSI lecture, Sir Samuel Baker, British explorer and Major-
General in the Ottoman army, told the assembled British officers that in bush 
warfare, ‘rockets are invaluable, especially those known as Hale’s three-
pounders…In bush fighting, the object of the rocket would be to try the jungle 
before the troops advanced’.957 The next year, in Ashanti, Lieutenant Bernard 
confirmed to The London Gazette, ‘the splendid way in which the rockets 
cleared the bush’.958 
4.2.3 Only as Good as His Tools 
Harcourt claimed of the battle of Magdala: ‘No more spectacular display 
could have been staged of the invincibility of modern weapons.’959 That was, 
indeed, how many contemporaries interpreted the battle, and the conflict as a 
whole. Such interpretations, however, added a new and potentially 
uncomfortable spin to the British perception of victory in small wars. Victory in 
the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions was often attributed to the military 
technology itself. Napier wrote to the Secretary of State for India that, ‘our 
shells, and rockets, and Snider rifles taught the enemy a lesson which will long 
be remembered in this country’.960 Brackenbury similarly opened his history of 
the Ashanti war with the providential claim that it had taught, ‘this warlike 
savage people that they must once and for ever bow to that mysterious strength 
which the arts and sciences of civilization confer upon the nations of the 
Western world’.961  
European civilisation may have thus bested African civilisation in the 
abstract, but that was quite a different thing to British soldiers having properly 
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bested African ones. The rhetorical focus on mere pieces of hardware as the 
foundations of victory worked somewhat to the detriment of the individual 
soldier and his agency in battle. Lieutenant Borret removed jingoism entirely 
from the equation when he wrote to his wife that: 
Our great strength lay in our breach-loading Snider rifles…It was the 
same in the late war between Prussia and Austria, where the soldiers of 
the latter were completely demoralized by the rapid firing of the 
Prussians. The Snider is a fearful and most deadly weapon, and no army 
armed with muzzle loaders could expect to beat one armed with the 
snider.962 
 
Borret represented an extreme end of cultural self-awareness in this letter. By 
comparing the small war in Abyssinia to a European conflict between Great 
(and white) Powers, he handed the credit for victory almost entirely to 
comparative armament. Captain Barker wrote to his father of an incident in 
which a group of Galla bandits tried to make off with some of the expedition’s 
mules. Barker and six others faced, ‘about 50 in all, but the old story of 
Europeans and sniders against niggers and muzzle loaders, made the odds 
well in my favour’.963 The Abyssinians had charged bravely, Markham claimed, 
‘But it was like a man struggling against machinery – the most heroic courage 
could do nothing in the face of such vast inequality in arms.’964 
The Ashanti were just as brave as the men of the expedition, Boyle told 
the Daily Telegraph readers, but ‘individual courage avails little in bush fighting 
against guns, for close quarters and the use of steel are impossible. For these 
reasons it may be credited that Ashantee deleta est.’965 One sailor agreed in a 
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letter home that such battles were, ‘murder, not a fair fight’.966  
The perceived central role that technology had played in victory thus 
posed a small but significant threat to the traditional martial ideal. The 
valorisation of the former and sincere desire to maintain the dignity of the latter 
may go a way to explaining the repeated allusions to soldiers as machines. 
‘Tommy Atkins reminds me of a steam engine’, wrote Prior of the Illustrated 
London News, ‘keep on plying the coal and you can always keep the steam 
up.’967 Stanley described the first volley at the Battle of Magdala as, ‘a clicking 
of triggers; and a roar of sharp musketry;- steady, deep-toned, like the thunder 
rush of an express train through a tunnel’.968 In his later account of the Emin 
Pasha Relief Expedition, In Darkest Africa, he described the expedition’s 
Remington and Winchester repeating rifles as ‘our souls’.969 Black has written 
that such themes continued to characterise cultural interpretations of 
industrialised warfare, where the ideal of manliness cannot relate solely to 
physical strength. Instead, ideals of soldiering have ‘been linked to the glamour 
of the machine notably with movement’.970 While this took a largely negative 
tone in the Crimea and certainly later in the Great War, mechanised allusions in 
Abyssinia and Ashanti were overwhelmingly positive. 
As their military success had depended largely on their technology, many 
came to a sobering realisation that things could have been very different. ‘Give 
the Ashantees the same weapon, the breech-loading Sniders, with the proper 
ammunition’, Stanley considered, ‘and even the white troops would find that the 
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Ashantees are a foe worthy of their best efforts’.971 In a review of his book, The 
Times considered that, ‘of the fighting qualities of the Ashantees…the more we 
hear the more we congratulate ourselves that our enemies were so very 
wretchedly armed’.972 ‘Had [the Ashanti] been better armed’, Private Ferguson 
told the press, ‘more of us would have fallen’.973 Wolseley conceded that, at the 
battle of Amoaful, ‘the enemy fought well under the terrific fire we poured into 
them, and had they been armed with Snider rifles we must have been 
destroyed’.974 Years later, in an odd article arguing against black soldiers in the 
modern industrialised army, he again granted that: 
the Afridi is a born warrior, and man for man is a far better soldier on his 
wild, roadless mountainside than John Hodge, the Dorsetshire hedger 
and ditcher, or than John Smith the street arab from Whitechapel. It is 
only by our superior arms and superior discipline that we can beat these 
fighting tribes.975  
 
This article will be examined further in Chapter 6.  
Henty warned his readers to consider what would happen if Britain 
should in the future have to fight a Dahomey or Ashanti army armed with 
modern weapons: 
if they had breech-loaders, rockets, and cannon, the advantages which 
the climate and country give them would more than balance our 
superiority in drill and discipline. In view of such a contingency, no time 
should be lost in making it a penal offence to import into Africa any 
weapons save the old flint-and-steel guns.976  
 
Such a comprehensive embargo would not come into being until the Brussels 
Act of 1892, at least nominally supported by most imperial powers, which limited 
the sale of flintlocks and completely banned the sale of breech-loaders to 
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central Africans.977 The aforementioned Gold Coast colonial ordinance was only 
used to limit the sale of arms during war. 
It was hoped that novel military, medical, and transport technology might 
help to penetrate the barrier of African nature, and protect the Europeans who 
passed beyond it. There remained, nonetheless, a certain anxiety that novel 
technology might itself prove irrelevant in the African wild; that the opposing 
African sphere of influence might affect British weapons and blunt the 
advantages that they bestowed. 
Napier arranged a fairly elaborate meeting with the Abyssinian Ras of 
Tigre to secure his assistance against Theodore. At this meeting on 25 
February, a selection of troops and artillery were shown off for the Ras as a 
demonstration of force to further solidify his goodwill. Stanley was in attendance 
and reported that, ‘the opinion which [Kassa’s] Abyssinian soldiers had of the 
English army was, that on an open field English troops would be perfectly 
unattackable, but that on the mountains they could do nothing’.978 This 
performance will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5. Of interest here is the 
fact that these Abyssinians did not believe that Britain’s technological superiority 
would prove relevant in the country’s mountains and causeways. Most 
Abyssinian fortresses were built on top of rocky peaks, the natural barriers 
providing a large component of their defence. The Ras of Tigre’s soldiers, and 
presumably Theodore when he stood against the British in his mountain fortress 
of Magdala, thought that such natural defences gave them the advantage, even 
against Armstrong cannons.  
Kwaku Dua I, King of Ashanti 1834-67, was believed to have said that 
‘the white man brings his cannon to the bush but the bush is stronger than the 
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cannon’, in reference to the failed British 1863-4 campaign.979 Dua was thus 
remembered as rallying his people around the idea that the natural barrier of 
West Africa could withstand European weapons. At the departure of Wolseley’s 
1874 expedition, The Lancet expressed agreement with, ‘the aversion which 
was entertained by the Government to our being embroiled in a little 
war…where the advantages to us resulting from the appliances of modern 
warfare are, to a great extent, neutralised by the nature of the country’.980 The 
Times openly conjectured: 
What will become of the Gatling guns we cannot venture to predict. The 
damp heat of the climate added to inexperience in the care of such 
delicate weapons, may have already included them among those 
unserviceable stores which before long will inevitably pile the shores of 
the Gold Coast.981 
 
In his fictionalised boys adventure novel, With Wolseley to Kumasi, 
Captain F. S. Brereton conveyed these initial anxieties through the character of 
Dick, an experienced officer at Cape Coast Castle. Notably taking the opposite 
position of Boyle’s opinion of bush warfare against Sniders, Dick told a new 
arrival that their weapons might not have the desired effect: 
If King Koffee leads his troops against us and shows up in the open, he 
will be smashed to pieces. Our rifles would beat down his gun fire, while 
our shells and gatlings would send his men running. But it will be 
different…we shall have to take to the bush, and it will be difficult work. A 
man can creep close to one and stab, while rifles are almost useless.982 
 
If racial dominance was context-sensitive, it might follow that technological 
superiority, itself a perceived advantage of Europeans over Africans, might 
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respond to context as well. As Brereton conveyed through the character of Dick, 
the British were concerned that nature would make all the difference and 
present a caveat to their desired civilisational dominance. Certainly, it was 
accepted that Africans would never be able to withstand modern weapons in the 
open. In the bush, however, everything became unpredictable. The Gatling gun 
was thus employed to manage the border between the competing spheres of 
influence, within which Europeans would have the unequivocal edge. 
4.2.4 The Mitrailleur and the Border 
At the outbreak of the Ashanti conflict, a number of parties pushed the 
army to send Gatling guns to the Gold Coast on the premise that it was 
particularly well-suited to bush warfare. The Huddersfield Chronicle and West 
Yorkshire Advertiser condemned the supposed ‘evidence of the failure of the 
Government to provide its officers with the means of warfare. Gatling guns and 
rockets are made for such service as this, and yet our troops are not provided 
with them.’983 A letter to the Daily News claimed that the light Gatling, ‘would 
prove invaluable’ in the bush and ‘infinitely superior’ to the 7-pounder guns.984  
When the first mitrailleur (and trained NCOs) was dispatched to Cape 
Coast Castle, The Times questioned if it would be enough: ‘The Gatling is 
believed to be specially adapted to the requirements of the troops engaged in 
operations against the Ashantees, but only this one weapon has, as yet, been 
sent.’985 Reynolds’ Newspaper made the same claim and suggested that more 
of the machines would be needed.986 
Captain Rogers, who, as discussed in Chapter 2, was a vocal champion 
of the Gatling gun, sent a series of articles to the United Service Magazine from 
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the Gold Coast, where he was stationed with the marines from the beginning of 
the conflict (well before Wolseley’s arrival). He argued for the Gatling’s ability to, 
‘supplement the painful disparity of numbers by mechanical means’.987 Rogers 
quoted former Governor Maclean, who had attributed the British victory in the 
first (1831) Anglo-Ashanti war ‘“especially to the terrible engine of warfare, 
Congreve rockets, which were then first made use of against the enemy.” (Will 
the same be able to be recorded of Gatling guns in the present hostilities?)’ 
(Rogers’ emphasis).988 Explicitly marking the Gatling as a war-winning weapon, 
Rogers highlighted the importance of novel military technology to imperial small 
wars. He claimed that the, ‘“destruction due to the Sniders” was excellent in its 
way, but if we want to bring a despicable little war to a speedy termination, and 
teach these savages a lasting lesson, it will be well to employ the most 
thoroughly effective engines known to science’.989 
Rogers and others argued that the Gatling would drive Africans out of 
their protective bush and simultaneously ensure that they would be unable to 
cross into the more civilised clearings of British camps. Having described one 
such area around Cape Coast, Rogers complained that, ‘the vexatious 
reflection is that when the approaches are so cleared there is no Gatling Gun in 
the Castle to command them’. He recounted a recent engagement in which the 
Marines and West Indian Regiments had driven a group of Ashanti out of cover 
and directed rifle fire into the main body of them, ‘which was then massed on 
the plain. We fancy that another “0” would have been added by a Gatling gun to 
the 200 or 300 to represent the enemy’s list of casualties, while the moral effect 
produced would have been inestimable’ (original emphasis).990 
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The Times placed more importance on the setting in which the device 
was employed: ‘For fighting in the bush a Gatling would be of as much use as a 
fire engine, but if by any lucky chance Sir Garnet Wolseley manages to catch a 
good mob of savages in the open, and at a moderate distance, he cannot do 
better than treat them to a little Gatling music.’991 
Norman Macdonald, former Governor of Sierra Leone (1845-52), sent a 
letter of advice to Kimberley recommending that a battery of ‘mitrailleuses’ be 
sent to Cape Coast Castle, ‘with a liberal supply of ammunition’. Macdonald 
made the popular suggestion that the gun would have a, ‘lasting effect on the 
minds of the natives’ and was, ‘pre-eminently calculated’, for colonial small 
wars. Tactically, moreover, he couched his suggestion in a perceived division 
between continental and imperial wars. While there were, he argued, 
‘differences of opinion as to the use of that weapon in European warfare, there 
can be but one as to its being the arm, par excellence, for driving savages out 
of the bush, when, of course, they can be speedily and effectually dealt with in 
the open’ (original emphasis).992 In light of the prevailing anxieties of a dark 
intimidating wild full of unseen enemies, it was tremendously reassuring to 
believe that this piece of technology might flush those enemies out. The 
requested arms were indeed sent. The Colonial Office replied to former 
Governor Macdonald that two Gatling guns with ammunition were already being 
prepared and would leave for the Gold Coast in days.993 Wolseley and Glover 
were each equipped with two of them.994 
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 Once in the field, however, and in keeping with so many of the novel 
technologies in Wolseley’s expedition, the Gatlings could not be used to great 
effect. Stanley relegated to a footnote that, ‘the Gatling was not taken to 
Coomassie on account of its weight. Something lighter should be invented for 
such campaigns as that in Ashantee’.995 The device was so specialised, 
reported Boyle, that only two of the officers and none of the privates understood 
how to load it properly. In the rough tracks of the Gold Coast, moreover, they 
would, ‘bear no ill-usage or accident’.996 The traversing mechanism of one 
permanently broke down, without which the gun could only ever fire in a single 
straight line. He concluded that, ‘the Gatling guns, from which so much was 
expected, have proved a failure’, and judged the decision to leave them behind, 
‘prudent’.997 They were never used in combat. 
All of these issues make the uses to which the surviving Gatling was put 
all the more interesting. Chapter 5 will explore in detail a test firing that was 
performed to intimidate a group of Ashanti envoys. Though the gun remained 
stationary aside from this one demonstration, its prominent placement at Prahsu 
camp, which Boyle evocatively described as dividing, ‘all the contrast between 
civilization and barbarism’, suggested a desire to employ the perceived special 
qualities of the mitrailleur to manage that division.998 Stanley described a walk, 
‘through the vast camp, which echoed to the sound of axes and forges, and 
vocal commands’, ending at the river bank, where the ‘Gatling menacingly 
point[ed] across the river towards the enemy’s land’.999 
Appendix 1, ‘Camp on the River Prah’, and Appendix 2, ‘Rough Sketch of 
the Tete-De-Pont at the Prah’, are sketches drawn by Major Home from the 
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official Journal of the Engineer Operations on the Gold Coast during the recent 
Expedition.1000 They illustrate the British camp on the southern side of the Prah 
River, the bridge spanning the river itself, and a fortified bridgehead on the north 
shore to protect the crossing. The most prominent feature of the tête du pont 
was a pentagonal fortification on a small hill at the far front, armed with a 
Gatling gun. From this vantage, the gun could theoretically cover the entire 60-
yard wide arc of clearing from which the bush had been laboriously removed. It 
could also be easily seen by anyone looking in along the edge of the bush.  
In the opinion of all involved, the Gatling was not in reliable working 
order. The expedition had never fired the contraption in combat, yet the decision 
was made to place it right out in the far front of the camp. The seeming 
disconnect between this prominent placement in spite of the perceived lack of 
functionality could be explained as appealing to the idea of the bubble of 
industrial civilisation. The Prahsu tête du pont lay at the border of that zone. 
Victorian preoccupations with vision, as explored by Otter, freighted the clearing 
with implications of health, order, and morality.1001 Firmly held British 
assumptions that Africans would fear their technology also hint at a desire to 
portray the bridgehead as something reminiscent of the panopticon.  
4.3 Conclusions 
Recent work on the interplay between technology and space has argued 
that the contextual presence of technology can influence perceptions and 
constructions of space in highly technified arenas, from small laboratories to 
large cities.1002 An examination of the Victorian ‘idea’ of imperial small wars, and 
that of their own place vis-à-vis an imagined Africa, further suggests the 
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influence of technology on perceptions and experiences of (what were seen to 
be) utterly untechnified spaces. Novel military technology was integral to the 
British re-imagining of Africa as a colonial space, from the ‘white man’s grave’ 
to, simply put, something that could be conquered. This chapter has thus 
argued that the machine gun was employed foremost in a symbolic role and 
appealed to the British imperial imagination in a similar way to the limelight and 
steam engine. The following chapter will consider cases where the British forces 
exhibited their novel technology directly to Africans, hoping to awe them with 
the power of symbolism. 
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Chapter 5: A Fearsome Presence 
As the Colonial Office prepared to take control of Elmina from the Dutch, 
Lord Kimberley considered it a matter, ‘of special importance’, that British 
gunboats make themselves generally seen on the Gold Coast as a, ‘display of 
force…calculated to impress the natives with an idea of English power’.1003 
When the Ashanti invaded in response to the transfer, Colonel Festing argued 
that in any British retaliation, ‘it is not only necessary to reach [Coomassie], but I 
hold it to be essential to arrive there with such a force that the native mind shall 
be fully impressed with the power and resources of England’.1004 Wolseley 
would later raid Elmina in an attempt to, ‘show them that a new era has begun 
in military operations’.1005  
In these cases, and as standard policy in small wars, it was believed that 
the mere sight of industrial machines would shatter enemy morale and 
engender a feeling of submissive awe. This chapter will explore the efforts 
taken to employ the spectacle of technology to stimulate that sense of awe, and 
the British interpretations and subsequent representations of African responses. 
It will be shown that the accounts of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions 
demonstrated a strong hope, desire to claim, and tendency to interpret that 
novel military technology would terrify the African enemy. This inclination 
among British commentators tells us something about the imperial ideal, even if 
(particularly if) it did not accurately reflect Africans’ actual reception. 
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In Small Wars, Callwell posited that one of, ‘the main points of difference 
between small wars and regular campaigns…are that, in the former, the beating 
of hostile armies is not necessarily the main object’, and that ‘that moral effect is 
often far more important than material success’.1006 He thus argued for the 
primacy of, ‘the moral effect of the spectacle of a trained and organized army’ in 
securing victory over ‘barbarous’ opponents.1007 Believing that ‘only a decisive 
defeat would lead savages to respect civilization and progress’, Shepherd of the 
Times of India made the similar argument that, ‘if the Force had to leave the 
country without a battle or two…only half the object of the expedition would 
have been accomplished. The captives would be safe; but the moral effect 
would be nowhere’.1008 In a certain sense, the notion that modern technology 
would terrify Africans was as important to the British imperial imagination and 
sense of civilisational pride as was the notion that it would defeat them militarily. 
After the 1865 Jamaica revolt, The Times had tellingly argued for the 
importance of a stronger military presence among the ‘barbarians’ as ‘signs and 
symbols of civilized authority’.1009 
5.1 Presumption of Terror 
Callwell also claimed that, while artillery, ‘admittedly exercises great 
moral effect in every kind of warfare’, the potential for that effect was much 
greater, ‘when in conflict with uncivilized forces, owing to their tendency to 
exaggerate the potentialities of the arm’.1010 There was, perhaps, also a 
tendency among British commentators to exaggerate the terror that modern 
weaponry would sow among their enemies. In Abyssinia, many accounts stated 
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as fact that the Shohos, ‘have no firearms, and are much afraid of them’.1011 
Simpson had not been present for the battle of Magdala, but reported the news 
passed down the line of march that, ‘the Snider rifle seem[ed] by its rapid and 
terrible fire to have frightened them very much’.1012 The Snider had certainly 
been effective, inflicting enormous casualties on the Abyssinian army. 
Simpson’s claim that it had frightened them, however, indicated his own 
interpretation of their reception. 
Early in his career, Wolseley had spent time as an observer with the 
often-outgunned Confederate forces of the American Civil War. In an 1865 
Blackwood’s article, he commented upon the psychological impact that artillery 
exerted upon, what he saw as, semi-disciplined soldiers.1013 He described a 
scene at Harrison’s Landing, where McClellan’s Union army evaded being 
overrun by retreating to the protection of offshore gunboats: 
Confederate soldiers seem to have some superstitious dread of gun-
boats…With soldiers lately raised, such as fill the ranks of both North and 
South, who possess no traditions of how their regiments in such and 
such former wars stormed batteries and performed other feats in action, 
it will always be found that an overweening confidence is placed in 
artillery fire, and an undue dread felt of its effects. As a rule, none but 
highly disciplined troops without guns will attack those supported by 
them; and a very heavy artillery fire brought to bear upon raw soldiers, 
although from the nature of the ground they may not suffer much from it, 
will disconcert them terribly. I believe that round shot frightens far more 
men than it kills. And if this is the case as regards field artillery, how 
much more so when the missiles are ten-inch shells, such as are thrown 
by gunboats.1014 
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 Wolseley’s experience in America had an impact upon his perspective on 
imperial and small wars. It is reflective of the complex relationship between 
Victorian views of race, training, and technological development that he would 
later describe the Ashanti in the same terms as he had previously described 
white Confederate soldiers. In his Memorandum on Bush Fighting, Wolseley 
assured the considerably outnumbered British soldiers on the Gold Coast that, 
‘our enemies have neither guns nor rockets, and have a superstitious dread of 
those used by us’.1015 All his field guns, moreover, now fired shells. Lieutenant 
Dooner took Wolseley’s claim to heart and dismissed rumours that the Ashanti 
would attack Cape Coast Castle. ‘I don’t think there is the smallest probability of 
the enemy coming near us’, he wrote early in the campaign, before seeing any 
combat, ‘believing they have a wholesome dread of white men in the open with 
a breach-loader’.1016  
There were similar suggestions made of the Gatling gun. Captain 
Ebenezer Rogers had endless faith in, ‘the immediate moral effect produced by 
this automatic manslayer’, claiming that ‘its very snarl hushed the war-cries of 
the savage foe’.1017 Sir Percy Douglas went so far as to suggest at RUSI that 
the Gatling:  
would have this disadvantage, that it makes such a horrible row in going 
off that it would frighten the foe away; whereas you want them to stand 
up, so as to get hold of them. It would no doubt strike great terror into 
these people. The only thing I am afraid of is that none of them would 
stop.1018  
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British assumptions as to how Africans were likely to react to mitrailleurs were 
central to interpretations of the Gatling gun demonstrations in Ashanti, which 
will be examined later in this chapter. 
British discussions of rockets also featured a marked overestimation of 
their effectiveness and a consistent presupposition of their ability to frighten 
enemies into submission. ‘In scientific warfare the absolute number of slain is a 
matter of secondary consideration’, The Times explained as the Ashantee 
expedition prepared to depart:  
Modern battles are won more by moral than by physical effects. We 
employ engines that terrify as well as kill…Thus, a flight of rockets – a 
comparatively harmless warlike engine – might cause a regular 
‘skedaddle’ among a set of savages without the loss of a single life.1019  
 
Such skewed interpretations of African reception were particularly evident on 
the subject of rockets, which were seen to be terror weapons. There were 
historical precedents cited as proof. In the backstory to his account, Reade 
described an incident from the First Ashanti War (1825-26), where hard-pressed 
British troops fired Congreve rockets at their attackers, who, he claimed, 
‘supposed [them] to be real thunder and lightning’. Reade attributed the 
cascade of events that followed entirely to the effect of the rockets: ‘these 
missiles caused havoc and confusion: the enemy retreated: the Ashantee 
captains blew themselves up’.1020 After a RUSI lecture, discussed in Chapter 2, 
Rogers described an 1867 battle in Honduras where, he claimed, hostile 
‘Indians’ immediately fled in panic when a few rockets whizzed past them.1021 
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Accounts from Abyssinia also demonstrated a considerable faith in 
rockets. Having watched the Naval Brigade carry out a test fire exercise, Henty 
assured his readers that there was, ‘no doubt that this novel instrument of war 
will strike terror into the hearts of the garrison at Magdala’.1022 When they were 
used in the battle, Stanley reported that the Abyssinian army charging the 
British lines, ‘from very astonishment at the novel sound caused by the rockets, 
halted and cast inquiring glances at each other, as if to ask “What manner of 
things are these?”’.1023 The ILN history of the campaign claimed that Chief 
Fetwarri Gabria, ‘experienced in a hundred battles, knew not what to make of 
[them]’.1024 
The rockets did indeed cause fear and confusion among the Abyssinian 
soldiers who had, after all, never previously encountered them.1025 They did not, 
however, halt the Abyssinian advance for more than a moment, nor inflict the 
bulk of the casualties that they sustained. Snider rifles had by far the largest 
effect on the outcome of the battle. Thus, while British accounts were not 
incorrect to claim that rockets had shocked the Abyssinians, they tended to 
overstate the practical consequences. Holland and Hozier included in the official 
history a translated statement made by Theodore’s servant, Welder Gabre, 
which was repeated in many British newspapers and books. According to 
Gabre, after a rocket narrowly missed Theodore, the King shouted, ‘What a 
terrible weapon! Who can fight against it?’, and soon after exclaimed, ‘Who can 
fight people who use such missiles?’1026 From this, Holland and Hozier 
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concluded that, ‘the fire of the Rocket Battery had produced a powerful effect on 
the King’s mind, and his impatience, after the battle was over, to avert the 
danger of a second attack by effecting a reconciliation with us, was great’.1027 
The majority of Theodore’s army had died in the battle. It would thus seem to be 
an overstatement to give the rockets a direct causal role in his decision to come 
to terms with Napier. 
 ‘When the fight with the Awoonahs and Aquamoos begins’, Stanley wrote 
from Ashanti, ‘I am sure they will be as much surprised by the vigour of [the] 
English officer as they will be by the spiteful alarming hiss of Hale’s rockets.’1028 
His choice of comparison for this compliment demonstrated his expectation that 
British rockets would provide the greatest shock to African soldiers. A similar 
interpretive filter was present throughout the conflict. Private George Gilham of 
the 2nd Rifle Brigade believed that the rockets fired against the Ashanti, ‘no 
doubt astonished them’.1029 The Daily News reported that the enemy, ‘don’t like 
fighting with the men with the schou-schou (the rocket)’, and The Times printed 
that they, ‘hav[e] a great dislike of those missiles’.1030 ‘Against the weapons of 
civilisation’, The Spectator claimed of the rocket, ‘the Ashantees, like the 
Abyssinians before them, are panic-struck and power-less’.1031 
The British forces thus sought, where possible, to capitalise on the 
rocket’s reputation in Africa, as will be explored in detail later in this chapter. 
Captain Butler, for example, had been sent to recruit, equip, and train the allied 
Akim nations to fight the Ashantee. Believing that Fuah, Chief of the West Akim, 
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was not doing enough to mobilise his forces, Butler warned him that Wolseley, 
‘expects you will keep moving, and moving quickly. On the one hand, he offers 
you his friendship and his rewards; on the other, if you fail he gives you rockets 
and ruin.’ Butler claimed in his book that, ‘Fuah funked a rocket as much 
perhaps as anything, save an Ashanti soldier’, and that his threat thus had the 
desired effect.1032 
5.2 Mutual Misunderstanding 
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the specific language the 
British used to denigrate their enemies and bolster their own confidence often 
centred on belittling African weaponry and ability to wield firearms. The notion 
that Africans were unable to manage modern weapons properly was also 
projected in the British view of their allies.  
The majority of commentators in the Gold Coast made a point of 
declaring that the Hausa soldiers lacked fire control in their first engagement 
armed with Snider rifles. Henty suggested that, ‘their wild excitability and ill-
directed fire were calculated to confuse and bewilder the troops, and do more 
harm than good’.1033 Maurice explained in the Daily News that when the ‘wild’ 
Hausa joined a battle, ‘up goes the Snider, and that latest product of civilization 
in these most uncivilized hands is made to pour volley after volley as if in mere 
mad joy, high into the air’.1034 The men were used to muskets that fired 
comparatively low-speed bullets along parabolic trajectories, and were thus 
accustomed to aiming above their targets. Maurice did not explain that fact and 
preferred to depict the Hausa soldiers as if they had been firing straight into the 
air. Only a few commentators would later explain that subsequent training 
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quickly corrected the problem. An article in The Spectator, and Captain Rogers 
in the United Service Magazine, in particular, noted the prejudice evident in 
Wolseley’s portrayal of the Hausa, who had learned how to use their new 
weapons as quickly as would any European recruit.1035 
Butler derisively recounted his efforts to convince his Akim soldiers that 
the Enfield rifle was superior to the flintlock ‘Dam’ guns with which they had 
previously been armed, describing ‘the Akim cries of wonder’ at his 
demonstration of the European import. When he gathered a small group for 
target practice, Butler explained: 
fully twenty out of the twenty-three Enfields declined to go off…the 
reason of this was soon apparent. Enfield cartridges rammed boldly into 
the rifle, bullet foremost, became even more harmless missiles than the 
iron stones of the Ashantis, and it was in this manner that my army had 
prepared their arms for war.1036  
 
If this scene did take place as Butler described it, one is led to wonder if he had 
demonstrated how to load the new rifles when he distributed them. 
This assumption that only Europeans could comprehend and manage 
military technology was particularly evident in the discussion of African 
artillerymen in the Gold Coast campaign. After his 1817 journey to establish 
British relations with Ashanti, Bowdich had recommended that an artillery 
company of freed slaves from Sierra Leone could be trained by European 
sergeants and stationed at Cape Coast Castle.1037 This was never put into 
practice, though the West India Regiment soldiers certainly knew how to 
operate the Castle’s defensive cannon.  
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As part of the 1873 expedition, Captain Rait of the Royal Artillery did 
indeed train a battery of Hausa gunners. Some accounts indicated that these 
soldiers were very successful. ‘Rait and his artillery…consist of Houssas’, 
Luxmore wrote to his wife, ‘and I dare say may do well’.1038 Maurice reported 
that during an early engagement, ‘at one time nothing kept back the attack of 
the enemy but the steady working of Captain Rait’s seven Houssas with their 7-
pounder gun and a rocket-tube. These men…worked the gun and rockets 
entirely themselves’.1039 A rocket fired by Hausa gunners was reported to have 
hit a group of Ashanti chiefs, killing or wounding six of them, and precipitating a 
rout.1040 
Despite the success of the Hausa battery, and their already established 
reputation among the British as a nation of brave and reliable soldiers, many of 
the accounts from the Gold Coast ridiculed the very idea that Africans could be 
taught to operate artillery. As Major Home prepared the equipment for 
Wolseley’s small party of officers, Maurice reported that, ‘unfortunately many of 
the things which would be most useful on the expedition, require the work of 
Europeans, and it has been therefore necessary to cut some of these down to a 
minimum’.1041 In Brackenbury’s book, written after the expedition and thus in 
light of the Hausa’s full performance, he stressed that, ‘the difficulty of teaching 
natives to act as gunners, when every word of command and every detail had to 
be explained and interpreted, can readily be imagined’, and that Rait had 
expressed concern that they would need European gunners. Even from 
Brackenbury’s choice of perspective, written with the aim of defending 
                                                       
1038 Percy P. Luxmore, ‘Ashantee: Extracts from the Journal of a Naval Officer Addressed to His 
Wife,’ Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 115, no. 702 (Apr. 1874) p. 523. 
1039 Maurice, The Ashantee War, p. 113. 
1040 Henry Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, A Narrative: Prepared from the Official Documents by 
Permission of Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874) 
p. 255. 
1041 Maurice, The Ashantee War, p. 33. 
244 
 
Wolseley’s decision to request artillery gunners from Britain, it would seem that 
the real issue had been a language barrier.1042 Yet, he included the patronising 
claim that, ‘their childish delight when practising with live shells and rockets was 
most amusing’.1043 He notably conceded that they, ‘had one great advantage 
over the European gunners…the Houssas could carry the guns…but it would 
have been impossible for Europeans to carry the guns’.1044 
In his 1884 boy’s novel, By Sheer Pluck: A tale of the Ashanti War, Henty 
placed his young lead character, Frank Hargate, as the prisoner of an Ashanti 
general. Frank served as an observer to his captors’ supposed reactions after a 
British attack: 
‘These men march as well as my warriors. They have guns which shoot 
ten times as far as ours, and never stop firing. They carry cannon with 
them, and have things which fly through the air and scream, and set 
villages on fire and kill men. I have never heard of such things before. 
What do you call them?’ 
‘They are called rockets,’ Frank said. ‘What are they made of?’ 
‘They are made of coarse powder mixed with other things, and rammed 
into an iron case.’ 
‘Could we not make some too?’ the Ashanti general asked. 
‘No,’ Frank replied. ‘At least, not without a knowledge of the things you 
should mix with the powder, and of that I am ignorant. Besides, the 
rockets require great skill in firing, otherwise they will sometimes come 
back and kill the men who fire them.’1045 
 
In this exchange, Henty called on both the practical and the racial explanations 
that Victorians had for their own technological dominance, and revealed the 
tension between those explanations. Hargate had as little knowledge of rocket 
ingredients as did his Ashanti captor, but nonetheless suggested that Africans 
with rockets would pose a threat only to themselves. 
 This discourse was even more patent on the subject of the Gatling guns. 
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When Lieutenant F. H. Eardley-Wilmot was killed in action, his obituary in the 
Illustrated London News stated that at Cape Coast Castle, ‘he was employed in 
the almost hopeless task of training a small body of natives in the use of the 
Gatling gun’.1046 Boyle described a practice fire during which the Hausa 
‘worked’ the Gatling. He made it quite clear, however, lest the reader mistake 
his meaning, that, ‘Captain Rait stood beside and “served” the gun…its terrible 
machinery is delicate as that of a watch, and no negro that ever lived could be 
trusted to work it’.1047 Having thus seen the men in action, Boyle later chose to 
depict the gunners during the less dignified task of hauling a Gatling along the 
road, ‘in silence, breathing hard, and desperately impressed with the mysterious 
science of the whites’.1048 
 Telegraph cables provided another locus for the discourse that Africans 
were unable to comprehend modern technology. The signalling corps in 
Abyssinia had constant trouble with the ostensibly friendly Shoho tribes, who 
made off with sections of the wire and necessitated the posting of guards to 
patrol the entire line.1049 Shepherd explained this problem in the Times of India 
with the theory that the Shohos, ‘found Hooper’s patent telegraph core 
exceedingly useful to bind their spear-heads with’.1050  
A story appeared in most of the newspapers and books from the Gold 
Coast expedition regarding, ‘the strange delusion’ of the Ashanti interpretation 
of the wire:  
Some of their scouts having very probably seen the telegraph line, 
imagined doubtless that it was some powerful fetich, and imitated it by 
stretching along the path a cotton string extending from Quisah to 
Fomannah…But little recked Russell’s Regiment while the men had 
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Sniders in their hands for the false fetiches of Ashantees, and no doubt 
before this campaign is over the Ashantees themselves will have lost 
much of their former faith in their abominations and frivolities.1051 
 
Prior likewise mused that he was, ‘afraid this fetish had not much effect upon 
the fortunes of the campaign’.1052 Henty’s claim that King Karikari and his 
priests, ‘would come to see that the white man’s firearms are greatly more 
effective than the black man’s fetish’, engaged a similar concept.1053 By placing 
European technology in parallel with his conception of Ashanti religion, Henty 
implied that Africans were only capable of interpreting the world in supernatural 
terms.  
Adas has argued that Western commentators often cited African, 
‘attempts to offset with magical talismans the decisive European advantages in 
the art of killing’, as manifest evidence of childlike, irrational thinking.1054 
Lieutenant Jeckyll of the Royal Engineers was in charge of erecting the wire 
along the road. In his report, he agreed that the Fantees, at least, interpreted 
the telegraph wire though a religious/superstitious lens. Yet, he provided a very 
practical source for such an interpretation. Some Fantee labourers deserted, he 
claimed: 
after being knocked down by lightning shocks, when handling the wire. 
This incident was productive of some good, inasmuch as it inspired great 
respect for the wire, which was henceforth regarded as fetish, and never 
molested by the natives. Thunderstorms were a constant source of 
interruption to the work, such strong induced currents being set up in the 
wire that it was impossible to touch it for a time.1055 
 
                                                       
1051 Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, p. 165. 
1052 Melton Prior, Campaigns of a War Correspondent, ed. S. L. Bensusan (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1912) pp. 21-2. 
1053 Henty, The March to Coomassie, p. 89. 
1054 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of 
Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) p. 306. 
1055 Whitworth Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. 2 (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1889) p. 16. 
247 
 
The telegraph instruments often had to be disconnected to protect them from 
lightning surges, and in December the line wire itself melted after a strike.1056 
Thus, Boyle claimed, the Fantees classed the telegraph line along with the 
traction engines and the Gatling guns as, ‘white man's fetish’.1057 The very 
concept of ‘fetish’ was linked to intellectual inferiority in the British imagination, 
which lent a deeply critical dimension to such reports of African reception. 
5.3 The Men Who Would be King 
In a moment of self-reflection, Henty considered that, ‘our energy and 
resources must indeed appear something quite supernatural to this primitive 
people’.1058 British commentators tended to highlight those cases in which 
Africans attributed otherworldly powers to Westerners. To ease the serious 
water shortage at the Zoulla camp, two coal-fuelled condensers were set up at 
the seaside. These boilers ran continuously during the British time on shore, 
producing one thousand gallons of desalinated water per ton of coal.1059 Henty 
reported that the Muslim Shoho people working as carriers and guides for the 
force would not believe that the British were Christians, arguing that, ‘you are 
sons of Shaitan. You are more powerful than the afrits of old. They could move 
mountains, and fly across the air, but they could never drink from the sea, they 
could never change salt-water into fresh. You must be sons of Shaitan’.1060 
Markham also claimed that the Shohos, ‘were firmly convinced that those 
strangers who drank water out of the sea, and throve upon it, were in league 
with Shaitan’.1061 
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 The army’s railway, understandably, also impressed them. Shepherd 
described the, ‘surprise the Shoho mind experienced’, when the engine first 
began to move along the track, ‘impelled by some invisible agency of which 
their “untutored minds” could form no conception’. He derisively added that their 
wonder was revealed by, ‘an enormous display of eyes and teeth’.1062 Simpson 
wrote of an episode in which a group of Tigrean Abyssinians rode with the Head 
Quarter Staff on the train down to Zoulla. He found them afterward in animated 
conversation, and told his readers that they had been debating, ‘whether 
Solomon in all his glory ever could have conceived such a mode of travelling as 
this railway’.1063 They did not seem to reach a conclusion, but Simpson asserted 
that by the end of that day, once they had witnessed the British technological 
wonders at Zoulla, ‘they might well have been willing to admit, that if the wisdom 
of Solomon applied to material things, we could at least show good signs of 
having had a fair share of the inheritance’.1064 There is no reason to doubt that 
the Abyssinians were impressed, but the suggestion that the British had 
descended from Solomon constituted an assumption on Simpson’s part.  
Such assumptions about the African mentality placed a filter on the 
British collective memory of the conflict and influenced the conduct of 
subsequent small wars. Years later, The Lancet recommended that Wolseley 
should construct a railway on his upcoming expedition to Ashanti to, among 
other ends, impress the natives. When the Abyssinians had first seen Napier’s 
steam-engine, the article claimed with a supposed direct quote, they declared 
that the English, ‘had put the devil into an iron box and made him work’.1065 
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 When Napier met with Kassa to discuss an alliance, the Ras recounted 
what he had heard about the more elaborate tools at Britain’s disposal. 
According to Stanley and Henty, Kassa believed that the rockets released a 
noxious vapour, fatal to man and beast, and could set fire to houses three miles 
away. He further believed, they reported, that ‘these (rockets) were weapons of 
enchanters. The English, according to [Abyssinian] ideas, practiced 
enchantment in many things’.1066 By all evidence, Kassa had intended to side 
with the British from their arrival, so his exhortations of their spectacular power 
must be interpreted with due consideration of diplomatic rhetoric. Once 
reported, however, such words nevertheless made an impression on the British 
perception of the Abyssinian mind and the effect that ‘superstition’ could have 
on the outcome of a campaign.  
Henty suggested that Kassa’s people were, ‘thoroughly convinced that 
we have great power of enchantment; and this will probably do more to retain 
their neutrality than any fear of our arms would do’.1067 Significantly, Stanley 
claimed, they believed that even though the British, ‘could not fight very well in 
the mountains, still, when they could not conquer by force of arms, they could 
have recourse to their enchantments, and were therefore invincible and entitled 
to respect’.1068 That was an important point regarding the psychological aspects 
of the expedition. The Abyssinians, in Stanley’s interpretation, saw British 
enchantments as compensating for their innate disadvantages in African 
mountain warfare. Through encounters such as these, British officers and 
commentators increasingly saw the potential benefits of technology as 
spectacle. If Africans were predisposed to interpret modern technology as 
evidence of supernatural power, those interpretations could be actively fostered. 
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5.4 ‘The collection of machinery excites far deeper interest than anything 
else exhibited’.1069  
 
Earlier explorers in Africa had attempted to use machines to awe the 
natives they encountered, a form of display Thomas called, ‘a pervasive ritual in 
the history of Western expeditions’.1070 Livingstone used a magic lantern on a 
number of his missionary expeditions to project illustrations of Bible stories and 
impress potential converts. He brought a camera on his 1858-64 Zambezi 
Expedition, the first ever used in an official British venture.1071 Bowdich believed 
himself to have won the favour of the Ashanti King in no small part through gifts 
of ‘ingenious novelties’, such as telescopes, pistols, kaleidoscopes, watches, a 
microscope, a compass, and a camera obscura.1072 Speke found that the 
Africans he met became much easier to deal with once he had enthralled them 
with the speed of his revolvers and even the opening and closing of his 
umbrella.1073 When the issue of Theodore’s European captives became 
intractable, Charles Beke, who had travelled to the country in the early 1840s, 
publically lobbied to be allowed to go to Abyssinia and negotiate for their 
release. In a letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he proposed that 
he would take with him, ‘an electric-telegraph apparatus, for the purposes of 
exhibiting and explaining to His Majesty the use and operation of this wonderful 
and, as to him it would appear, miraculous invention’.1074  
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Many such demonstrations during Napier’s expedition were reported in a 
mocking tone. Lieutenant Scott told his wife of a visit to an Abyssinian church 
where he convinced the attendant priests that the cover of his pocket watch 
could only be opened by blowing upon it. After they failed in their attempts, 
Scott pressed the latch while giving a gentle blow, and left the priests, ‘in a 
delightful state of bewilderment’.1075 Simpson demonstrated a European child’s 
toy, a wind-up cat playing a harp, to Captain Speedy’s Abyssinian servant. The 
man, ‘became wild with excitement’, Simpson reported, and asked in 
Abyssinian, ‘how in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost can you 
people teach cats to do such things?’1076  
There was, nonetheless, a serious side to these displays of European 
gadgetry, and a desire to influence Africans for practical effect. In a discussion 
of Markham’s geographical observations from the expedition at the RGS, Sir 
Stafford Northcote, the Secretary of State for India, suggested that the drought 
with which the Army in Abyssinia had to contend:  
had not been unattended with advantages; it had enabled us to impress 
upon some of the native chiefs and their representatives an idea of our 
skill and power, in being able to turn the sea into drinking-water, and to 
draw water from the earth by means of Mr. Norton’s admirable American 
pump.1077  
 
Sir Samuel Baker advised that ‘savages’ could be ruled by either ‘force’ or 
‘humbug’ and recommended that anyone who wished to gain the admiration of 
Africans should bring tricks and gadgets to encourage the latter. While 
Governor of British Equatoria (modern South Sudan), he stocked music boxes, 
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a magic lantern, a magnetic battery, fireworks, and mirrored silver balls.1078 
Baker’s opinions carried considerable weight among the administrative class. 
He had travelled extensively in East Africa, held the titles of Pasha and Major-
General in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, and lectured at RUSI on the subject 
of ‘savage warfare’.1079 In a review of his 1867 book in Macmillan’s Magazine, 
Thomas Hughes scornfully referred to him as the ‘favourite champion’ of ‘Mr. 
Carlyle [and] the Anthropological [Society]’ with an over-enthusiastic tendency 
to ‘volunteer his testimony as to the negro race’.1080 
Thus, while machines had certainly been used as spectacle before the 
Abyssinian expedition, by the time of the Ashanti war it had become standard 
practice for the British abroad and a characteristic of the high imperial era. In 
1888, Wolseley published an agenda-laden article on the subject of black men 
as soldiers. In reference to the Sudanese Mahdists, but also meant to apply 
broadly, he claimed that due to, ‘the innate superstition of the black man. I 
believe that a clever conjuror who could manipulate spectre figures well, would 
be the most successful of Mahdis in the Soudan’.1081  
A very similar idea had occurred to Henty in Abyssinia. After hearing of 
the Tigreans’ preconceptions about rockets, and indignant at their dismissal of 
British cannon as ‘too small’, Henty made a proposal for future expeditions, 
which is worth quoting at length: 
As the natives are impressed by enchantment, and are not at all 
impressed by our soldiers, I should propose that in any future war of the 
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same kind there should be an officer appointed under the title of 
magician to the forces, and that he should have subordinate officers as 
assistant magician and deputy-assistant magicians. The duty of these 
officers should be to exhibit signs and wonders. Mr. Anderson might 
perhaps be induced to undertake the control of the machine tricks and 
general magic; Mr. Home would do the spiritual business, and could 
astonish the native mind with the sight of elephants floating in the air, or 
could terrify a negro potentate by tweaking his nose at a durbar by 
invisible fingers. One of the deputy-assistant magicians should be a 
pyrotechnist, whose duty would be to light up the camp with unearthly 
fire, and to place strange portents in the midnight sky. Certainly, had this 
department been organised before the expedition began, and had a few 
of its officers been present, we might have dispensed with several 
regiments, and the cost of the expedition would have been greatly 
lessened, however munificent the remuneration of the chiefs of the 
department might have been. Should Government adopt this suggestion, 
and I have no doubt they will do so, I shall expect a valuable appointment 
in the corps.1082 
 
Henty clearly meant his modest proposal as a (he might say ‘light hearted’) 
criticism of what he took to be African gullibility and low intelligence. At its core, 
however, the idea of appealing to African ‘superstition’ was already fairly 
popular among British explorers and government officials. Moreover, Napier 
and Wolseley both staged demonstrations with dramatic flair for African 
ambassadors. The army might not have a department of magic, but the 
expeditions had considerable supplies of advanced technology in tow. British 
demonstrations of technology in Abyssinia and Ashanti were rooted in this 
particular conception of the interpretive filters through which Africans would 
witness those demonstrations; in European assumptions about the African 
mode of reception. 
5.5 Exhibition and Performance of Technology in Abyssinia and Ashanti 
 
In Small Wars, Callwell repeatedly emphasised, ‘the great importance of 
impressing the enemy with the feeling of inferiority, the advantage of a 
dominating attitude in the theatre of war, the value of moral effect’.1083 While this 
could, many argued, be accomplished through the infliction of overwhelming 
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casualties, it also became common practice in British imperial Africa to 
engender a feeling of inferiority through demonstrations of European military 
technology.1084 During the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (1886-90), Henry 
Morton Stanley frequently attempted, with some success, to impress the African 
leaders with whom he negotiated with a machine gun that Hiram Maxim had 
donated to the cause.1085 
Stanley had, of course, witnessed the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions. These campaigns were in some ways pilot trials for the military 
demonstration of technology to Africans. Everyone in Napier’s army, Shepherd 
reported in the Times of India, was mindful of, ‘the desirability of doing 
everything that could conveniently be done to enable the people through whose 
country the Force was passing, to form a correct estimate of their nothingness 
when compared with it’.1086 While showy in nature, performances of 
technological spectacle were intended to serve practical strategic purposes. 
Thus, the Staff Officer in Blackwood’s was confident, ‘that our friendly relations 
with those around us have largely rested on the military array which we have 
held all the time in the background’.1087 This section will explore a series of 
cases where the military array was deployed to the centre stage. 
5.5.1 Abyssinia 
Ras Kassa of Tigre First Durbar1088 
During the march to Magdala, Napier arranged a durbar [meeting] with 
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Kassa, the Ras of Tigre, to establish friendly relations. Kassa was among the 
most powerful of Theodore’s rivals and, at that point, may in fact have been 
stronger than the King.1089 It was, thus, very important that this relationship be 
solidified, as the force would rely on Tigrean goodwill for supplies, information, 
and safe passage. Several aspects of the British performance, such as the use 
of elephants, have been covered in earlier chapters. 
 Before the Ras made it to the British camp, he had heard fantastic 
reports from his ambassadors about the weapons that this foreign army 
possessed. Scott of the Bengal Artillery wrote to his mother that a group of 
Kassa’s representatives, ‘were very anxious to see our guns (the Mountain 
Train)’, but unfortunately found them to be smaller than they had expected.1090 
As the army marched, Scott observed, ‘every mile or so along the road the 
Abyssinians collected, having heard the guns were coming; they have a great 
respect for guns; but I fancy have seldom seen anything over a three-
pounder’.1091 Abyssinian cannon were, in fact, often of enormous calibre, which 
was equated directly with power. Henty was frustrated by the Abyssinian focus 
on size and the subsequent disappointment among some visiting envoys. It 
was, he suggested: 
a great pity that the artillery and the infantry had not a few rounds of 
blank cartridge, which would have given his ambassadorship a much 
more lively idea of what the real thing would be like, and would have 
given him such a tale to bear to his king and master as would have 
opened his Majesty’s eyes to what the consequences of a war would 
probably be.1092 
 
He later argued that, despite the effort required to transport ammunition inland 
to be used in such demonstrations, ‘the lesson those hundred cartridges would 
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have taught would have been cheaply purchased at any cost’.1093 Tales were, 
nonetheless, told, and Napier sought to encourage the more fantastic rumours 
about British weaponry by inviting all visiting dignitaries to see the artillery train.  
Shepherd told of one group of, ‘chiefs who had heard [the] rumour’, and 
wished to, ‘judge for themselves regarding its truth or falsity. The intelligent of 
these were shown the wonders of the Armstrongs and Sniders.’1094 When Grant 
and Munzinger returned from a preliminary meeting with the Ras of Tigre, 
having invited him to meet with Napier, they were escorted by a noble Chief 
named Llma. Knowing that the man would have Kassa’s ear, Markham 
reported, Napier ‘considered it desirable…to hold a review of the troops in his 
presence. The fire of the mountain-guns and the charge of cavalry across the 
plain rather astonished [Llma], and must have impressed him with the 
conviction that it was better to have us as friends than enemies.’1095 Kassa had 
every reason to arrive with high expectations. 
 With the Ras himself due to appear, there was a clear desire among 
British commentators to use a similar performance of technology, ‘in order to 
convince him of [the Army’s] irresistible power’.1096 Shepherd hoped that, 
‘showing him the organization, the equipment, and the power of an English 
Army’, would assure, ‘that the remembrance of the approaching field-day would 
make him a wiser and a better man’.1097 To that end, the party that 
accompanied Napier to meet Kassa included four Armstrong guns, two 
elephants, and a group of engineers with a camera and a gas light flash 
signal.1098 There was no report of Kassa’s opinion of the camera or signaller, 
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but the decision to bring those devices along to the meeting suggests a 
perception among the British that they would have an impact. 
Most important for the demonstration, the meeting began with the four 
Armstrong guns firing a ‘salute’ of blank charges.1099 Stanley, who was present 
for the meeting, was happy to report that the noise of the cannon, ‘caused 
visible commotion among the array of horses and men on the opposite side of 
the stream; and great uneasiness among the dusky warriors, who, with tilted 
lances, looked down upon the red-coated army below’.1100 Highlighting the 
inferior weapons with which the Tigrean soldiers were armed, Stanley 
supported the interpretation that they were easily frightened by British 
technology. Since the custom of firing salutes was not widespread in Abyssinia, 
it is likely that the men were simply surprised. In his report dated 14 February 
1868, Napier described a military parade, cannon demonstration, and mock 
horse charge that were held after the durbar for Kassa and his chiefs. He 
expressed his opinion that, ‘the fire of the mountain guns…astonished them not 
a little, and taught them, it is to be hoped, how unwise it would be on their part 
to reject our friendship’.1101 Markham seems to have parroted Napier’s wording 
in his later description of the demonstration made for Kassa’s ambassador 
Llma. 
 In the official history of the expedition, Holland and Hozier concluded 
that, while the Abyssinians had admired the British infantry and cavalry 
displays, ‘they were chiefly delighted and impressed by the Armstrong guns. 
Kassai dismounted and closely inspected the pieces, handled the shells, and 
looked through the rifled barrels’. The claim that Kassa was interested in novel 
military technology fits with his characterisation in British sources as a 
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particularly, perhaps atypically, intelligent Abyssinian. Similar claims, it has 
been shown in earlier chapters, were made of King Theodore. The more 
superstitious interpretations were attributed to Kassa’s followers, who ‘remarked 
that the English must be good Christians, or Heaven would not grant them 
intelligence to mould such wondrous weapons. It appeared to their view that the 
greatest blessings which would be vouchsafed to Christian morality were 
firearms and gunpowder.’1102  
All British accounts of African opinion were susceptible to exaggeration 
at two points, those of experience and of retelling. Scott was present for the 
entire scene, but made only one passing mention of Kassa being ‘allowed to 
examine one of the Armstrongs’.1103 The real subject of interest here is what the 
British thought about the impressions that their technological demonstrations 
made on African observers, and not necessarily what those Africans actually 
thought. The phlegmatic Europeans may not have been used to Abyssinian 
diplomatic rhetoric. 
Apropos, any Abyssinian references to religion in these discussions were 
usually taken by British commentators to imply and indicate a declaration of 
civilisational status. Thus, the Tigreans’ claim that the English [British] were very 
Christian was taken as evidence of their recognition that the British were 
superior. Such interpretations of Abyssinian religious rhetoric in reference to 
railways and water purification were discussed earlier in the present chapter. In 
that sense, therefore, the artillery demonstrations were seen as having 
achieved the desired effect. 
 Stanley was, however, still frustrated by the Abyssinian focus on size. He 
contemptuously reported that, ‘the cannon were not so large as what they had 
                                                       
1102 Ibid., pp. 415-16. 
1103 ‘A Staff Officer’ [Scott], Letters from Abyssinia during the Campaign of 1868, p. 53. 
259 
 
been led to expect by their camp gossips (Breech-loading Armstrongs with 
double shells they had no very high praise to bestow upon.)’1104 Thus, while 
blank cartridges had indeed on this occasion been fired to gain Kassa’s 
attention, Stanley argued that more should have been done. He suggested that, 
if Napier had, ‘only expended half-a-dozen shells and rockets in exhibiting the 
real power of the condemned Armstrongs, much lasting benefit would have 
accrued therefrom’. Stanley did concede that, since little was known about 
Theodore’s fortress at Magdala, Napier did not wish, ‘to waste his projectiles of 
war in a mere exhibition’.1105 This comment somewhat belied the amount of 
effort that had in fact been expended on ‘mere exhibition’. Once Magdala had 
been taken, at any rate, there would be ammunition to spare. 
Theodore’s Envoy 
After the battle outside Magdala, the King sent his son in law, Dejach 
Alami [Dejaj Alamé], to negotiate with Napier. The envoy was accompanied by 
two of the European captives, Lieutenant Prideaux and Reverend Flad, who 
later described the meeting. Henry Blanc, a third captive, reported that Napier 
demanded Theodore’s full surrender, ‘then showed Alamé some of the “toys” he 
had brought with him, and explained to him their effects’.1106 One wonders if 
those descriptions were at all exaggerated. Napier retained the advantage of 
novelty since, while the rockets and 7-pounder mountain guns had been used to 
good effect in the battle the day before, the Armstrong steel guns and the 
mortars had arrived during the night and had not yet been seen in action by 
anyone in Magdala. As Flad reported, Napier told the Abyssinian ambassador:  
that the arms used against [the Abyssinians] yesterday were but mere 
playthings in comparison to these destroying machines; if the King would 
not surrender and give up, the big mortars and the Armstrong guns 
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would be sent up against him, and then none of his soldiers would 
escape alive. Horror-struck and amazed, Dejach Alami looked at the 
elephants which were standing like giants before him, still having the 
Armstrong cannons on their backs.1107 
 
The army and later commentators were thus able to assert a continued state of 
technological superiority and to suggest that there would always be more 
devices that Africans could not understand. As a popular history of the 
campaign would claim, ‘Alami was shown the battery of Armstrong guns and 
mortars…that he might tell King Theodore how much more formidable were the 
implements of war now ready to be used against him, than those which he had 
seen employed the day before’.1108 
Galla Chiefs  
 During the march back to the Red Sea after the destruction of Magdala, 
the army was harassed by bands of Gallas. Napier had established peaceful 
relations with a number of Galla chiefs, but isolated groups continued to rob the 
baggage train as opportunity allowed. Thus, Shepherd described, when the 
army halted by a large lake for the day, ‘a number of experiments in gunnery 
[were] made, chiefly with a view to get rid of a large quantity of cumbrous 
ammunition, and to show the congregated Gallas with what manner of persons 
they had been meddling’. The Royal Artillery and the Naval Brigade fired 
hundreds of rockets to test their elevation tables and the tendency to ricochet. 
The mountain guns fired shells over the water to observe shrapnel spread, and 
the 4th King’s Own practised with their Snider rifles.  
As Shepherd had noted, these tests provided a good opportunity to 
dispose of excess ammunition and train the troops. He was, nonetheless, keen 
to claim that, ‘there is reason to believe that the Gallas were duly impressed 
with all they saw; for on Sir Robert’s pointing to their hills and asking upon 
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which of the villages they would like the fire directed, they seemed terribly 
shocked at the idea’.1109 As well they might. It should be noted that Shepherd 
was the only British commentator to describe this event in such detail or to 
make claims about the Galla’s reception. Scott mentioned that the 33rd paraded 
to impress a visiting Galla ambassador, but did not mention any display of 
technology.1110 If Napier in fact made the comment that Shepherd described, it 
would indicate his concern for African reception and reveal a performance 
element to the tests. 
Ras Kassa of Tigre Second Durbar 
After Theodore’s death, Ras Kassa of Tigre was one of the most 
powerful and influential leaders in Abyssinia. If there was henceforth to be a 
single ruler of the country, Napier and many realistic commentators believed 
that he was a likely candidate. It was thus important to British interests to 
maintain his friendship. As the army withdrew through Tigre, Napier met with 
Kassa for a second durbar on 25 and 26 May. The Lieutenant General 
compensated the Ras for his support with six mortars, six howitzers, 725 
muskets, 130 rifles, and a considerable stock of ammunition.1111 As it 
happened, Theodore was in fact succeeded by Wagshum Gobeze, who 
became Emperor Tekle Giyorgis II. Kassa went on to use his new weapons to 
defeat Gobeze in 1871, becoming Emperor Yohannes IV, or King John; he 
would reign until 1889.1112 Napier also invited him to a demonstration put on by 
the Naval Rocket Brigade. This performance was charged with meaning, as the 
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British sought to solidify Kassa’s long-term goodwill, but also suggest a sense of 
his subordination. The future King Yohannes IV was not, significantly, rewarded 
with any rockets of his own. 
 The Illustrated London News claimed that the rockets’, ‘fame had spread 
throughout Abyssinia, so that Kasai was most anxious to see these terrible 
instruments of destruction’. As the brigade fired at a selected rock in the 
distance, ‘Sir Robert Napier led Kassai by the hand, and had the rockets and 
their action explained to him. The principal chiefs of the Tigré were there, and 
all manifested the greatest astonishment at what they saw.’ It was also duly 
reported that the Spanish Army observers, General Florente and Count Mirasol, 
were quite impressed by the rocket demonstration.1113 Simpson drew a portrait 
to accompany this description, which was printed in the newspaper and 
selected for reprinting in the subsequent ILN book about the expedition.1114 In 
the former, the image was titled, ‘The Abyssinian Expedition: The Naval Rocket 
Brigade Firing Rockets at Senafe’, but this was changed in the latter to, ‘Kassai 
Seeing the Practice of the Naval Rocket Brigade at Senafe’. The title change 
interestingly altered the subject of the image from the rockets themselves to 
Kassa’s gaze at the rockets.  
In the image, Simpson and the lithographer conveyed a sharp sense of 
contrast between the dark-clad British officers and soldiers, who glanced calmly 
at the rockets whizzing off into the background, and the white-clad and barefoot 
Kassa with his assorted chiefs, who appeared positively shocked. Napier was in 
fact shown looking away from the rockets and toward Kassa, his arm 
outstretched and palm open to direct the Ras’ attention to the demonstration. 
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Kassa himself, in contrast, stood with his hands raised to chest level, palms 
slightly outward, as if vaguely attempting to shield himself. His eyes were 
unmistakably flared and his mouth open. He appeared as if he was in the act of 
gasping in surprise. While earlier accounts had interpreted Kassa’s interest in 
technology as a mark of his intelligence, Simpson’s image conveyed a duller 
characterisation of him. Markham likewise downplayed, ‘the weak-minded 
Kasa’, and described him as having, ‘gazed with stupid wonder at the rocket 
practice of the Naval Brigade’.1115   
Three days later, as the British force moved on and Napier bid Kassa 
farewell, a final brief demonstration of technology was held as part of the 
concluding ceremonies. A soldier exhibited the Snider’s breach-loading action 
for the Ras and an officer fired 7 shots from an American repeater rifle. Two 
mountain guns fired a final salute, and the groups parted ways.1116 
Technological spectacle had been a central part of the British interaction with 
Kassa and the allied Tigreans from beginning to end.  
5.5.2 Ashanti  
Butler’s Rifle Demonstrations 
Captain Butler had been sent as special commissioner to West Akim, 
entrusted with recruiting Chief Quabina Fuah to attack Ashanti along a different 
route from Wolseley’s main army. In addition to the cases of Enfields, bottles of 
gin, and considerable money with which he sought to enlist Fuah’s support, 
Butler also packed an ‘American fourteen-shooter’ rifle. During their inaugural 
meeting, Butler punctuated his argument, ‘as [he] spoke’, by firing ‘fourteen 
times in rapid succession’ over the Chief’s head. He claimed in his book that 
Fuah was left in a ‘paroxysm of terror’, his soldiers let out ‘a roar of 
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astonishment follow[ing] the exhibition of the American rifle, and [Butler] went 
on’.1117 The placement of this demonstration of technology, in the middle of a 
call to arms, indicates that Butler expected it to make a strong impression on his 
African allies. 
He described making another demonstration during his inspection of the 
Akim army, where, ‘the climax of the review consisted in the performance of the 
fourteen-shooter. This weapon, fired with great rapidity across the river nine or 
ten times without reloading, had a marvellous effect upon the “Army”’. He tried 
to prolong their reaction by repeatedly lowering the rifle, feigning empty, then 
firing more shots, to ‘still further astonish the wondering Akims’. After several 
such acts of showmanship, Butler assured his readers, ‘the magic weapon 
became the first-class “fetish”’ among the men.1118 
Traction Engine Exhibition 
 The traction engine, or steam sapper, at Cape Coast was the first such 
device ever taken on a British expedition. Able to travel on both roads and rail 
lines, Wolseley’s sapper was a variant of the farming tractor that had been 
making an impact on British agriculture. The practical and symbolic uses to 
which the British hoped these engines might be put have been discussed in the 
preceding chapter. In addition to transport, some hoped that they might also 
serve a performance role. At the outset of the campaign, the editors of The 
Lancet predicted that ‘the moral effect of a steam-engine on the Ashantees 
would be great’.1119  
The Fante, it was claimed, demonstrated the expected reactions. Major 
Home and Captain Buckle managed, after considerable trouble, to get one of 
the sappers up and running on 30 October. Buckle piloted it through Cape 
                                                       
1117 Butler, Akim-Foo, p. 99. 
1118 Ibid., p. 156. 
1119 ‘The Ashantee War’, The Lancet, Vol. 102, no. 2610 (6 Sep. 1873) p. 344. 
265 
 
Coast town, he claimed in his log, ‘to the intense astonishment of the 
natives’.1120 Wolseley similarly wrote to his wife that the engine was working, ‘to 
the utter astonishment of the natives who have never heard of such a thing 
before’.1121 Those press representatives who were present provided more 
colourful characterisations. Henty described streets crowded with people, ‘in the 
highest state of excitement – a mixture of fear and admiration’.1122 Reade 
claimed that the Fante, ‘uttered screams, compared with which the whistle of 
the engine was melodious and subdued’.1123 In Boyle’s account, the machine 
stirred up, ‘such excitement as Cape Coast Castle has rarely seen. Mad with 
delight and astonishment, the populace turned out, galloping from the remotest 
quarters, with ungirt cloths flying wild, to behold the phenomenon’. The Fante 
believed, he claimed, that the mechanical, ‘thunderbolt of war’, would smash the 
Ashanti army, ‘without further exertion on their part’.1124 
Having thus witnessed and selectively interpreted Fante reactions to the 
traction engine, the British hoped that it might be used to impress the enemy as 
well. An opportunity arose only two days later, when an Ashanti prisoner was 
brought to Cape Coast. Wolseley released the man to carry a letter back to the 
King in Coomassie, and, ‘in order to impress him as much as possible’, ordered 
Butler and Buckle to drive him the two miles to Dunquah aboard the sapper. 
The Major-General wrote to his wife that he, ‘should like to hear what [the 
messenger’s] description of this screaming monster will be when he reaches his 
destination’.1125 This means of transport was chosen, Brackenbury claimed, ‘in 
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order that [the Ashanti man] might be impressed with a sense of the immense 
power of the white man’.1126 
The demonstration did not go at all as planned. Buckle recorded in the 
journal of engineer operations that, a short way along the road, ‘her boiler 
primed, she got short of water, and refused to go up a hill. Altogether, it was not 
a successful trip. On returning, the engine melted the lead plug in the boiler and 
blew out…the hills are too steep to allow of an engine working along the 
road’.1127 The messenger had to proceed on foot under escort.  
Perhaps more disappointing than the technical failure itself was the 
messenger’s decidedly subdued reaction to the steam sapper while it had been 
working. ‘Alas!’, Butler lamented, ‘he seemed to regard it as a most ordinary 
adjunct of the African bush, and neither its puffing nor its screaming caused him 
the least astonishment’. When Butler attempted to explain to the messenger 
that the sapper, ‘was a very great fetish, [the Ashanti man] nodded his head in 
complacent recognition of the fact’.1128 Faced with the fact that an African had 
not reacted to, ‘this terrible machine’, as expected, Henty further embellished 
Butler’s subsequent explanation. ‘It was accordingly impressed upon him’, 
Henty claimed, ‘that the engine was a great white man’s fetish, that its screams 
and whistles were tokens of its rage at a white man’s enemy being placed upon 
its back, and that if he ever failed to deliver his message to the king the great 
fetish would assuredly follow and crush him’.1129 Reade admitted that he had, 
‘charitably hoped that the Steam Sapper would frighten [the messenger] out of 
his wits’, but reported that the man, ‘took his seat as coolly as a railway 
passenger with a season ticket. The fact is that when a man expects to have his 
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head cut off every moment, he is not easily impressed by the wonders of 
science.’1130 The case of the Ashanti messenger thus represented an attempted 
exhibition of British technology to Africans; it revealed disconnects both 
between the expected mechanical performance and results and, moreover, 
between the anticipated and observed African reception of the event. 
Ashanti Envoys and the Gatling Gun Demonstration 
This chapter will move toward a close with an extended look at another 
case where African reactions were made to match British expectations. In early 
January 1874, Wolseley’s army was camped on the southern shore of the Prah 
River, the border of Ashanti territory, preparing for the push to Coomassie. 
When a party of ambassadors arrived to negotiate on behalf of King Karikari on 
4 January, Wolseley gathered them by the shore for a demonstration of the 
camp’s Gatling gun. Earlier tests had given him reason to expect they would be 
impressed. A practice shoot had been conducted on 12 November at Dunquah, 
where it was discovered that the traversing mechanism on one of the guns was 
beyond repair, the gun having to be left behind.1131 Despite that unfortunate 
result, the trial had caused quite a commotion, as Boyle described in the Daily 
Telegraph: 
Another desperate excitement amongst the natives! Another rush from all 
parts of the town, cloths flying loose, and a hurricane of dust. This time it 
is the Gatling gun which rouses the population. Once more the rumour 
has spread that “white man’s fetish” is about to take up the war single-
handed, dispensing with native assistance…the Fantees put an 
undiminished trust in the “pistol-gun”…The Houssas, who, of course, saw 
only the beauties of the weapon, turned its handle in ecstasy; their 
comrades screamed with delight to watch the splash — splash of the 
bullets, falling like hail into the sea, a thousand yards away.1132 
 
Boyle’s description, as usual, was couched in the stereotyped image of the 
unrestrained and childlike African. Events like the November Gatling test 
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reinforced an impression among the British that technological spectacle could 
garner the undivided attention of West African natives. It was a logical step for 
Wolseley to attempt to use such spectacle, which Rogers described as a 
‘performance of Gatlingeers with their hydra-barrelled field-piece’, to influence 
the Ashanti envoys.1133 
On the day of the January demonstration, Wolseley claimed that, ‘the 
roar of [the gun’s] fire and the precision of its aim seemed to impress them 
somewhat’.1134 In his 1903 memoirs, written long after the public narrative of 
this event had been set, Wolseley wrote in slightly stronger terms that, ‘the 
sharp roar of its fire, the precision of its aim and the way in which its bullets 
threw up the water all round the target in the river, impressed them; at least I 
thought so’.1135 
It is worth reiterating that this chapter is focused on the British 
interpretations of African responses. Whatever relation such images had to 
reality, they were disseminated in military and public spheres and, in turn, 
influenced imperial culture and the idea of Africa. In their descriptions of the 
January Gatling demonstration, most British commentators made their own 
claims about the impact that the gun had made upon the Ashanti ambassadors. 
As Stanley evocatively cast the scene: 
The handle being turned, the Gatling began to speak with startling 
emphasis. That part of the river at which it was directed began to shoot 
up tall columns of water and spray, until it appeared as if the Prah was 
about to form itself into so many grey columns of liquid and to join in a 
dance…the effect of the exhibition was hailed with boisterous applause 
by the Fantee spectators and by the Ashantees with low remarks and 
expressive looks toward one another.1136 
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It might be noted that the ambassadors in Stanley’s description were rather 
calm. By all accounts, the envoys were actually stoic throughout the practice 
shoot. Any British claims about impact were thus in reference to their own views 
of the Ashanti’s hidden feelings.  
Dooner similarly concluded that, ‘the Ashantee ambassador played his 
part well, looking on with a most dignified air, completely disguising what his 
real feelings were, as I am sure he must have been astonished’.1137 ‘The effect 
was tremendous’, Luxmore claimed in Blackwoods, though with little 
substantiation. ‘The Ashantees would have bolted if they could, they looked in a 
“blue funk”’.1138 When the, ‘Gatling gun was set to work for his education’, Henty 
rather cryptically explained, the ambassador’s, ‘countenance, as the steady 
stream of bullets threw up a continuous fountain of spray, showed how deeply 
the lesson went’.1139 In his 1884 boy’s novel set during the campaign, he more 
directly claimed that the gun, ‘astonished, and evidently filled with awe, the 
Ashanti ambassador’.1140 
There remains a question of Wolseley’s intent. ‘As a soldier [Sir Garnet] 
did wrong in exhibiting the Gatling to the Ashantee envoys: these surprises 
should be reserved for the battle-field’, Stanley argued, though he then 
recognised that, ‘Sir Garnet thought that the Gatling…would frighten the king 
into peace’.1141 Wolseley had not been planning to use the machine gun in 
battle, and was thus not worried about blunting the shock of novelty. The 
Gatling guns, it seems, were intended primarily for intimidating demonstrations, 
at least once the mechanical problems were encountered at the first test shoot. 
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Thus, when the king soon after sent a second group of Ashanti envoys, ‘chiefly 
with the object of seeing the Gatling gun [having] not believe[d] the report of his 
first envoys’, they were unable to see it because it had been left behind at the 
Prah camp, considered too heavy and unreliable.1142 
Some commentators believed that the demonstration had achieved the 
desired influence on the King’s opinion. The editor of The Spectator put forward 
that: 
the effect of the Snider, the terrible power of the Gatling guns, had all 
been carefully reported to the King, and that inexplicable awe of the 
white man which falls on all savage races alike, on King Theodore – as 
brave a man as ever lived – as on Atahualpa, had fallen also on Kaffee 
KalKallee.1143  
 
Stanley put his own words into the King’s mouth with the claim that, ‘the 
reputation of the Gatling is now spread throughout Ashantee….The effect of 
this, combined with many other things, has been to induce the king and his 
council to deliberate and reflect on the possibility of peace.’1144 His analysis was 
quoted in the American Army and Navy Journal as well, with the comment that 
the anonymous author was, ‘not surprised that the Ashantees were awe-struck 
before the power of the Gatling gun. It is easy to understand that it is a weapon 
which is specially adapted to terrify a barbarous or semi-civilized foe.’1145 
In the description accompanying an image of the British artillery park, the 
Illustrated London News editor claimed that the Gatlings, ‘were only seen by the 
messengers of the King of Ashantee at Prah-su, but the sight of them was 
enough to make them return to King Koffee Kalkallee, with such a report as 
frightened him into submission’.1146 Such claims are difficult to understand, even 
from a jingoist position. It took several serious losses on the north side of the 
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Prah and the destruction of his capital for the Ashanti King to consider 
surrender. Yet, British commentators were keen, with very little evidence, to 
insert a crippling fear of novel military technology into their interpretations of the 
Ashanti reception of the Gatling demonstration. This tendency was further 
evident in the contrasting narratives of a scene that took place the night of the 
test shoot. 
Interpretations of the Ashanti Envoy’s Suicide  
 After the Gatling demonstration, the envoys spent the night in the British 
camp, under guard but still armed. At about one in the morning, the sound of a 
gunshot roused most of the army and it was quickly discovered that one of the 
envoys had committed suicide by placing his own rifle under his chin and 
pressing the trigger with his toe. On those facts, absolutely everyone agreed. As 
for the unfortunate man’s reasons, however, there was much disagreement 
among British commentators. It was perhaps understandable, but also 
indicative of the British perception of the African mind, that many drew a link 
between the suicide and the Gatling demonstration of the day before. 
Wolseley, in fact, made no such link. He recorded in his diary that, after 
initial inquiries, the dead man’s ‘brother who is with the party and the head men 
say he has been brooding over his position & believed we meant to kill him, so 
they all say that he did it on purpose’.1147 Wolseley repeated this explanation 
verbatim in his 1903 memoir, in which the Gatling shoot and the suicide appear 
in the same paragraph but with no stated connection.1148 Luxmore described 
the suicide, but made no mention of the Gatling or any other potential reason for 
it.1149 
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A large proportion of the military commentators, however, drew a direct 
causal link between the Gatling demonstration and the Ashanti man’s suicide. 
Private Gilham of the Rifle Brigade described the envoys being shown, ‘one or 
two experiments with the Gatling gun, at which they were greatly astonished, 
and soon afterwards one of them shot himself’.1150 A sergeant in the Rifle 
Brigade sent a letter to his brother, which was then published in The Times. He 
was not present for the firing, but heard down the line that Wolseley, ‘told this 
chief [the envoy] that he wanted King Coffee himself, or he would give him a 
taste of that instrument of torture, which so frightened the chief that he went 
away and shot himself. Such is the version that has reached us’.1151 ‘Blue 
Jacket’, a sailor interviewed by the Daily News while convalescing from 
dysentery in a naval hospital at Haslar, had been present and claimed that, 
‘either the noise of that gun or the sight of us was too much for one of the 
ambassadors, for that same night he shot himself dead in his tent’.1152 Dooner 
agreed that, ‘the general idea is, that he was so frightened at the performance 
of the Gatling, that he thought the best thing was to kill himself at once’.1153 
In his biography of Wolseley, Low again focused his interpretation on the 
Ashantis’ supposed hidden emotions. ‘Though they looked on with well-bred 
imperturbability, [the gun] created a powerful effect on their minds, for during 
the night…one of them shot himself’.1154 Brackenbury made a similar contrast. 
During the demonstration, he claimed, ‘the well-bred native envoys looked 
coolly on and seemed but little surprised. But the view of the Gatling was 
destined yet to bear fruit.’ After the suicide, he continued, ‘it appeared that they 
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had all been more or less surprised and astonished by the firing of the Gatling; 
and that this man, being of rather a cowardly nature, had determined to destroy 
himself’.1155 The conclusions asserted by these soldiers involved the 
assumption of fear, but in fact only an abstract link between the Gatling and the 
suicide. The implication was that the demonstration had simply driven the man 
mad. 
The press correspondents largely made the more direct argument that 
the envoy had committed suicide out of fear of the machine gun; that modern 
British technology had scared him to death. The Times reported that, ‘the moral 
effect produced by the machine gun was such as to impel one of King Coffee’s 
envoys to blow his brains out, after seeing it fired’.1156 The Lancet 
correspondent at Cape Coast Castle claimed on good authority that, ‘one of the 
ambassadors (a general) was so much terrified at seeing a Gatling gun go off, 
and witnessing its effects, that he committed suicide some hours afterward’.1157 
The envoy was not a general. In his first report to the ILN, Melton Prior did not 
attribute the suicide to anything in particular, mentioning only that the envoy had 
shot himself under the chin.1158 Yet, in a later despatch, he altered the 
explanation to focus on the, ‘Gatling battery gun, which frightened them so 
much that one of them went mad, and shot himself in the night’.1159 
Reade made a vague reference to the notion that differing narratives had 
been simultaneously circulating through the British force. ‘Some say it was pure 
fright at the Gatling’, he reported, ‘others, that he had said something 
treasonable which his companions intended to report against him to the 
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king’.1160 Boyle stated in the Daily Telegraph that, ‘in regard to the cause of 
death there are many reports’.1161 The correspondent originally believed that the 
suicide had been a result of fear. Ten days later, however, the missionary Mr. 
Kuhne arrived in camp, having been released from his captivity in Coomassie. 
Boyle reported that Kuhne had explained to him, ‘that this envoy shot himself, 
not for fear of the Gatling gun, but because he had used incautious words which 
would, he knew, cost him his head on returning’.1162 Khune had been acting as 
a translator during his captivity and was present when the party of envoys 
returned with Wolseley’s letter and the unhappy news. Evidently, the envoy had 
suggested to a British officer that the King would kill any white messengers sent 
to Coomassie and knew that his impolitic remark would be punished.1163 
Stanley reported an identical story to Kuhne’s, having also interviewed the 
missionary.1164 The idea that the envoy had feared punishment for having 
spoken out of turn was the most measured and realistic explanation among the 
varying British reports. There were, yet, several different versions.  
In the Daily News, Maurice claimed that the man, ‘had been so 
frightened by the Gatling that he had said that if white men had those weapons 
resistance was useless. The other envoys said they would report him to the 
King of Ashanti, and the fear of death by torture made him kill himself.’1165 
Henty began with the story that the sight of the Gatling had made the envoy 
believe that he and the others were to be ritually killed by the British. Then, 
within in the same article, he explained that this version, ‘was afterwards found 
to have been wholly untrue’. The man had, he continued, stated that the 
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machine gun would make it impossible to resist the British advance. The head 
ambassador then, ‘said that he should report [that] speech to the king. The 
man, to escape the death by lingering torture which he knew would be the 
result, committed suicide’.1166 Maurice and Henty thus presented a narrative in 
which the man died, not directly from his fear of the Gatling, but still as the 
result of his disgrace at having revealed his fear of the Gatling.   
Since all of these interpretations were present in the British public sphere 
and had their effects on British imperial culture, the issue of the ‘correct’ version 
may be moot. While it would only have been read by military officers, Buller’s 
intelligence report agreed most closely with Kuhne’s, and thus with Maurice and 
Henty. Buller conducted interviews with the surviving Ashanti delegates and a 
Fante carrier who had overheard a private conversation between them. It 
appeared, he concluded: 
that the man who shot himself on the night of the 4th, was frightened by 
the Gatling practice, and, having told his comrades that he thought it 
would be impossible to fight men with such weapons, was by them to be 
reported to the King for cowardice. Through fear of the consequences he 
committed suicide.1167 
 
The idea that the Gatling had more or less scared the Ashanti envoy to death 
was nonetheless persuasive and pervasive in British public discourse, perhaps 
because it appealed so directly to the desire and tendency to believe that novel 
military technology had made Africa much easier to grapple with.  
5.6 Conclusions 
The British forces in Abyssinia and Ashanti went to considerable effort to 
dazzle local populations with the spectacle of modern technology. With these 
staged performances, they hoped to engender reverence among their allies and 
morale-breaking bewilderment among their enemies. Such motivations tinted 
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the filter through which British observers interpreted and selectively represented 
the African responses. The resulting vision of the African mind presented in the 
press was, itself, a sort of imperialist performance. The presupposition that 
displays of novel military technology would overawe Africans was central to the 
developing imperial ideal, and vital to the reimagining of Africa as a colonial 
space. Colonial officials would seek to demonstrate the empire’s power through 
exhibitive machine gun firings for a long time, as seen in the 1920-21 Nyala 
rising in Southern Darfur.1168 In Britain, at least, the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions were seen to provide solid proof that the Army could deploy 
‘humbug’ in the field. 
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Chapter 6: The ‘Idea’ of Africa and a 
Growing Culture of Confidence 
Bayly recently argued that the solution to the problems of imperial 
expansion was sought, among other means, ‘in the “civilized” pursuit of ordered, 
systematic, and “scientific” approaches. These were empires seeking to tame 
the frontiers of their new territories, and the frontiers of their imaginations 
too’.1169 In practice, the taming of the imperial imagination was a long, 
inconsistent, and continuous process. The struggle to subdue both the real and 
imagined outer world was not merely a precursor or prerequisite to rapid 
imperial expansion, but, rather, comprised an integral part of imperialism itself. 
There were, nonetheless, moments of particular significance, or which were 
given particular significance.  
The successes in Abyssinia and Ashanti were held up by the British as 
pivotal moments in the battle for, and against, the imagined Africa. The 
campaigns provided seeming proof that both the land and the people of the 
Dark Continent, indeed, the idea of Africa in the British imagination, could be 
bested. Moreover, these conflicts took place in the midst of particular intellectual 
currents on the interpretation of race, and precipitated a reassessment of the 
nature of racial dominance. The conquest of the idea of Africa was intertwined 
with the development of a new sense of racial superiority. 
The medical and military successes in Africa were so at odds with the 
dire popular expectations that the public sphere tended to exaggerate the 
importance of these victories to the point that it almost appeared as if the 
hardest work had already been accomplished, that of breaking through. The 
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conquest of Africa had not quite yet begun in earnest, but the conceptual door 
was seen to have swung open. 
6.1 Minimisation of the Land 
A host of advances in medical science had been achieved from the 
1840s to the 1860s, giving Europeans a much better chance in the tropics. The 
most significant by far was quinine, which could, by 1868, be acquired in 
consistent quality and sufficient quantity to serve as a daily prophylactic for 
entire armies.1170 The morbidity rates of paroxysmal fevers, a diagnosis 
encompassing both yellow fever and malaria, dropped by 90 per cent in the 
British West Indies over these two decades; the death rates of those infected 
had fallen precipitously as well. British India experienced similar improvements 
to European health. Mortality caused by intestinal disease had also plummeted 
through a combination of improvements to diet, sanitation standards, and 
medical treatments, as well as a decline in certain dangerous treatments that in 
earlier decades had exacerbated such illness.1171 Missionary societies and 
Colonial Office officials benefited from these improvements, and the trend was 
well understood in those circles by the end of the 1860s. Military death rates 
also underwent what Curtin termed a, ‘spectacular decline’.1172  
Arnold has challenged Headrick’s tendency to, ‘over-estimate the 
importance of medicine in general and quinine in particular as a weapon in the 
armoury of nineteenth-century empire’. Some medical historians, he points out, 
place the turning point in tropical medicine in the 1940s, not the 1850s.1173 The 
focus of this chapter is on the cultural perception of disease, rather than the 
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numerical trends. It will, in fact, be argued that the stories of the Abyssinian and 
Ashanti expeditions were emplotted in ways that exaggerated the apparent 
success over disease. Nonetheless, the sense of confidence that those stories 
engendered in the British imperial mind was itself a weapon in the armoury of 
nineteenth-century empire.  
Apropos, despite the ‘spectacular decline’ in tropical disease, the medical 
improvements were not well understood by the general population. The British 
popular mind at the time of Napier’s expedition still saw Africa as the ‘white 
man’s grave’.1174 Vaughan claimed that, ‘the representation of Africa as a place 
of disease, danger and death was one which survived the reductions in 
European mortality effected by sanitarian policies of the mid-century, and later 
advances in curative medicine’.1175 Thus, the surge in imperial confidence 
connected to the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions, which this chapter will 
explore, comprised only part of a long-term and contested dynamic. 
In Wolseley’s much-publicised first meeting with the chiefs of the allied 
Gold Coast nations, the assembly declared through their interpreter that, ‘when 
your honour was appointed to come, your honour did not refuse, but came to 
our help, though you knew that this place was deadly to Europeans! For this we 
thank your honour.’1176 The belief in a hostile climate in the region was also 
dominant among British commentators, as was thoroughly explored in Chapter 
3. At his self-congratulatory speech at the Mansion House, Wolseley, ‘[felt] 
bound to remind [the audience] that at no previous period of our military history 
have British troops been called upon to vindicate their country’s honour in so 
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pestilential a climate’.1177 Butler optimistically reasoned that, ‘it was possible for 
a hardy English constitution to brave this climate of the forest for a few months 
[though] many; many, doubtless, would fall even in these few months’.1178 
Moreover, the notion of a deadly African environment was intertwined 
with that of the dark and unknown interior. As late as 1872, the epidemiologist 
Sir William Farr announced in his presidential address before Britain’s Statistical 
Society that, ‘of Africa, statistics knows little or nothing certain…as yet all Africa 
is for science a great desert’.1179 The sense of mystery added to the perception 
of danger and The Lancet stressed that, ‘the march beyond the Prah must be to 
some extent “a leap in the dark”’.1180 Once British soldiers marched into these 
unknown places, the health and medical results from the field were bound to be 
subjects of eager interest in Britain. In light of the troubling professional medical 
predictions and the positively dire public interpretations of medical opinion, the 
actual results from Africa turned out to be surprisingly encouraging. 
6.1.1 Health in Abyssinia 
During the entire expedition to East Africa, the British contingent suffered 
only 35 (1.3 per cent) deaths from all causes and 333 (12 per cent) cases of 
serious wound or illness. Over the nine-month deployment, the total admissions 
to hospital for all reasons amounted to 1,332. This could, at most, have 
accounted for 49 per cent of the British force if no individuals were admitted 
multiple times.1181 The health of the white troops of the Indian army received the 
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bulk of the attention in Britain. This reflected the usual ethnocentrism of the 
press, but also the widespread assumption that the sepoys had been in less 
danger to begin with. Yet, the fears of malarial and tsetse fly outbreaks never 
truly materialised. The assistant surgeon to the Rocket Brigade reported that his 
unit encountered very little disease while in Abyssinia and that ‘goitre’ had been 
the most common ailment demanding his attention.1182 In his final report to the 
Medical Department, Dr. Currie put forward the unexpected conclusion, ‘that 
Abyssinia was a very healthy country for Europeans, and this favourable 
opinion was formed, notwithstanding the hardships of making long and fatiguing 
marches, exposure to cold, rain, and sleet, and the habitual use of coarse and 
indigestible food’.1183 
The Medical Department returns indicated that the British force was in 
good health for an army on active campaign. More importantly, the fact that 
these hard numbers were such a surprise against expectations led journalists 
and commentators to further exaggerate their significance. Tweedie claimed in 
Blackwood’s that the climate was, ‘not only not unwholesome, but positively 
most agreeable; and that too while we are living in tents which at no season of 
the year in India would be acceptable as sufficient shelter from the weather’. 
The comparison was significant. Though not as bad as the West Indies or West 
Africa, India was still famous as a dangerous posting, be it civil, military, or 
missionary. In suggesting that the climate of East Africa was less onerous than 
that of India, he implied that the British army was already well capable of 
operating there. ‘Nothing has been seen or heard of’, Tweedie continued, 
‘excepting in some English newspapers, of those anomalous diseases which we 
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were told to make up our minds for’, and thus ‘the dangers and difficulties which 
had been predicted for us happily turned out to be myths’. In an enormous 
downplaying of perhaps the most serious difficulty to face the campaign, he 
asserted that, ‘water has everywhere in Abyssinia itself, proved sweet and 
abundant’.1184 What supply there was had required considerable feats of 
engineering, and proved insufficient for the large number of lost pack 
animals.1185 
‘This climate must certainly be an extraordinarily healthy one’, Henty 
reported, ‘for, in spite of hardship and privation, or wet, exposure, bad water, 
and want of stimulants, the health of the troops has been unexceptionally 
good’.1186 The men had reason to be relieved, but there was certainly an 
element of rose-coloured hindsight in their accounts and a tendency toward 
retroactive minimisation of the threat posed by the African landscape. William 
Thomas Blanford, the expedition geologist and zoologist, found that, ‘the 
climate during the greater part of the time was perfect’, and claimed that he 
‘only regretted being obliged to return to a more civilized country’.1187 Scott 
similarly wrote to his mother from outside Magdala that, ‘the climate here 
nobody can complain against; it is simply perfection’.1188 
Markham, the expedition geographer and the secretary to the RGS, 
offered a particularly positive description of Abyssinian travel to Macmillan's 
Magazine:  
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There is probably no mountain range in the world that is traversed by so 
easy a natural pass as the Abyssinian Alps; and the difficulties of 
crossing these mountains and reaching the table, which has been so 
much dealt upon by “Nobody,” that self-complacent oracle of the Times, 
are purely imaginary.1189  
 
That his comments might have been intended to encourage future travellers is 
suggested by his repeated descriptions of the diverse and abundant game 
locally available for sportsmen.1190 In his subsequent book, published after his 
safe return to London, Markham summarised the campaign in terms so light-
hearted they could only have come in hindsight: 
When the Commander-in-chief landed, there remained to organize a 
transport train, and to march over a fine country, yielding corn, grass, 
wood, cattle, and means of transport, with a friendly population and no 
enemy in the field, in one of the most healthy climates in the world, either 
to Magdala or to some point on Theodore’s line of march.1191 
 
In his own book account, Shepherd of the Times of India deftly backdated the 
medical success of the Abyssinian campaign, stating that, ‘in such a 
magnificent climate as that of the Abyssinian highlands, the health of the troops 
could hardly have been otherwise than excellent’.1192 Shepherd’s wording 
manoeuvred around the fact that few had been so confident ahead of time. 
In his annual sanitary report, Sergeant Stewart, doctor to the 3rd Dragoon 
Guards, expressed his belief in the hitherto unbelievable conclusion, ‘that troops 
stationed on the table land of Abyssinia during the dry season could - if fairly 
housed or furnished with good and commodious tents, good food and water, 
appropriate clothing and not too hard work – be maintained at a high standard 
of health’.1193 As such assertions, themselves representing somewhat the 
extreme, were disseminated through rumour and the press back in Britain, they 
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shifted the popular image of the African climate more quickly than had the 
preceding decade of medical improvements that underlay them. It had been 
accepted fact, common sense, that East Africa was a mire of malaria and other 
mysterious dangers.1194 If something so well established could be so quickly 
(seemingly) debunked, then the validity of the larger idea of ‘deadly Africa’ could 
itself come under suspicion. After all, asked The Spectator, ‘Since when has 
Europe marched a scientifically organized army into an unknown mountain 
region in the tropics?’1195 The experience planted the seed of a belief in the 
British imagination that things could be taken further, and one of a tendency to 
minimise the future risk of disease.  
When the Ashanti campaign hit British headlines several years later, 
Abyssinia provided a positive example to be pointed to. Henty recalled that the 
announcement, ‘was followed by the appearance of a number of letters in the 
papers by gentlemen who knew, or believed they knew, all about the coast; and 
a host of prophecies of evil, similar to whose which preceded the expedition to 
Abyssinia, were freely indulged in’.1196 Henty’s readers would have known what 
came of those Abyssinian prophecies, especially if they had read his book. His 
comparison implied that any concerns expressed of the Gold Coast climate 
were also sure to prove false, and cautious commentators exposed as paranoid 
doomsayers. After noting the, ‘very serious risk of death by marching through 
the most unhealthy country in the world’, a writer for the Hampshire Telegraph 
and Sussex Chronicle etc also took some solace in the Abyssinian example. 
‘There are plenty of stories current as to the deadly creatures which infest the 
country’, he continued, ‘but judging from our Abyssinian experience they are 
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nearly sure to be exaggerated’.1197 The Spectator, always in favour of a good 
campaign, showed even greater confidence in the comparison and greater 
contempt for the African landscape:  
No doubt it will be said that the thing cannot be done…that Europeans 
cannot struggle successfully with an African climate and African 
miasmata; and that we shall only bury treasure and brave men in the 
Bush, without accomplishing our Quixotic purposes. The same sweeping 
assertions were made when Napier, creating a town on a desert shore, 
set out on his march to Magdala. He was to be starved, killed with fever 
and cholera, drowned in torrents, slain in ambuscades, eaten alive, he 
and his horses and cattle, by venomous flies…We know the result.1198  
 
Hailed as a great experiment, the Abyssinian campaign had yielded positive 
data. For a myriad of reasons – genuine relief, vested interest, and cultural 
momentum – many in the British public sphere portrayed the result of that 
experiment as evidence of a new medical paradigm, applicable to, and 
predictive of, all future field tests. 
6.1.2 Health in Ashanti 
That said, Ashanti was, and was seen to be, a very different case. The 
1874 campaign had been the subject of even more dire expectations than had 
the 1868 one. Moreover, the initial results from the Gold Coast theatre were not 
quite so encouraging. Dr. Anthony Home, the Principal Medical Officer for the 
expedition, was encouraged by the relatively good health of the British officers 
in Wolseley’s first expedition party. He submitted his prediction, ‘as to the 
probable amount and kind of sickness in a picked European force…operating in 
this country for six weeks or two months’, and anticipated that such an army 
would suffer thirty to forty per cent ineffectiveness from sickness alone, 
excluding battle casualties.1199 Those figures, while significant, were seen to be 
optimistic for the Gold Coast. Ten weeks later, Home saw the incoming 
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sickness figures and worried that, ‘the amount of sickness amongst the Officers 
of the Expeditionary Force has been excessive, unlooked for, and such that all 
calculations, based on former statements, now seem to be erroneous, and must 
be revised in the light of actual experience’.1200 Dr. Home was a Victoria Cross 
recipient who had served as the surgeon of Wolseley’s regiment in the 
Crimea.1201 He was well acquainted with military disease and was hardly 
squeamish. 
Of the 2,587 men in the European contingent, 1,018 (43 per cent) had to 
be invalided out by the end of the conflict. The original Wolseley Ring suffered a 
71 per cent sickness rate, with 31 of the officers invalided.1202 Again, the health 
of the European troops was far bigger news in Britain than that of the West 
Indian soldiers. Sickness rates were, thus, quite high during the Ashanti 
campaign, even by tropical standards. The death rates due to illness, however, 
were successfully kept low. Disease killed 40 of the British contingent, 1.5 per 
cent of its total strength. The West Indian Regiments, in contrast to 
expectations, lost 34 men to disease, 2.7 per cent of their original number.1203 
‘No deaths occurred beyond the Prah’, Surgeon-Major Albert Gore noted in his 
medical report on the expedition, ‘but much sickness’.1204 
Mortality was, understandably, the greatest concern to the British public 
and military, rather than illness in itself. Death was also impossible to conceal, 
while fevers and intestinal disarray could be glossed over in letters home and 
even in reports to the War Office. Thus, despite the high rate of sickness, 
                                                       
1200 Ibid. 
1201 Beckett, Wolseley and Ashanti, p. 40. 
1202 Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘Manipulating the “Modern Curse of Armies”: Wolseley, the Press, and 
the Ashanti War, 1873-1874,’ in Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918, ed. Stephen M. 
Miller (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2009) p. 224; Alan Lloyd, The Drums of 
Kumasi: The Story of the Ashanti Wars (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1964) p. 150.   
1203 Beckett, Wolseley and Ashanti, p. 107; John Keegan, ‘The Ashanti Campaign 1873-4,’ in 
Victorian Military Campaigns, ed. Brian Bond (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1967) pp. 194-5.   
1204 Surgeon-Major Albert Gore, A Contribution to the Medical History of our West African 
Campaigns (London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1876) p. 61.  
287 
 
reports from the field all seemed to point to the conclusion that the Gold Coast 
was much less dangerous than had been feared. The Lancet described the 
early skirmishes and raids as having, ‘given the medical service something in 
the way of an experiment as to the amount of sickness and inefficiency they 
may expect among troops operating in the field, and the doctors are said to be 
satisfied with the results’.1205  
 Consequently, the normative medical perspective continued to shift 
toward a lighter view of the Gold Coast climate. In a report to the Sanitary 
Branch of the Army Medical Department, Muir argued that, ‘there is an idea in 
the minds of many people that the climate of the Coast is of the same deadly 
character all the year round. This is a mistake…in the dry and healthy season 
these attacks [of fever] are not only less common but less grave’.1206 Windows 
of time had thus opened in which Europeans could ostensibly operate in the 
region. There was also a greater confidence than ever in the efficacy of medical 
treatments. Maurice argued that, in light of experience, there could, ‘now be no 
question in anyone’s mind who has seen the whole course of experience here, 
that quinine has been a most important and powerful “prophylactic,” as it is 
called – has, that is to say, helped to ward off fever’.1207 ‘If it were not for quinine 
and tea’, Dooner wrote optimistically to his wife, ‘I think the white man would 
have very little chance of surviving the West African climate’.1208 Gore 
summarised his extensive, semi-official, medical summary of the expedition as: 
A large amount of sickness, increasing rapidity with an insignificant 
mortality – a comparatively few grave cases of remittent fever and 
haemorrhagic dysentery – many slight wounds, and a few severe ones – 
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a great tendency to debility, followed in some instances by speedy 
recovery, were, in a few words, the medical and surgical teachings of the 
Expedition.1209 
 
That was a far cry from the teachings of the disastrous 1863-4 war. On the 
whole, The Lancet concluded, the results from Ashanti, ‘sufficiently indicate that 
disease, death, and disaster do not necessarily track the footsteps of the 
European in the bush. It has shown what Englishmen can do in this climate’.1210 
6.1.3 Good News from Ashanti 
Wolseley, in particular, had much to say in derision of the threat that 
Africa posed to European health. In his letters to London, he repeatedly 
described the climate in positive terms. Deeply freighted with vested interest, 
his depiction was intended to encourage and impress War Office officials in 
anticipation of his planned request for European battalions. ‘Each day has 
shown me that the climate is not, at this and a later season, by any means so 
injurious to European health as I had imagined’, he wrote to Cardwell on 24 
October, ‘The health of my officers has been excellent: one or two had slight 
attacks of fever, but none have been seriously ill’.1211 By 15 November, twenty-
nine of Wolseley’s sixty-four officers had been hospitalised, seven had been 
invalided (including both of his ADC’s), one had died of dysentery, and the 
Wolseley himself was confined to bed and unintelligible with fever.1212 The 
commanding officer was downplaying the sickness rates in his correspondence. 
He put forward the dubious appraisal that, ‘after a night without rest, a long and 
fatiguing day’s march can be made by Europeans in this climate, without as 
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much evil effect from sun and fatigue, as I have often known follow a march of 
less duration under less fatiguing conditions, on a summer’s day in England’.1213  
In a letter to Cambridge, Wolseley claimed to have, ‘set to rest all dread 
regarding the use of English soldiers for a short spell in this country’. Before the 
war, Sir A. Clarke had asserted that English soldiers could not march in Africa 
and would have to be carried. As only one point in Wolseley’s several-point 
refutation of Clarke, he countered that, ‘never was there a wilder statement 
made by an unpractical man. An officer marched in here from Dunquah 
yesterday heavily laden with pistol, ammunition, water bottle and field glass, a 
distance of 20 miles.’ The marines, he continued, did so, ‘with as great 
regularity as they would at Aldershot’.1214 Wolseley made similar comparisons 
between the Gold Coast and British climate settings throughout his 
correspondence. He sought, above all, to convince the War and Colonial 
Offices to send him the European battalions that he felt he would need to bring 
his little war to the public’s attention. Wolseley was always one to use popular 
opinion to support his position, so he ensured that his trivialisations of the 
African climate made it to the newsstands as well.1215 
 With the medical reports and Wolseley’s prodding, the imagined Africa 
changed very quickly among the British public. In an October article describing 
military preparations, The Lancet took the measured perspective that, ‘if half the 
gloomy anticipations and prophecies under which the expedition has been 
undertaken be realised, it will prove to be the most disastrous campaign on 
record. But the pendulum of public opinion swings easily from one extreme to its 
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opposite’.1216 A mere two months later, the journal reported that, ‘public opinion 
appears now to have swung to the opposite extreme in regard to the danger to 
health of this undertaking. From declaring that everybody was to die or be 
invalided, it is now prophesied that the loss in these respects will be utterly 
insignificant.’1217 
Henty and some of his fellow journalists had an influence on the tonal 
shift. ‘Nothing is more difficult to believe’, he reported with exaggerated 
enthusiasm, ‘that the lovely, bright, bustling Sierra Leone “is the white man’s 
grave”’.1218 Parroting Wolseley (for neither the first nor last time), Henty claimed 
that the campaign had shown, ‘that British soldiers can not only fight in the 
bush, but that they can make a march under a tropical sun, which would, under 
similar circumstances, be considered a hard day’s work in England’.1219 ‘If the 
troops were properly cared for and looked after’, he extended the comparison, 
‘the Gold Coast presented little more danger and inconvenience than Dartmoor 
or Salisbury; and that it was, in short, a sort of earthly paradise’.1220 Henty went 
so far as to suggest that the march to Kumase, ‘resembled a great picnic rather 
than a military expedition’.1221 In a particularly fanciful passage toward the end 
of his book, the Standard special correspondent drew another comparison 
between the climate of the African bush and that of the British Isles: 
Altogether, what with the thatched roofs, the mud walls, and the universal 
pig, if an Accra man were put down in an Irish village, far off the general 
line of traffic, and an inhabitant of that village dropped in Accra, save for 
the human population, neither would be conscious of any change, except 
that Paddy would wonder what had bewitched those creatures the 
pigs.1222 
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Henty had previously told his readers that he found the domestic pigs and cows 
on the Coast to be quite misbehaved. His passage downplayed the severity of 
African nature and wildlife, only making mention of farm animals, and 
completely bypassed the issue of disease. 
In a dynamic similar to that seen after Abyssinia, media focus on the 
medical victories stimulated a popular idea that long-term European residence 
in the Gold Coast would be possible, even easy, after all. ‘There is very little 
sickness’, Boyle reported to the Telegraph from Mansu, contradicting his 
readers’ expectations, ‘all experience leads me to believe that…Europeans 
could live in the African bush with scarcely more risk than in any other country 
of the Tropics’.1223 Lord Carnarvon, who succeeded Lord Kimberley at the 
Colonial Office, claimed in the House of Lords that the mortality rate of soldiers 
in Ashanti, 23 per thousand, amounted to, ‘about the same as the death-rate in 
the metropolis, and lower than the death-rate in some English towns’.1224 This 
comparison required vigorous massaging of the numbers. Carnarvon held the 
mortality rate from a two-month campaign up against that from an entire year in 
London (yet gave his figure in ‘per thousand’, rather than in ‘per thousand per 
year’). He also failed to recognise that Wolseley’s army represented a cohort of 
picked soldiers mostly in their twenties and early thirties, while London 
sheltered a population including infants, the elderly, and the chronically 
infirm.1225 
6.1.4 A Path Already Travelled 
‘So prevalent is the idea that the whole of Central Africa is either a sandy 
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waste or a wilderness of jungle, that our troops themselves will scarcely be 
open to any other view until their own experience convinces them of the 
immense mistake.’1226 The British explorer Henry Dufton had travelled through 
Abyssinia in 1862-3, and made the above prediction in his travel narrative, 
rushed to publication in 1867 on the surge of popular interest in the region. 
Dufton also forecast that the pleasant highland climate would so surprise the 
British government that they would reverse their anti-entanglement views in the 
wake of an expedition. Any military venture inland, he claimed, would presage 
outright annexation and colonisation in Central Africa. 
‘Anybody who has seen our line of march would have certainly said it 
was utterly impossible to take an army anywhere we have been’, Scott claimed 
from Abyssinia, ‘Such a line of country it certainly never has, and, probably, 
never will, fall to the lot of an army to cross again’.1227 The military 
correspondent wrote those lines to draw attention to the immensity of the 
present achievement, in which he felt personal pride. Yet, to many observers, 
the very fact that a British army had successfully crossed into the African 
interior seemed to present the possibility that more would follow. The 
unprecedented now had a clear precedent. Collins has argued that ‘simply 
projecting power as far as Peking, Kabul, Cairo, or deep into the interior of 
Abyssinia, or inland into west Africa, or into the heart of Chetshwayo’s kingdom 
of Zulu warriors, would have seemed like victory in itself to many in Britain 
during the 1860s and 1870s’.1228 The intense focus on pomp and display 
characteristic of the later empire can be understood in part as an attempt to 
claim victory from the often-ambiguous outcomes of small wars, a feat which in 
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earlier periods could be achieved with the, ‘basic requirement of reaching a 
distant and hitherto inaccessible objective’.1229 Magdala and Kumase fit that bill 
nicely; Napier and Wolseley were champions of empire, at least in the public 
sphere, simply for having stepped foot in them (to say nothing of subsequently 
burning them down).  
While investing Britain with a feeling of accomplishment, successful 
marches into the interior also added momentum to the already well-established 
myth of the healthy African interior. Charles Beke typified this ideal in his book 
on the plight of the Abyssinian captives: 
when the narrow belt of low land along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean…[is] passed, and the eastern edge of the elevated tableland is 
attained, a climate is met with, which is not merely congenial to 
European constitutions, but is absolutely more healthy than that of most 
countries.’ (original emphasis).1230  
 
Such pervasive hope that Europeans might find healthy climates in the inland 
regions of Africa existed alongside, and in tension with, a fear of the unknown 
Dark Continent. The more optimistic side of the equation rose in prominence on 
the back of the British military successes. Even after European explorers and 
empires had mapped most of landmass and failed to uncover it, as Curtin 
claimed, ‘the myth of the healthy interior lived on into the twentieth century’.1231 
Parts of Africa were, certainly, healthier than others, but the myth was one of 
extremes. Notwithstanding the fact that malaria was more severe on the coast, 
the widespread hope that vast tracts of virtually disease-free land might exist a 
mere few hundred miles inland contrasted with reality. 
If a zone where white people could thrive did indeed lie just beyond the 
outer strip, there was, after Abyssinia, more confidence than ever that the 
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hurdle could be successfully crossed. The idea emerged in strength in 
discussions of the Ashanti war. A writer for The Lancet posited that, ‘we know 
nothing of the climatic conditions of the interior of the country. It is quite possible 
that, as in the case of Abyssinia, the low-lying coast-line once passed, the main 
sources of malaria and the dangers to health will have been surmounted’.1232 
An article in the following issue made a similar claim and again introduced it 
with the link, ‘as in the case of Abyssinia’.1233 
In this way, each success added further momentum to the British sense 
of confidence vis-à-vis the climate. Reporting on the early skirmishes in the 
West Coast interior, The Spectator declared that, ‘it now appears that the 
Marines do not suffer in the bush, but only on the coast, and only there probably 
from bad sanitary arrangements’.1234 Boyle similarly blamed the coast for fevers 
while simultaneously insinuating that the climate was not the only cause: ‘It is 
the coast line, the water, and recklessness that has given this quarter of the 
world such a deadly eminence’.1235 Harper’s asserted that, ‘a singular contrast 
exists between the physical aspects and climate of the Gold Coast and those of 
the interior’.1236 Success drove further expectation of success. Maurice felt able 
to claim that, ‘the men were now in such high spirits that the terrors of the bush 
were no more’.1237 
Curtin argued that, taken together, the West and East African expeditions 
were, ‘hailed as final proof that European soldiers could now be sent safely to 
fight in any part of the world’.1238 Many British commentators focused on the 
victories as manifest evidence of this point. In his medical treatise, Surgeon-
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Major Gore claimed that, of all the British wars in tropical settings, ‘the Ashanti 
campaign was undoubtedly the most important, as being the only one where a 
successful attempt had been made to conquer with European troops a great 
African kingdom, hitherto deemed to be impregnable’.1239 The Medical Times 
and Gazette considered it to be a ‘fact the present campaign has conclusively 
established’, that Britain was able to, ‘[send] troops to fight in any part of the 
known world without incurring exceptionally heavy loss from climate’.1240 
 As Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Forces, the Duke of Cambridge 
announced his congratulations and thanks to each victorious army. As Napier’s 
force approached the base camp at Zoulla, a general order was distributed 
featuring a telegram from Cambridge lauding the lieutenant-general for having, 
‘taught us once more what is meant by an army that can go anywhere and do 
anything. From first to last all has been done well’.1241 Years later, speaking at a 
House of Lords vote to grant an official thanks to Wolseley’s expedition, 
Cambridge again focused on the idea that, ‘our gallant General and his troops 
have proved to this country and the world that British troops can go anywhere if 
only we have reliance on the spirit of their officers’.1242 Thus, the importance of 
the victories lay not just in what had been done, but also in what now could be 
done in future. Now that British troops had accomplished the ‘impossible’, it 
could be claimed, and perhaps truly believed, that anything was possible. 
In his 1903 memoirs, Wolseley mocked the Ashanti reliance on their 
natural barricades: ‘Accustomed to the bush, in which they could move about as 
they liked, it never seems to have occurred to the illogical mind of the 
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Ashantees that we could do so equally well if only we had the courage to face 
them.’1243 He of course retroactively obfuscated the point it had not occurred to 
most Britons that a white army could operate in the bush as well as an African 
one. Once the conceptual (and believed by some to be literal) barrier had been 
passed, however, many British commentators would speak as if their victory 
over nature had been expected, predetermined, and assumed. 
6.1.5 Tropical Medicine and the Culture of Confidence 
On the development of the high imperial ideal, Bell wrote that: 
a Promethean confidence in the power of technology catalyzed and 
structured the debates over Greater Britain, leading to a fundamental 
recasting of imperial possibilities. Nature was no longer seen as the 
immutable, inscrutable foe that had confronted Burke so forcefully; it had 
been overcome, defeated, tamed.1244   
 
The Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were moments in the British 
understanding of the taming process, and, in particular, in the role that military 
technology could play within it. The fundamental idea that Europeans could 
successfully conquer the natural world of tropical climates, and that native 
populations could not do so, would form much of the conceptual and moral 
basis of the developing field of tropical medicine.  
Arnold argued that, ‘western medicine attained its greatest importance in 
imperial ideology and practice between 1880 and 1930, the period when 
European empires were at their most expansive and assertive’.1245 As medicine 
became ‘a hallmark of the racial pride and technological assurance that 
underpinned the ‘new imperialism’, so disease ceased to be so terrifying a 
threat and instead became part of the seeming proof of African and Asian 
backwardness. Ill health among non-Europeans thus, ‘fostered Europeans’ 
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growing sense of their innate racial and physical superiority’.1246 Denoon 
claimed that the turn-of-the-century discipline of tropical medicine was, 
‘implicitly racist’, as it was based on, ‘an important link between tropical disease 
and tropical people. The former could be prevented if the latter were 
excluded.’1247 Imperial ideology took it for granted that Africans were incapable 
of and, perhaps more importantly, disinclined to interrogate nature for her 
secrets. It followed that they were themselves among the objects of study for 
tropical medicine.1248 
Topical medicine was largely a late-nineteenth-century phenomenon, 
with schools of the subject opening in London and Liverpool in 1899.1249 Yet, 
some of the hallmarks of the field could be glimpsed in the aftermath of the 
Abyssinian and Ashanti campaigns. As discussed, a number of commentators 
had reacted to the relative medical successes with the conclusion that disease 
control might be a matter of intervention and sanitation, rather than one of 
strictly climate. The Spectator further reasoned that climate could be altered 
over time: 
And as to unhealthy climes, if Englishmen had been daunted by them, 
what now would be the British Empire? Cape Coast is not worse than 
Bombay and Hooghly a hundred years ago; barely worse than Hong 
Kong a few years since…Why, it turns out that until the other day, no 
attempt to take ordinary sanitary precautions was ever made on the 
Coast. We can only inhabit these countries with comparable immunity by 
making them habitable.1250 
 
A belief that it was incumbent on one’s own efforts to improve the climate of 
tropical regions required a certain level of confidence that it was ultimately 
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within one’s power to do so successfully. A faith in the protective and 
destructive power of technology, boosted in the popular imagination by 
successful small wars, encouraged such confidence among imperial-minded 
Britons. Tweedie, who had written to Blackwood’s as ‘A Staff-Officer’ from 
Abyssinia, had by 1875 risen to First Assistant Resident to the Government of 
India. He proposed that the government should intervene to control, ‘noxious 
beasts in India’, by employing professional tiger-killers. He suggested that these 
men would function, ‘just like’ the mole-catchers and rabbit-killers back in 
England, implicitly downplaying the wild tropical threat to the level of vermin.1251 
In his 1829 essay, ‘Signs of the Times’, Thomas Carlyle attempted to 
illustrate the sense of confidence and inevitability permeating what he termed 
the ‘Mechanical Age’: ‘We can remove mountains, and make seas our smooth 
highway; nothing can resist us. We war with rude Nature; and, by our resistless 
engines, come off always victorious, and loaded with spoils.’1252 The following 
section will explore the changing British estimations of Africans, who were, as 
explored in earlier chapters, perceived as part of the increasingly defeated 
natural world. 
6.2 Vindicated Arms 
 
 The perception that ‘easy’ victories had been achieved over two 
substantial African empires nurtured the British imperial culture of confidence 
and its expression in the public sphere. These successes were seen to be all 
the more significant since they had been attained with less loss than many had 
initially expected. The outset of both campaigns had been met with a pervasive 
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sense of self-doubt in Britain’s military capability in Africa, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Beke had predicted that any British intervention in Abyssinia, which 
he considered to be inevitable, would cost, ‘the sacrifice of millions of treasure 
and tens of thousands of human lives’.1253 The threat of disease intertwined with 
Britain’s human adversaries in the public imagination, and both seemed to 
challenge the nation’s status as a world power. However triumphant she had 
been in great wars, Henty claimed, Britain, ‘has yet notoriously failed in her 
“little wars”’.1254 Except for the far south, Britain’s unstable presence in Africa 
until the later 1860s was confined to the absolute edges of the continent.1255 
‘From time immemorial’, Wolseley stated in his Mansion House speech, ‘our 
military policy on the Coast of Africa had not been of a nature to impress a 
powerful and warlike nation with any high opinion of our military strength. This 
fact was encouraging to the enemy.’1256  
No wonder, then, that the battle reports from Magdala were met with 
surprise. In the final despatch to his ‘The Abyssinia Expedition’ column, Henty 
considered that: 
it would, in the face of the terrible forebodings which were launched 
when it was first set about, have seemed an almost impossibility that we 
could have journeyed here, defeated and almost annihilated Theodore’s 
army…with the loss of only one man dead from his wounds.1257  
 
At the end of the campaign, two of Napier’s soldiers had been killed. It took 
fifteen elephants and almost 200 mules to transport the booty looted from 
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Magdala back to the coast.1258 
A large number of Wolseley’s soldiers were wounded by Ashanti 
muskets but only thirteen of the Europeans and one of the West Indians died 
from enemy action in the Gold Coast.1259 Henty’s description of the Elmina raid 
encapsulated the public view of that war as a whole: ‘our objects were attained 
with but slight loss, and the lesson to the enemy was sharp and startling, while it 
certainly increased our confidence in ourselves and in our commanders’.1260 
 British commentators put the campaigns forward as repeated manifest 
proof of British military effectiveness in colonial conflict. Of the victory at 
Magdala, The Spectator claimed, ‘the gain in prestige…is but a trifle, compared 
with the gain in our own self-confidence. We can, then, be efficient, can do the 
work we intend to do without blunder, or disaster, or endless liability.’1261 An 
article in the Birmingham Daily Post reprinted the statement and, as if to 
highlight this newly gained self-confidence, made the bold claim that, ‘double 
that army, leaving it to the same leader…and there is no empire in Asia it could 
not conquer; treble it, and there is no power in Europe to which it would not be 
formidable’.1262 In his seemingly sincere praise of the expedition, the author of a 
later Spectator article implicitly revealed the anxieties that had loomed over it: 
‘an expedition without a blunder, a march which reached its goal, a retreat 
without disaster, a great enterprise finished as if it had been designed by 
Bismarck and organized by Von Moltke, restores our waning self-respect’.1263 
 At the outset of the Ashanti expedition, the War Office had even more to 
prove. Cardwell had implemented waves of comprehensive reform to army 
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organisation and administration since taking office in December 1868, facing 
considerable resistance from, among others, the conservative majority of the 
officer corps.1264 Controversies surrounding Cardwell’s abolition of commission 
purchase and his introduction of short-term service enlistment received serious 
attention in the public sphere. Conservative officers openly argued that these 
changes would leave Britain unprepared for war and virtually undefended. The 
success in Ashanti allowed his supporters (Wolseley foremost among them) to 
claim proof that the reforms had created an effective and efficient military force, 
ready to tackle colonial conflict anywhere it might arise.1265 In matter of fact, the 
soldiers of Wolseley’s picked force were long-term enlistment men of the old 
system, and the war had been launched and supervised by the Colonial Office, 
not the War Office.1266 Nonetheless, the public knew that it had been a British 
expedition and had achieved victory. Cardwell, at the end of his tenure as 
Secretary of State for War, felt vindicated. ‘You and I had great reason to 
congratulate ourselves on the success of the Ashanti Expedition’, he later wrote 
to Lord Northbrook, his former under-secretary at the War Office, ‘We were told 
that we had disorganised the War Office and reduced the Army to a force “that 
could not march”.’1267  
After Wolseley’s victory, The Times declared that the war had been, ‘one 
of the most credible exploits of British arms’. The article quoted the Earl of 
Granville’s assertion to the House of Lords that the small war ‘sort of fighting’ 
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might in fact provide ‘the greatest test of each individual man’.1268 The British 
military abroad had, it seemed, passed that test. 
6.2.1 Foot In the Door 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, Henty opened his account of 
the Abyssinian expedition with the claim that, ‘since the expedition of Pizarro 
and Cortes in the middle ages, no such novel and hazardous expedition is on 
record’.1269 Disraeli similarly told the House of Commons that, ‘it resembles 
more than any other event in history…the advance of Cortez into Mexico’.1270 
The earlier chapter considered their choice of analogy in light of its implied 
characterisation of the African interior as new and uncharted. There was 
another related connotation to the Cortez example: gold. If the Abyssinian 
expedition was akin to the conquest of Tenochtitlan, then the ‘new world’ of 
Africa was now open to conquest and to profitable business. The imperial 
British sense of identity also meshed well with the explorer typology.  
Butler applied the same conquistador imagery to the Ashanti war. 
‘Looking for its counterpart’, he wrote, ‘one must seek the record of by-gone 
strife, when Latin Europe first moved into the New World, and the mailed 
chivalry of Spain scaled the sun-shrines of Cusco or pierced the mountain-
passes from where the mysterious Mexico lay outspread at their feet.’1271 In a 
United Service Magazine editorial, Captain Acklom pushed for stronger tactics 
to be used against the Ashanti to further, ‘the march of the Bible, the steam-
engine, and the plough’ into an African interior that he portrayed as incredibly 
rich and fertile. The time had arrived, he notably argued, ‘for the further opening 
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up and extending the producing limits of civilisation’. The interior, to Acklom, 
was an untapped source of prosperity, and ‘Ashantee alone obstructs the march 
of civilisation toward the interior of Africa.’1272 Such all-or-nothing rhetoric was 
commonly applied to both campaigns, and generated the popular notion that a 
historic milestone, or significant barrier, had been successfully crossed. Sir 
Richard Temple posited that, ‘the Prah becomes the Rubicon of this story’.1273 
His allusion denoted a point of no return, but also the onset of a spectacular 
conquest comparable to that of Julius Caesar. 
At the outset of Ashanti conflict, Gladstone expressed his hope to 
Kimberley that, ‘the miserable war…abates the disposition of John Bull to put 
his head hereafter into a noose’.1274 In his hopes for the return of imperial 
pacifism, Gladstone would be disappointed. Having seen that British arms could 
succeed in the Gold Coast, public opinion and interested parties refused to 
support a withdrawal from the region, which had seemed a foregone conclusion 
only a few years earlier.1275 After the army left Ashanti territory, Britain annexed 
the lands of the Fante Confederacy. The newly founded Gold Coast Colony, 
proclaimed on 24 July 1874, thus became the first substantially inland British 
colony in tropical Africa and came about as a direct result of the expedition.1276 
 Captain Glover gave a talk at the RGS entitled Geographical Notes on 
the Country Traversed between the River Volta and the Niger soon after his 
return. Wolseley, Freemantle, and Sir Bartle Frere, the Society president, were 
in attendance and the event was transcribed and published in the Society’s 
journal of proceedings. Glover emphasised that, ‘there can be no question as to 
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the amount of gold which is to be obtained’ in the country on the far side of the 
Volta, which the recent British invasion had shown could be trod by large 
numbers of Europeans. ‘I therefore see no objection’, he continued, ‘to the 
exploration of that country being carried out, and the really rich stores of gold, 
which it produces, opened up to our enterprising miners, who, no doubt, will go 
up there’. Now that the interior, which by Glover’s description would be as 
prosperous as that of myth, had been opened, ‘it is only a matter of time before, 
I suppose, we shall be all eating with gold-handled knives and off gold 
plates’.1277 
 In the discussion following Glover’s talk, Wolseley was keen to define the 
monumental impact that his little expedition was to have on the range of British 
influence: ‘The effect of opening the road to geographical discovery, as the 
expedition had done…would be to throw open the interior of Africa in a manner 
that it had never been done before’. He did ‘not think that any explorer would 
have, for many years to come, any difficulty in penetrating into the very heart of 
Africa’.1278 
 Frere affirmed in his closing remarks that, ‘it appeared as if, for the first 
time, the veil was lifting up which had concealed the interior of Africa from our 
view’. Always a supporter of imperial expansion, he gave substantial credit to 
Wolseley’s and Glover’s, ‘expeditions, [which,] though they might not reach 
beyond a few hundred miles, showed the possibility of penetrating far into that 
unexplored interior’.1279 Frere was made High Commissioner to Southern Africa 
three years later, and in 1879 would give the order that initiated the Anglo-Zulu 
War. 
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The decade following Britain’s invasion of Ashanti witnessed a marked 
increase in the pace of African expansion and a rise in popular support for 
empire.1280 Porter described the 1870s as a ‘new era of competitive 
imperialism’, in which ‘the popular mood in Britain seemed to be changing, 
becoming more enthusiastic towards the extension of the empire for its own 
sake, instead of merely apathetic or straightforwardly chauvinistic as in the 
past’.1281 Elements of this cultural and political shift were certainly in play before 
Napier’s and Wolseley’s expeditions, perhaps helping to precipitate them, but 
the movement received practical legitimisation by the victories those officers 
achieved. The Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions provided significant 
examples, data points, to be pointed to in support of Britain’s military prowess. 
Henty suggested that 31 January 1874, which saw the battle of Amoaful, ‘will be 
noted in the annals of Africa as the day on which the British soldier for the first 
time fairly met the warriors of the hitherto unconquered Ashanti kingdom in their 
native bush, and after a desperate conflict, lasting five hours and a half, 
completely routed them’.1282 Africa was not yet in the bag, by any measure. In 
1876, more than 90% of the continent was still ruled by Africans.1283 Yet, the 
victories in East and West Africa seemed to prove to the British public what 
many in military and colonial circles had already hoped, that Africa was 
conquerable. ‘If we have other wars to come’, the Illustrated London News 
history of Abyssinia trumpeted, ‘may they be carried out like this!’1284 The 
military door, in tandem with the environmental one, had swung open.  
                                                       
1280 Lawrence James, The Savage Wars: British Campaigns in Africa, 1870-1920 (London: 
Robert Hale Ltd., 1985) p. 22; John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1963) p. 169. 
1281 Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995, 3rd ed. 
(London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996) p. 73, 63. 
1282 Henty, The March to Coomassie, p. 374. 
1283 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 (London: UCL Press, 
1998) p. 28. 
1284 Roger Acton, The Abyssinian Expedition and the Life and Reign of King Theodore (London: 
Office of the Illustrated London News, 1868) p. 77. 
306 
 
 British victories in Africa played a stimulating role in a general 
reappraisal, in both political and public opinion, of the relative costs and benefits 
of empire.1285 Porter argued that mid-Victorian anti-annexationism had been 
sustained by much more than humanitarian fervour. Britain had in fact remained 
fairly pacifist, ‘because it was in her material interests to be; from which it 
followed that if ever peace was not in her interest she could quite happily resort 
to war…when the expense and the risks of war seemed worth it’. Small wars, 
fought in later decades against increasingly technologically inferior opponents, 
therefore, ‘made solid actuarial sense’.1286 Headrick has consistently argued 
that it was the flow of new technologies, above all other factors, which ‘made 
imperialism so cheap that it reached the threshold of acceptance among the 
peoples and governments of Europe, and led nations to become empires’.1287 
This thesis has further argued, in agreement with Edgerton and others, that 
such thresholds of acceptance are drawn and crossed on the basis of the 
perceptions of new technologies, which may be related to but are not 
necessarily equal to their actual material potentials. Stafford also regarded 
technological innovation as the primary driver of the intensified ‘new’ 
imperialism, though with more credence given to the cultural dimension of its 
influence. Advances in these, ‘dependable symbols of progress’, he argued, 
‘profoundly stimulated a mind-set already disposed to think about Empire in 
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terms of what was possible, desirable, and (morally speaking) defensible’.1288 
Adas also contended that it was not victory in itself that most impressed 
Europeans after 1870, but, ‘the growing ease of colonial conquest’. The 
seemingly sudden wave of comparatively easy small wars across the globe, 
including Abyssinia and Ashanti, ‘served to bolster the consensus among 
European thinkers, politicians, and colonial administrators that they had earned 
the right (and duty) to be the “lords of humankind”’.1289 Harcourt flagged the 
British reactions to Abyssinia and Ashanti as evidence of a reconceptualisation 
of mid-Victorian humanitarianism. With both conflicts, ‘the legitimacy of using 
“civilized” force to reduce “barbarous” intransigence received public sanction’, 
marking a shift from a paternalist viewpoint to a more providentialist one.1290 As 
Bell argued, the growing sense of technological and thus civilisational 
superiority over indigenous peoples, ‘easily slipped into a cyclical logic in which 
the means of empire became the justification of empire’.1291 Each victory, or, 
rather, each case where victory was declared, further boosted the consensus 
on Britain’s unrestrained dominance and deepened the expectation of victory. 
6.2.2 Foregone Conclusions 
‘We can ill afford a perpetual succession of “little wars”’, claimed the 
Illustrated London News in 1868, ‘We have no right to expect that they will all 
end as fortunately as, thanks to Sir Robert Napier and his gallant army, the war 
in Abyssinia has ended.’1292 Quite the contrary, in fact, the developing culture of 
confidence in Britain was characterised by a growing expectation of easy victory 
in small wars. Belich considered the functioning of this interpretive dynamic in 
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his history of the New Zealand Wars. He described the expectation of victory as 
a powerful filter, which ‘pervades the interpretation of the Wars’. At one level, 
this perception led to the exaggeration of British victories and, if necessary, the 
creation of fictional ones. In those cases where a real defeat was recognised:  
the jarring disjuncture between event and expectation created a 
traumatic shock, which then had to be alleviated, mainly through the 
development of acceptable explanations for the disaster. British 
stereotypes of their own and of Maori military abilities determined what 
was acceptable and what was not. Unacceptable implications which 
survived this part of the process were subsequently downplayed, 
obscured, or forgotten.1293 
 
In a similar manner, British victories over the Abyssinians and Ashanti were 
exaggerated to the point that they were made to signify, conclusively, the 
dominance of European industrial civilisation over African savagery and 
barbarism. Once established in popular opinion and the official mind, this 
dominance became normative and tremendously resilient to contrary data (as 
confirmation biases usually are). Thus, as Belich argued of the popular 
interpretation of the New Zealand Wars, what was: 
hard to accept was the way in which sophisticated artefact technology, 
the European hallmark, was neutralized by superficially less impressive 
techniques. It was almost impossible for a Victorian to acknowledge that 
a wonderful scientific achievement such as the Armstrong gun was 
functionally inferior to an anti-artillery bunker, a mere hole in the 
ground.1294 
 
Once, therefore, the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions had ‘proven’ that novel 
military technology granted the British army a comfortable superiority in African 
small wars, an unexpected loss would not necessarily shake that 
presupposition. 
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The Anglo-Zulu war provides a prominent example. In 1879, the Daily 
Telegraph predicted that, ‘the mere handful of white men’, sent to defeat King 
Cetshwayo: 
will probably be found equal to the task before them, which is to break 
down the military peril upon the Natal frontier, and, by conquering and 
disarming the Zulu barbarians, to open the way for the extension of 
civilization northwards upon the vast African continent.1295  
 
The ‘opening up’ rhetoric had by then become standard trope, and Lord 
Chelmsford’s columns were expected to pierce the African interior from the 
south as had Napier from the east and Wolseley from the west. Ten days later, 
the Western Morning News reported that: 
a calamitous reverse has befallen the British arms in South Africa… 
Englishmen are little accustomed to news of this sort. They sometimes 
forget that such news is possible. They belong to a conquering race. 
They have been boasting very much lately that their arms are 
invincible.1296  
 
The loss at Isandlwana was bound to make for shocking news. The British force 
lost some 1,300 troops, over 700 of which were Army regulars. It is, 
nonetheless, worth noting that in the fifteen years since the disastrous second 
Ashanti war, the home press and popular opinion had become so accustomed 
to victory that the risk of a major loss was no longer seriously considered. Gone 
from the public sphere were the dire predictions and pessimistic editorials that 
had anticipated the Abyssinia and Ashanti expeditions. Taken as a whole, the 
media had approached the declaration of the Anglo-Zulu war with little 
trepidation and considerable fanfare.  
 It would have seemed that there was ample reason for such confidence. 
Notwithstanding Frere’s attempts to characterise the Zulu as a race of savage 
warriors, they were by all accounts far more primitively armed than were the 
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Abyssinians or the Ashanti. They lacked Theodore’s artillery train, Karikari’s 
well-connected firearms trade, the protection of mountaintop fortresses, and 
even the cover of a forest.1297 The Natal had its problems with the tsetse fly, but 
it was no ‘white man’s grave’. It was, in fact, common knowledge that these 
sorts of little wars were supposed to be easy. Thomas Freedman, owner of the 
Freeman’s Exmouth Journal, revealed in his commentary on the Isandlwana 
disaster where the public expectations for imperial conflict stood: 
it is hardly possible to get rid of the disturbing reflection that the 
disaster…need never have occurred at all if the invasion of Zululand had 
been set about in the same deliberate, methodical, and energetic manner 
as the Abyssinian and Ashantee expeditions, both of which, without any 
mishaps occurring, were crowned with success.1298 
 
Thus, Isandlwana did not strip the British expectation of victory. The strength of 
that expectation caused commentators to explain away any unexpected losses, 
as had been done in the New Zealand Wars. As Orme claimed, by 1879, 
‘expectations about colonial warfare had filtered into the public 
consciousness’.1299 The memories of Magdala and Kumase still held, showing 
that Isandlwana need not become habit. 
British popular culture, the media (and nascent ‘New Journalism’), and 
even the ‘official mind’ of political and military circles continued to look back to 
Abyssinia and Ashanti as examples of how easy imperial ventures could (and 
therefore should) be. These campaigns had raised the bar for those that 
followed. Henceforth, when the British public thought about the prospect of 
small wars, they would do so with an understanding that they could expect 
success, ‘without any mishaps occurring’. That notion tended to make the 
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nation considerably more disposed to support African expansion. In that sense, 
these two seemingly small and peculiar campaigns made a significant impact 
on Britain’s imperial future. 
6.3 Minimisation of the People 
Ramseyer, missionary and former captive at Kumase, recalled a certain 
African servant who, after witnessing the British camp, exclaimed that, ‘Europe 
is come to Africa!’ Upon his own arrival sometime later, Ramseyer remarked, 
‘how wonderful was the appearance of so many white faces in the old African 
forest’.1300 The colour of the soldiers’ faces was perhaps more significant to the 
history of British imperial culture than was their flag of allegiance. In his 1915 
history of the Gold Coast, Claridge argued that the: 
first part of the war had been conducted mainly by Africans, and a few 
hundred seamen and marines and a West India Regiment had been the 
only regular troops employed…This was by far the most arduous part of 
the campaign; but it aroused very little interest at the time, and it was not 
until British regiments with well-known names were employed during the 
operations beyond the Prah that the public in England began to pay any 
serious attention to what was taking place on the Gold Coast.1301 
 
It was the presence and perceived success of European soldiers that made the 
Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions particularly newsworthy to Victorian Britain. 
These conflicts took place in the midst of particular intellectual currents on the 
interpretation of race. Bolt has discussed the link, perhaps prerequisite link, 
between the aggressive assertion of white superiority in the 1860s and the 
explosion of British expansion in Africa.1302 Abyssinia and Ashanti straddled a 
time when these assertions were beginning to influence imperial policy. Racial 
ideas also guided the ways the conflicts were interpreted and reported. 
Retellings of the expeditions in turn reinforced the shifts in British racial thought. 
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The perceived ease of the military victories, coupled with evident advances in 
medicine and an imagined triumph over the natural world, precipitated a 
reassessment of the nature of racial dominance. Integral to this process was a 
consistent minimisation by British commentators of African people as non-
martial. 
6.3.1 Previous Beliefs of African Dominance 
 In his 1863 Savage Africa, Reade described the Kingdom of Ashanti in 
large and threatening terms, ‘whose monarch slew Sir Charles Macarthy at the 
head of his troops, and conquered the English on the brink of the sea. In the 
centre of his kingdom is Coomassi, the City of Gold.’1303 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Britain’s difficult history in African wars left a mark of caution upon 
any notion of further excursions into the interior. Reade also reported having, 
‘often heard it said by military men that British soldiers are poor bush-
fighters’.1304 During the planning for the Abyssinian war, the New York Tribune 
played on the conflicting feelings in the British public sphere at the prospect of 
an inland invasion, positing the following discussion: ‘But we have managed the 
Ashantee war more than once, says the Times and Abyssinia cannot well be 
worse. No, rejoins a pitiless correspondent, we never did manage an Ashantee 
war, the Ashantees always managed us.’1305 Such military setbacks meshed in 
the popular imagination with developments and fashions in the theory of race 
and environment. 
In a notable speech for the Ethnographical Society of London, also 
discussed in Chapter 3, Hunt declared his intention to ‘examine how far the 
supposition of man’s cosmopolitan power is warranted by an induction from the 
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facts at present known to us’.1306 He wished to scrutinise the modernist ideal 
that man is capable of thriving anywhere on the globe and determine the extent 
to which that ambition could be approached. His central conclusion was, ‘that it 
is as difficult to plant a race out of its own centre, as it is to extinguish any race 
without driving it from its natural centre’.1307 Significantly, Hunt believed that this 
applied to Europeans as well, thereby limiting their ability to thrive outside of 
European climates. ‘Man’, therefore, could not be said to be cosmopolitan 
because race was the largest determinant of success in any given context (Hunt 
was, after all, a polygenecist). Thus, to Hunt, Africans could not thrive in Europe 
just as Europeans could not in Africa or Asia; he argued, for example, that 
European children could not be reliably raised in India.1308  
Hunt conceded that one slight exception, or at least flexibility, in this rule 
was provided by the adaptive influence of ‘civilisation’: 
It is civilization which chiefly enables the European to bear the extremes 
of climate. Indeed, a people must be civilized to some extent before they 
desire to visit distant regions. The Esquimaux, for instance, is perfectly 
happy in his own way, and has no desire to move to a warmer climate. 
His whole body and mind are suited for the locality; and were he moved 
to a warm climate, he would certainly perish. The whole organism of the 
Esquimaux is fitted solely for a cold climate.1309 
 
Hunt believed, however, that the ameliorating influence of ‘civilisation’ was very 
limited and best expressed in exploration rather than in procreation. He did not 
believe that British civilisation, however advanced, would allow Europeans to 
thrive in the African interior. Hunt may have represented an extreme 
interpretation, out of the scientific mainstream even by the 1870s, but some of 
his major themes retained their weight in British culture for years. Less 
formalised versions of these ideas were still in general circulation during the 
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Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions. McCaskie has described, ‘the continuing 
potency of an imagined Africa in an era of greatly increased factual knowledge’. 
Even as scientific circles began to reject the influence of climate and ecology on 
cultural history, ‘repetitions, traces, or echoes of [these concepts] are to be 
found in the literature of colonial conquest concerning Benin, Yorubaland, 
Igboland, and Sokoto in West Africa, or Zululand and the Sudan elsewhere on 
the continent’.1310 
The British army had long responded to the manifest inability of regular 
soldiers to handle the tropics by employing African soldiers in various 
capacities. Bowdich, the first European to visit as far inland as Kumase, 
recommended such an arrangement in 1819. He suggested that soldiers for the 
British Cape Coast garrison should be recruited from among: 
the Negroes captured in the illicit Spanish and Portuguese slave ships, of 
whom there must be a number unemployed at Sierra Leone, [they] would 
form the most desirable military force, even preferable to European…the 
climate would be natural to them; and they would prove valuable 
companions, if not intelligible guides, in future missions to the interior.1311 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the formation of the West Indian Regiments was 
predicated on the supposed superiority of African soldiers over Europeans in 
tropical warfare. First conceived to garrison Britain’s Caribbean colonies, the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, and 4th West Indian Regiments played pivotal roles in the 1863-64 
Ashanti war and certainly in the first phase of the 1873 war.1312 They were, 
indeed, essential for the defence of British West Africa during this period. Any 
argument that the white soldiers of the British army were fully capable in tropical 
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settings was thus bound to be linked to a denigration and dismissal of the black 
soldiers upon which that army had long relied. 
6.3.2 In Victory, Contempt 
Despite, perhaps in reaction to, the widespread belief that African 
warriors excelled in their own environments, British accounts of the Abyssinian 
and Ashanti expeditions demonstrated a strong tendency to portray Africans as 
impotent and non-martial. Looking back to the fall of Magdala upon the 
occasion of Lord Napier’s death, The Spectator claimed that the, ‘Abyssinian 
soldiers, utterly cowed by the white men’s weapons, refused to fight.’1313 
 In his memorandum distributed to the European soldiers in Ashanti, 
Wolseley attested that: 
Providence has implanted in the heart of every native of Africa a 
superstitious awe and dread of the white man that prevents the negro 
from daring to meet us face to face in combat. A steady advance or 
charge, no matter how partial, if made with determination, always means 
the retreat of the enemy.  
 
While the Ashanti army was formidable to ‘enemies of their own colour’, he 
continued, ‘they will not stand against the advance of the white man’. Wolseley 
closed with the declaration: ‘Soldiers and sailors, remember that the black man 
holds you in superstitious awe.’1314 
 British commentators made particular notice of Ashanti ‘superstition’ as a 
signifier of, indeed even a metaphor for, the ineffectiveness of that empire’s 
military defences. Almost every official and press source made some reference 
to the great fetish tree of Kumase. According to Ashanti custom, the city and 
empire would stand as long as this large tree remained upright. On 6 January 
1874, the tree was toppled by storm winds and crashed to the ground. On that 
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very day, journalists were keen to emphasise, Wolseley sent his first letter of 
ultimatum to the King and the first white man of the expedition crossed the Prah 
River.1315 It is impossible to determine if this incredible coincidence took place 
as described or if the dates and details had been altered, but the tale seems to 
have been agreed upon by all. 
 Maurice described a forest track purportedly called ‘the Haunted Road’, 
on which neither Ashanti nor Fante would dare tread, ‘except under the guiding 
influence of the European in whom he confides with a kind of idolatrous respect. 
It is in some way sacred to Fetish custom’.1316 If that was the case, one 
wonders who had been maintaining the track before the expedition. Maurice’s 
characterisation served the dual purpose of discrediting the power of Fetish 
rites, and also marking the Ashanti and Fante men as cowards and fools for 
fearing it. 
 The Illustrated London News ran Prior’s tale of a scouting party that 
encountered, ‘an Ashanti priest or wizard’. The man fled, leaving, ‘a fetish on 
the spot, fixed in the ground like a scarecrow, but consisting only of a stick, with 
bundles of cotton and grass tied round it. This was the terrible guardian of the 
Ashantee kingdom.’1317 The failure of these guardians was put forward as 
marking the failure of an inferior way of life, of a stagnant and superstitious 
civilisation in the face of a modern and scientific one. Stanley made a direct 
appraisal: 
Virtue of fetichism seems to be on the wane; the traditional terrors of 
Coomassie, the stronghold of the Ashantees, have lost their effect. 
Heaps of broken crockery, corn-meal flour splashed on trees, and 
stakes, and dwelling houses, are of no avail; human sacrifices, 
performed with all due ceremony, daunt not the palefaces; lengthy lines 
of cotton thread strung across bush and branch impede not the advance; 
all the howling and loud incantations of fetich priests are so much power 
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of demented men’s lungs in vain; and vociferous vaunting of braggart 
chieftains deter not the Saxons’ march. No, men with Sniders in their 
hands march on unrestingly!1318 
 
These tropes in the British engagement with Africa have been explored 
throughout this study. The utter defeat of African warriors, the piercing of the 
bush barricade, the ineffectiveness of fetishism, and the manifest superiority of 
European technology, all fed into a continually reinforced popular representation 
of Britain’s African enemies as impotent, powerless, and inadequate. Such 
characterisations were not, however, solely directed toward the enemy. Over 
the course of the Ashanti campaign, Britain’s West African allies were pushed 
even lower in popular discourse. 
6.3.3 West African Allies 
Negative African and orientalist stereotypes were asserted most openly 
in British discussions of their West African allies. It was endlessly repeated that 
the Fante, Western Akim, Assin, and Wassaw nations were poor soldiers. 
‘They’re a nice lot to fight for them Fantees!’, a Naval Brigade private told the 
Daily News, ‘If they hear a twig move as they march along they say “Ashantee, 
Ashantee!” and get their legs together for a run.’1319 Marvelling at the ‘wonderful’ 
dread the Fante appeared to have ‘of the white man’, Dooner recounted 
scattering a group of them at Cape Coast by threatening them with a stick.1320 
 Henty characterised the native allies as, ‘far worse than worthless as 
companions in a fight’.1321 Wolseley, similarly, called them, ‘worse than 
useless…they bolt en masse whenever they can, leaving their white officers to 
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shift for themselves as best they can.1322 ‘It is impossible to exaggerate the 
cowardice and feebleness of our allies’, he wrote to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and also published in The London Gazette, ‘a sudden panic seizes 
them and they rush panic-stricken home when no Ashanti is near them’.1323 
Wolseley and Henty would both later describe, ‘one of the funniest scenes I 
have ever witnessed’, when the General, unable to convince a Fante force to 
advance against the enemy and, ‘in despair at their utter cowardliness’, brought 
up a company of sword-wielding Kosso soldiers to, ‘make a frightening show 
behind the Fantis and scare them forward’.1324 Such claims played on the 
popular notion of an African childish (or feminine) inability to control emotion 
and bolstered Wolseley’s requests for battalions of British soldiers. 
Similar terms were used to describe the other allied nations of the British 
Protectorate. In a lecture at the Royal United Service Institute, Colonel Evelyn 
Wood claimed that when the leaders of the Assin were offered European 
officers to train their soldiers, they replied, ‘No! our hearts are not big enough to 
fight as your Officers would require.’1325 The various kings and chiefs were, 
perhaps prudently, hesitant to commit their armed forces to march so far into 
the dreaded Ashanti territory, and this reluctance was always portrayed as 
cowardice. Wolseley had sent Captain Butler to the Western Akim and Captains 
Dalrymple and Moore to the Wassaw, instructing them to induce their hosts to 
invade Ashanti territory. The War Office summary of the conflict indicated that 
these allied nations were intended to, ‘protect his flanks and act as decoys to 
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keep the Ashanti disorganized’.1326 Wolseley was incensed when the 
Protectorate Kings did not adequately play their decoy roles, writing that:  
the curs of the [Western Akim and Wassaw] King[s] won’t move, they 
procrastinate from day to day, in fact they are afraid to cross the Prah…If 
this was the beginning of the war I should try one of them & see what 
effect a sentence of death or transportation would have on them.1327 
 
In their criticisms of African allies, many commentators cited their 
supposed martial shortcomings as evidence of a low racial status. Stanley wrote 
of ‘the most insolent, lying, thieving negroes’ of Sierra Leone.1328 ‘It cannot be 
too firmly impressed on Englishmen’, Boyle reported in the Telegraph, ‘that our 
native allies of the protectorate are mere beasts, cowardly to a degree 
incredible unless one had beheld them, slavish and greedy, and 
treacherous’.1329 Of the Fante, ‘rank cowards’, Prior claimed that Wolseley had 
made them porters and carriers as a direct result of their worthlessness as 
soldiers.1330 The Lancet, blaming them for the expedition’s transport problems, 
called the Fante, ‘the most indolent, timid, and useless of the African tribes. 
Utterly unfit for soldiers, they seem even incapable of becoming bipeds of 
burden’.1331 
 The supposed link between martial weakness and racial degradation was 
in fact taken by many to be a direct result of the British presence in the region. 
British products, education, and protection were seen to have spoiled the Fante. 
Henty argued that contact with the white man had, ‘completely destroyed the 
savage virtue of his courage, and their deterioration in this respect has been as 
complete as that which the Britons underwent when under the protection of the 
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Romans’.1332 Such attacks on any signs of Europeanisation among non-whites 
were typical of the period. In having grown weak without becoming civilised, 
according to this logic, the British allies were considerably worse than the 
Ashanti. ‘The Fantees are only fit to be slaves to the Ashantees’, Wolseley 
wrote in his report, ‘and it would be far better for us if the Ashantees had 
possession of this country…we should have to deal with a fine warlike race 
instead of with the Fantees who certainly are par excellence the cowards of the 
world’.1333 Boyle claimed that, whatever the cruelties of Ashanti slavery, among 
the ‘humane’ officers of the expedition, ‘one opinion only rules, that the worst 
fate they could incur is well deserved by the Fantees’.1334 Luxmore took it a step 
further in a letter to his wife. He indicated his wish, in which he was ‘not alone in 
saying’, that when Wolseley made a treaty with the Ashanti, he insert the 
stipulation, ‘viz. – that they should immediately collect all their fighting men and 
come down after we leave and exterminate UTTERLY these brutes of Fantees. 
They are fifty times worse than any Ashantee’.1335 
6.3.4 West Indian Regiments 
Wolseley opened his 1888 essay The Negro as a Soldier with the 
suggestive claim that, ‘since the abolition of slavery, and until recent years, the 
ranks of our West India regiments have been filled with fairly good fighting 
material’.1336 For the remainder of the essay, however, he argued against the 
future employment of any black regulars in the British army. Using his 
experiences in the Ashanti and Zulu wars as anecdotal evidence, Wolseley 
brought out the usual dismissive claims of African cowardice and stupidity. His 
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central argument, however, was far more specific than that. Wolseley sought to 
square the well-known historic successes of the West Indian Regiments in 
colonial small wars with his contemporary claim that they were no longer 
capable units. The key variable, he argued, was military technology: 
Before the introduction of rifled arms, and especially of the breechloader, 
the private who could bear fatigue, who was brave, absolutely obedient, 
and who was to be depended upon to stand by his officer under all 
circumstances, possessed the best qualities which go to make up a 
really good soldier. As long as success in war depended on fighting at 
close quarters, and when accuracy in shooting was of little or no account, 
the natural instinct of the savage from the interior of Africa went far to 
make up for his want of intelligence as a soldier.1337 
 
Wolseley portrayed the Ashanti and Zulu wars (with the Cardwell reforms 
unspoken of in the background) as turning points in a transition from the 
primacy of the ‘mechanical soldier’ of old to the ‘scientific soldier’ of the modern 
world. The former was ostensibly open to all races; the latter was a European 
prerogative: 
I do not think Europeans learn drill as quickly as the Basuto or the 
Zulu…There seems to be something in the disposition and genius of the 
common stock from which they [‘savages’] come, some hereditary bias in 
their brain, in their very blood, which fits them for the easy acquisition of 
a soldier’s duties. And yet many of these races who thus quickly acquire 
an excellence in drill, &c., cannot be taught any mechanical handicraft; 
indeed, many can never even learn to draw a straight line.1338 
 
The men of the West Indian Regiments had, Wolseley argued, thus been left 
behind, unable to make the transition to modern warfare. But what of the 
influences of climate and disease, which had forced the establishment of these 
novel regiments in 1795 and necessitated their extension across the tropical 
colonies? Those factors, he claimed, were no longer relevant. In earlier days, 
he admitted, the regiments had been made up of African-born men who 
withstood tropical environments and resisted the associated ailments. In more 
recent years, however, ‘now that they are raised from a class of negroes with a 
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considerable proportion of English blood in their veins’, referring to the creole 
populations of the British Caribbean, ‘they stand the climate at Cape Coast 
Castle and in the neighbouring provinces little better than the white man’.1339 
Wolseley believed that men from colonial mixed-race populations had, ‘lost the 
best qualities [their] forefathers possessed as savages, and [had] failed to 
acquire those which belong to that civilization with which [they were] now more 
or less associated’.1340 
Wolseley’s opinion of the West Indian Regiments stood in stark contrast 
to the view of African soldiers explored in Chapter 3 and dominant in British 
military thinking even at the outset of the Ashanti war. That he directed his 
attack on those regiments was particularly significant, since their very existence 
was rooted in contemporary British military beliefs of African dominance in 
tropical climates and supposed innate superiority in bush warfare. They had 
long been valued specifically because they were black. The popular and even 
professional military views of the West Indian Regiments were tied to, and 
coloured by, fluctuating martial race ideals. Their fall from grace in some circles 
provides a potent indicator of the changing views of race. 
Wolseley had begun his line of argument in 1873 in Ashanti, where he 
persistently and repeatedly belittled the West Indian soldiers as incapable of the 
very kind of irregular warfare in which they were widely believed to excel. He 
found the 2nd Regiment to be, ‘unsuited by their dress and training for bush 
fighting’ and told Earle that, ‘they are of little use in the bush under the present 
organization’.1341 Surprisingly, Wolseley argued to Cardwell that the West 
Indians were, ‘not physically by any means as capable of withstanding the 
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climate, still less exertion and fatigue’, as were white soldiers. He claimed it 
was, ‘a well-known fact here that Europeans suffer from the climate less than 
black men from other localities’, a polar opposite position to the received 
wisdom in Britain. Realising that his own testimony could only carry so far, 
Wolseley supported his claims by reference to the work of Captain A. Clarke 
and Staff Assistant-Surgeon W. A. Gardiner.1342 
 Clarke had visited Cape Coast Castle in 1863 and, in the aftermath of the 
first Anglo-Ashanti war the following year, submitted a report in which he was 
very critical of the West Indian Regiments and argued against their use in 
Africa. Man for man, he pointed out, they cost as much to maintain and required 
the same amount of transport as did British soldiers. For this investment, he 
continued, ‘they have not those moral qualities which the later possess to 
sustain them in times of pressure, difficulty and disaster. They cannot move with 
the same rapidity and if broken, or separated from their officers, they are said to 
be wholly unable to act for themselves.’ In an allusion to the ‘panic’ trope, and 
without any provided evidence, Clarke also claimed that the black troops of the 
West Indian Regiments had failed to, ‘become free from a certain awe which 
deters him from even threatening his life’.1343 The presumed superiority of a 
white force of soldiers, he posited, meant that the army could replace 1,600 
West Indians with a mere 200 Europeans at no loss of strength.1344 
 That same year, Staff Assistant-Surgeon W. A. Gardiner published a 
sanitary report on the 1863 expedition against the Ashanti Empire, where he 
had served as senior Medical Officer. He correctly concluded that West Indian-
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born soldiers of the 1st, 2nd and 4th W. I. Regiments were not immune to West 
African diseases (at one point a full half of the Prahsu detachment was on the 
sick list)1345. He somehow extended that conclusion, however, to the claim that 
they ‘suffered more from the effects of this climate on their first arrival than 
white men would’, despite the fact that the white officers of the corps suffered a 
higher sickness rate.1346 Gardiner further proposed that ‘white soldiers might be 
able to bear up under hardships and changes of climate, even on this coast, 
black troops cannot without considerable loss; have none of the hardiness and 
spirited endurance of the white man’. He referred to this critical and intangible 
advantage Europeans supposedly had in the battle against fever as ‘what is 
commonly called pluck’.1347 
Clarke and Gardiner were in the minority when they published in 1863-4, 
when an exaggeratedly positive characterisation of the West Indian Regiments 
was still the norm. The officers of the second Anglo-Ashanti war brought their 
reports back to the fore. Brackenbury delivered a lecture about Gardiner’s 
conclusions to the officers on the Ambriz, and the doctor’s arguments appear to 
have influenced opinion among the Ashanti Ring officers. In his discussion of 
‘the abortive effort of 1864’, Brackenbury drew particular attention to the 
‘hardihood and spirited endurance’ point.1348 
 Early in the 1873 expedition, while Wolseley was preparing his request 
for European battalions, Deputy Adjutant-General Armstrong included as fact in 
his War Office report that, ‘those who are familiar with the climate agree in 
stating that soldiers of our West Indian Regiments do not bear the climate better 
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than Europeans; this would probably be equally true of Goorkhas, whose 
employment has been advocated’.1349 It was a large conceptual leap on the part 
of British commentators to extend the notion of white superiority to encompass 
even climatic adaptation. Though not yet universally accepted at the time, it was 
growing in prominence in discussions of empire and race and reinforced quite 
significantly by interpretations of Napier’s and Wolseley’s expeditions. 
 In 1868, Blackwood’s published Tweedie’s declaration that: 
The old theory that the British soldier is less adapted than the Indian for 
the vicissitudes of campaigning, or that he requires more transport, and 
greater care taken of him in the field, is surely at last exploded…The 
truth is, the British soldier…is in all ordinary climates, and most notably in 
one like that of Abyssinia, by far the hardier of the two.1350 
 
Having complimented the Belooch native infantry and the Mazabee pioneers on 
their performance against Theodore, he cautioned that, ‘to suppose, however, 
that the former possess any special military capabilities which do not exist in a 
still greater degree in our own countrymen, is contrary to reason and 
experience’.1351 
 On the Gold Coast, Wolseley felt he had to continuously press his case 
for access to European battalions. His orders from Cardwell had made very 
clear that any employment of British soldiers would require thorough 
justification.1352 Indeed, Wolseley understated when he commented that, ‘I have 
upon several occasions written disparagingly about the 2nd W.I. Regt’.1353 When 
the European soldiers did arrive, and the time came to advance on Kumase, 
Wolseley held the West Indians back at Amoaful as a reserve and sent the 42nd 
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Highlanders ahead instead. ‘The 2nd West Indians were most unfortunate in 
having been kept behind at Amoaful’, Henty sympathised, ‘and it was certainly 
hard upon them that they were unrepresented at Coomassie’.1354 Most 
regiments, in fact, would probably have complained about such a slight. To 
justify his decision, Wolseley parroted Clarke’s point that black soldiers required 
the same rations and transport support as their white counterparts, yet, ‘the 
services of one English battalion are worth that of two Regts of black 
soldiers’.1355 He told the War Office that the West Indian Regiments, ‘must, from 
the very nature of their material, be inferior to…Her Majesty’s 42nd 
Highlanders’.1356  
Stanley was also unimpressed with the ‘material’ of the West Indians. He 
agreed that they were, ‘as little capable of standing this climate as white troops 
are’, and that, ‘their constitutions are as frail before malarial diseases as those 
of Europeans’.1357 While such medical claims were reasonably correct, he 
characterised the men as unmilitary in character in terms so vague that they 
could only refer to race: 
as soldiers [the WIR] don’t strike me favourably…their appearance 
contrasts unfavorably with that of the Naval Brigade. Their marching was 
a mere slouch, a heavy, careless, leaden walk. There was no dignified 
military pace among them; they jerked their heavy feet forward, after 
which they permitted them to fall, without order, unison or emphasis, on 
the ground; and, of course, their bodies were as ill-regulated as their 
pace. Their arms were swung about as if they were using sledge 
hammers; their heads bobbed up and down irregularly, and their bodies 
swayed indolently from side to side, with a downward droop distressing 
to witness.1358 
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This move away from the ‘imagined West Indian Regiments’ and their supposed 
advantages in bush warfare had real effects on British policy. The loss of their 
status as a specialist force hastened their removal from the Gold Coast. Once 
looked to as the only soldiers capable of defending the empire in tropical 
climates, the West Indians were pulled back and disbanded around the time of 
the Ashanti expedition. Some government officials, averse to the idea of black 
soldiers protecting colonies of black people, had campaigned to that effect and 
succeeded in reducing the West Indian presence on the Gold Coast from 1,600 
in 1864 to 375 in 1872.1359 The 3rd West Indian Regiment was disbanded 
entirely in 1873 and Kimberley considered replacing them with a local irregular 
force of armed police.1360   
After the Ashanti war, the reports from the field seemed to finalise the 
government’s choice. As Parkes noted in his medical report, ‘it is true that the 
men of the West India regiments had not shown the same impunity to climate 
since they had been largely recruited in the West Indies; and a local force of 
Houssas, a Mahometan martial tribe very loyal to England, had been suggested 
as a substitute’.1361 
6.3.5 Hausa Armed Police 
The Hausa Armed Police force of the Ashanti expedition were spared 
much of the harsh criticism directed toward the West Indian Regiments. A 
number of British commentators couched their praise in direct comparisons 
between the former over the latter. Brevet-Major A. Gordon, who had 
commanded the Hausa, wrote in his report that they were: 
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the best and cheapest of Colonial force. In courage and dash they are 
unspeakably superior to any of the native races in the Protectorate. In 
action they require to be restrained rather than urged on. They will march 
any distance without requiring a train of carriers and hammock-bearers, 
and supplies of rations, hospital comforts, &c., without which the men of 
the West India Regiments cannot march.1362 
 
In a much-publicised lecture on his part of the expedition, Captain Glover 
described, ‘the élan, bravery, and good conduct of the Houssas’, and tellingly 
described them as ‘the Sikhs of Africa’.1363 
Their supporters, it is worth noting, tended to focus on the claim that the 
Hausa were cheap to maintain, not necessarily superior to army regular 
alternatives. It required a twist of perception and of logic to argue that the 
Hausa were superior to the West Indian Regiments because they required less 
pampering and impedimenta, yet also believe that British soldiers were better 
still in spite of having those same requirements. It was an argument that 
required a heavy consideration of race as possessing independent value, 
which, as the following section will argue, had become typical of the period. The 
Hausa were not envisioned to be simply the West Indian Regiments’ 
replacements, but as holding a position in a new conceptual ladder of martial 
qualities. British officers may have felt more endeared to the Hausa than to the 
West Indian Regiments because the military did not consider them to be on 
equal footing with the white regulars, as it did the West Indians. Hausa troops 
and other irregulars fit more comfortably with the developing image of 
subordinate martial races, which was predicated on a consistent racial 
hierarchy. In a sense, the Hausa were seen to ‘know their place’ in line with 
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where contemporary military opinion imagined their place to be. Apropos, Henty 
painted a scene during the battle of Amoaful in which the Houssas, ‘their usual 
pluck and dash [having] deserted them’, would not advance. When the Naval 
Brigade moved up to charge in their place, Henty claimed that, ‘the lesson then 
given of the white man’s superiority now stood us in good stead’.1364 
6.4 Reconsidered Options 
Underlying the decline in the reputations of Britain’s African soldiers, 
allies, and enemies was an important general shift in popular perspectives of 
race, place, and the Other. The military successes in Abyssinia and Ashanti 
accelerated a reappraisal of the nature of racial dominance. The ethnocentrism 
common to so many imperial commentators caused them to exaggerate the 
conclusions that could be drawn from Napier’s and Wolseley’s victories. One 
recurring suggestion was that white soldiers had been proven superior to black 
soldiers, even within Africa. 
Reade had defied convention when he asserted before the West African 
campaign, ‘that Europeans alone could conquer Ashantee’. There was not, he 
wrote to The Times from Sierra Leone, ‘the least prospect of the Commander-
in-Chief being able to bring this war to an honourable termination without 
European troops…they are essential to the success of this expedition’.1365 
When the European battalions arrived at Cape Coast, Stanley assured his 
readers that, ‘we may confidently back these white men against any number of 
Ashantees. Even the tribes of the entire West Coast of Africa combined could 
not oppose them successfully, bush or no bush.’1366 Henty argued that the 
attack on Elmina and other early engagements, ‘taught us that it was upon 
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white men, and upon white men alone, that we must rely in our campaign 
against Ashanti’.1367 
In a report to the Army Medical Department, which was reprinted both as 
a pamphlet and in The Lancet, Dr. Parkes claimed that Wolseley, ‘has shown 
the superiority of a handful of disciplined men to hordes of barbarians’.1368 In his 
own medical report, Gore came to the conclusion that, ‘the best fighting force 
for such a climate would appear to be Europeans in reserve or support of 
disciplined and irregular native auxiliaries’.1369 The medical appraisal of 
European soldiers in tropical settings had seemingly shifted from utterly 
incapable, to, in fact, the best and most reliable choice. 
Wolseley’s opinions on the comparative value of European and African 
soldiers were well known and have already been discussed. In his request for a 
third British battalion, he stressed that combat experience had, ‘convinced me 
more strongly than any opinions of others could have done, that it is quite 
practicable for European troops to best the natives in bush fighting’. British 
soldiers were, thus, ‘the only troops by which this war can be satisfactorily 
ended’.1370 In one of his periodic ultimatum letters to King Karikari, Wolseley 
attempted to, ‘impress upon your Majesty that hitherto your soldiers have only 
had to fight against black men, helped by a few Englishmen. If, however, you 
should now be so ill-advised as to continue this war, your troops will have to 
meet an army of white soldiers.’1371 In another letter later that month, he argued 
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that, ‘you know that your soldiers are powerless before an army of white 
men’.1372  
 As with their claims of British technological superiority, many 
commentators suggested that their African enemies were themselves well 
convinced of their subordinate military status. Upon the capture of Karikari’s 
capital, The Spectator concluded that, ‘the most powerful and most brutal race 
in Africa has learned that it cannot measure itself against the white man with 
any chance of success…and we ourselves have learned the conditions of a 
successful African war’.1373 The British army had, Dooner claimed: 
taught the whole coloured race a lesson, which the men of the different 
tribes cannot fail to talk about. The warlike Kings of Bonny, Opobo, and 
the Kossoos will all hear of how the white man went into the bush and 
drove the Ashantee out of his stronghold. The name of England will now 
be respected on the Coast – the superiority of her soldiers 
acknowledged; and I do not think we shall be troubled during the present 
generation with any more Ashantee invasions of the Protectorate.1374 
 
After the destruction of Magdala, similarly, the Pall Mall Gazette rejoiced in the 
belief that rulers in India and Africa would surely henceforth recognise that 
European powers were, ‘absolutely irresistible by less civilized races’.1375 
Imperialists and jingoists believed they had their proof that the British soldier 
was militarily superior anywhere and, hence, the British race everywhere. 
6.5 Context Insensitivity 
Colonel George Charles Depree, Surveyor-General of the Government of 
India from 1884-87, once noticed that some of his European surveyors had 
been instructing their Indian servants to make field drawings. He insisted that 
this practice stop in a memorandum to the Public Service Commission, arguing 
that, ‘it is suicidal for the Europeans to admit that Natives can do any one thing 
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better than themselves. They should claim to be superior in everything and only 
allow Natives to take a secondary or subordinate part’.1376 During the time of the 
Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions, the conceptual norm in Britain was moving 
from what this study has earlier referred to as ‘racial environmentalism’ to a 
characterisation of race that was rigidly hierarchical and in which a person’s 
place in that hierarchy was believed to manifest in all attributes. The 
determining influence of setting had seemingly been dropped from the issue. 
The dominance of the white European was increasingly put forward as context-
independent. 
 As Bolt argued, when evolutionary theory was applied to anthropology in 
the 1860s and ‘70s, ‘Victorians’ ethnocentrism allowed them to think in terms of 
a cultural hierarchy, in which Western civilizations occupied first place, followed 
by those of the East, and with the stagnant, technologically backward cultures 
of Africa and the Pacific at the bottom.’1377 Early- to mid-century ethnocentrism 
could, in and of itself, still allow for Europeans to take subordinate roles in some 
categories and in some settings, the tropics in particular. The cultural hierarchy 
formulated in the mid- to late-century, conversely, was taken to be categorical 
and thus universal. Spurr described this mode of scientific discourse, devoted to 
the arrangement of things into one master ‘table’, as the ‘squared and 
spacialized’ development of natural history. While premised on a strict 
conformity to observation and measurement, such systems require the 
prioritisation of particular traits to determine table placement, which is then 
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projected back onto the interpretation of other traits.1378 Thus, for example, a 
people with less-well-developed methods of iron manufacture would be 
presumed to also lag behind in the medical, governmental, and philosophical 
fields. 
This focus on hierarchy was reflected by a shift in the emphasis of 
anthropological surveys during the 1860s from comparative linguistic analysis, 
which is tied to culture and upbringing, to comparisons of physical traits, thought 
to be immutable, deterministic, and certainly quantifiable.1379 A person’s status, 
in short, was increasingly believed to derive from their inherited characteristics 
above all else. Moreover, these ideas were increasingly reflected in imperial 
administration. Perhaps the most famous example was the eight-volume The 
People of India, published from 1868 to 1876 by the India Office. The work 
represents an ambitious attempt to quantify and establish lines of racial grading. 
It was also notable for its use of photographic technology, containing 468 
annotated photographs of ‘typical’ representatives of the Indian tribes and 
castes.1380 
 There is always the consideration of the degree to which theories of race 
and ethnography impacted upon the broad British population. As MacKenzie 
argued:  
It was, perhaps, principally through warfare that the racial ideas of the 
day were diffused to the public at large. Concepts of race were closely 
related in popular literature to the imperative of conflict between cultures, 
and the evidence of superiority it provided. Colonial heroes became the 
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prime exemplars of a master people, and this enhanced their position in 
the military cult of personality.1381 
 
Thus, British engagements with the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions were 
more than simply reflective of contemporary notions of race and dominance, but 
were in fact integral to their development and dissemination. Small wars drew 
the Victorian attention and naturally generated discussion on matters of race. 
Men of the officer class were more than likely to read on the subject and often 
keen to garner public attention. Imperial conflicts were usually followed by a 
surge in public speeches and article presentations. Wolseley had many 
opinions on race and he gained a much larger share of the public ear due to the 
Ashanti expedition. Newspapers naturally ran stories on the areas in which 
small wars were taking place, reviving earlier geographic and ethnographic 
surveys. Military conflict in any scenario tends to promote comparisons between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Reade had already published ethnographic work, Savage Africa 
in particular, which then gained a boost in notoriety and prestige on the back of 
his involvement as a special correspondent. His strongly-held opinions 
influenced the tone of his reporting in the field. In these ways, officers and 
journalists provided a number of bridges between the work generated by 
learned societies and the general public. Indeed, this study has shown that the 
coverage of colonial and imperial small wars provided an imagined setting in 
which issues of cultural identity were negotiated and contested. 
British successes in the African interior encouraged a very direct 
interpretation of natural selection in discussions of empire. In January 1867, the 
London Fortnightly Review published a series of five essays by the journalist, 
banker, and Economist editor Walter Bagehot. In 1872, the essays were 
published as a book titled Physics and Politics, or: Thoughts on the Application 
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of the Principles of “Natural Selection” and “Inheritance” to Political Society.1382 
Bagehot set out to explain the influence of evolution by natural selection in 
human social development, which, according to his interpretation, both 
explained and justified imperial conquest and nationalist militarism.1383 War, he 
claimed, was the foundation of human nature and the ultimate arbiter of 
civilisational progress (and thus of comparative superiority). He asserted that, 
‘since the long-headed men first drove the short-headed men out of the best 
land in Europe, all European history has been the history of the superposition of 
the more military races over the less military’.1384 Civilisation itself, he 
continued, ‘begins, because the beginning of civilization is a military 
advantage’.1385 It was not only weaponry, therefore, but also non-military 
technologies that served as clear indicators of British military superiority over 
less advanced civilisations.  
In his study of the Anglo-Maratha campaigns in India, historian Randolf 
Cooper argued as well that the ubiquitous concept of ‘superior British training, 
discipline and drill’ in nineteenth-century discussions of small wars had itself 
developed from social Darwinism.1386 The term ‘discipline’ provided Europeans 
with a respectable and seemingly ‘objective’ means of evoking assumed racial 
superiority. 
 Certain commentators concluded that Darwin and Wallace had in fact 
described the workings of a categorical hierarchy of races, and that this 
provided a strong justification for imperial expansion. Wallace in particular wrote 
                                                       
1382 Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics, or: Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 
“Natural Selection” and “Inheritance” to Political Society, Roger Kimball, ed. (Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee, 1999 [1872]). 
1383 For a concise analysis of Bagehot’s work, see Richard G. Olson, Science and Scientism in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008) pp. 254-7. 
1384 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 46. 
1385 Ibid., p. 48. 
1386 R.G.S. Cooper, The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Conquest for India: The Struggle 
for Control of the South Asian Military Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) pp. 310-11. 
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of the, ‘great law of “the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life,” 
which leads to the inevitable extinction of all those low and mentally 
undeveloped populations with which Europeans come in contact’. Wallace, at 
least as interpreted by some readers, went beyond the claim that the strong 
would defeat the weak through military conflict. Rather, he posited that humans 
could remove themselves from the boundaries of nature through the adaptive 
influence of civilisation, but that the different races sat at different points along 
this process. He thought that the key to the origin of the races lay in the idea 
that, ‘in proportion as man’s social, moral and intellectual faculties became 
developed, his physical structure would cease to be affected by the operation of 
“natural selection”’. Europeans and Africans, therefore, had diverged in form as 
the former pulled ahead in the race to separate themselves from, and thus 
conquer, nature. When Europeans came into contact with less developed races, 
the natives, ‘die out, not from any one special cause, but from the inevitable 
effects of an unequal mental and physical struggle. The intellectual and moral, 
as well as the physical qualities of the European are superior.’1387 Hence, to 
many British commentators, Europeans were a priori able to adapt and thrive in 
any environment, at the expense of those less adapted races. Context was 
irrelevant. 
 A year earlier, Reade closed his study of West Africa with a certain 
anticipation of the coming scramble:  
Africa shall be redeemed. Her children shall perform this mighty work. 
Her morasses shall be drained; her deserts shall be watered by canals; 
her forests shall be reduced to firewood. Her children shall do this. They 
shall pour an elixir vitae into the veins of their mother now withered and 
diseased. They shall restore her to youth and to immortal beauty. In this 
amiable task they may possibly become exterminated. We must learn to 
                                                       
1387 A. R. Wallace, ‘The origin of human races and the antiquity of man deduced from the theory 
of “natural selection”’, Journal of the Anthropological Society of London, Vol. 2, (1864) pp. clxiv-
clxv. 
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look on this result with composure. It illustrates the beneficent law of 
nature, that the weak must be devoured by the strong.1388 
 
Reade predicted that, as European civilisation advanced into the African 
interior, the country itself would be altered, made more habitable to the 
newcomers and yet less habitable to natives. This was the ultimate goal of 
acclimatisation studies and the final success of the conceptual civilisational 
bubble that men of the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions had sought to use 
novel technology to erect.1389 Climatic context would follow the British, and then 
Africans would find themselves out of their element. 
 In 1899, an article in Pearson’s Weekly reflected the tenor of British 
popular views of race, space, and dominance that had developed over the 
imperial renaissance. Asking, ‘Are we an aggressive race?’, the article replied 
that progress required strong states to conquer weak states and that the Empire 
was thus an agent of progress. Some natives had benefited from this progress, 
but, ‘there are coloured races who wither in the presence of civilisation, but that 
is because they are deficient in that quality which we call adaptation to 
environment’.1390 
6.6 Conclusions 
The Victorian fixation with novel technology thus united with 
ethnocentrism to provide the justification of British civilisation’s superiority over 
nature and those ‘lesser’ races still tied closely to nature. Macgregor Laird 
encapsulated the confidence of the Victorian imperial impulse in the often-
quoted close to his book, Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of 
                                                       
1388 Reade, Savage Africa, p. 587.  
1389 Osborne, Michael A. ‘Acclimatizing the World: A History of the Paradigmatic Colonial 
Science.’ Osiris 2nd Series, Vol. 15, Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, 
(2000) pp. 135-51. 
1390 ‘Are we an aggressive race?’, Pearson’s Weekly, 21 Oct. 1899, p. 245; Also discussed in 
Peter Broks, Media Science before the Great War (London: MacMillan Press, 1996) p. 93.  
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Africa.1391 The wealthy son of a shipbuilder, Laird had steamed up the Niger in a 
high-publicity expedition with the stated intent of opening the interior of Africa to 
British trade and the Christian religion. Forty of the forty-nine Europeans died 
during the voyage, and Laird was financially ruined by the attempt.1392 Yet, he 
did not lose his enthusiasm for novel technology, which he saw as the engine of 
humanity’s progress. He closed with a call for Britain to end slavery in Africa:  
We have the power in our hands, moral, physical and mechanical; the 
first, based on the Bible; the second, upon the wonderful adaptation of 
the Anglo-Saxon race to all climates, situations, and circumstances, - a 
facility of constitution which has spread them from Hudson’s Bay to the 
Gulf of Mexico – which is fast peopling Australasia, and which has 
changed the government of a hundred millions of people in the East: the 
third, bequeathed to us by the immortal Watt. By his invention every river 
is laid open to us, time and distance are shortened.1393 
 
As British armies penetrated the African interior, it appeared to some that 
Laird’s view of the transformative power of civilisation had toppled Hunt’s 
restrictions. Civilisation had taken primacy over the limits of climate, and novel 
technology had brought it there.  
  
                                                       
1391 Quoted in, for example, Daniel R. Headrick, ‘The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the 
Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century,’ The Journal of Modern 
History 51, no. 2 (1979) pp. 231-63; and Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain.  
1392 Curtin, The Image of Africa, p. 296. 
1393 MacGregor Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1837) 2:397-8.  
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Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis began with the bold claim that the Abyssinian and Ashanti 
expeditions were Britain’s first successful major forays into the African interior, 
and turning points in the imperial project. This concluding section will review the 
arguments that have been put forward in justification of that statement, touch on 
the state of the British idea of Africa at the end of the surveyed time period, and 
offer some comments on this study’s larger resonance. 
Throughout this examination of the portrayal and reception of military 
technology as constructed spectacle in the popular coverage of these 
expeditions, it has been argued that new and ‘novel’ military technologies were 
made to serve symbolic roles in a technophile discourse that cast expansion 
into Africa as part of a final conquest of the natural world. The ‘idea’ of small 
wars became an important component of the frame through which British 
society viewed its relationship with the non-Western world, and with Africa in 
particular. It incorporated both the struggle for, and the moral justification for, 
imperial conquest. Different groups in Britain each saw in small wars what they 
wanted to see, and made the idea of imperial conflict work for them. Small wars, 
in turn, became a site on which British culture was contested and remade. 
A central claim of this thesis has been that the conduct of small wars in 
the field mirrored and reflected the sense of performance that characterised the 
media reproductions and narratives of such conflicts in the home country. A 
certain technophile impulse pervaded how the expeditions were conceived, but 
also how they were actually performed. The vision of Africa that was solidified 
during this collective engagement with the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions 
had ramifications on Britain’s future on that continent. These campaigns 
received considerable popular attention in Britain, around the empire, and 
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among the other Great Powers. The manner in which they were discussed in 
the public narrative enhanced the subsequent popularity of, and popular comfort 
with, the notion of imperial small wars. 
The form that imperial culture would take through the ‘scramble’ period to 
the late nineteenth-century owed much to the manner in which these early 
expeditions were presented, perceived, and remembered by the public and by 
the military. The success of these ventures enhanced perceptions of military 
capability, technological superiority, and civilisational supremacy in the Victorian 
imagination. The perceived ease of the victories, along with the manifest 
evidence of advances in medicine, precipitated a reassessment of the nature of 
racial dominance. 
This thesis has also demonstrated how the press and military accounts 
of the expeditions were framed by discourses emplotting a battle against the 
natural world, discourses in which the people of Abyssinia and Ashanti were 
portrayed as reflections of that natural world. Narratives of technological 
superiority and scientific violence were generated in response to particular 
anxieties of the perceived dangers of the African interior. Accounts of the 
expeditions analysed in this thesis demonstrated a strong hope, desire to claim, 
and tendency to interpret that the presence of novel technology would shield 
British forces, beat back the wild climate, and terrify Africans into submission. 
Furthermore, officers in the field went to considerable effort to dazzle local 
populations with the spectacle of modern technology. The presupposition that 
these displays would overawe Africans was central to the developing imperial 
ideal. Novel military technology was integral to the British re-imagining of Africa 
as a colonial space, from the ‘white man’s grave’ to something that could be 
conquered. This ‘technologised’ imperial rhetoric, then, was more than a simple 
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expression of arrogant ethnocentrism. It was a reaction to anxiety as much it 
was an assertion of confidence, and imperial culture emerged out of the tension 
between them. 
In practice, the taming of the imperial imagination was a long, 
inconsistent, and continuous process. The struggle to subdue both the real and 
imagined outer world was, not merely a precursor or prerequisite to rapid 
imperial expansion, but was itself an integral part of imperialism. The popular 
image of Africa had indeed been tamed over the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
The multifarious strands of such discourses have been examined throughout 
this study.  
Patrick Porter has argued that Western views of the Orient at war were 
highly fluid. As ‘a mixed bag of self-glorification and self-doubt’, images of the 
Other could be made, ruptured and redrawn in the wake of events, all the while 
maintaining the assemblage of stereotypes upon which both the original and 
transformed images were based.1394 
As this thesis has demonstrated, Western images of Africa were similarly 
malleable. The experience of war, selectively interpreted and filtered by layers 
of military culture, press culture, exploration culture, exhibition culture, indeed, 
imperial culture, reinforced many of the existing stereotypes of African nature 
and African people. Yet, the same process drastically altered the public’s 
reactions to these images of Africa’s nature and people, both of which were 
heavily fictionalised constructions. These clichéd tropes received a boost and 
took greater hold in British culture in the late 1860s and early 1870s. The 
military and public engagement with the Abyssinian and Ashanti expeditions 
further show how the accepted emplotments of particular events can become 
                                                       
1394 Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (London: C. Hurst & 
Co., 2009) p. 23, 29. 
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embedded in the popular ‘idea’ of a place, concept, or activity. After the British 
successes in Abyssinia and Ashanti, the weight of feeling had swung from self-
doubt to self-glorification. 
The associated view of Africa as more ‘conquerable’ became, to many in 
Britain, the one upon which their support of future expansion was based. Such 
stereotypes formed part of the intellectual foundation for the Scramble for 
Africa. These ideas did not change overnight, of course, nor ever achieve 
consistent or uniform penetration among the population. Rather, these 
campaigns became shorthand references, signifiers for a range of associated 
images and interpretations, which advocates of empire could employ in their 
defence of future invasions. Over time, the positive associations that those 
references implied surely had some effect on popular moods. Such effects bear 
on Collins’ concept of ‘creating victory’ in Victorian warfare. He rightly argues 
that, ‘the political and psychological processes involved in creating victory were 
fluid and multi-faceted’, depending upon the perceptions of a wide variety of 
participants.1395 The Abyssinian and Ashanti campaigns became signifiers that 
could be used in the psychological generation of victory. They formed part of 
the corpus, or ‘text’, of imperial ideals on which debates were often outwardly 
premised.  
It is important to recognise that the shift in Britain’s culture of confidence 
was one of ideals and expectations, and not necessarily one of coherent or 
consistent maxims for foreign policy. There were certainly many examples 
during the 1880s and 90s where Britain did not move aggressively into Africa. 
Each case featured its own push factors, pull factors, interested parties, and 
political divisions. Yet, the debates over each new case – in the press, pubs, 
                                                       
1395 Bruce Collins, ‘Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882,’ The Journal of Military 
History 77 (Jul. 2013) p. 927. 
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peace societies, Parliament, and Colonial and War Offices – were conducted in 
reference to an imprecise ‘idea’ of Africa, which posed certain risks and 
presented certain potential (psychological as well as material) rewards. Any 
shifts in the form of that ‘imagined Africa’ would affect the substance of those 
debates. The existence of a set of ideal expedition types in the public 
consciousness likely had some effect on government policies, as politicians 
must respond to, and cater for, public expectations, and themselves exist within 
their nation’s culture. 
Wolseley’s and Napier’s expeditions were notable in their time for having 
defied expectations. Far more significant, in retrospect, was the fact that they 
then became part of the collective expectation, clichés in themselves. 
Imperialism, and the small wars that drove it forward, had changed because 
portions of the British public, government, and military establishment believed 
they had changed. While malleable, such constructed perceptions gained a 
momentum and indelibility of their own. The small wars and expeditions that 
followed in later years were selectively interpreted and incorporated into an 
idealised, ‘All Sir Garnet’, image that remained recognisable throughout the 
Scramble for Africa and the ‘new’ imperial era. Henceforth, doubts could be 
allayed and jingoism encouraged by appealing to these ‘very models of the 
modern expedition imperial’.1396 
This thesis more widely illustrates that the study of imperial culture and 
popular imperialism has much to gain from the study of the internal cultures of 
military organisations, the history of technology, and the popular narratives of 
campaigns. The cultures of military organisations, in particular, offer a rich area 
for further study into the processes of interpretation and incorporation of new 
                                                       
1396 A reference to Arthur Sullivan and William Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance: Or, The Slave 
of Duty, (London: Chappell & Co., 1911 [1879]). Also discussed on p. 129. 
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technologies. This applies to ‘civilian’ technology as well as firearms. Virtually 
every British small war saw the introduction of some new weapon, medical, or 
transport technology. The military and public engagement with these 
technologies can provide windows into the contested and intersecting 
interpretations of race, climate, landscape, and national purpose to be found in 
the parent societies. 
The history of military technology can lend significant insights to the 
study of culture, and must itself be undertaken with due consideration of the 
social and cultural factors that influence weapons development. 
Interdisciplinarity may be the appropriate term, though it should not obfuscate 
the simple fact that these issues and processes were intertwined in the first 
place. Indeed, how could a society’s reaction to a weapon system be discussed 
adequately without serious investigation of that society’s prevailing images of 
their enemies, and of their own self-identified purpose in warfare? The answers 
are never straightforward, and rarely to be found solely on the battlefields.  
At some philosophical, and even strategic, levels, war never changes. 
Yet, the particulars of ‘how’ and ‘why’, as well as those of ‘them’ and ‘we’, are 
historically mutable and highly sensitive to context. The study of small wars can 
illustrate both of these points, which alone makes it a subject of great 
contemporary relevance and resonance. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix: 
 
 
Appendix 1: ‘Camp on the River Prah’.1397 
 
 
Appendix 2: ‘Rough Sketch of the Tete-De-Pont at the Prah’. 1398  
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